A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (18 page)

Willan made reports on all his interviews and suggested how the British should deal with recalcitrant rulers. He also suggested the sequence of royal signatures to be obtained. First on the list was the Sultan of Johor, who had readily agreed to the terms. Next was Selangor, then Negeri Sembilan and Pahang. After these four had signed, Willan was certain that the Sultan of Perak would not refuse to join them.

After getting the signatures of the Ruler of Johor and the Federated States, MacMichael was to approach Kedah and the other northern states. Kedah would offer some resistance as the Sultan was bound to consult his state council. Haji Sheriff Awang Osman, the State Secretary who was close to the Sultan and who was likely to be a stumbling block, had to be convinced first. This, the British believed, was a sure-fire way of getting the Sultan’s endorsement. No problems were expected in Perlis, Terengganu and Kelantan as all three Rulers had ascended to the throne during the Japanese Occupation and would rely on British recognition of their positions.

Following Willan’s reports, MacMichael was dispatched to Malaya the next month. By this time the 
rakyat
 of Malaya had heard about the Malayan Union proposal and were agitated, even though they did not know the full content. Because they lacked reliable information, they assumed that the British wanted to make a colony of Malaya and confer citizenship on everyone living in the country. The Malays were very conscious of their poverty, poor education and lack of involvement in the country’s enriching economic activities. They feared they would become the lowest, most deprived stratum in Malayan society.

However, unlike their brothers in the Dutch East Indies, the Peninsular Malays were not thinking of independence. All they wanted was a return to the comfortable 
status quo ante
 they had enjoyed before the war. They wanted to stay as British Protectorates where, as the indigenous people and subjects of the Sultans, they would remain the legitimate definitive people of the Malay states. Everyone else would remain foreigners.

As reports and stories grew of the British determination to implement their Malayan Union plan, the 
rakyat’s
 confidence in their Rulers began to erode. They were no longer content to be excluded from politics. As treasonable as it may have been, they felt that their Rulers were not up to resisting British pressure. The incipient idea of Malay unity slowly spread through the states of Malaya, but they were not confident they could frustrate British plans. The call became louder and more insistent for the Malays to think of themselves as people of 
Tanah Melayu
 and not as subjects of the Rulers of the different states. Newspapers began to promote Malay unity and proposed the setting up of a single body to represent all Malays. The 
rakyat
 envied Indonesia for having a charismatic leader in Sukarno, and some even considered a union between the two countries. Still, the majority believed that if they succeeded in setting up a grouping open to all Malays from all the states, a leader would emerge.

The British noted this increasing level of Malay political activity and their opposition to the Malayan Union, but they were not deterred. They still believed that if the Sultans acquiesced, their plan to unify the Malay states and rule them directly as a Malayan Union would succeed. MacMichael arrived in Malaya in October 1945. On Willan’s advice, he went to see the Sultan of Johor first. Although I was at that time still a student in the Sultan Abdul Hamid College, I watched MacMichael’s progress closely. I wanted to find out what I could do to show Malay displeasure at what he was doing.

The meeting was held in Pasir Pelangi Palace. MacMichael explained that His Majesty’s Government was concerned only with the welfare of the country and that his own work was limited to the congenial task of obtaining the cooperation of the Rulers. For His Majesty’s Government to properly and efficiently carry out the policy, it needed powers of jurisdiction which it did not have at the time. The treaty to be signed by the Sultan would grant this jurisdiction. MacMichael said he had an explanatory note giving more details, strictly for the Sultan’s personal and confidential information. In his notes on the encounter with the Sultan, MacMichael remarked, “that these documents had been printed at very short notice and with really remarkable efficiency, together with the text of the Treaty all ready for signature.”
[10]
 

The Sultan insisted that a British official head every department to ensure that it was properly administered. He stated he had lost faith in Malays—this was duly recorded in the files kept in the archives. The Sultan also expressed concern over such matters as the fate of postage stamps and police badges after the Union, perhaps because he was concerned that these items would not carry Johor’s crest. He said he wanted time to study the papers and to prepare a
memorandum, so it was agreed that another meeting would be held two days later. On 20 September, H.T. Bourdillon,
[11]
 Assistant Secretary in the Colonial Office, produced the documents for signature. Both MacMichael and the Sultan signed without formality or discussion.
 

MacMichael, having served in Palestine, marked the occasion by saying “Praise God” in Arabic. The Sultan did likewise. The Sultan’s memorandum (containing his views on British-Johor relations) was produced and he said MacMichael could take it for what it was worth, and, if he saw fit, could throw it in the wastepaper basket. MacMichael then expressed a hope to meet the Sultan in England, mentioning that General R. Hone, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, had wired an urgent request for passage to England for His Highness.

Jubilant over this coup, MacMichael knew that he would thereafter encounter fewer difficulties with the other Rulers. As he anticipated, they all signed without demur, except for Tunku Badlishah, the Sultan of Kedah.

MacMichael then noted when he went to the palace in Anak Bukit, Alor Star, where Tunku Badlishah was waiting for him, that “he was a small stocky man whose figure hardly permits him any great natural dignity”.
[12]
 Nevertheless he impressed the British envoy “as a man of sense and honesty, courteous and friendly and possessed of considerable self-assurance”. Tunku Badlishah must have been aware even at that time that if he failed to sign, someone else more pliable would be anointed by the British. MacMichael explained his mission along the same lines and made a point of telling the Sultan that “he had been granted discretion by His Majesty’s Government in the matter of recognising him as Sultan of Kedah”.
 

Tunku Badlishah read the copy of the new Treaty and the Explanatory Note handed to him carefully and without comment. When the British officer remarked that he hoped there was nothing unpalatable in the agreement, Tunku Badlishah replied that it was “very devastating”.
[13]
 The point which disquieted him most, and which he constantly returned to in the discussions, was the surrender of power by the Rulers. He noted that Rulers would advise the Resident Commissioner and the Governor (a reversal of roles) but neither would have to heed the advice. This was a reference to the role of the British Adviser, whose advice could not be refused whereas the Sultan’s instructions could be ignored without fear of reprisal. To this, MacMichael said that it was no more than a formal recognition of the existing state of affairs. He said that pre-war, the Governor had always exercised the real power and it was foolish to deny this fact. Under British rule, he said, Sultans had been bound to accept the advice of the Residents or Advisers, and it was only right that this power and overt responsibility should remain in the same hands.
 

His Highness demurred to the suggestion that the Rulers had always been bound to accept the advice of the Residents and referred to the right of appeal to the High Commissioner or the Secretary of State under the old treaty. This made MacMichael unpleasant. He issued a veiled threat, saying it was fortunate that His Majesty’s Government had not concluded—as would have been consistent with modern conceptions of democratic Government—that Sultanates were altogether out of date. What Tunku Badlishah thought of this we do not know, but MacMichael went on to say that even if the policy were to be modified, the change would not favour the Rulers. Despite these menacing undertones, and MacMichael’s insistence on referring to him as the Regent, the Sultan would not readily accommodate himself to the surrender of nominal power. He continued to argue about the independent status of the Unfederated Malay States, Kedah in particular. He went on to say that Malaya would be reduced once again to the status of a colony.

Brigadier Sir Alex Newboult, who later became Chief Secretary of the Federation and who was also present, snidely suggested that perhaps His Highness was thinking of returning to Siamese control as an alternative. This ill-mannered comment was followed by MacMichael remarking that if His Highness’ qualms had been well founded, they would surely have been voiced by the Sultan of Johor. To this the Sultan of Kedah retorted that he was not bound to follow Johor’s example. Finally, he said that he would consult members of the state council. Before MacMichael left, Tunku Badlishah reverted to his courteous Malay self by showing his guest the wedding regalia of the Kedah ruling house. But the strength of his sentiments had registered with MacMichael.

The Sultan again expressed his sense of shock to Colonel E.V.G. Day, the Kedah Senior Civil Affairs Officer, who had accompanied MacMichael and had stayed back after the meeting. Tunku Badlishah added that although the British were far more polite, their bullying tactics were similar to those of the Japanese. For four days MacMichael was kept waiting as Tunku Badlishah consulted the state council. Offers by Colonel Day and Brigadier Newboult to help explain the issue were not taken up.

Finally, there were no more excuses. On 3 December, MacMichael prepared to see the Sultan again to get his signature. But Tunku Badlishah said the signing should take place the next day. When MacMichael refused on account of having other engagements, the Sultan agreed to the signing only after he had had his lunch. At 4pm, before the signing, the meeting of the state council was questioned by the state council members themselves as the British Adviser had not been present. Perhaps this was their way of delaying the signing. MacMichael then took pains to explain that Colonel Day—later to be appointed British Adviser of Kedah—had all the powers and functions of the British Adviser. This authority was only revealed after the fact.

Minutes of the state council meeting, without which the treaty could not be signed, were then prepared. But before signing took place, it was cleverly pointed out by a council member that the Sultan was the President of the state council. This meant that Tunku Badlishah could not sign the minutes before he was made Sultan and therefore the legitimate Council President. Having obtained the assurance of all members that the treaty would be signed, MacMichael was then forced to formally declare that His Majesty’s Government recognised His Highness as the Sultan of Kedah. The minutes of the state council were then signed by all. Tunku Yaacob, the State Agricultural Officer and brother of the Sultan, stated in no uncertain terms that he gave his consent only because he had no choice. Bourdillon then produced the treaty itself for signature. At this stage, the Sultan stood up and announced that he would like to say a few words. Speaking firmly, he said that this was the most distressing and painful moment of his whole life. MacMichael did not let that pass. He stood up and expressed regret at the Sultan’s pessimism, insisting that the treaty would be good for Kedah, and Malaya as a whole. He indicated that he had to report the Sultan’s declaration to the Secretary of State. Finally, the treaty was signed at 5.10pm.

While the Sultan was negotiating with MacMichael, the people of Alor Star were starting to get restless. This was also when my friends and I produced the anti-Malayan Union posters, tacking several of them onto a tree opposite the residence of Colonel Day, where MacMichael was staying. We had heard about the Sultan of Johor readily signing the treaty, then we learnt that four other Sultans had done the same. To us, the treaty was grievously wrong, for it was no less then the surrender of the Malay States to the British. Many of us felt betrayed by our Rulers.

Disappointed though the people were with their Sultans, they still felt that only the Rulers could right the wrongs caused by the treaties. If the Rulers did not repudiate them, these treaties would remain legal. This was the dilemma faced by the nascent political leadership of the Malays. They needed to get the Rulers on their side if they wished to overturn the proposed Malayan Union. Fortunately, the Rulers sensed the change in the attitude of their subjects and a few of them tried to undo the damage. But the British were adamant. This was the catalyst needed to make the Sultans more amenable to the suggestions by the newborn United Malays National Organisation to boycott the installation of the first Governor of the Malayan Union. However, all these issues would soon be overtaken by an outbreak of civil strife that threatened to throw Malaya into conflict.

ENDNOTES

[
1
] Ordained by law.
 

[
2
] Sultan Mahmud Shah II (1675-1699) was known for his cruelty and was said to have had any of his
 
wives who became pregnant killed so that no heir could be born to challenge him. He was assassinated by Laksamana Megat Sri Rama, whose wife and child he had killed in a palace intrigue.

[
3
] Hang Tuah and Hang Jebat are the two most celebrated members of the court of Sultan Mansur Shah of Malacca who ruled from 1456 to 1477.
 

[
4
] The Pangkor Treaty of 1874 between Raja Muda Abdullah of Perak and Sir Andrew Clarke, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, recognised Raja Abdullah as the legitimate Sultan of Perak. In return, Abdullah had to accept, among other things, the advice of a British Resident in all matters except the religion and customs of the Malays.