Reagan's Revolution (15 page)

In the Ford campaign plan,

Ronald Reagan as a candidate brings to his campaign some significant advantages in terms of attempting to acquire the Republican nomination. He is the strong favorite of the Party’s right wing and if not handled correctly, could cause conservative Republicans to unify around him.

His longstanding national visibility in the Republican Party is perhaps his biggest advantage. Reagan has had a national image in the Republican Party since the 1964 election. . . . During that same election, Reagan went on nationwide television advocating Goldwater’s candidacy in what has been described as the most effective speech given in the ’64 campaign.
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In assessing Reagan’s other advantages in the campaign, the brief said,

Since that time, he had twice been elected Governor of the most populous state in the nation and been active across the country as a fundraiser for both state parties and individual candidates. As a result, Reagan is well known to the Party rank and file and has a significant number of outstanding I.O.U.’s.

A second advantage is the flexibility he has as an individual who is not currently holding office and, therefore, not obligated to divide his time between official duties and campaigning. This will allow him to spend much more time in both Primary and Convention states than the President.
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Regarding Reagan’s drawbacks, the author wrote, “Even among conservatives are many who consider Reagan to have too conservative an image to be a credible candidate in the general election—this may prove to be his greatest negative.” The brief continued to note that since Ford was the “Party Candidate,” Reagan would be the de facto spoiler in any contest between the two. It concluded this section on a hopeful note by saying, “Finally, many of Reagan’s friends consider his candidacy unwise and are privately telling him so. In the end, this may be the deciding factor regarding Reagan’s candidacy.” It also suggested that some members of Reagan’s family opposed his run.

The Ford campaign also looked to an early knockout strategy of Reagan like Sears was planning for Ford. In the case of a long protracted battle, the document naïvely warned, “The 1976 Convention should not give rise to old liberal/conservative splits within the Republican Party.”

However, the memo mistakenly suggested that Ford was considered as conservative as Reagan among Republican primary voters. The author imagined that Ford was viewed as a conservative by the rest of the country because he was from the Midwest.

Ford’s chances in individual states in the Midwest were explored: “It is important for him [Ford] to do well in Primaries and State Conventions in the various Midwestern states.” In fact, Reagan would win five of the eleven Midwest states that the Ford campaign thought it would win.

States were assigned levels of priority, including Georgia. Of course, New Hampshire and Florida were “Priority One,” but the addition of Georgia was curious.

This is the home state of the President Ford Committee Chairman (Callaway) and a place where he has been a statewide candidate and has many friends. . . . [S]hould the President be able to carry Georgia, this would be the third nail in the coffin of the Reagan campaign.
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Reagan apparently had more friends in Georgia than Callaway since he slaughtered Ford there earlier. Nonetheless, the memo correctly identified Reagan’s strength in North Carolina, citing his support from Senator Jesse Helms. The document still held out hope for a Ford victory in the Tar Heel State. The balance of the state-by-state analysis was a combination of both the realistic and the surreal. Reagan’s chances in some states were accurately portrayed, while others bordered on the ridiculous.

When it came to how the Ford campaign would work at the Kansas City convention in the event that Reagan was still in the campaign, the plan said, “If Governor Reagan remains in the race, much of the President Ford Committee activity at the National Convention will have to surround holding delegations and making sure the President has enough delegates to nominate him on the first ballot.”

Despite edicts by some at the Republican National Committee that they take a “neutral” position in the campaign, the Ford campaign clearly saw the RNC as a resource. The memo listed those items it could rely on the national committee to provide in the looming battle with Reagan, including polling and research. Furthermore, “There will, of course, be a relationship between the Campaign Chairman and the Chairman of the RNC, but we would recommend that, in addition, all Division Directors at the PFC also maintain an informal relationship with each of their counterparts at the RNC. A formal liaison between the two should not be designated for purposes other than the transfer of items of value.”
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A detailed budget allocated nearly $6 million for the primary and convention states, but Ford would actually need to spend over $7 million in those contests before he could beat Reagan at the convention. The budget also broke down staff salaries, with secretaries at the President Ford Committee receiving $10,000. The staff total was projected to number sixty-three.
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The thoughtful brief could not anticipate all the problems Ford would continue to face, including new challenges from his left.

The President’s moderate supporters in the Senate were not thinking about budgets or payrolls. Angered by Ford’s drift to the right and his handling of Rockefeller, Senate Republican moderates began to explore the possibility of fielding their own candidate in the Presidential primaries in 1976.

The group of liberal and moderate Republican Senators, members of the

Wednesday Club, met twice in early November to discuss a bid by Howard Baker, a moderate conservative Senator from Tennessee, as reported by Martha Angle in the
Washington Star.

“We think [Ford] has been overreacting to the Ronald Reagan threat,” said one Western Senator who asked not to be identified.

Although no votes have been taken, and no firm consensus reached, sources said some in the group yesterday expressed interest in urging Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. . . . to enter the primaries.

Baker is not a member of the Wednesday Club and is generally viewed as a moderately conservative Republican. But as one liberal put it, “we have to recognize that none of our own members could mount a viable campaign in the Republican Party as it exists today. A ‘Mac’ Mathias or a ‘Chuck’ Percy could not pull votes in a contest with Ford or Reagan,” this Senator said.
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Baker was “flattered” at the notion, but still expressed his support for Ford’s nomination. The meetings were called by liberal New York Senator Jacob Javits, angry over Ford’s treatment of his old friend Rockefeller. It was ironic that the Wednesday Club had opposed Baker’s challenge to Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania for the position of Senate Minority Leader several years earlier.

“Javits yesterday said that ‘as a senior statesman’ with no further political ambitions of his own, ‘I feel free to lay before my colleagues all of the options, especially in view of my strong feeling that the President is turning too far right,’” Angle reported.
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Percy took a harder line against Ford for his apparent move to the right and an even harder line against Reagan. Percy understood that the party was headed in the direction of Reagan and away from the liberal and moderate elements of the party. Nonetheless, he made it clear that he thought Reaganism was bad for the party and the country.

At one point, Ford raised the possibility of selecting Senator Ed Brooke of Massachusetts, a moderate African American for his running mate, but this gesture did not appease his moderate critics inside the GOP. Meanwhile, the President openly speculated that a third party candidacy by Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, who had previously announced his candidacy for the Democratic Party’s nomination, could throw the election into the House of Representatives.

While liberal Republican Senators were pulling Ford in one direction, Barry Goldwater was giving Ford fits from the other side of the ideological divide. Speaking before the National Press Club, Goldwater, while reiterating his support for Ford’s nomination, bluntly assessed Reagan’s appeal. He called Reagan “a very strong conservative. . . . I believe my supporters will support Reagan, although some may support Ford. You have to remember that Reagan has a very great following,” Goldwater told the assembled media.
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But he also made clear his opposition to Reagan taking the second position on the ticket with Ford, citing Reagan’s age.

A much rougher view of Reagan than Goldwater’s was contained in a secret, unsigned White House memo that aggressively reviewed Reagan’s record as Governor and found it wanting, citing issues like growth of the California budget under Reagan and his policies on crime (“We are exploring the possibility that we can charge Reagan with being soft on crime, specifically liberal on the parole of felons”). The memo also critiqued Reagan’s more recent proposal to transfer $90 billion in federal services to the states.

Reviewing Reagan’s energy record, the memo said,

My plan is to explore the Reagan PUC (Public Utility Commission) appointments and their decisions. I believe that we can build a case for industry favoritism while the consumer got screwed. Politically, this could be used by saying that while Reagan mouthed the line on energy just like everyone else, he was busy screwing the California consumer.

After discreet talks with a number of people ranging from Reagan’s former opponents to some of his friends, it appears to me that the anti-Reagan attack with whatever information we eventually produce should be carried on as a second level campaign by those within the campaign structure other than the President himself.

The author concluded to the unknown recipient, “Sorry for the rough typing. I’m being so secretive about all this that I’m scaring myself coming around corners.”
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One of the darker portions of this Ford White House memo dealt with material obtained from the 1970 Jesse Unruh campaign. Unruh had been the Democratic nominee for Governor of California until the Reagan juggernaut squashed him in the general election. Under the heading “Malibu Ranch Deal,” the Ford staffer realized the explosive nature of the material. In his cover memo, which bore no Administration names, they wrote “We have not attempted to review it for accuracy but feel it should be presented as early as possible in order to give the committee the chance to determine whether or not it warrants further checking.”
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The Unruh memos alleged that the Fox Realty Corporation overpaid Reagan by one million dollars for his former 236-acre ranch in Malibu, initially purchased in 1951 and sold by Reagan to Fox in 1966. Fox Realty was a part of the Fox Studios and the company was looking for additional space for their television and movie productions, having lost their lease. The charge never surfaced in Reagan’s 1970 gubernatorial race or the 1976 Presidential primaries, and no allegations came out of the material, but the extent of the Ford campaign’s interest in this matter suggested the lengths the Ford campaign was willing to go to defeat Reagan.

The Ford White House was looking for something—anything—to stop the Reagan bandwagon. Meanwhile, frustrated at how he was being treated in the media, the President summoned two
Washington Post
reporters to the White House to try to confront his unfair image.

In an interview with Lou Cannon and David Broder, Ford said, “I think it is an inaccurate depiction. . . . Most of the critics . . . have never played in a ball game, never skied. I don’t know whether it is a self-defense mechanism in themselves or what, but I’m kind of amused at that. It doesn’t bother me at all.”
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In fact, Ford was deeply offended at the continued oafish portrayals of him in the media. Ford’s former Press Secretary, Jerald terHorst, who had resigned over Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon, became a syndicated columnist and shed light on Ford’s plight:

Creating trouble for President Ford could be easy for Reagan, given the President’s penchant for creating trouble for himself in recent months. Republicans of every hue seem disappointed in his performance, faulting Ford for lackluster speeches, his barnstorming around the country, a fumbling Administration shakeup, and a shuffling campaign organization.

Letting Vice President Rockefeller go has displeased the moderates while failing to appease the conservatives—and ditto for Ford’s drift to the right on social issues and his zig-zagging line on financial aid for stricken New York City.
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TerHorst referred to Ford’s situation as a “shambles.”

Reagan was also having his problems with his campaign.
The Political
Animal
, a widely read tip sheet, reported:

Sears does not run a tight ship and one result is that practically everybody in the campaign except the receptionist and mailroom staff is talking to the press. This not only undercuts Nofziger, the presumed spokesman, but the campaign itself. Unless Sears steps in quickly, supported by RR, and disciplines the campaign staff, including regional directors and local chairmen, further inconsistencies, contradictions and embarrassing stories will continue and escalate. Staff fighting is already public, reminiscent of the disastrous McGovern’s ’72 campaign.

This particular issue had been circulated to Cheney attached to a handwritten note from Ford.
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The newsletter did not detail the staff infighting or embarrassing stories going on inside the Reagan campaign. The story also incorrectly assumed that Sears did not want the staff talking to the press. In fact, he was encouraging Reagan’s people to talk to the media without any fear, and to try not to deceive them, Lake later said.
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However, the newsletter did (in the minds of some) accurately portray Sears as a “weak administrator.” David Keene said, “John was a great strategist and had a fine mind, but the problem in politics is that people [always want] to do the job that they’re not good at instead of what they are good at. John should have been head of strategy for Reagan, but not campaign manager.”
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