Reagan's Revolution (32 page)

The national media took their political coverage seriously. All the networks, newspapers, radio syndicates and wire services had extensive political units which included editors, reporters, and pollsters, along with outside consultants from both parties who would keep them informed on the “inside dope” from both sides of the aisle. It was not unusual for a major daily paper like the
Washington Post
to carry six or more lengthy articles on the national campaign or for the networks to devote four minutes for just one political story.

President Ford told reporters he was “elated” at the outcome, but he refused to speculate on when Reagan would withdraw. All parties agreed Reagan’s strategy was in shambles, and the only question was when he would face the obvious and make a graceful exit. Behind the scenes, the White House and the President Ford Committee were devising ways to get Reagan out of the race, despite Reagan’s umpteenth proclamation that he was in the race until the bitter end.

Reagan had been enjoying a modest lead prior to his upset in New Hampshire, but that went out the window. Still, in the intervening two weeks, he had climbed back into the race in Florida to lose by “only” six points.
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But the subtler implications of the effects of his new, more aggressive campaigning were lost on the national media and the political classes. As far as they were concerned, it was probably all over. The
New York Times
wrote, “The Californian’s attacks on the Administration’s policy of détente with the Soviet Union appeared to avail him little.” Spinning anew, the Reagan campaign took a new tack with the media, suggesting that their candidate could lose four or five primaries at the outset of the campaign but still survive by winning caucus states and California.
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Reagan was forced again to go before the cameras and supporters to declare himself “delighted” with losing. “I can’t act well enough to convince you how delighted I am,” he told a group of doubting reporters. “The incumbent in these first couple of primaries has thrown the whole load at us; he has shot all the big artillery there is, used everything in the incumbency he can, and we are still possessing almost half the Republican vote,” Reagan said gamely.
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The overjoyed Ford staff threw Florida oranges to each other for the benefit of television crews at the Washington headquarters, while letting it be known that Ford would consider Reagan for the number two spot. The Ford campaign was becoming skilled at the “visuals” necessary for campaigns in the media age, having sent hundreds of Michiganders to Florida with thousands of snowballs, to playfully throw at each other—all of which was dutifully recorded by the local Florida media.

Perhaps caught up in the moment, Rogers Morton told the
New York Times
, “People are not just accepting [Ford], they’re falling in love with him as their President.”
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Possibly writing the epitaph for Reagan’s campaign, the story also went on to note that the offices of his North Carolina campaign had not been in touch with the Washington office of Citizens for Reagan in over ten days and that television commercials there had been abruptly cancelled.
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The lead story in the
Miami Herald
began, “President Ford probably ended Ronald Reagan’s challenge for the Republican Presidential nomination.”
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Reagan staggered into Illinois. A “beauty contest” primary would be held in conjunction with the election of delegates and he was trailed by renewed speculation in the national media as to when he would withdraw.

Illinois was the first head to head contest between the two candidates in a state where conservatives did not dominate the Republican Party. It was a moderately liberal party from top to bottom, with the exception of a few, solitary individuals like Congressman Phil Crane and State Rep. Don Totten, who helped lead the Reagan effort in the Land of Lincoln. It was also the place of Reagan’s birth, and his strategists hoped this would play well with the voters.

Predictions by both camps showed how the world had changed in just a few short weeks. In the beginning, while most political analysts were forecasting the state as a do or die proposition for Ford, the Reagan people had once again predicted a big showing for Reagan in Illinois. But after earning four big wins, Ford’s in-state forces, led by former Governor Dick Ogilvie, were sure of a comfortable win for their man. Reagan was reduced to saying publicly that he would be comfortable with 40 percent. Ninety-six delegates were at stake, with an additional five to be selected at their state convention later in the campaign season. Two hundred fifty grassroots Republicans had filed to run for delegate. Some were for Reagan, the bulk were for Ford, and others were for third party candidates.

In Illinois, Reagan tried a new theme, suggesting for the first time that the events of Watergate would make Ford vulnerable in the fall election against the Democrats if he were to be nominated by the Republican Party. “I don’t think we want to go into that battle against the Democrats in November having to defend a part of the past which Republicans would like to be left to history,” Reagan told a GOP group in Marion.
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The new attack not only fell flat; it backfired on Reagan, as he was forced to backtrack from reporters’ queries about Ford and his pardon of Richard Nixon. Several days earlier in Florida, Reagan implied that the Chinese government invited Nixon to China because they had no faith in Ford. This attack went largely unreported, but Reagan should have known better. These types of attacks were not part of his natural style.

Furthermore, for the first time in the campaign, Reagan started talking like a Campaign Manager instead of a candidate, telling reporters that he would start winning when the campaign moved to the South and the West. He also analyzed Florida by observing that it was not truly a Southern state because of the high percentage of Midwesterners who had relocated there. The state’s high senior citizen population tended to support the status quo.
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Reagan was off message and off stride. He was fighting a cold and was depressed. Mike Deaver often asked Totten, when he was traveling with Reagan, to tell him a joke to perk up his spirits. Reagan tried to make the argument that Florida was not such a bad loss because the Ford forces said they would “clobber” him there and they failed to do so. “I was so far behind two weeks ago, and I know there was no celebrating in the White House last night, because they thought they were really going to clobber us in Florida. Anyone who describes their camp as euphoric is out of his mind.” He also oddly suggested that before the resignation of Nixon, he and not Ford was on everyone’s list of leading Republicans for the 1976 nomination.
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Meanwhile, word was leaked to the
New York Times
that Ford was “privately furious over Ronald Reagan’s criticism of his policies.” According to one official with the President Ford Committee, “He’s got the blood coursing through his veins right now. He’s unhappy with Reagan and determined as a result.” The story devolved into patronizing Reagan, as Senator Chuck Percy told the
Times
, “Ronald Reagan has sharpened up the Ford organization. His campaign has helped us. It would have been a very poor organization. We wouldn’t have been prepared without the Reagan challenge.”
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Resentment was also boiling in the Ford White House over Reagan’s earlier comments about Ford and Watergate. Reportedly, Ford was incensed by the comments, and aides were urging Ford to destroy the Reagan challenge, once and for all.
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The Reagan campaign’s frustrations were also running high with the inability of Congress to rewrite the section of the federal election law pertaining to the appointment of the FEC Commissioners. While the Supreme Court previously ruled that the joint naming of Commissioners by Congress and the Executive Branch constituted a violation of the separation of powers, the FEC continued to operate, disbursing up to eleven million dollars to qualifying candidates. But even this function would cease on the March 22 deadline set for Congress by the Court. Then the bill would go to Ford for his signature and the disbursements would presumably keep flowing. The FEC was also budgeted approximately forty-eight million dollars for both parties’ conventions and their fall campaigns. This was the first time in American history that the taxpayer would subsidize political parties.
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Ford was also forced to “subsidize” Henry Kissinger while campaigning in Chicago, defending his Secretary of State from Reagan’s attacks. Ford’s defense, while low key, came on the heels of a vigorous speech Kissinger had made in Boston defending his stewardship of American foreign policy. Kissinger, while not mentioning names, charged those who were criticizing the Ford Administration’s foreign policy with “erroneous and reckless allegations.” Ford had initially defended Kissinger to an inquisitor at Wheaton College. Later, speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, he expanded, telling listeners, “I do regret that foreign policy has been injected into both the primary as well as potentially in the Presidential election. Our policy of peace through strength is not something I recently invented.”
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As possibly an omen of things to come for Gerald Ford after Illinois, a storm of tornados marched across the Midwest, including Chicago, where one barely missed the President’s motorcade including the limousine that was carrying him. But four people were killed and one hundred injured.

Storming against Ford’s ongoing use of political patronage, Don Totten told a group of Republicans that the President was trying to buy the primary. Totten charged, “It’s actual buying of votes by outright bribery. The President says he has honesty and integrity, but I question the use.”
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Reagan did not disavow Totten’s tough charges and leveled a couple of his own, accusing the Ford operation of “lying through their teeth” and of “the cheapest kind of politics” when the topic of Ford’s campaign’s tactics was raised.

To Reagan and Totten’s point about the uses of incumbency, Ford had invited the anchormen for the top four Chicago television stations to interview the President on the eve of the Illinois primary. Reagan had complained that the White House was now even manipulating the news.

Reagan appeared on an obscure local Chicago television show hosted by the little known Phil Donahue and the challenger was asked about the interviews with Ford. Did Reagan intend to appeal to the stations under the new, equal time provisions of the Federal Election Commission? Reagan paused for a moment, brightened, and said to Donahue, “That’s a good idea!” Within minutes, Reagan aides were on the phone to the managers at all four Chicago stations, and all assured them that, yes, Reagan would indeed be granted the same amount of broadcast time as Ford.
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While the former Governor of California was flailing, another Governor, Milton Shapp, dropped out of the campaign for the Democratic nomination. Shapp had been a successful businessman and was equally accomplished as Governor of Pennsylvania, but the media never took him seriously. Shapp was the first Jewish candidate to campaign actively for a party nomination. He joined four others, including former North Carolina Governor Terry Sanford, Texas Senator Lloyd Bentsen, and Indiana Senator Birch Bayh in folding their tents and withdrawing from the race.

Reagan’s successor as Governor of California, Jerry Brown, also casually threw his love beads into the ring by announcing to one reporter in the Sacramento State House that he too would run for President. Mike Royko, one of the toughest political columnists in the country, later hung Brown with the moniker, “Governor Moonbeam” because of Brown’s devotion to yoga, yogurt, Zen Buddhism and sleeping on a mattress in the Governor’s office. The nickname stuck, and Brown never quite escaped ridicule again.

Meanwhile, the former Governor of Texas and former Democrat, John Connally, let it be known that he would not consider accepting a Vice Presidential selection. When he appeared before a group of reporters and Republican Party officials at his ranch, he was asked about being Vice President and replied, “I’ve never known a happy one yet.” Connally had one of the best, most ribald senses of humor in either parties, as when he told the gathering, “I know you all came here expecting an announcement of some kind and you’re going to get one. We have a new herd bull here and we’re going to start selling semen this fall at $10 an ampule.”
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He declined to endorse either Ford or Reagan, preferring to see if his chances would open should the nomination be deadlocked, and the party be looking for a compromise candidate.

Three days before the Illinois primary, Citizens for Reagan filed an FEC complaint charging Secretary of State Kissinger with abusing his office by overtly campaigning for Ford in the primaries. Loren Smith, General Counsel for Reagan, filed a petition that stated Kissinger “is using his high office for the express purpose of a campaign platform to promote the Ford candidacy.”
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Smith alleged that Kissinger’s travel and speeches defending Ford’s foreign policy should be charged against the Ford campaign’s expenditures and not paid for by the U.S. Treasury. Reagan finished campaigning in Illinois and headed for California for a few days of rest to watch the returns from Illinois. He departed saying once again that he did not expect to win Illinois. His campaign would continue to other states in the South and the West where he felt his message would resonate better. The message was about all Reagan had at this point. While Ford now had an operating surplus of almost $1.5 million, Citizens for Reagan was showing a deficit of $688,000, according to FEC reports.
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