Aachen: The U.S. Army's Battle for Charlemagne's City in World War II (29 page)

Herlong took McBride somewhat by surprise when he informed him that the regiment had now given the battalion the mission of capturing Merkstein-Hofstadt and setting up defensive positions to the south of the village. He also told him that the engineers had cut a roadway through the railroad embankment where the Germans had previously blown an overpass and then followed with word that a platoon from the 743rd Tank Battalion had come through and would now support the attack. This was undoubtedly very good news to Captain McBride. It would be the first time in days that the armor was able to help out. Herlong also told McBride that his men and the platoon of tanks would be on the right, while Bons's Company C attacked to the left. McBride responded by telling the battalion commander that he would be ready in ten minutes,
but he was uncertain of Company C's location; McBride's patience had grown increasingly thin with his neighbor. It turned out that Bons's men were still 500 yards to the rear of Company B; twenty minutes later these men arrived at Captain McBride's location. Herlong had come down from his command post by this time; the company captains joined him and the platoon leader from the 743rd Tank Battalion to receive the attack order. Bons and McBride exchanged harsh words; Herlong helped sort this out, but he remained focused on the mission. Company B would clear out the remaining portion of the woods; Bons would still attack to the left. Once the woods were cleared, Company C would be responsible for cleaning out the eastern half of Merkstein-Hofstadt while McBride's men reduced the west side of the hard coal mining town. The tanks were to initially operate on the right of Company B, and then assist the companies as the situation dictated when they reached Merkstein-Hofstadt. Captain Simmons's Company A would follow Company B and protect the right flank of the battalion.

When the attack jumped off, Captain McBride and his platoons again displayed exceptional initiative. By 1400, they had cleaned out the woods in their zone with the assistance of the tanks that first fired into its western fringes and had taken twenty prisoners. Company C was still back in the woods, so McBride, unhappy with Bons, ordered his left platoon to join with the tanks and again take over Company C's mission. After conferring with Captain Simmons, McBride directed his left platoon to be responsible for this task; Company A would now provide close support. By 1630, McBride's platoons had cleared out the upper part of Merkstein-Hofstadt to either side of the north-south roadway that ran through it and had taken fifteen more prisoners. At 1715, Bons's Company C finally arrived and assisted in securing the factory area to the south of the crossroad through town. An hour and a half later, the battalion consolidated its positions; they established defenses to the east and south. They had accomplished their mission.

“This was the last day of heavy fighting for the 1st Battalion in the Siegfried Line operation,” Lieutenant Colonel Herlong noted a few days later.
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The battalion journal also noted it was a day for which they could be proud. “Battalion praised by corps and division on their stubborn and aggressive fighting,” it stated.
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In part, this was because reducing the Rimburg woods and capturing Merkstein-Hofstadt had finally relieved
the pressure on the left flank of Lieutenant Colonel Brown's 3rd Battalion; his forces would now be able to launch an attack against the pillboxes to the southeast. But it was still a day where losses were particularly hard-felt in the 1st Battalion. McBride lost Technical Sgt. Adrian F. Vetter and Lt. Kenneth R. Knowe. Both had been killed. Lieutenant Bons was also slightly injured, but he had continued on through the day. Captain McBride aptly summarized:

In the five days of attacks the 1st Battalion had made an open river crossing and captured 19 pillboxes, one enemy town, one enemy factory, 245 enemy soldiers and an undetermined quantity of their equipment. The battalion paid a high price for these accomplishments; the rifle companies sustained a total of 354 casualties.
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At daylight on 6 October, elements of two battalions of the 49th Infantry Division's 148th Regiment launched a determined counterattack against Lieutenant Colonel Cox's 2nd Battalion from the ridge on the east edge of Herbach. Following a very heavy artillery strike, two fearsome looking Mark VI Tiger tanks emerged down a draw and fired on Company E's forward outpost. Charged-up German infantry attacked and captured every man in this position, except for one sergeant who hid in some underbrush. The Mark VIs then turned their turrets and fired at the pillbox that was the joint command post of Lieutenant Parker's 1st and 3rd Platoons. Like their opposite numbers when they were attacked, the Americans who were in the outlying trenches raced inside the pillbox. The Germans used the same tactics that the Americans had and poured in rapid and heavy small-arms fire while they rushed forward with smoke charges, quickly closing the apertures of the box to return fire. Taking advantage of the holes the Americans had put in the pillbox when they captured it the day before, the Germans threw hand grenades through these openings. Lieutenant Parker's entire 1st and 3rd Platoons, to a man, had no choice but to surrender.

The Mark VIs confidently resumed their hunt, this time moving into the woods that had been captured the previous day on the battalion's left flank. To the right, three more enemy tanks suddenly appeared. Again, methods the Americans had used on the Germans were turned
against them. Two more pillboxes fell; all the friendly troops in these boxes surrendered. Parker's weapons platoon personnel were the only ones who put up a real fight. It was costly. Seven men were wounded and one soldier was killed before the Germans took their pillbox back.
²⁸

A similar fate befell Lieutenant Arn's Company F. At about 0530 that morning a two-man patrol from Staff Sergeant Todd's squad reported that they had heard tank movement to the southeast of the woods. Then at dawn, fire from these tanks—Mark Vs—was directed at the pillbox occupied by the 1st Platoon. Lt. Henry F. Bayard, commanding the 3rd Platoon, witnessed what followed and remembered, “The next thing I saw were Jerries approaching the pillbox, followed by [Lieutenant Masonheimer's] 1st Platoon running into the woods with their hands up. They did have men in the trenches adjoining the pillbox. The hostile infantrymen rushed the position so rapidly after the tank fire lifted that the platoon was caught off balance and surrendered.”
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Lieutenant Colonel Cox had been frantically calling for tank support since the counterattacks began, but none was available because the armored vehicles were being resupplied with ammunition. The German tank strike raged on. Fortunately, one very quick-thinking runner in the 2nd Platoon, Private Sewell, left his pillbox before the Germans attacked and raced several hundred yards back to the box that Lieutenant Arn and Lieutenant Bayard were in. Subsequently, the lieutenants called in artillery and mortar fire; it was Arn who was later credited with doing a “great job” in directing this fire. From a trench outside the box, his 300 radio operated satisfactorily; he had range. He stayed here, calling adjustments, despite hostile return artillery fire by the Germans, and began to turn the situation around.

Another alert private added more momentum to the fight when he noticed a smoke screen at the northeast edge of the woods. Fortunately, by this time the American tanks had reappeared with their ammunition loads; communication between the tankers and the infantry suffered from the confusion at that moment, but not for long. Lieutenant Arn again displayed exceptional leadership. This time he exposed himself to enemy fire, left his trench, got right on top of the pillbox from which he was commanding, and directed the tankers with hand motions; radio contact had failed. One M-4, commanded by Lt. Walter D. Macht, followed Arn's signal to place fire on the northeast edge of the woods by
taking the initiative to move forward. Fifteen rounds were laid in; one Mark V turned and ran.

But German infantry reaction was quick; this time they placed a machine gun on top of a recaptured pillbox and aimed it at Lieutenant Arn's box. There was just one 60mm mortar left in his weapons platoon and Sgt. Karl L. Jilig, following Arn's hasty order to start setting it up, discovered that the tube had been hit by a shell fragment and was defective. Again, quick thinking proved fortuitous. The 117th Infantry was 200 yards away on the left at the time, so a mortar man—Pfc. Conley—made a hasty round trip and returned with a borrowed mortar and some ammunition. Sergeant Jilig went right to work with it, placing a round directly on top of the pillbox housing the enemy machine gun and then laying smoke and fire on the side where the aperture was located, rendering the box useless as Germans fell to their deaths.

Others fought on. Some of these infantrymen had worked their way around to the south of Lieutenant Arn's command pillbox by this time. Arn had just twenty-five men with him and when he saw the counterattack coming he ordered everyone to grab their weapons and take up positions in the adjoining trenches. Incredibly, the men were slow to open fire when the enemy skirmish line approached. Arn's personal reaction had been to empty three rounds of his carbine toward the Germans, but then the weapon jammed. The Company F commander yelled for someone to give him an M-1, but as Lieutenant Bayard noted later, “No one volunteered because [his] words galvanized the men into action and every weapon opened up on the advancing enemy. One of the most effective defenders was Private Floyd J. Mikula, who placed his machinegun in a Jerry-dug position and kept firing as long as there was a German standing.”
³⁰

This single spirited defense was not the only reason the counterattack was stopped. It was sunny on 6 October, permitting air support for the first time in days. Eight P-38s responded to calls initiated by Lieutenant Colonel Cox and laid their bombs on a coal pile just south of the woods where more enemy forces were assembling to strengthen the counterattack. The work of Lieutenant Macht's tank platoon was also critical; they eventually knocked out three Mark Vs, their charred hulls later found smoking at the edge of the woods. Company H's 81mm mortars delivered approximately 1,200 rounds, which were accurate and
effective. Friendly artillery fire also made a difference. “Lieutenant Arn was in the best position to adjust both the mortar and artillery fire, which he did,” remembered Sgt. Raymond O. Beaudoin, Company F's communications sergeant.
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“Lieutenant Colonel Cox was a mountain of strength throughout the counterattack,” others agreed. “His calm voice on the radio under the most critical of circumstances was of inestimable value to all subordinate commanders.”
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Lieutenant Parker did not have good communication that morning; his 300 radio was out of commission. Still, his Company E benefited from the support of Captain Hopcraft's Company K, which had come down from the Rimburg Castle in the afternoon to retake the four pillboxes lost that morning. The Germans ran when the company attacked. Parker was able to prevent other pillboxes from being captured because he, like Lieutenant Arn, had ordered his remaining soldiers to man the outside of the boxes. “This meant that when the hostile infantry advanced, they were mowed down by rifle fire from the trenches,” Parker stated later. “Artillery also knocked out two Tiger tanks and forced three others to withdraw. With their tank support gone, the enemy infantrymen soon pulled back.”
³³
Major Laney, the executive officer of the 2nd Battalion, maintained that the credit for repulsing the counterattack also belonged to the accuracy of the air strikes.

It had nevertheless been a very costly day for Lieutenant Colonel Cox. After their hostile ground forces withdrew, the Germans plastered the crest of the hill fronting Herbach with artillery. Many Americans in the pillbox trenches became casualties from this fire, as well as from 75mm direct enemy fire delivered from positions in the town. Company E had started the day with 165 soldiers; it ended with just 35 fighting men left. Lieutenant Parker was barely able to form one platoon, which he put under the command of Sergeant Holycross. When the counterattacks were over, Lieutenant Arn's Company F was down to twenty-three enlisted men and just two officers. Lieutenant Masonheimer's 1st Platoon had been almost at full strength before they were all captured; Lieutenant Bug's 2nd Platoon started with thirty-two men, the 3rd Platoon with thirty-eight, and the weapons platoon with twenty-eight. Company G had assisted in repulsing the counterattacks; many of these men accompanied the tanks when they attacked. With all of the pillboxes lost
during the day recaptured by 1910 hours, Cox ordered what remained of his battalion to dig in for the night. Herbach was flanked on two sides by this time. Major Greer's 3rd Battalion of the 120th Infantry Regiment had endured a counterattack by approximately 100 Germans at 0745 that morning, but by 1600 his companies had worked their way on line to the right of the 2nd Battalion.

For Lieutenant Colonel Brown's 3rd Battalion of the 119th Infantry Regiment, the day involved adjustments, some movement, and ducking artillery fire. Captain Palmer's reconstituted Company I took over Company K's duties to watch over the Rimburg bridge and help guard the regimental command post in the castle. Stanford's Company L had maintained contact through the day with Herlong's 1st Battalion, and as they progressed out of the Rimburg woods the company was able to move ahead ever so slowly. Two pillboxes in the woods south of the castle were captured and fifteen prisoners were taken. The company suffered several casualties during the attack, including Lieutenant Hager, who was wounded in the shoulder. It was enemy artillery that many remembered as particularly frightening, however. “It was suicide to walk around,” recalled another officer. “Any moving that was necessary was done on the run from one covered spot to the next covered spot.”
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During the time Lieutenant Colonel Cox's 2nd Battalion was experiencing their troubles with the pillboxes near Herbach, Colonel Stokes's left column of CCA struck to the northeast, with their first mission securing a crossroads in Blanstein. The leading company in his assault wave took heavy concentrations of antitank fire on their south flank as they approached the town, so they called for friendly artillery fire. While these enemy guns were being neutralized, Stokes dispatched a separate task force toward the northeast consisting of Company D of the 66th Armored Regiment, Company K of the 29th Division's 116th Infantry Regiment, and a platoon of tanks from the 702nd Tank Battalion. Their mission was to finally secure Beggendorf, and they accomplished this before noon.