Eichmann, Bureaucracy and the Holocaust (4 page)

* In this respect, Eichmann's case is similar to that of Franz Rademacher of the German Foreign Office. Rademacher's distaste for the Final Solution led him to seek a transfer, although he remained in his post for a further 18 months, diligently performing his duties while simultaneously training his successor. See Browning, 1992, pp.137-8.

Yet the fact remains that Eichmann cuts a fairly unimpressive figure as a monster, and so we must look elsewhere for an explanation for his actions. Here, the single most important fact concerns his status as an official within a bureaucracy and hierarchy, which defined and limited his actions, provided a set pattern of official duties, and rendered him subject to the orders of superiors. These are, of course, fundamentally Weberian observations, which offer no real explanation
per se
. However, it is possible to extrapolate from them practical consequences for the bureaucrat, his
modus operandi
, attitude and personal motivations. This is not to say that Eichmann's actions can or should be isolated from the wider social milieu in which both he and the RSHA operated. Given that the RSHA can be considered part of the regime's public administration it is important to note that the administration of policy is conducted "in accordance with the values which have determined it", and, as such, "that policy and its administration are not rigidly separable" (Beetham, 1996, p.32). Naturally, therefore, one expects to see the influence of the external environment in the official's orientation to rules and the organisation's dominant cultural standards (Albrow, 1970, pp.56-7). Be that as it may, it is all too easy to overstate the case and find oneself bogged-down in explanations concerned with the supposed efficacy of ideological inculcation and propaganda. Tempting though it may be, it is too simplistic to assume that all members of the S.S. were mere robots mindlessly executing orders.

Accordingly, this examination of Eichmann's activities is concerned with, and limited to, the organisational predicates of action: specifically the practical consequences of the bureaucratic ethos and so-called "honour of the civil servant", together with the mediating effects of hierarchy, the /files/01/74/57/f017457/public/private dichotomy, functional division of labour and spatial distance between action and consequence. While seeking to understand Eichmann's behaviour, provide a framework in which some of his more ostensibly callous actions can be understood, and highlight the potential irrationality of rational bureaucratic systems, the intention here is not to negate his culpability, for Eichmann's guilt is beyond doubt. And yet it seems that any attempt to explain his actions in this way is open to a charge of revisionism. If so, perhaps the best response to any potential criticism is to state at the outset that insofar as this work is concerned with moral corruption, insofar as Eichmann seemed able to speak of guilt only in a formal legal sense, the desire here is only to understand how it is possible for a 'normal' individual to drift so far from fundamental moral imperatives.

D
uring his interrogation Eichmann was questioned at length about a disturbing incident involving Dr. Wolfram Sievers' request for a number of "skeletons" (i.e. living Jews required for their skeletons) to be transported to the Ahnenerbe Institute, an obscure experimental organisation (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, pp.170-3). While ultimately one of many incidents demonstrating Eichmann's extraordinarily poor memory (Arendt, 1994,
passim
), his comments in this context are revealing, for he stated that "whatever I may have done, I had no responsibility whatsoever, because the oath I had to take obligated me to loyalty and obedience" (ibid, p.173). Similarly, during his trial (session 95-4 & 95-5), and in response to the prosecution's demand to know why he labelled those who disobeyed orders as "scoundrels and traitors", Eichmann identified oath-breaking as the worst possible crime a person can be guilty of. In a somewhat less disturbing context, Attorney General Gideon Hausner questioned him at length about the large number of documents (even those he had claimed to sign on a
per pro
basis) in which he referred to himself using the singular "I", to which he replied: "that is German officialese (sic) … it has nothing to do with my private self as Eichmann" (session 99-3). Although this final statement is relatively innocuous, the first two seem particularly damning, the first as a callous attempt to evade responsibility and the second as simply incomprehensible given the very nature of his role. How, then, are we to interpret his comments?

These ostensibly unrelated issues, concerning the demand for obedience and separation of one's private self from one's public activities, are in fact integral to any understanding of Eichmann's actions and form the foundation of the bureaucratic ethos. Weber explicitly asserts that the official is required to separate public and private, to separate public duties from private affairs, and loyally devote himself to the organisation's impersonal and functional purposes (in Gerth & Mill, 1991, p.199). Indeed, such a separation is seen as a prerequisite for the "official's integration into the given functional conditions of the disciplined mechanism" (Weber, 1978, p.968). Of course, this separation, this required disposition toward obedience and loyalty, has both its own
raison d'être
and very real practical consequences for the bureaucrat. These characteristics are vital to, and reflections of, a bureaucracy's need to create "social conditions constraining each member of the organisation to act in ways that, whether they appear rational or otherwise from the individual's standpoint, further the rational pursuit of organisational objectives" (Blau & Meyer, 1987, p.23).

In this way loyalty, obedience and the ability to follow orders, even when abhorrent to one's own personal beliefs, are for Weber 'normal' characteristics of the bureaucrat and essential to the everyday functioning of bureaucratic organisations. Here, then, we have a clear example of how bureaucratic virtues, part and parcel of the "honour of the civil servant" (Weber cited in Bauman, 1989, p.22), can sow the seeds of moral corruption, inasmuch as they require the official to suspend judgement and simply obey. As an analogy, consider the role of the journalist or interviewer who suspends his own political preference in the name of neutrality and impartiality. Occupying an ideological no man's land, the constraints of his profession demand that he refrain from vocalising either condemnation or support, this being a violation of the journalists' creed. Hence the 'good' journalist is impartial and generates 'news', whereas the 'bad' journalist is partisan and peddles 'propaganda'. Obedience to the rules - of journalism, of a creed, of an organisation - thus becomes an end and ethic in itself. Therefore Eichmann's loyalty, obedience and distaste for those courageous enough to disobey may be 'normal' corollaries of what Merton (1968, p.253) refers to as the dysfunctional consequences of bureaucracy, resulting in the "over-conditioning" of the official, for whom the rules and discipline become everything, "an immediate value in the life-organisation of the bureaucrat" (ibid.).

This lends a certain credibility to Eichmann's claim that "… if I receive an order, I'm not expected to interpret it … I receive an order and I'm expected to obey" (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.158). In strict terms this is exactly what every bureaucrat or employee is expected to do. However, this begs the question: to what extent is the bureaucrat prepared to suspend judgement? Obeying a morally ambiguous order is one thing, obeying an order to ship millions to certain death is quite another. Surely the conscience would step in? Surely one would draw a line in the sand, refuse to obey and damn the consequences? The /files/01/74/57/f017457/public/private split might be a necessary condition but it is not a sufficient one: in and of itself it cannot explain Eichmann's moral corruption, his willingness to participate despite witnessing the horror of the death camps. In order to fully understand Eichmann's actions we must turn to the next sections and consider how, in Steinberg's (1990, p.176) words, the inner world of the bureaucrat "split into compartments, water tight areas which
prevented
considerations of morality seeping into official acts" (my emphasis).

H
ierarchical organisations predicated on a system of rigid super- and subordination require the bureaucrat to be supervised and directed by a superior, and expect the bureaucrat to sacrifice his or her private beliefs in the name of loyalty and obedience. As such, the official is part of a chain of command, a complex concatenation of authority "pointing to superiors as the supreme subject of moral concern and, simultaneously, the top moral authority" (Bauman, 1989, p.160). Accordingly, orders from an authority that is
perceived
to be legitimate, in the Weberian sense that obedience to authority is always based on the
perception of
legitimacy rather than a quality
inherent to
the authority, render the bearer an agent of the authority, to whom responsibility for the subsequent action is perceived to pass (ibid, pp.161-2; Ritzer, 1996, p.128). The chain of command thus has the potential to resolve what would otherwise represent an insurmountable dilemma, providing the means by which the subordinate can transfer to a superior officer the ethical and moral dimensions of the required action. In other words, it has the potential to
re-deploy
morality (Bauman, 1989, 159-61).

In this context it is interesting to note a startling statement made by Eichmann during his trial, concerning the extent to which the January 1942 Wannsee conference served to allay his doubts and misgivings, to soothe his troubled conscience. Wannsee was the logical consequence of Göring's July 1941 directive to Heydrich, in which he charged the latter with preparing the ground for the Final Solution and securing the co-operation of other vital administrative bodies and ministries. Eichmann attended the conference as minute taker and was taken aback by the ease with which Heydrich secured the complicity of significant figures from key German ministries and the eagerness with which they accepted their allotted roles. This was a pivotal moment for Eichmann, who felt "something of the satisfaction of Pilate*, because I felt entirely innocent of any guilt. The leading figures of the Reich at the time had spoken … the 'popes' had given their orders, it was up to me to obey, and that is what I bore in mind over the future years" (trial session 79-1).

*The New Testament tells us that Pontius Pilate washed his hands before giving up Jesus for crucifixion, declaring "Let this man's blood be on your hands".

Wannsee was thus Eichmann's personal panacea. Any lingering doubts or guilt he felt disappeared in the recognition that these higher authorities were not only in favour of the Final Solution but were in a very real sense the architects of it. He had not instigated it, he was not one of its leading figures or designers, and so despite his misgivings he was able to "escape into other areas … to attach this whole thing one hundred percent to those in judicial authority" (trial session 95-5). This was a pivotal moment for Eichmann, a point demonstrated by his statement that "after the Wannsee conference, I particularly made it a point not to take any decisions, no matter how minor, on my own initiative" (trial session 79-1). He seems to have recognised that his constant consultations with superiors, and persistent attempts to seek orders and instructions from above, provided a warped form of moral absolution, a bureaucratic equivalent of the confession box.

Here one is reminded of the situation facing any soldier, for whom the killing of the 'enemy' - ordinarily known as murder - is a legitimate act committed on the orders of a legitimate authority and derived ultimately from a
raison d'etat
(Weber in Gerth & Mills, 1991, pp.216-20). Eichmann's take on this was to claim that "where the state leadership is good, the subordinate is lucky; where it is bad, he is unlucky" (trial session 88-2), thus implying that the legitimacy of his actions was determined from above and he was at the mercy of higher authorities. Clearly, however, Eichmann's actions differ from those of a soldier in a 'just war'. By his own admission he was aware that most of those transported to the camps faced immediate death, and freely acknowledged his responsibility where the actions of his department were concerned (trial session 95-1). Some sense of responsibility, and thus some sense of guilt, surely remained, and in any case the chain of command perspective
per se
cannot explain why Eichmann continued to work with efficiency and professionalism despite his misgivings. Accordingly, we need to understand why it was that although "the chain of command, the bureaucratic system of which one was a part … appeared to absolve the individual of all responsibility", it became so important "to do one's duty with skill and efficiency" (Landau, 1992, p.185).

T
his discussion of war, orders and responsibility raises the point that the progressive bureaucratisation of murder "has placed a steadily increasing distance between the perpetrators and the consequences of their decisions and actions" (ibid, p.9). The hierarchy and chain of command common to the bureaucratic form, representative of a functional division of labour, serves to isolate the individual from the end product, which, being the result of an aggregation of separate processes (i.e. a production process) is itself seen to be 'responsible' for its creation. Representing only minor parts of the whole - mere cogs in the machine - individuals tend to reify the production process and be fetishised by it, thereby failing to see the extent to which their actions are relevant or vital to the entire process (Bauman, 1989, pp.98-102). The result is that officials may demonstrate extreme concern with their own actions and those of their department, yet be singularly unable to associate them with the end result, of which they form an integral part. In practical terms, this translates into accepting responsibility only for one's own actions and creates the impression that one's responsibility ends where another's jurisdiction begins, which is something that may explain Eichmann's almost total inability or unwillingness to associate his actions with criminality or immorality (see below).