No Lack of Courage (3 page)

Instead, Canada decided to deploy a light infantry BG based on the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), on 1 February 2002, to support American operations in the Kandahar area.
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Throughout the next six months, in support of the American initiatives to destroy Taliban and al Qaeda forces, members from 3 PPCLI and Canadian SOF conducted combat operations with their American counterparts in the Tergul mountain range in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan, as well as in the Gardēz area. By late July 2002, Canada redeployed these ground forces back home.

However, Canadian ground participation in Afghanistan quickly resumed. On 12 February 2003, Canada's European allies requested Canadian participation in ISAF. John McCallum, the minister of National Defence (MND) at the time, told the House of Commons: “Canada has been approached by the international community for assistance in maintaining peace and security in Afghanistan for the UN mandated mission in Kabul. Canada is willing to serve with a battle group and a brigade headquarters for a period of one year, starting late this summer.”
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He explained, “The ISAF mission is not only essential for continental security. It is also consistent with Canadians' longstanding commitment to peacekeeping and to providing security for people in distress.”
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The motive was not completely altruistic. “The best defence for Canada is a good offence,” insisted Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, then the commander of the Canadian Army. Canada, he observed, “must play a significant part in the world to prevent that violence and conflict from coming home.”
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As a result, in July 2003 close to 2,000 Canadian troops were dispatched to Kabul as part of Operation Athena, to assist the NATO ISAF mission, which was tasked with providing security in the Kabul area and reinforcing the Afghan Transitional Authority.
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Over five successive six-month rotations, Canadian troops conducted foot patrols and surveillance tasks that established a presence and capability within the ISAF area of responsibility. Those tasks also generated intelligence and situational awareness. Canadian soldiers also assisted and facilitated the rebuilding of the democratic process in Afghanistan.
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Operation Athena officially ended on 18 October 2005, with the withdrawal of the remaining Canadian sub-unit, the reconnaissance squadron from the Kabul area.
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But Canada was not leaving Afghanistan. Rather, she was redefining her contribution as part of Stage 3 ISAF expansion into Afghanistan. Canada took responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the turbulent and insurgent rich Kandahar Province. Canada assumed command of the PRT in August 2005.
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The Americans created the PRT construct in November 2002, as part of OEF. It became a critical component of the U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. PRTs were conceived as a way to integrate diplomats, development officials, military assets, and police officers to address the causes of instability, namely poor governance, weak institutions, insurgency, regional warlords, and poverty.
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The 350-strong Canadian PRT copied this multidisciplinary focus that stressed development as well as security. It became a multi-departmental effort, employing personnel from the DND, Foreign Affairs, and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and other Canadian police forces. Its mission is to help extend the authority of the Afghanistan government in Kandahar Province by promoting local stability and security, improving local governance structures, and engaging in reconstruction activities. Specifically, the PRT is designed to:

The adoption of the PRT and the move of the Canadian expeditionary force from Kabul to Kandahar was a deliberate decision. General Rick Hillier, then the CDS, put the Afghan deployment in context. “We
must export stability to places like Afghanistan,” he explained, “otherwise we will import the instability that results from a lack of action.”
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Spurred by recent events, he pronounced:

Gordon O'Connor, who was appointed minister of National Defence a year later, remarked, “We can't allow the Taliban to return to their former prominence to take over Afghanistan and resume their regime of terror and tyranny; to flaunt their disregard for human rights; to punish and terrorize their own people; to murder innocents; to harbour those who would threaten us and our families at home and abroad.”
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He went on to state, albeit rather melodramatically, that “it's naïve of us to think that Canada is not a pathway to get to America and that Canada would not be the next objective.”
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The net output of the Canadian commitment was the deployment of an infantry BG of approximately 1,000 soldiers to work with the American forces to conduct stabilization and combat operations throughout Kandahar Province as of February 2006. The American forces were still operating under the framework of OEF and the introduction of the Canadian BG became an integral component of the transition from the American OEF framework to the ISAF Stage 3 transition of NATO control of coalition forces in Afghanistan.
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This new evolution of the mission was called Operation Archer.

The continuing commitment to Afghanistan was not surprising. “Canadians have never shirked from their responsibility to help those in need, nor has Canada ever failed to take operational leadership when it was necessary to do so,” extolled the Standing Committee of National Defence. “Difficult challenges will not deter our national will.
Our military history is the story of Canadians going abroad to fight in the national interest of Canada and on behalf of others who could not defend themselves.”
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The governmental rationale for the Canadian military commitment to Afghanistan was succinctly articulated:

In the end, the rationale was as much about others as it was ourselves. Former Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan, Chris Alexander, stated, “Our objective isn't to simply invest well-equipped forces under strong leadership into the eye of the storm that is Kandahar. It's to support a transition from 25 years of war to long-lasting peace.”
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Prime Minister Stephen Harper explained, “As 9/11 showed, if we abandon our fellow human beings to lives of poverty, brutality and ignorance in today's global village their misery will eventually and inevitably become ours.”
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Undeniably, Canada's continued engagement in Afghanistan helps create the conditions for longer-term reconstruction. Canadian Forces operations in Afghanistan have always been conducted with the consent and at the request of the Afghan government. The aims of the CF in Kandahar Province were also clearly thought out. First and foremost the Canadian intention was “to provide the people of Afghanistan with the hope for a brighter future by establishing the security necessary to promote development and an environment that is conducive to the improvement of Afghan life.” In addition, the CF was to conduct operations in
support of the ANSF, strengthen and enhance Afghan governance capacity, and to help extend the authority of the Government of Afghanistan throughout the southern regions of the country. Finally, the CF effort was to support the larger Canadian integrated whole-of-government team to facilitate the delivery of programs and projects that support the economic recovery and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, as well as assisting in addressing humanitarian needs of Afghans by supporting Canadian governmental organizations and NGOs whose efforts meet Canada's objectives.
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The overall effort was in keeping with what a Senate report noted was a long-standing Canadian value. It stated, “Canadians have generally recognized the need to be willing to send troops abroad to defend Canada's interests and values, as well as play the kind of role that any mature country must play in promoting international stability.”
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And so, in 2005 Canadians were once again committed to the struggle in Afghanistan. By the summer of 2006 Canadian combat forces had deployed south to the volatile and extremely dangerous Kandahar Province and became actively involved in the fight for that country. But after all, as the outspoken CDS, General Hillier, observed, “Canadians have never flinched in the face of danger.”
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Subsequently, as part of Operation Archer, it fell to the 1st Battalion, the PPCLI or Task Force (TF) Orion, as its CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, titled it, to conduct the combat tasks in Kandahar Province.
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Their mission read, benignly enough, “Task Force Orion will assist Afghans in the establishment of good governance, security and stability, and reconstruction in the province of Kandahar during Op Archer Rotation (Roto) 1 in order to help extend the legitimacy and credibility of the Government of Afghanistan throughout the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and at the same time help to establish conditions necessary for NATO Stage 3 expansion.”
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The execution of the mission, however, would be far from benign.

T
HE BRUNT OF THE
fight to pacify the southern region of Afghanistan fell to Lieutenant-Colonel Hope's TF Orion. Few realized exactly how desperate that fight would actually be. On arrival to Kandahar, the CO intended for his BG to become an extension of the efforts being exerted by the Canadian PRT in Kandahar City. Hope had a vast area to cover, approximately 54,000 square kilometres. He broke his BG into company groups, which were the core elements of his TF. Hope explained, “We needed to make up for lack of numbers by being constantly aggressive and dynamic.”
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Each was as self-contained as possible and consisted of approximately 150 riflemen augmented by engineers, military police, a forward observation officer (FOO) party, and civilian military affairs (CIMIC) officers.

Each company group had to be able to operate independently for long periods of time. The CO also stressed flexibility and explained to his company commanders that it was necessary that they be able to adapt to the situation on the ground. “Don't be template about doctrine,” insisted Hope. “Do what works.”
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And with that advice, he pushed his sub-units out into autonomous forward operating bases (FOBs) located in areas that would allow them to work with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and district leaders to improve governance, security, and socio-economic conditions in key districts of the province. Hope instructed his task force elements to engage village, district, and provincial leaders in order to convince them to implement GoA initiatives. The BG committed itself to this “3D” (Development, Diplomacy, and Defence) whole of government approach.

An added challenge facing TF Orion, which had moved to southern Afghanistan under the U.S. led OEF mission, was that it would also have to make the difficult transition from an American command and control framework to an ISAF command model partway through their rotation when the Americans transferred responsibility for the area to NATO as part of the alliance's Phase 3 expansion.
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As part of that transition, Brigadier-General David Fraser would take command of the southern region—including the province of Kandahar for which the PPCLI BG was responsible. Fraser would also have under his jurisdiction the other southern provinces, including the hot spots of Helmand and Uruzgan provinces, an area measuring 220,744 square kilometres. In essence, the Canadians would be the bridge between the current U.S. led OEF mission and NATO's ISAF mission.
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Nonetheless, for TF Orion the tour began quietly, almost too quietly, with many of the troops complaining that they had not yet “closed with the enemy.” The young soldiers craved action—they wanted to see combat and the endless framework patrolling and leader engagements became rather mundane to many. However, as the adage goes, “be careful of what you wish for.” As winter turned to spring, the traditional Afghan fighting campaign season began and TF Orion initiated what would be a long series of events leading to a very cataclysmic encounter between Canadian and Taliban forces in the killing fields of Panjwayi.

The surge in activity occurred June 2006. It quickly became evident that the steady increase in Taliban activity was indicative of a full-blown offensive. Consequently, the 1 PPCLI BG began focusing its energies on security operations, specifically to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. Hope deployed his manoeuvre forces in a dispersed, dynamic, and flexible manner. The troops lived amongst the Afghans to gain their trust and to keep the Taliban off-balance. The TF leaders utilized coalition intelligence and sensors to try and pinpoint the enemy. They also used human intelligence (HUMINT) gathered from local nationals.
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All of this information, distilled with intuition, shaped the decisions Hope and his subordinate commanders made in regard to finding the enemy. Once the enemy was located, they attempted “to manoeuvre into that district quietly under the cover of darkness, using deception, and—as much as
possible—isolate the village by using thin blocking and cut off forces.” The CO explained, “We would conduct manoeuvre (cordon and searches) and fires (show of force with artillery or 25mm fire) to produce enemy ICOM [Intercepted communications] chatter, and from this ICOM chatter (or HUMINT from local nationals), we would attempt to vector in upon the enemy locations.” But in the end, Hope conceded, “finding him [the enemy] was almost always a result of advance-to-contact in the close country where he hid and was confirmed by the exchange of fire at close quarters.”
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He added: