Read The Three Christs of Ypsilanti Online
Authors: Milton Rokeach
The Three Christs of Ypsilanti (6 page)
Mark, also of preschool age, was listening to his mother complain what a cold, rainy afternoon it was. “I wish I could be a bear and hibernate for the winter,” she said. “But you're not a bear. You're people,” Mark responded. She said that didn't matter; she would be a bear and hibernate anyway. Mark insisted firmly she was not a bear. When she asked him how he knew this, he burst into tears. She tried to soothe him by saying she was only fooling, but he continued crying and said he didn't like the game.
Consider next some instances in which there is a violation of primitive beliefs about physical reality. The television program
Candid Camera
often achieves its surprise effects precisely because primitive beliefs are momentarily and inexplicably violated. A gas-station attendant is confronted with a motorless car driven into the station by a woman, or with a four-wheeled car that runs nicely on three tires; someone says casually that today is Friday, a Friday in December, only to hear everyone around him express amazed disbelief at his contention.
In the well-known experiments by the psychologist Solomon Asch,[
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] a group of six people are asked to look at a line and then
to report aloud which one of three other linesâeach of a different lengthâis the same length as they one they first examined. The first five persons are confederates of the experimenter and have been instructed in advance to give the same
wrong
answer. The sixth person, who is the only real subject in the experiment, is now confronted with a situation he has never before experienced. He discovers that the line he believes to be equal in length to the standard line is, according to his colleagues, not equal to it at all. He also discovers something just as surprising: that something he believes to be true, and which
he believes everyone else believes
to be true, is not so! The others are in a position to know; yet they all disagree with him. This experiment is upsetting to the subject because there has been a violation of a primitive belief; the consensus of the group is in conflict with the direct evidence of his own senses. The experiment lasts for a relatively short period and Asch reports that the subjects are highly relieved when at the end they are let in on what happened.
This experiment and the situations described earlier involving a change of name all have something in common, although at first glance they might appear unrelated. In all cases there is a strong anxiety reaction, which is relieved by reassurance: it was only an experiment; it was only a game. In all cases the experience is short-lived and is terminated well before severe emotional disturbances set in. It is frightening to speculate what might happen if such experiences were prolonged. For example, what would be the out-come for a child if the change-of-name game were “played” for, say, a whole week? One can only guess at the possible consequencesâloss of identity, a breakdown of his total system of belief, and, in the extreme, a schizophrenic shattering of personality.
We can get at least a hint of what might happen under such prolonged experiences by considering some recent reports on “thought reform,” “brainwashing,” and voluntary confession.[
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Robert Lifton, a psychiatrist who studied a number of Westerners following their release from Chinese prisons, reports that one of his subjects was addressed, while in prison, by number rather than name. The “undermining of identity is the stroke through which the prisoner âdies to the world,' the prerequisite for all that follows.”[
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] And again: “Belief and identity are so intimately related that any change in one must affect the other.”[
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] It would seem that under such conditions as isolation, absolute control of information from the outside world, and the removal of the usual group supports, there would be a loss of ego and group identity, and that, with the substitution of new group supports, the way would be paved for the emergence of new identities, changes in ideology, voluntary confession, and collaboration. But it is difficult to pin down the exact conditions which led to changes in some prisoners and not in others, and to gauge the exact changes actually effected in those who did change. Physical hardship and duress were often present, and the methods of control varied from time to time, from prison to prison, and from prisoner to prisoner. Differences in the personality, status, and education of the prisoners were also unknown variables.
Social scientists cannot, for ethical reasons, conduct “thought control” experiments or violate primitive beliefs in children or even in adults for prolonged periods. It is necessary to find other ways to explore the conditions which lead to changes in systems of belief and in behavior, and to explore what happens when primitive beliefs are violated for longer periods. The identity of the person must not be endangered and the effects should be constructive rather than destructive.
Consider, therefore, a converse situation. Suppose that the primitive belief to be violated is one that has no social support instead of one that has unanimous social support. This would be the case
for a psychotic with a mistaken belief in his identity. Suppose we brought together two or more persons claiming the
same
mistaken identity?
In delusional systems of belief, the primitive belief in one's identity (or, for that matter, any other delusional belief) cannot effectively be contradicted by another person because the deluded person will accept no external referents or authorities. A major reason that psychoanalysts have generally avoided even attempting psychotherapy with psychotics is the enormous difficulty of establishing a transference relationship, one in which the patient is able to develop an emotional relationship with the therapist as the figure of authority. Since a deluded person will accept no external referents, how can one possibly hope to change his beliefs from the outside?
Further consideration suggests that this may not be necessary. There is a second primitive belief which is based on reality even in a psychotic with a mistaken belief about his identity: the belief that only one person can have a particular identity. In confronting the three Christs with one another, we proposed to bring into a dissonant relation two primitive beliefs within each of them: his delusional belief in his identity and his realistic belief that only one person can have a given identity. In such a situation, the locus of the conflict, if there is conflict at all, would be within each individual rather than among them.
It should be clear from the preceding account that the research with the three delusional Christs evolved as a result of a theoretical concern, not with psychopathology as such, but with the general nature of systems of belief and the conditions under which they can be modified. Because it is not feasible to study such phenomena with normal people, it seemed reasonable to focus on delusional systems of belief in the hope that, in subjecting them to strain, there would be little to lose and, hopefully, a great deal to gain. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that we do not as yet have much understanding of the nature of psychotic systems of belief, or the conditions leading to their formation, organization, development, or modification; nor, for that matter, of normal
systems of belief. The problem has thus far been largely ignored by experimentally-minded social psychologists, undoubtedly because of its tremendous complexity. Instead, present theory and research has typically focused on the problem of single beliefs and attitudes and the conditions under which they change; these beliefs and attitudes, moreover, have by and large been of the kind we have here called peripheral or inconsequential and typically involve short-range changes.[
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Because theory and knowledge in this field are so limited, all that could reasonably be stated in advance was that bringing together several persons who claimed the same identity would provide as untenable a human situation as is conceivable, and that in a controlled environment wherein escape was not possible, something would have to give. If delusional primitive beliefs are violated, will this lead to other changes in beliefs? to a return to reality? to even greater retreats from reality? If the original reasons for the psychotic state continue to exist, could the pressures lead to the adoption of other false, rather than true, identities? The study of what would have to give, and in what sequence, should at the least prove of scientific interest and possibly lead to advances in the treatment of the mentally ill.
Two Earlier Reports on Confrontation
Two brief accounts have been found of what happens when two people who claim the same identity meet. The first is told by
Voltaire in his Commentary to Cesare Beccaria's
Essay on Crimes and Punishment
. The story concerns Simon Morin, who was burned at the stake in 1663.
He was a deranged man, who believed that he saw visions; and even carried his folly so far as to imagine, that he was sent from God, and gave out that he was incorporated with Jesus Christ.
The parliament, very judiciously, condemned him to imprisonment in a mad-house. What is exceeding singular, there was, at that time, confined in the same mad-house, another crazy man who called himself the eternal father. Simon Morin was so struck with the folly of his companion, that his eyes were opened to the truth of his own condition. He appeared, for a time, to have recovered his right senses; and having made known his penitence to the magistrates of the town, obtained, unfortunately for himself, a release from confinement.
Some time afterwards he relapsed into his former state of derangement, and began to dogmatize.[
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The second is told by the psychoanalyst Robert Lindner in his well-known case history,
The Jet-Propelled Couch
. This story concerns a psychotic physicist named Kirk who goes off on imaginary trips to outer space and visits other planets. Lindner decides to play along with Kirk's delusional system of belief and justifies this in the following passage:
...It is impossible for two objects to occupy the same place at the same time. It is as if a delusion such as Kirk's has room in it only for one person at one time, as if a psychotic structure, too, is rigidly circumscribed as to “living space.” When, as in this case, another person invades the delusion, the original occupant finds himself literally forced to give way.
This fantastic situation can also be represented by imagining an encounter between two victims of, let us say, the Napoleonic delusion. The conviction of each that he is the real Napoleon must be called into question by the presence of the other, and it is not unusual for one to surrender, in whole or in part, when such a confrontation occurs.
Some years ago I observed exactly this while on the staff of a psychiatric sanitarium in Maryland. At that time we had a middleaged paranoid woman who clung to the delusion that she was Mary, Mother of God. It happened that we admitted another patient with the same delusion some months after the first had been received. Both were rather mild-mannered people, both Catholics, both from a similar socio-economic level. On the lawn one day, happily in the presence of another staff member and myself, the two deluded women met and began to exchange confidences. Before long each revealed to the other her “secret” identity. What followed was most instructive. The first, our “oldest” patient, received the information with visible perturbation and an immediate reaction of startle. “Why you can't be, my dear,” she said, “you must be crazy. I am the Mother of God.” The new patient regarded her companion sorrowfully and, in a voice resonant with pity, said, “I'm afraid it's you who are mixed up; I am Mary.” There followed a brief but polite argument which I was restrained from interfering with by my older and more experienced colleague, who bade me merely to listen and observe. After a while the argument ceased, and there followed a long silence during which the antagonists inspected each other warily. Finally, the “older” patient beckoned to the doctor standing with me.
“Dr. S.,” she asked, “what was the name of our Blessed Mary's Mother?”
“I think it was Anne,” he replied.
At once, this patient turned to the other, her face glowing and her eyes shining. “If you're Mary,” she declared, “I must be Anne, your mother.” And the two women embraced.
As a postscript to this story, it should be recorded that the woman who surrendered her Mother of God delusion thereafter responded rapidly to treatment and was soon discharged.[
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Both accounts suggest a confrontation leading to recovery. In Simon Morin's case, the recovery was short-lived. In that of the Mother of God, we are not told what happened to her subsequently, whether she too “relapsed into a former state of derangement.” Both cases are quoted above in their entirety, and in neither are there any details about the process, sequence, or scope of change either in the delusional system of belief or in behavior.
Through the good offices of Dr. Vernon Stehman, Deputy Director of the Department of Mental Health in Michigan, inquiries were sent in the fall of 1958 to five hospitals for the mentally ill within the state. The objective was to locate two or more patients who believed delusively that they were the same person. The replies revealed that of the 25,000 or so mental patients in the state hospitals of Michigan there were only a handful with delusional identities. There were no Napoleons or Caesars, no Khrushchevs or Eisenhowers. Two people claimed to be members of the Ford family, but not the same person. We located one Tom Mix, one Cinderella, a member of the Morgan family, a Mrs. God, and an assortment of lesser known personages.
About half a dozen or so patients were reported to believe that they were Christ, but closer investigation revealed that some of them did not consistently evince this delusion, and that some were suffering from obvious organic damage. From the records it appeared that only three who were free of organic damage did consistently believe they were Christ. Two of them were at Ypsilanti State Hospital, the third at another. The latter was transferred to Ypsilanti, and all three were shortly thereafter assigned to the same ward. All this, of course, was the result of the cordial cooperation of the psychiatric staff at Ypsilanti State Hospital, all of whose members shared my hope that the research we were about to engage in might lead to results of considerable scientific importance and, furthermore, to significant improvements in the mental state of the three patients.