No Mission Is Impossible (3 page)

Peres had bought the Rhinos during a visit to Georgia in the United States, a few years before; he had at the time presented Governor Jimmy Carter with his book
David's Sling
. Carter had said to Peres, “All that David needed was a sling but today's David needs more than a sling,
he needs a Hercules!”; he had talked Peres into buying several Georgia-made Rhinos.

Peres was intrigued by Peled. At first look, his plan seemed to him and to others like lunacy, but after weighing all other options, he deemed it “quite realistic.” His colleagues, though, did not share Peres's assessment. Motta Gur, in particular, was negative; the plan, he declared, “was unrealistic, nothing but a fantasy,” and ought to be scrapped.

Peres, however, set aside these doubts and pursued discussions with a small group of senior officers. Among them were the chief of staff; generals Kuti Adam, Benny Peled and his deputy, Rafi Harlev; Dan Shomron (chief infantry and paratroopers officer); Shlomo Gazit (head of military intelligence); Yanosh Ben-Gal (IDF assistant head of operations); and a few colonels, including Ehud Barak, a brilliant officer and former head of Sayeret Matkal(and a future prime minister of Israel). Their discussions were held in utmost secrecy.

The very morning of these discussions, Peres received the list of jailed terrorists whose release the hijackers had demanded. It was most complicated. Forty of the prisoners were held in Israel, among them the notorious Kozo Okamoto, a Japanese terrorist whose group had massacred twenty-four people and wounded seventy-eight in Lod airport in May 1972. Also included were six terrorists jailed in Kenya, where the local authorities denied having them. Another five were in Germany, including the leaders of the ferocious Baader-Meinhof Gang. One was in France and another in Switzerland. A quick glance and Peres realized it was an impossible demand. How could he possibly organize the release of terrorists held in so many countries, subject to different laws and for different crimes? And what if some or all those countries refused?

Rabin, however, continued to insist that Israel negotiate immediately, fearing that when the terrorists' ultimatum expired, they would start killing innocent people. But Peres stood his ground—he contended that Israel could push back the ultimatum, which had been set for Thursday, July 1, at 11:00
A.M
. At the same time, he agreed with the decision to negotiate, but stressed he would be doing so only as a “tactical maneuver” to gain time.

On Wednesday, June 30, Peres decided to explore another angle. He summoned three IDF officers who had served in Uganda and had worked with Idi Amin. He asked them to describe Amin's character, behavior and attitude toward foreigners. These men thought Amin would not dare massacre the hostages, but they also felt certain Amin would not confront the terrorists. Peres asked Colonel “Borka” Bar-Lev, who had been friendly with Idi Amin, to telephone the Ugandan ruler. Bar-Lev was unable to reach him despite repeated efforts.

In the meantime, Peres again summoned his top officers. Beni Peled's plan was discussed once more but now with a narrowed focus. Its goal now became not to conquer Uganda but simply to win control over Entebbe airport, release the hostages and fly them back. Peled laid out a revised plan calling for a thousand paratroopers to be dropped from ten Rhino aircraft. Shomron and Ben-Gal estimated that such an operation could be successfully carried out with two hundred men and three Rhinos.

Kibbutz-born Dan Shomron, a paratrooper and a hero of the Six Day War, was opposed to any parachuting. He told Peled that “by the time your first paratrooper hits the ground, you won't have anybody left to rescue anymore.” Soft-spoken, but sharp and cool, this future chief of staff was certain that as soon as the terrorists saw paratroopers descending, they would massacre the hostages. So Shomron, who now became the key coordinator, started drafting a plan to land planes carrying his soldiers directly onto the Entebbe runways. Kuti Adam pointed out the need for a stopover base close to Uganda, in case of an emergency. They all agreed it would have to be in Kenya, whose government maintained friendly relations with Israel while loathing Idi Amin. Peres asked the Mossad head, General Yitzhak (“Haka”) Hofi, to check discreetly with his Kenyan contacts to ascertain if their country would authorize such a stopover at Nairobi airport. Peres, however, felt dubious about this approach, as Haka seemed to him reserved and skeptical.

Additionally, the emerging mission continued to have an important and stubborn antagonist: Chief of Staff Motta Gur, who strongly believed it could not succeed and insisted that Israel had no military option. He
stressed the complete lack of intelligence about what was happening in Entebbe. He called the group working with Peres “the Fantasy Council.”

Meanwhile, one far-fetched aspect of the plan did progress—Borka Bar-Lev at long last established a telephone connection with Idi Amin. The talk was discouraging, though. Uganda's ruler bluntly advised him that Israel should accept the hijackers' demands without delay.

This was also the opinion of Rabin, who now had the cabinet's backing to start negotiations right away. He further informed his ministers that the opposition leader, Menachem Begin, agreed with his decision to negotiate. Rabin criticized Peres for using “demagogical lightnings . . . and ornate phrases that sounded totally ridiculous.” Indeed, Rabin regarded Peres's responses throughout the crisis as pure demagogy. He did not believe that Peres even meant what he was saying. Most of the ministers agreed that Israel had no military option. Rabin also kept nervously demanding that France immediately be informed of Israel's acceptance of the terrorists' conditions, so that the French foreign ministry could immediately establish contact with Entebbe.

Amid all the angry politicking, some good news came on July 1: the terrorists had by themselves postponed their deadline for capitulation to Sunday, July 4. This stemmed from Idi Amin's departure to an African nations' conference in Mauritius. He was supposed to return in a couple of days. The terrorists wanted Amin to be present when the negotiations took place. So Peres and his “Fantasy Council” now suddenly had a little more time.

Kuti Adam and Dan Shomron thus were able to present the plan they had drafted: The mission would sortie at night, under cover of darkness. The Rhinos would land at Entebbe, and the IDF would acquire control of the airport, kill the terrorists and rescue the hostages.

The whole operation, Dan Shomron emphasized, would not last more than an hour, making all possible use of surprise and speed. First to land would be a Rhino, not asking permission from the control tower. It would arrive at 11:00
P.M
., right after a British airliner that was scheduled to come in at the same time. With the Rhino landing in the shadow of the British aircraft, the airport radar would not detect it. Two armored
cars laden with commandos would emerge from the Rhino and race toward the Old Terminal, where the hostages were being kept. Five or ten minutes later another Rhino would land and disgorge two more cars, with soldiers who would gain control over the New Terminal, the main runway and the fuel reservoirs. After these men in the first two planes had fulfilled their assignments, two more Rhinos would land, load up the hostages and return home.

Peres now asked the head of the Mossad for his input, but Hofi kept stressing the risks—what if the Ugandan soldiers fired an RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) or a machine-gun burst into the Rhino fuel tank and set off an explosion? In that event, one or more planes might have to be abandoned, ruining the delicate interdependencies of the plan. And then there were the potential human costs—what if soldiers and hostages were killed or wounded? What if the terrorists simply blew up the Old Terminal with all the hostages? Hofi was—to say the least—unenthusiastic.

Peres's council then tore apart every detail of the mission—what snags might occur; whether, if the first Rhino was hit or damaged, the other planes would be able to return; what to do if the airport had antiaircraft guns; whether there were Ugandan MiG jet fighters stationed there, and would there be enough fuel left for the takeoff from Entebbe? . . .

Peres then asked the military for their opinions. Dan Shomron said, “If we start in Entebbe at midnight, we can take off for the flight back at one
A.M
.” He estimated the chances of success were close to 100 percent. Benny Peled thought 80 percent and Kuti Adam, between 50 and 80 percent.

Peres finally approved the plan and set the deadline for carrying it out at Saturday night, July 3, the night before the terrorists' deadline. The generals all agreed, except for Motta Gur, who still stubbornly objected.

“Such an operation without adequate intelligence,” he said, “is charlatanism!”

“Motta,” Peres asked, “will you reconsider?”

“Without intelligence there is no chance that I'd recommend such an operation. Some of the things I have heard here aren't worthy of an
army's general staff. If you want Goldfinger, that's a different story. If you want James Bond—not with me!”

Peres then pulled Gur into an in-depth discussion that lasted all through the night, but Gur still would not budge. And without the chief of staff's support, Peres could not bring the go-ahead to the cabinet for its approval.

Gur, despite his opposition, did agree to assemble the task force—Sayeret Matkal, paratroopers and other units—in a training facility to prepare for the assault, but it would move forward only if the situation were to change. The facility was sealed, and to prevent any leaks, no one was allowed to leave. Shomron was appointed mission commander. An advance command post was to be established in a big air force Boeing that would accompany the Rhinos to Ugandan airspace and control the operation from the sky. Models of the old and new Entebbe terminals were built in the facility, and the soldiers repeatedly rehearsed for an attack and for the rescue.

Peres now set out to freeze the efforts to reach a compromise with the hijackers. Israel's former ambassador to France, Arthur Ben-Natan, had just arrived in Paris to talk with the French about a joint initiative to deal with the terrorists. He was Peres's longtime friend and a former director general of the defense Ministry. Peres telephoned him and conveyed a veiled hint, using “typical” Parisian banter, to delay his talks with the French. “If you meet the French girl tonight,” Peres advised, “please don't get too excited. At most, content yourself with a vague flirtation. As a friend, and not only as a friend, I am telling you: don't take your clothes off.” Ben-Natan laughed but clearly understood the message and let nothing come out of his “flirtation” with the French.

Two encouraging reports then arrived the following morning, Friday, July 2. The first, from Hofi, the head of the Mossad, informed Peres that Kenya, Uganda's neighbor, had agreed to authorize a stopover for the Israeli planes. The second came from an unexpected source—Paris. The Sayeret operation planner, Major Amiram Levin, had been sent to France to debrief the non-Israeli hostages who had just been released. But most, still terrified, confused and unfocused, could supply no useful
information. Suddenly an older Frenchman approached Levin, introducing himself as a former French Army colonel. “I know what you need,” he said. He sat down beside Levin and gave him a succinct description of the Old Terminal, where the hostages were being kept, the layout of the various halls and the positioning of the terrorists. He also drew for Levin detailed sketches of the building.

Various sources reported that the total number of terrorists was thirteen, including two Germans and a South American who was apparently the hijackers' commander. The other terrorists were Palestinians. Four had participated in the hijacking while the others had been waiting for the plane in Entebbe. Their rapport with the Ugandans was cordial. The captors were armed with small submachine guns, revolvers and hand grenades. The hostages were being held in the main hall of the Old Terminal, and the French crew of the Air France plane (which had refused the opportunity to be released out of loyalty to their passengers) were confined to the women's restrooms.

Additionally, the Ugandan military unit said to be watching over the prisoners was sixty men strong—but less than a battalion, as earlier reports had stated. In the Old Terminal a wall of crates had been erected, which the terrorists claimed were full of explosives. But intelligence sources indicated that these crates were not connected to any wires and no preparation for blowing them up appeared to have been made.

The Mossad, in preparation for the mission, should it be given a green light, had sent to Entebbe a foreign aircraft that allegedly had mechanical problems. The plane circled over the airport while radioing calls for help and secretly photographing the buildings, runways and equipment, as well as the military aircraft stationed there—two helicopters and eight MiG-21 jet fighters.

Armed with all this new information, Peres hurried to Motta Gur's office and presented him with these new reports. He noticed that on hearing the news, “Gur's eyes shone.” The chief of staff reacted with enthusiasm and completely reversed his position. Gur, reassured that he now had enough information, became a staunch supporter of the Entebbe rescue.

Peres hurried to the prime minister's office. Rabin's headquarters was
located in a picturesque small house a stone's throw from the Ministry of Defense, in the modest, book-filled room where David Ben-Gurion had planned major moves in the War of Independence. Peres described the plan to Rabin. The prime minister's reaction was lukewarm. He lit a cigarette and asked, “What would happen if the Ugandans identified the plane as it landed and fired at it?”

Peres told him that the IAF commander was certain that the plane could be landed without any response from the ground. Hofi, who had joined the meeting, for the first time expressed cautious support for the operation.