Eichmann, Bureaucracy and the Holocaust (6 page)

Again, there is a striking correlation with Weber's schema and the principle of
sine ira et studio
. The constant references to "general measures", protestations over "special treatment" and unwillingness to make exceptions highlights the problematic and potentially irrational nature of the bureaucratic
modus operandi
: its inability to adapt to specific, individual cases (Bendix, 1977, p.428). In these instances, the 'rational' action, the morally correct decision, is corrupted and turned on its head, becoming an irrational affront to the bureaucrat's ethical structure. And yet this topsy-turvy approach to morality is also a form of morality itself, a 'normal' pattern of responses and concerns made perverse only by the aims of the Nazi regime.

With this in mind, a fitting finale to this study concerns an incident from Eichmann's time in Vienna. While perfecting his fast-track 'emigration' system it seems that Eichmann became annoyed by the irritating subjectivity (i.e. lack of compliance) of Josef Löwenherz, a Jewish Representative he was 'negotiating' with. At some point he appears to have lost control and slapped Löwenherz's face. Subsequently appalled by his actions, a contrite Eichmann later gathered together his staff and offered a public apology to Löwenherz (Arendt, 1994, pp.46-7). However, Arendt (ibid.) informs us that this incident "kept bothering him", it being inconsistent with his distaste for violence and his refusal to tolerate violence on the part of his subordinates. This demonstrates that on some level at least his moral integrity remained intact and his own personal actions were of great concern. In this limited private sense, it also demonstrates that Eichmann knew the difference between right and wrong. In a wider public sense, however, Eichmann's bureaucratic tunnel vision - the product of institutional moral blinkers - prevented him from passing sentence on his own moral responsibility right to the very end. In his own words:

"As for guilt in the ethical sense, any admission of one's own guilt to one's innermost self, that is something entirely different. That lies in areas totally inaccessible to the rules and regulations of a legal order. Here you argue with yourself, and you are your own judge. I have done it in my own case, and I am still doing it" (trial session 88-2).

For our man of "average character" this brief moment of personal anger remained more significant than his impersonal contribution to the death of millions. Understanding why is perhaps the key to understanding the Holocaust.

Part Three:
Eichmann
in
Perspective

"Regrets do not do any good, regretting things is pointless, regrets are for little children. What is more important is to try and find ways and means of making such events impossible in the future."
-- Adolf Eichmann

I
n re-examining Adolf Eichmann there is always the temptation to focus on his intellectual and psychological failings at the expense of the evidence presented here. For example, Arendt might well have had Eichmann in mind when she wrote that totalitarian regimes tend to replace "all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crack-pots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty" (1986, p.339). Similarly, in light of Eichmann's authoritarian upbringing and obvious need for leadership, some might find Fromm's conceptualisation of the "authoritarian personality" more satisfying and assume that his behaviour and loyalty can be better explained in psychological terms (Kellner, 1989). However, if we assume that Eichmann's behaviour was the product of a neurosis combined with a limited intellect then we must also assume that this malaise had attained pandemic status in the Third Reich, given that following one's own personal convictions was the exception that proved the general rule of unconditional obedience. Although this serves to disprove the belief that the perpetrators were 'abnormal', such determinism fails to explain how and why fundamentally 'normal' people contributed to a policy of genocide. Nor can a purely psychological perspective explain why so many of the perpetrators seemed unable to discern the immorality of their actions, this being a prerequisite for any form of disobedience.

While not discounting the possible influence of psychological factors, predicating Eichmann's actions on this basis alone does not stand up to serious examination. Notwithstanding his ignorance of NSDAP policy and chance entrance into the S.S., Eichmann always maintained that he knew exactly what it was that he was joining (in Arendt, 1999, p.43). Moreover, whether intelligent or not, Eichmann clearly possessed a certain amount of insight into the moral dilemma he faced: his desire to cover himself with orders demonstrates his awareness that this provided a (ultimately indefensible) defence of sorts. In fact, Eichmann's efforts in this respect validate a key aspect of Weber's theory, inasmuch as he clearly believed that responsibility for actions undertaken under orders lay with the issuing authority rather than the enacting officer. With these points in mind, the litmus test for any explanatory framework is to discover why so many failed to acknowledge their individual culpability, why even those who were aware of the centrality of their role managed to deflect responsibility for their actions, and to understand how they could return home as husbands and wives and fathers and mothers, having directly or indirectly contributed to the murder of entire families.

The point then is to understand how it was that thousands became estranged from normal conceptions of right and wrong. In Eichmann's case it seems apparent that his moral sensibilities as a private individual remained intact and that he was fully capable of feeling guilt, shame and remorse. In his public role as Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, however, right and wrong were determined not by conventional Judeo-Christian norms but by his performance as measured against the exacting standards of his profession and superior officers. Morality for this public manifestation of Eichmann became synonymous with compliance, dedication, precision, excellence and absolute impartiality. North on Eichmann's moral compass was indicated by the flush of pride experienced on recognition of a job well done and furtherance of his reputation as "The Master"; South by feelings of fear, humiliation and anger at the thought of incurring a black mark on his record and the disapprobation of his superiors. These moral magnetic poles are by-products of the bureaucratic form and the strategies it employs to harness and redirect standards, concerns, beliefs and activities in ways that further the objectives of a specific department or organisation.

This examination of Adolf Eichmann thus refutes the claim that he should be regarded as either evil or abnormal. By all accounts, his actions and behaviour demonstrate a high degree of correlation with those regarded as 'normal' for any bureaucrat. That he acted as he did despite the fact that his actions contributed to murder seems symptomatic of a bureaucracy's tendency to abrogate the subordinate's sense of personal responsibility and deflect moral concerns onto mere trivialities and details. Viewed from this vantage point, it's possible to read Eichmann's testimony with new eyes and assess the extent to which his "lies and distortions" reflect the functional requirements of Weber's "disciplined mechanism". In this sense, it could be argued that Eichmann's case, and the Totalitarian era more generally, represents a temporary realisation of Weber's prophecy of a "polar night of icy darkness": a victory for bureaucratisation and rationality at the expense of individual initiative and freedom of action. Given that these processes are on-going and seemingly never-ending, this particular 'warning from history' tells us that the fundamental ingredients of the Holocaust form part of our daily diet. In this sense, it's important to recognise that the past remains with us as a possible future reality, one aided by processes and technologies more advanced than the Nazis ever could have imagined.

I
n the eleven years that have elapsed since this work was researched Eichmann has remained a subject of great interest, concern and speculation. It would seem that there is no end to the number of blogs, books and documentaries about him, and the intervening years have even gifted us with a new full-length feature film*, one which regurgitates many of the myths discredited in this work. However, it would be only partially true to suggest that this mythical Eichmann is presented for dramatic effect and to reinforce the widely held public perception that the typical S.S. officer was a sadist who drank and fornicated his way across Europe killing Jews with wild abandon. Although there's little doubt that this kind of thing boosts sales figures, it also serves another and far more important function: specifically, it adds a kind of meaning to the senseless deaths of so many millions by providing a handful of faces and names that can be held responsible and accountable in black-and-white terms that make sense at a human level.

* Robert Young's
Eichmann
released in 2007.

The uncomfortable truth that Eichmann presents us with is that the overwhelming majority of Jews were not butchered by a select cadre of fanatical anti-Semites. Rather, they were the victims of a vast, faceless and impersonal bureaucratic and technological process. As Henry Feingold points out, the machinery of destruction was, in essence, a production process whose raw materials and end product were living and dead Jews respectively. The machine itself was operated not by sadists and monsters - they were the exception rather than the rule - but by 'ordinary' people performing mundane roles. Needless to say, the mind recoils at such a suggestion, and for many the cognitive dissonance it generates is allayed by presenting the Final Solution in more personal and human terms. Hence the need to represent the Holocaust in fairy tale form, with the Jews as the Three Billy Goats Gruff and Eichmann as the ravenous troll lurking under the bridge.

Mythologising in this way also helps us to imagine the Third Reich itself as representing a partial return to an 'uncivilised' past: a time of torch-lit ceremonies, blood-curdling oaths, pseudo-mystic fallacies and unrestrained barbarity. However, were we to take a trip back in time to Eichmann's offices on Prince Albrechtstrasse circa 1940, we would probably find the environment entirely and disconcertingly 'normal', differing in purpose rather than form and function. In this sense, demonising Eichmann and his ilk frees us to continue to abandon our own private selves at the factory gate and perform our sometimes unpleasant, sometimes distasteful, sometimes ethically dubious roles as detached and disinterested 'professionals': 'just doing my job', 'it's nothing personal', "I don't make the rules", and so on. Portraying Eichmann as a 'monster' thus ensures that we never have to put ourselves in his shoes and ask the most pertinent and unsettling question of all: faced with a society that has
legalised
persecution and murder, and
criminalised
dissent and opposition, would we stand against colleagues, superiors, and even the State itself and refuse to obey?

Appendices

First Count

Nature of Offence: Crime against the Jewish People, an offence against Section 1(a)(1) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950 and Section 23 of the Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936.

Particulars of the Offence: The Accused, during the period from 1939 to 1945, together with others, caused the deaths of millions of Jews as the persons who were responsible for the implementation of the plan of the Nazis for the physical extermination of the Jews, a plan known by its title "The Final Solution of the Jewish Question."

Second Count

Nature of Offence: Crime against the Jewish People, an offence against Section 1(a)(1) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710-1950 and Section 23 of the Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936.

Particulars of the Offence: the Accused, together with others, subjected many millions of Jews to living conditions which were likely to bring about their physical destruction, during the period 1939 to 1945 and to this end operated in Germany and the other countries of the Axis, in the areas of their occupation and also in areas which were in practice subject to their authority.

Third Count

Nature of the Offence: Crime against the Jewish People, an offence against section 1(a)(1) of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 5710-1950, and section 23 of the Criminal Law Ordinance, 1936.

Particulars of the Offence:

1. During the period of Nazi rule, the Accused fulfilled functions in the Security Service of the S.S. (SD) for dealing with Jews, according to the plan of the Nazi Party (NSDAP). These functions were amalgamated after the outbreak of the Second World War with the functions of the Department in the Gestapo described in the First Count and which was headed by the Accused.
   
2. Throughout that entire period the Accused, together with others, caused grave harm to millions of Jews, physically and mentally, in Germany and in the other countries of the Axis, in the occupied areas them and also in the areas which in practice were subject to their authority in those countries specified in the First Count.
   
3. The Accused, together with others, caused this grave harm by means of enslavement, starvation, expulsion and persecution, confinement to ghettos, to transit camps and to concentration camps - all this under conditions intended to humiliate the Jews, to deny their rights as human beings, to oppress and torment them by inhuman suffering and torture.