Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War (19 page)

It was in this context that Chile launched its very own diplomatic offensive in Latin America in 1971. From the start of Allende’s presidency, the UP had emphasized its attachment to the “Andean Pact,” a group dedicated to subregional development and economic integration that was established in 1969 by Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia. At the end of 1970, the UP had then signed the group’s “Decision 24,” an agreement to regulate foreign investment and decrease external control of the members’ industrial production. Foreign Minister Almeyda later admitted that Chile’s main purpose in doing so was political rather than economic and that Chile had “no illusions” about the prospects for economic collaboration. Member states did not have a history of commercial relations; in fact, when the pact was signed, their exports to and imports from each other amounted only to just under 3 percent and less than 5 percent of their total trade respectively. As Almeyda recalled, some in the UP believed that trying to transform this unfavorable balance of trade was economically unwise, but it was increasingly considered politically important to show “an active and visible Chilean loyalty to the process.”
¹⁰⁸

Beyond the Andean Pact, Chilean diplomats campaigned widely in early 1971 to spread information about the democratic, peaceful, noninterventionist character of Allende’s government and its commitment to “ideological pluralism” in foreign affairs. As Mexico’s foreign minister told Santiago’s ambassador in Mexico City, this type of diplomacy was pivotal, given
the way in which foreign news services had taken to attaching “political or ideological surnames” to all things Chilean. His advice was to launch an “open and extensive campaign” as the only means of defending the truth, which is exactly what the Chileans were already doing.
¹⁰⁹
Allende publicly challenged the idea that he planned to export La Vía Chilena in the Southern Cone, noting that it was “difficult to conceive” how this would happen in countries with no political parties, workers organizations, or a parliament.
¹¹⁰
In April, Almeyda then emphasized Chile’s “sober” approach to foreign affairs and rejected the idea that Allende had any regional leadership pretensions when he addressed the OAS General Assembly. And with regard to Chile’s decision to reestablish relations with Cuba, Almeyda not only defended his government’s actions by pointing out that Chile was not the only one that had relations with the island—Mexico also had them—but argued that the nature of Cuba’s isolation was becoming ever more “artificial.”
¹¹¹

Yet, in practice, the UP’s regional policies were far more ambiguous to outsiders than the Chilean Foreign Ministry and Allende proclaimed. Partly, this was the consequence of the heterogeneous nature of the UP. At the PS Congress in January 1971, the party’s newly elected general secretary, Carlos Altamirano, publicly declared that Uruguayan and Brazilian revolutionaries would “always” receive asylum and support from “comrades in arms” in Chile.
¹¹²
Allende’s own position also raised doubts about conflicting allegiances abroad. When in mid-1971, the British ambassador in Montevideo, Geoffrey Jackson, was kidnapped by the Uruguayan revolutionary movement, the Tupamaros, London discreetly asked Allende to appeal for his release, which he did. As Britain’s ambassador in Santiago, who was rather sympathetic to La Vía Chilena, noted after he met the Chilean president, Allende was “very good at making those with whom he talks feel that he is fundamentally on their side.”
¹¹³
Moreover, in helping out on this occasion he surmised that Allende had wanted “the best of both worlds.” “He has hoped for a great boost for himself as president of Chile and as leader of the Latin American left,” the ambassador noted; “he would not do anything to embarrass the Tupamaros and he might indeed be able to help them both by facilitating a satisfactory arrangement over Jackson and by presenting them and the left wing in general in a relatively good light. He also wants to gain credit with us: he is anxious to be on good terms with the Europeans, and we are particularly important as Europeans and also as an influence on the US.”
¹¹⁴

Despite this rather ambiguous image, and while engaging in active diplomacy
elsewhere, the Chileans began questioning officials in Washington directly about their Latin American policies. Unsurprisingly, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Crimmins “absolutely, totally and categorically” denied the existence of a plan to isolate Chile.
¹¹⁵
And Kissinger predictably told Ambassador Letelier the idea was “absolutely absurd … with no foundation.”
¹¹⁶
In fact, so persuasive was Kissinger that as a result of these conversations Letelier was once more taken in. Certainly, he advised the Chilean Foreign Ministry to avoid making the mistake of reading too much into U.S. visits to Latin American countries. And he also urged Almeyda again not to underestimate the value of the high-level personal assurances he had been given.
¹¹⁷

But of course, as in the case of U.S.-Chilean bilateral relations, the Chileans had
every
reason to be suspicious. Although there were differences in Washington regarding the extent to which the United States should rally Latin American counterrevolutionary forces against Chile, the whole administration wanted to curtail Allende’s regional influence.
¹¹⁸
As Crimmins told one Latin American diplomat, “U.S. policy toward Chile is to act with prudence and restraint, reacting to Chile rather than taking initiatives. We want to avoid any confrontation; if any untoward difficulties arise, they will be Chile’s fault. We are not happy or optimistic; but we don’t believe it is good to assume that all is lost.”
¹¹⁹
The Ad Hoc Interagency Group on Chile also recommended that although anti-Americanism in the region meant that the United States had to tread gently, it could still play a “behind-the-scenes” role, “encouraging Latin Americans to take the initiative but, if necessary, feeding suggested initiatives to them.”
¹²⁰

In fact, U.S. leaders were once more heavily engaged in building up Latin America’s military institutions and antidemocratic strongmen. As Rettig had feared, the Nixon administration was making a concerted effort to improve Washington’s relations with Brazil’s military regime. And, already, by the beginning of 1971, Nixon’s orders to pay special attention to the country as a response to Allende’s election had significantly changed the results of a yearlong Program Analysis at the eleventh hour. Before this, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s attention to Brazil as an emerging Third World power had been resisted by the State Department, which called for distance from General Emílio Garrastazu Médici’s authoritarian regime.
¹²¹
Moreover, those at the State Department who had been mainly responsible for compiling the Program Analysis on Brazil (NSSM 67) had stressed Brazil’s relatively unimportant strategic significance. Brazil’s military use,
they argued, was only in “UN and OAS peacekeeping operations” and did not justify substantive military assistance.
¹²²

However, when the NSC’s Senior Review Group met to discuss NSSM 67 back in December 1970, these conclusions had effectively been thrown out the window. On the surface, the SRG had approved a “Selective Support” option.
¹²³
But discussion had inevitably drifted to the impact Allende’s election had on the inter-American system. In this climate, those who argued that U.S.-Brazilian relations should not be determined by Allende’s arrival on the scene lost out.
¹²⁴
For one, Kissinger had already preempted the SRG meeting’s conclusions by asking Nachmanoff how U.S.-Brazilian relations could be improved.
¹²⁵
And echoing General Vernon Walters’s advice to Kissinger a month earlier, Nachmanoff had suggested that although Washington would have to respond as favorably as possible to military equipment requests, and even address the problems of economic development “if necessary,” it also had “to try to lift their sights to bigger concepts and historical problems.” He recommended that a way to do this was to concentrate on improving “matters of style and consultation,” and shortly afterward Nixon instructed Kissinger that he wanted President Médici invited to the United States by July 1971.
¹²⁶
Indeed, in late 1970 the White House effected a decisive priority shift when it came to U.S.-Brazilian relations. By January 1971 the American Embassy in Brasilia had prepared a Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) underlining what had changed:

The fundamentally most important U.S. interest in Brazil is the protection of U.S. national security through the cooperation of Brazil as a hemispheric ally against the contingencies of: an intracontinental threat, such as a serious deterioration in the Chilean situation (example—Chile adopting a Cuba-style “export of revolution” policy) or the formation of an Andean bloc which turned anti-US; or an admittedly more remote extra-continental threat, such as Soviet penetration of the South Atlantic. The danger posed by recent events in Chile and Bolivia establishes a hemispheric security threat which did not exist at anywhere near the same level as this time last year. The maintenance, therefore, of Brazil as a potential ally in hemispheric security affairs could be of critical interest to the U.S.
¹²⁷

Nixon was especially insistent on improving and strengthening the U.S.-Brazilian alliance. As he later privately told Kissinger and Haldeman, he
wanted the Brazilians to know that “we are just about the best friend Brazil has had in this office [the Oval office].” There may have been sectors of Congress and the State Department that were opposed to strengthening relations with the military regime, but, as Nixon instructed on this occasion, he wanted Brasilia to know they were being ignored.
¹²⁸

At the same time as the U.S. administration was reviewing policy toward Brazil, the Pentagon had also taken advantage of this priority shift to stop scheduled reductions of Military Group personnel in Latin America.
¹²⁹
As Deputy Assistant Secretary Crimmins noted, the Pentagon tended “to be uneasy with the restraints imposed by the risks of playing into Allende’s hands through becoming too overt. Against these risks they set those of appearing to Latin America and the opposition to Allende in Chile to be weak and indecisive.”
¹³⁰
Indeed, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had written directly to Nixon at the end of November, arguing that reductions were “inconsonant” with the president’s instructions to improve ties with the region’s military leaders. Instead, he called for a joint interagency plan to increase Military Groups “on a selective basis … as quickly as possible.”
¹³¹
When Laird informed Kissinger of progress toward upgrading military assistance a month later, Kissinger welcomed the news. As far as the latter was concerned, it was essential that the Latin Americans understood they should go only to the United States in search of security and military supplies.
¹³²

By this point, Kissinger had also already ordered an interagency review of the U.S. military presence in Latin America.
¹³³
The conclusion he received in response was bold: aside from having security and military value, the Interdepartmental Group on Inter-American Affairs found that “military missions, attaché staffs, training, and other programs” were highly effective for diplomatic and political purposes. To clear up any ambiguity, the Interdepartmental Group recommended sending “definitive guidance removing any doubts about the permissibility, propriety and desirability of utilizing mission personnel and attaches for purposes of influencing host governments’ military leaders toward U.S. foreign policy objectives.” In addition, it advised overcoming legislative restrictions on military sales and according Latin America a “high priority” over other regions.
¹³⁴
In April 1971 the president also took a direct interest in ensuring a strong U.S. military presence in Latin America when he intervened to stop plans to phase out the U.S. Armed Forces’ Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).
¹³⁵

Brazil’s military regime was either unaware of or unimpressed by this resurgent U.S. interest in hemispheric affairs. Indeed, throughout early
1971, the Brazilians believed the United States was not doing
enough
to combat the communist threat in the Southern Cone. Brazil’s ambassador in Santiago, Antonio Castro da Câmara Canto, certainly doubted the United States’ ability to counter Allende’s impact in the hemisphere effectively. He regretted that, together with Washington’s difficulties in Vietnam and tensions with a number of Latin American countries, Chilean “able diplomacy” was limiting its impact. Not only did the UP’s legal, constitutional approach give the United States nothing to “protest,” but the United States had been too wary of repeating the same mistakes it had made in 1959. By contrast, Câmara Canto suggested that Santiago had absorbed the lessons of Castro’s experience well.
¹³⁶

In view of these concerns, the Brazilians tried to persuade Washington to do more about Chile and, beyond that, about what they perceived to be threatening trends in South America. One Brazilian vice admiral spoke to the U.S. ambassador in Brasilia, William Rountree, “at length and almost emotionally” about the prospects for U.S.-Brazilian military cooperation and “dangerous potentialities in Latin America” (he highlighted Chile, other Andean states, and Uruguay for particular attention).
¹³⁷
In November 1970 Brazilian foreign minister Gibson Barbosa had also told Rountree, that “he realized that [the] U.S. was far more important to Brazil than Brazil was to [the] U.S. Nevertheless he regarded Brazil’s success as [a] large, dynamic, and successful country with [an] economy based on [a] free enterprise system, and serving as an important counter [weight] to trends in certain other Latin American countries, to be important to [the] U.S. and [the] free world.”
¹³⁸
Then, in early February, Gibson Barbosa stressed the potential for U.S. cooperation when he raised further concerns about “trends” in the Southern Cone region directly with U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers in Washington. Specifically, he underlined Allende’s impact on nationalist military governments in Peru and Bolivia and also on Uruguay, where Brazil was particularly concerned about “marked leftist gains.” Although Gibson acknowledged that direct intervention in Chile would be “counterproductive,” he urged the United States to work with Brazil “to meet the threats posed by these developments … (1) to counter the Chilean situation; (2) to help rebuild friendship for the United States which has waned in certain sectors in Brazil and (3) to reinforce trends in Brazil toward a return to responsive political institutions.” (The latter was presumably for domestic U.S. consumption.)
¹³⁹