A Doctor in The House: A Memoir of Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad (71 page)

ENDNOTES

[
1
] The Guthrie Group was Southeast Asia’s first trading company and pioneered rubber and oil palm plantations in Malaya.
 

[
2
] Sime Darby Berhad is one of Malaysia’s biggest multinational companies with interests in plantations, property, motor, heavy equipment and energy and utilities. It is also one of the biggest listed oil palm plantation groups in the world.
 

[
3
] Harrisons and Crosfield was a British trading company that united a number of small estates in Malaya into Golden Hope Rubber Estates, which eventually became Golden Hope Plantations Berhad.
 

[
4
] The British Overseas Airways Corporation became British Airways in 1976.
 

[
5
] The General Services Administration is a US Government agency that oversees the operations of federal departments by implementing cost-cutting policies and providing products, transport, and communications.
 

[
6
] See Chapter 39: Daim Becomes Finance Minister.
 

[
7
] The late Tan Sri Alex Lee was the son of Malaysia’s first Finance Minister, Tun H.S. Lee. A lawyer by training, Alex Lee was also a politician who held several Cabinet positions until he decided not to seek re-election as a Member of Parliament in 1995. He was also a key figure who helped Malaysia win her bid to host the 1998 Commonwealth Games.
 

[
8
] The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development involves 30 countries who adhere to the principles of representative democracy and a free-market economy.
 

[
9
] Signed in 1992, the Maastricht Treaty led to the creation of the European Union and the euro.
 

Another important matter that needed urgent attention in the early days of my administration was the way Bills in Parliament became law. There were flaws in the system which required changes to the Constitution.

The Malaysian Constitution is the result of an agreement reached by the representatives of the Malay Rulers and an Alliance delegation led by Tunku Abdul Rahman, then the elected Chief Minister of the Federation of Malaya.

The two delegations were due to discuss with the Colonial Office in London the future of the Federation, principally its Independence. The Rulers were apprehensive over their status and role in independent Malaya and decided that they should be involved in the negotiation for Independence by the Alliance Government of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Hence, their delegation.

The wily Tunku decided that the two delegations should go by ship so that they could have time to iron out differences between them and present a united front to the British Colonial Office. In this the Tunku was so successful that they were able to fly to London when their ship reached Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

Essentially, it was agreed that independent Malaya would be a Parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. Obviously both sides had as their model the British system, which had successfully retained the monarchy while giving legislative and executive powers to the people via an elected Parliament. Republicanism, which had been the choice of India and Indonesia, was never considered by the Malayans.

However, the British Constitution is unwritten. Malaya could not allow such an important law to remain unwritten. It was agreed that an independent commission would be set up to recommend to the Rulers and the elected Government a constitution in keeping with the understanding between the Rulers and the democratically-elected representatives of the people.

It must be remembered that the Malay states were absolute monarchies when they invited the British effectively to rule their states. The Malay states had no provision for citizenship. The only people recognised as the people of these states were those designated as the subjects of the Malay Rulers. These were mainly the indigenous Malays and the Malays from the Malay Archipelago (Gugusan Pulau-Pulau Melayu) who chose to migrate and settle in the Malay states and were Muslims.

The delegation agreed that the Malay states should federate and become a single country. Each Ruler would continue to be the head of his state but in addition, a King would be chosen by the Rulers from among themselves to preside over the federation. The King as well as the Rulers of each state would be constitutional non-executive heads. When finally the Constitution was accepted by all parties, the provision was for the King and the State Rulers to act on all matters on the advice of the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers (
Menteri Besar
) of the states. On only three matters may the King and the Rulers act on their own and they are:

a) the appointment of the Prime Minister (or state Chief Minister),

b) the dissolution of Parliament (or State Legislative Assembly),

c) the requisition of a meeting of the Conference of Rulers concerned solely with the privileges, position, honours and dignities of their Royal Highnesses.

It would seem that the division of roles and power of the King (and the Rulers) and the representatives of the people was clear-cut. But in practice the King and the Rulers held significant authority and power which could negate the democratic principle of government by the people.

This is because the assent of the King (and the Rulers) to all decisions made by Parliament must take the form of a signature appended by the King (and Rulers) to the documents concerned. If the King chose not to append his signature, Parliament could be frustrated. There was nothing in the Constitution to provide for this contingency.

Although the Malays had accepted democracy, they were and still are very feudal in their thinking. They find it extremely difficult to say “no” to their Rulers. Although they may consider some requests made by their Rulers as not being right, the Malay 
Menteri Besar
 and Prime Minister would find it extremely difficult to say so. The easy way out was to accede to the royal request.

If they turn down the royal command, it is likely that their relations with the Rulers would sour. Yet the Prime Minister, 
Menteri Besar
 and other senior officers of the administration need the cooperation (and consent) of the Rulers in the course of their work. Should the Rulers withhold their cooperation, work could become difficult if not impossible. The impasse could present many administrative problems.

Over the years it was seen that the non-official activities of the Rulers might also create problems embarrassing to the Government, and may also be difficult to resolve. Although it was not mentioned in the Constitution, it was felt that Rulers should not be involved in business. Tunku Abdul Rahman made this clear and so did Tun Hussein. This is because most businesses involve dealing with Government officials and the officials would find it difficult to reject any request from the Rulers, especially when they are state officials.

There is also the possibility of business people “partnering” with the Rulers or making use of them to get permits and concessions. Where there are other business people competing for Government projects or licences or concessions, it would be difficult for officials and even politicians to be evenhanded. They would be forced to favour the King or the Rulers.

Then there might be disputes between business partners and the Rulers. At such times the immunity conferred on the Rulers could frustrate the processes of law.

Every now and then young members of royal families would be involved in fights and assaults. Even Rulers themselves might be involved. Where grievous hurt has been caused, it is unfair to the victims when they cannot resort to redress through the courts. In most cases such incidents would be covered up and would not be reported in the Press. The police would feel powerless to act. But the people would know anyway and there would be much public resentment. When immunity is conferred on the royals, it is expected that they would not abuse it. But the fact is that in Malaysia they do, even if infrequently.

Then there are royals who interfere with the administration, including in appointments to senior posts. There have been cases of royalty tampering with political matters. The Government would be placed in a dilemma. Led by Malays, the tussle faced by Government leaders was always between Malay respect and subservience to royalty and the need to do what is right. At the same time, Malay politicians felt constrained because any overt show of disrespect for the Malay Rulers would cause a lot of Malays to be resentful towards them (the politicians). Disrespect or seeming disrespect of the Rulers by the Government or leaders can result in accusations of wanting to do away with the monarchy, or wanting to convert the country to a republic.

Politicians have always been aware of the strong feelings of the Malays in favour of the royals, and in particular the persons of the Rulers. Ordinary citizens are usually not aware of any wrongdoing by their Rulers. Even if they are, they do not seem to mind, especially when it does not affect them personally.

The Constitution says that the King must act on the advice of the Government as represented by the Minister entrusted by the Cabinet, usually the Prime Minister. But, as pointed out above, it does not say what the action of the Government would be if the advice is rejected or ignored. During the Colonial period, British Advisers actually interfered in the appointment of successors to the Sultan. The Constitution of independent Malaysia provides for no such interference by the Government. Yet there might be cases where the suitability of a candidate might be questionable.

In the case of the promulgation of laws, the Constitution clearly requires the assent of the King in the form of his signature before a law properly legislated by Parliament can become operable. If he refuses, can anything be done to uphold the right of the representatives of the people to make laws? Can it be said that Malaysia is a democracy if it is the King who eventually exercises the right to validate and approve its laws?

Although the Constitution provides that the King may refuse to appoint as Prime Minister anyone representing the majority of elected members, this can easily be remedied by the elected members passing a vote of no confidence in whoever is named by the King. But now we know that the King or the Sultan can effectively frustrate the leader of the majority party by insisting on the appointment of the Rulers’ own candidates.

The majority party should be able to reject the Ruler’s choice simply by passing a vote of no confidence in him when the legislative body is convened. But Malay custom and respect for the royals can prevent this from being done. Thus Malay custom and feudal attitudes can actually override the Constitution. This is not healthy.

When I took over as Prime Minister in July 1981, I was determined to get along with the Rulers and especially the King. The practice in Malaysia was for the Prime Minister to have an audience with the King every Wednesday before the Cabinet met. The King was given a copy of all the papers, including the minutes of the previous week’s meeting for him to read, study or peruse so that he may be able to comment or ask questions on the Cabinet papers. Often the King would not have any question or comment to make. But the meeting also enabled the King to raise any matter, personal or official, that he may feel a need to.

I will not relate here the specific issues that were raised by the six Yang di-Pertuan Agong I served. Suffice to say that a number of these items did put me in a quandary. Despite the provision or the tradition that the King acts on the advice of the Minister (i.e. the Prime Minister) representing the Government, the opposite was sometimes the case. The Prime Minister on several occasions had to accede to the wishes of the King. There had even been cases where another Sultan was able to influence the King.

It is for this reason that I discussed with my Deputy, Tun Musa Hitam, about how the elected representatives of the people, i.e. Parliament, should be the final authority in determining the legitimacy of Acts of Parliament. The King should still append his signature to the laws passed by Parliament, but should he fail to do so for whatever reason, the laws would still come into effect after a period of time. All the other rights of the King, such as the appointment of the Prime Minister and the dissolution of Parliament, would remain with His Majesty.

I thought there should be no difficulty in getting the amendment to the Constitution through as the King would normally accept the advice of the Prime Minister.

After the 1982 General Election and the setting up of the new Cabinet, Tun Musa, who was reappointed Deputy Prime Minister, expressed the view that if we wanted to amend the Constitution to return the rights for law-making to the elected representatives of the people, we should do it as soon as possible after the election. This would prevent the amendment from becoming a fresh issue at the next election. Besides, the 1982 General Election strongly confirmed public support for the Barisan Nasional and my leadership of the party and the Government.

The Attorney-General was tasked with the drafting of the amendments to be made to the Constitution. It was to be quite simple as all that was needed was to provide for all Bills, which had gone through both Houses and been approved as drafted or as amended, to be submitted to the King for His Majesty’s signature. If for any reason the King fails to append his signature, the Bill would be regarded as law after a period of 15 days.

Basically the amendment simply formalises what was already being practised, i.e. the King approves and signs into law the Bills, on the advice of the Prime Minister or any Minister authorised to advise the King. Since the Prime Minister heads the Government which had proposed and obtained the approval of the Parliament, his advice on the amendment would be in accord with the spirit of the Constitution and therefore should receive the King’s assent.