A Just Cause (28 page)

He began his statement by telling the senate that in the past weeks he had been talking “to as many people as [he] possibly could” about his desire to appear before the senate to “tell the whole story” and show that he had “done absolutely nothing wrong.” Blagojevich had appeared on radio and television entertainment talk shows, pleading to be allowed to call witnesses who could attest to his innocence. The witnesses Blagojevich was presumably referring to during his public-relations campaign, and now before the senate, would address the criminal charges brought by the US attorney, which would be the subject of a trial in federal court several months or perhaps years later. The senate had limited access to the evidence concerning the criminal charges, as only four recordings had been provided by the US attorney. Although the first eight articles of the house impeachment resolution addressed criminal charges, only the evidence concerning the governor's attempt to coerce a campaign contribution for signing the horse-racing bill was made available to the Ellis and presented to the senate.

The governor's defense strategy was to claim his innocence and demand that witnesses be subpoenaed and allowed to be cross-examined during the impeachment trial. Blagojevich argued that if the government released all the tapes and he was allowed to call and question witnesses, he could prove his innocence. The house prosecutor had previously addressed this strategy. During both the house investigation and the senate trial, Ellis had often reminded the bodies that they were not a court of law. The proceedings were not intended to determine whether the governor had committed the crimes he was charged with by the US attorney, but to decide whether justifiable cause existed to remove him from office.

Blagojevich told the senate he wished to bring in Rahm Emanuel, President Obama's chief of staff, and US senators Richard Durbin, Harry Reid, and Robert Menendez, all presumably related to the charge of trading
Barack Obama's Senate seat. Repeatedly, he emphasized how his inability to bring in witnesses was unfair: “fundamental fairness, fundamental justice, natural law and constitutional rights suggest I should be able to bring witnesses in to say I didn't do the things they said I did.” He asked the senate to put themselves in his shoes and repeatedly proclaimed that he had not done anything wrong (591–94).

Blagojevich acknowledged that the impeachment resolution was divided into “basically two portions”: allegations that he referred to as an abuse of “executive discretion” and allegations of criminal activity. The only evidence presented to the senate, he rightly said, were the four recordings that dealt with the allegation of coercing a campaign contribution related to the horse-racing bill. Justifying his remarks in those recordings, and speaking familiarly to the senators, he said, “You guys are in politics. You know what we have to do to go out and run—run elections. There was no criminal activity on those four tapes.” He reminded the senate that “those are conversations relating to the things all of us in politics do in order to run campaigns and try to win elections” (596–97). The senators were stunned by the remarks. They sat motionless, their faces radiating disdain. The spectators in the galleries were amazed, some mildly amused. Several spectators began to shake their heads in disbelief, while others smiled. The governor was telling the senate that extortion and coercion were business as usual in public service, in politics. He was telling the senators that they all did it. With that one remark, it seemed to many that Blagojevich sealed his fate.

The governor then returned to the issue of witnesses and complained that it was unfair that he could not call people who could challenge the allegations. He argued that the house prosecutor had not proven criminal activity and asked the senate, “How can you throw a governor out of office who is clamoring and begging and pleading with you to give him a chance to bring witnesses in to prove his innocence?” Over and over he repeated his mantra: let me call in witnesses; give me a chance (597–99).

Blagojevich had prepared notes, but he rarely consulted them. His remarks were in the form of a campaign speech: establish some talking points, engage in small talk, and try to connect with the crowd. Several times he veered off the topic, and in an attempt to bond with the senate, he told stories. He told of serving on a congressional committee and being in the same room with US senators Ted Kennedy, John Glenn, John McCain, and John Warner. Warner, he pointed out to the senate, had been married to Elizabeth Taylor, and he told of the time Senator Warner thought he was a
young staffer and told him to fetch him a cup of coffee (600–601). Although this was a favorite story on the campaign trail, here the tale felt lame, inappropriate, and overtly manipulative to the senate and spectators.

The instincts of a seasoned politician were apparent. Blagojevich used the familiar Warner story as a lead to defending his actions with the Joint Committee on Administrative Rules. Some senators served on JCAR, and Blagojevich attempted to establish a parity with them by noting his having served on a US congressional committee. “I know how important it is for those of you who are appointed to a committee like that, but let me respectfully suggest a couple of things,” he said. He maintained that JCAR was only an advisory committee and could not dictate policy to the executive branch, saying, “12 lawmakers picked by . . . legislative leaders cannot constitutionally thwart the executive branch.” He reminded the Democrats that he had worked with senate leader Emil Jones and, recalling the past animosities between Jones and Speaker Michael Madigan, stated that the house had blocked his and Jones's efforts to fund an expansion of health care. He appealed to his purpose—to help poor families obtain health care. “Now, how is it an impeachable offense to protect low-income parents from losing their healthcare?” he implored. The governor said that he had received the advice of lawyers and, attempting to appeal to the Democratic members of the senate, that his actions were in concert with the senate Democratic leadership. Besides, he continued, the issue of JCAR's authority had not been settled and was still the subject of litigation (601–5).

He turned to the procurement of the flu vaccines and told of warnings by the US Centers for Disease Control that the flu season of 2005–6 would be “one of the worst flu seasons in recent American history.” A portion of Illinois' normal supply of flu vaccine was contaminated, and it had been determined that a shortage existed. His decision to obtain the vaccine from Canada “was a no-brainer” and was for a straightforward reason: “because I was foreseeing the possibility that our elderly and infants might be vulnerable to flus that could conceivably take their lives.” In a self-righteous tone he added, “And by the way, if I get criticized for it, that ain't the first time.” He claimed that officials in other states contemplated the idea until the FDA became involved and blocked the delivery of the flu vaccine to Illinois. He said the state had not lost $2.5 million because the case was not settled and was still before the Illinois Court of Claims, and Illinois' attorney general had argued that the state's taxpayers should not pay the bill. Again he argued, “How can you throw a governor out of office who
was acting to protect the lives of senior citizens and infants and trying to find ways to be able to help families?” (605–8).

Blagojevich turned next to an arguable point: the charge related to the flu vaccine had taken place during his first term, but the house did not pass or even consider an impeachment resolution in 2005. He had stood for reelection and the people had again elected him, presumably with the full knowledge and approval of his actions (609). This valid and problematic argument had worried the house prosecutor and the senate chief legal counsel, Eric Madiar. Should the Illinois senate invalidate the sovereign will of the electorate expressed through the reelection of Rod Blagojevich?

The governor moved next to the I-SaveRx program, his effort to provide lower-cost drugs from Canada. “I can't wait to talk about this one,” he said. Blagojevich told the senate that the idea was given to him by Rahm Emanuel, and again attempting a personal connection, reminded the senate that Emanuel was his congressman and also Senator Cullerton's congressman at the time. “Think about the morality of this,” he posed to the senate. He had thought about helping senior citizens and families, he said, “and I loved the idea, and we did it.” He claimed to have worked with Senators Ted Kennedy and John McCain on the issue of importation of prescription drugs and said that if what he had done was so wrong, then “let's demand that President Obama fire Rahm Emanuel.” Again he reminded the senate that the I-SaveRx incident had also occurred during his first term, pointing out, “The people of Illinois elected me a second time knowing what I did with regard to prescription drugs for our senior citizens” (609–12).

The governor then attempted to refute charges related to the efficiency initiatives, that funds had been removed from one agency to another without legislative approval. Many considered the efficiency initiatives a simple shell game with little or no accountability. The governor began by extolling the many accomplishments of his administration and reminded the senators that in many past instances they had been his allies and that he could not have accomplished the “big achievements” without the senate's support. He justified and obfuscated the alleged manipulations by stating that the expansion of health care to 750,000 families and an increase of $8.4 billion in education funding was not accomplished “on the backs of the middle class by raising their taxes,” but through “efficiency, consolidating functions,” and streamlining operations. He claimed that Central Management Services (CMS) found ways to save money and had saved over $500 million for taxpayers and “wanted to . . . allow us to be able to use that money in
the General Revenue Fund to invest in healthcare and education and other general revenue items, but then the Auditor General got involved and said, stop, don't do it.” Minimizing the situation as merely an administrative disagreement, Blagojevich likened the discussions between Auditor General Bill Holland and the head of CMS as “a couple of accountants kind of scrapping over the issue of whether or not the money should be spent in a certain way.” Blagojevich noted that CMS had stopped the practice and that this was another issue that had occurred during the first term (613–15).

The last article in the impeachment resolution concerned abuses in hiring and firing state employees. The allegations were uncovered through an investigation of the hiring practices of the Blagojevich administration conducted by the Illinois inspector general. The house investigative committee reiterated the findings of the inspector general: that the governor's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs directed the Illinois Department of Employment Security to bypass hiring protocol and violate the
Rutan
hiring mandate and veteran hiring preference.
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The governor said little about the charge except that he had supported the legislation that created the position of inspector general and that the allegations were not yet proven. He did not deny the allegation, but he claimed that the inspector general had not presented any evidence that the governor knew about the activity or was involved. He also reminded the senate that the allegations of employment abuse, like the other maladministration charges, had occurred during his first term in office. He dismissed the allegations as administrative disagreements that came about through his desire to help people (616–19). His message was clear: if he only had the chance to bring in witnesses, they would exonerate him.

The governor had covered all the charges contained in the impeachment resolution and offered nothing more of substance. But he was not finished. Blagojevich now shifted from the role of the accused answering specific charges to a role where he was at his best—Rod Blagojevich on the campaign stump. His campaign speeches were structured with phrases and stories designed to stir audiences. Common content in his political speeches included expressions of humility, attempts to identify with the audience, displays of concern for the disadvantaged and downtrodden, tales of his focus on economic growth using unsubstantiated job projections, heartrending stories that the audience easily accepted and no one could challenge, acknowledgements of connections with famous people or with familiar people in the audience, and a self-narrative of Rod Blagojevich, the family man.
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While addressing the specific charges in the impeachment
resolution, Blagojevich had occasionally referred to his notes. Now he did not need notes. His campaign-style remarks were guided by the instincts that the seasoned politician had acquired through years of campaign performances. He used all the hackneyed phrases and allusions commonly employed in campaign speeches, but he was addressing an audience of politicians who received his remarks with an air of incredulity and cynicism.

Over and over, in dolorous tones, he implored the senate to give him a chance to bring in witnesses who could prove his innocence. Justifying his administrative actions, he claimed legal means with moral motivations. He was just trying to help poor people keep their health care and had “found a way that [he could] actually do something and help them be able to have a better quality of life, not ration their medicine, maybe extend their lives, [and] the means are legal.” In an effort to associate himself with other prominent public figures, he continued; “because if they're not, then the governor of Wisconsin, the governor of Kansas, and Ted Kennedy and Rahm Emanuel and John McCain and others ought to be co-conspirators with me.” He again attempted to establish commonality and kinship with the Illinois senate and talked of the things they had accomplished together. To display humility and solicit compassion, he solemnly admitted, “I know sometimes I probably push too much and prod too hard. I know you guys have this impression that sometimes, you know, I go outside of you and say certain things” (620–21).