Eichmann, Bureaucracy and the Holocaust (5 page)

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Here, then, we are dealing not just with spatial distance between action and consequence but the effects of an enormous annihilation process, involving almost all sections of the German administrative and military machine. Eichmann, based predominantly in Berlin, managed to reconcile his actions with the knowledge that at least
some
Jews would be used for labour, that
he
was not responsible for the selection process and that
he
was not responsible for gassing the Jews. In this way he found it possible to deny his culpability, for apparently "in the absence of responsibility, there can in the end be no guilt" (trial session 88-2). This may explain why deaths in the freight cars
en route
to the death camps "became a minor administrative detail not worth bothering about" (Hilberg, 1961, p.547), because the deportations themselves were the responsibility of the Order Police, whereas Eichmann was responsible only for organising them (Life Magazine). In this abstract sense Eichmann was correct: he was charged with oversight of a specific jurisdictional area and responsible only for organising transportation schedules and rounding-up his 'passengers', actions which carry no criminal connotation
per se
. Consequently, Eichmann's personal awareness of the fate of his passengers provided no spur to disobey: as horrific as they were the exterminations and death camps were not of his design or doing, not part of his 'jurisdiction', being instead the thankless task of the "unhappy man"* (trial session 95-5).

 

* This was Eichmann's response to the prosecution's question: "In your eyes, was someone who was involved with the extermination of the Jews a criminal?" Eichmann's reply elicited gasps from those present: "He was an unhappy man".

 

Yet in all this it is vital to remember that we are talking about the redeployment of morality rather than its negation: it would be incorrect to assume that Eichmann became amoral as such. Rather, as a consequence of the /files/01/74/57/f017457/public/private split, fixed jurisdictional areas, chain of command, and functional division of labour his moral judgements and concerns were deflected toward his own personal activities and conduct, being "forcefully shifted in another direction - the job to be done and the excellence with which it is performed" (Bauman, 1989, p.159). This is another example of the dysfunctional and irrational consequences of bureaucracy cited by Merton, producing what Bauman (1989, p.101) calls "technical morality", a form that differs from moral responsibility inasmuch as "it forgets that the action is a means to something other than itself … the bureaucrat's own act becomes an end in itself". Concomitantly, Landau (1992, p.9) notes the extent to which this concern with technical morality can be reinforced by the approval and recognition of superiors. In relation to the activities of Treblinka commandant Franz Stangel he observes that "as long as he received the approval of his superiors he would aim for and reach quite remarkable standards of efficiency … it is a syndrome that will perhaps be familiar to many who have worked in a bureaucratic organisation" (ibid, p.187). This concern with performance, standards, achievement and detail thus serves as a surrogate for the kind of morality practised in everyday life. The process impedes the bureaucrat's ability to associate action with consequence, prevents the emergence of what Arendt (1994, p.106) refers to as "instinctive animal pity" and pushes the 'big picture' even farther into the background.

 

The above goes some way towards explaining an extensively cited example of Eichmann's activities, concerning an incident that occurred in Paris sometime in June 1942. From the Nazis' perspective the French proved somewhat problematic, for although they welcomed the deportation of foreign Jews from their territory they did not regard French-born Jews as a problem. This rendered negotiations delicate, frustrating affairs. Having finally received the order to commence the deportation of French Jewry, Eichmann's arrangements were subsequently derailed by the French authorities' failure to concentrate the Jews so as to facilitate their deportation. Having obtained the necessary rolling stock with great difficulty, Eichmann found himself unable to fill the trains and was forced to cancel the action. According to Röthke (a IV-B-4 representative based in Paris), Eichmann described the affair as a "disgrace" and a "matter of great prestige" insofar as it affected his standing with the French, the Transport Ministry and his reputation more generally. Tellingly, Röthke also records that Eichmann was afraid to report the fiasco to his superior, Heinrich Müller (in Von Lang & Sibyll, 1999, p.132-3; Gilbert, 1987, p.376; Arendt, 1994, pp.163-4).

 

While often interpreted and reported as a prime example of Eichmann's inhumanity, as proving his testimony to be nothing more than lies and distortions, there is nonetheless a striking correlation with Bauman and Landau's assertions. Concerned only with his reputation, with the extent to which this failure represented a slip from his usual high standards and a black mark on his record, Eichmann's response is exactly what one would expect from someone suffering from this form of moral corruption. And, of course, the fear Eichmann expresses at the thought of having to report the matter to his superior also tallies with Landau's claim that approval and recognition (and their opposites) are major reinforcing factors. As such, these points suggest that one can have the highest personal standards, the greatest concern with propriety, not to mention a 'normal' human response to praise and congratulations, and yet still express disappointment and dismay at having failed to contribute to mass murder.

 

T
he bureaucrat's commitment to rules and personal correctness, rational concomitants of the bureaucratic form, has further irrational potential with respect to individual cases. For Weber, bureaucracy serves as the optimum means by which to specialise administrative functions, does so in accordance with purely objective considerations and calculable rules, and thus leads the official to act on a purely impartial, neutral basis (in Gerth & Mills, 1991, p. 224). Accordingly, a bureaucracy is not entitled or indeed able to regulate "by individual commands given for each case but only to regulate … abstractly" (Weber, 1978, p.958). Weber traces this concern with generality and impersonality to the emergence of mass democracy, which, being associated with the development of bureaucracy, created a demand for abstract regularity, egalitarianism, equality before the law, and the rejection of special privileges; that is, the rejection of corruption and personal favours derived from arbitrary decision-making on an individual basis (in Gerth & Mills, 1991, p.224; Beetham, 1996, p.32). The bureaucrat is thus conditioned "to treat cases alike" (Beetham, 1985, p.68) and conduct his affairs "in a spirit of formalistic impersonality … without hatred or passion" (Weber in Blau & Meyer, 1987, p.20). These, then, are yet more examples of bureaucratic 'sacred values', as a consequence of which personal involvement and rule-bending gain 'taboo' status, rendering the official liable to a charge of misconduct for "inviting arbitrariness in the treatment of different citizens" (Beetham, 1996, p.32).

 

If, as Weber claims, bureaucracy is intimately associated with the emergence of democracy, and if abstract generality and impersonality are key guiding principles, then the Final Solution is indeed the product of modernity and uniquely modern principles, which facilitated the murder of abstract depersonalised Jews* by abstract depersonalised officials in accordance with abstract depersonalised rules. This depersonalisation, or, as Bauman prefers, dehumanisation, derives also from the preponderance of formal rationality, a cost-benefit analysis approach which quantifies the subject, whose individuality thus becomes irrelevant to the official. In fact, individuality can be a positive irritant given that the official expects and requires a high degree of predictability in order to ensure the uninterrupted flow of his or her routine (Bauman, 1989, p.102-4). This is of vital importance for Weber, for whom bureaucracy's specific nature "develops the more perfectly the more … [it] … is 'dehumanised', the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation" (in Gerth & Mills, 1991, p.216). Similarly, it is also crucial to Eichmann's case, and some final examples of his activities and behaviour.

 

* See Arendt (1989) and Baumann (1989) for an account of the abstract "conceptual Jew".

 

I
n March 1944 Eichmann, along with most of his representatives, was sent to Hungary as head of the so-called "Eichmann Special Commando". The last country from which deportations were made, Hungary was home to some 750,000 Jews and had remained untouched until this time. In fact, Eichmann's activities there came at a time when the war was all but lost, with the Red Army already poised to strike at Hungary's borders. Upon arrival, Eichmann was soon confronted by the presence of Himmler's Special Plenipotentiary, one Obersturmbannführer Becker, who to his dismay had orders to work alongside him, so as to speed up the confiscation of Jewish wealth. Outraged by this infringement of his jurisdiction and upset to think that this in some way amounted to criticism of abilities, Eichmann determined to transport the Jews "in a lightening operation" so as to "set an example for future campaigns" (trial session 86-3; Life Magazine). However, Eichmann did not reckon with the relative independence of Hungary's leader, Admiral Horthy, who ordered a halt to deportations in July 1944 and threw a spanner in the works of the extermination process.
Per contra
, it seems that Horthy did not reckon with the determination of Eichmann, who in a bid to circumvent this order detained the entire Jewish Council in his offices (in order to prevent them from contacting Horthy) while he organised a final deportation via road to Rakocsba and then Auschwitz (Burleigh, 2000, p.773-4).

 

Of all Eichmann's activities this is by far the most cited example, apparently demonstrating his hatred of the Jews, his preference for dead Jews over live ones, and willingness to utilise "deception tactics of the most evil kind" (Krausnick in Krausnick et al, 1968, p.93). Indeed, for Burleigh this is the account that "makes some baulk at the triteness of the term 'banality of evil' to describe such people, for it does not quite convey the willingness of those concerned to circumvent or surmount each and every obstacle" (2000, p.774). Yet however unconvincing Arendt's term may be the fact remains that this example seems peculiarly consistent with Weber's schema and Bauman's description of "technical morality". Eichmann's primary concern was to conduct his Hungarian operation with a new level of efficiency in order to set new standards of excellence. Furthermore, his willingness to disobey Horthy's order and continue the deportations smacks of someone following a general order, someone for whom the general rules and regulations take precedence over the personal whims of superiors (Bendix, 1977, p.425). Horthy's personal order, indicating his private distaste for the Final Solution, thus clashed with the general order for the destruction of all European Jews. By allowing favouritism and arbitrariness to enter into the decision-making process it also violated a sacred bureaucratic principle:
sine ira et studio
*. As monstrous as it sounds, key virtues of the bureaucrat and bureaucratic form again demonstrate a potential to produce irrational consequences, once more contributing to Eichmann's willingness to aid mass murder rather than suffer the humiliation and guilt of failing to do his job well.

 

* Without ill-will or favour

 

A number of incidents involving individuals are also worth citing in this context, these being decisions made by Eichmann* as regards the fate of specific individuals and key points of contention for the prosecution. The first of these concerns a July 1943 memo to Von Thadden of the German foreign office, in which Eichmann expresses his concern that Jews of foreign (i.e. neutral) nationality were still living in the Reich, despite having received orders to leave Germany. It seems that instructions to leave were to come via the respective governments of these foreign Jews, although it appears that the relevant authorities had failed to issue them. Here, then, Eichmann is seeking a new ruling to guarantee their departure by August at the latest, on the grounds that their continued presence represents a violation of the "general measures" (Hilberg, 1961, pp.290-1). Similarly, Eichmann refuses Röthke's request for an exemption for Polish-born inventor Abraham Weiss, stating that as Weiss' patents already belonged to the Reich "there is no further interest in the affair and he should be dealt with in accordance with the general measures" (Gilbert, 1979, pp.153-4). On another occasion, Eichmann contacts Hahn of the German Foreign Office to protest Luther's decision to release the Bondy children from Theresienstadt**, noting the tendentious nature of their Swedish naturalisation - this being the reason for their release - and protesting this "special treatment" (Browning, 1978, p.157). A little earlier, during October and November 1941, and in response to the Foreign Office's need for a decision on the fate of Lily Satzkis and Flora Bucher, two French Jews seeking emigration to the unoccupied territories, Eichmann replies using what amounts to an identical form letter, stating that "in view of the forthcoming Final Solution of the problem of European Jewry one has to prevent the emigration of this Jewess into the unoccupied zone of France" (in Gilbert, 1987, p.222 & pp.237-8).

 

* Eichmann in fact denied ever having made such decisions, claiming that only his superior had the authority to rule on individual cases, whereas he merely drafted the letters derived from such rulings. In this instance, we shall err on the side of the prosecution, which maintained that Eichmann did indeed have such authority.

 

** Theresienstadt was created by Himmler as a 'show-camp' in which to hold 'sensitive' cases.

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