Attack on Pearl Harbor (60 page)

11
. Sakai states that the development of the strategic range capability in the A6M Zero freed up three light carriers. This probably is not exactly correct. In addition to the six fleet carriers, on 8 December 1941 the Japanese had six light and escort carriers available or in the latter stages of workups. The two escort carriers,
Kasuga Maru
and
Chuyo
, were engaged in aircraft ferry missions. Light carriers
Hosho
and
Zuiho
were attached as aviation support to the battleships of the First Fleet operating out of Hashirajima Anchorage. Light carrier
Shoho
was in the final stages of workups and not ready for active operations. Light carrier
Ryujo
was attached to the Southern Philippines Seizure Force operating off the east coast of the Philippines. From examining the dispositions of the fleet on 8 December, it would appear that CarDiv 5 (fleet carriers
Shokaku
and
Zuikaku
) was originally intended to provide air support for strikes against Clark Field, Cavite, and Manila, followed by the invasion of Davao, and possibly followed thereafter by a quick transit around north of Luzon to the west coast to support the Lingayen Gulf invasion. This support became unnecessary with the increase in range of the A6M Zero, allowing the Japanese to immediately strike the Philippine air bases from Formosa. In addition, fighter bases were established after the landing at Bataan Island (north of Luzon) on 8 December 1941, and on Philippine soil after the landings at Vigan and Aparri on Northern Luzon, 11–12 December 1941. MacArthur incorrectly evaluated those landings as a feint designed to draw his forces away from the main landing site at Lingayen Gulf, which was not invaded until the 21st of December. He allowed the 5th Air Army to become established on Luzon and elements of the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas at Davao without opposition. MacArthur did not understanding the significance of allowing Japanese air power to become established on the Philippines.

12
. Prange, 1981, 158.

13
. Peattie, 2001, 102.

14
. Peattie, 2001, 108.

15
. Yoshimura, 27.

16
. Peattie, 2001, 113.

17
. Oberg.

18
. Francillon, 112–120.

19
. Watts and Gordon. Aircraft capacity numbers should not be considered fixed or standard. A carrier’s rated capacity would change as larger or smaller aircraft models were introduced, doctrine was changed, or the ships modified. In addition, most fleet carriers stowed additional disassembled spare aircraft that might be assembled before a battle in anticipation of losses.

20
. Operational were fleet carriers
Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu
and
Soryu
, light carriers
Hosho
and
Ryujo
, and escort carrier
Kasuga Maru
. Fleet carriers
Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo, Hiyo
, and
Taiho
were in the pipeline, along with light carriers
Shoho
and
Ryuho
and escort carriers
Unyo
and
Kaiyo
. The term “escort carrier” was not used until later in the war. The Japanese escort carriers listed here were considered as auxiliaries by the Japanese, and more often used as aircraft transports.

21
. The B5N Kate had the lifting capacity for three 250-kg bombs, and this capacity is listed in many references. However, only two were carried on the Pearl Harbor mission. The possibility exists that at this time the bomber had only the hard point attachments for two.

22
. This would include the carriers, considering that two of the potential target carriers,
Lexington
(CV-2) and
Saratoga
(CV-3), were built on battle cruiser hulls.

23
.
Japanese Torpedoes and Tubes, Article 2—Aircraft Torpedoes
.

24
. NavShips A (374), 7–9.

25
. Peattie, 2001, 36.

26
.
Japanese Bombs
.

27
. This shell has been variously identified as 15-inch, 40 cm, or 16-inch, even in official Navy documents. Initial estimates were taken from measuring the curvature of shell fragments recovered from the battleships, a process subject to some uncertainty. Most of the information cited on this weapon, correcting several errors in official documents, was provided by Nathan Okun, correspondence. Data Page on Type 99 No. 80 Mark 5 armor piercing bomb, from US Naval Technical Mission to Japan,
Japanese Bombs
. December 1945, 35. Note that it incorrectly identifies the original shell as “40 cm AP.”

28
.
Striking Power of Air-borne Weapons
, v.

29
.
Japanese Bombs
, 35. Also Richard Worth, correspondence with the author.

30
. Prange, 1981, 268.

31
. Brown, 208.

32
. Data Sheet 2-C5a. Perforation of Armor: Bombs. August, 1944.

33
. The US Naval War College Maneuver Rules (USNWCMR) and Fire Effect Tables represented the most advanced mathematical modeling of naval combat developed in the interwar years. It was a tremendous collaboration between the War College, BuOrd, and BuC&R to develop the most advanced training and analytical tool ever created. The rules and data tables were several inches thick of legal-sized paper. The rules and data were constantly updated with new releases nearly every year between 1922 and 1946. The calculations and values incorporated into the Maneuver Rules represent the official US Navy view of such things as gunnery effectiveness, armor penetration, and resistance of ships to damage, the effectiveness of bombers and fighters and submarines and torpedoes, and many other technical topics.

34
. Prange, 1981, 160.

35
.
Striking Power of Air-borne Weapons
, v.

36
. Prange, 1981, 259.

37
.
Japanese Bombs
, 19.

38
.
Striking Power of Air-borne Weapons
.

39
. Campbell, 1985, 172.

40
. Peattie, 2001, 143.

41
. USNWCMR, 12 March 1940, j-24, j-25.

42
. USNWRMR, 19 June 1944, j-24.

43
. Peattie, 2001, 146.

44
. Olson, 43.

45
. This was before the invention of NAPALM or other jellied gasoline weapons. NAPALM was first employed operationally in 1944 against ground targets. NAPALM was never used against warships underway during WW II.

46
.
Downes
AAR, Commander, Battleships, Battle Force AAR.

47
. Preliminary Report,
USS Shaw
(373) War Damage Report, and
USS Shaw
(373) Bomb Damage Report, 29 January 1942.

48
. Also reported at 500 rounds per gun

Chapter 3: Wargames

1
. Prange, 1981, 113.

2
. Admiralty, Naval Staff, Tactical Section.
Instruction for Tactical and
Strategic Exercises Carried out on Tables or Boards
. O.U. 5243, January 1921.

3
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 60.

4
. Prange, 1981, 30–39.

5
. Prange, 1981, 31.

6
. Prange, 1981, 381.

7
. Prange, 1981, 35–36.

8
. Fuchida and Okumiya, 92.

9
. Prange, 1981, 34.

10
. Prange, 1981, 404. In footnote 22 for Chapter 4 Prange cites Fuchida’s Midway book as his source, going on to say, “Similar cheating occurred during the war games for Pearl Harbor.”

11
. Prange, 1981. Toland, 161, states that one-third were shot down.

12
. The number of “130 aircraft” is from Prange. Agawa, 228, states that 180 aircraft were “shot down.”

13
. Prange, 1981, 229–230.

14
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 57.

15
. Prange, 1981, 161–3.

16
. Prange, 1981, 389.

17
. Prange, 1981, 234.

18
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 57.

19
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 57.

20
. Prange, 1981, 282.

21
. Prange, 1981, 229–230.

22
. Prange, 1981, 234.

23
. Burlingame, 50.

24
. Prange, 1981, 338.

25
. Agawa, 230.

26
. Prange, 1981, 263, 285.

Chapter 4: Planning the Attack

1
. The Japanese solved the range problem by converting some voids in some of their carriers to carry fuel, by carrying fuel in drums on the hangar deck, and by underway replenishment from oilers. Another option that could have precluded the problem would have been for the carriers to refuel at the Marshall Islands from oilers at anchor after the strike. The destroyers would still require underway replenishment to make the trip. No satisfactory explanation has ever been offered why this option was not considered, although it is possible the Japanese were concerned that Pacific Fleet carriers might follow them to the islands and strike the carriers while at anchor, a remote possibility.

2
. Thomas Hone to the author.

3
. The A6M Zero was about 30 feet long, the D3A Val 33 feet, and the B5N Kate 45 feet, although they could be parked in overlapping configurations.

4
. Japanese aircraft carriers had closed hangars, so engines could not be warmed below decks. Applying full power for takeoff on a cold engine could crack the cylinder block or blow out engine gaskets. A proper warm-up would require about 15 minutes. The Japanese lost one A6M Zero in the water from engine failure after launch.

5
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 81. Werneth, 100.

6
. The American doctrine was different. When two carriers were operating together, one would be assigned as “duty carrier,” responsible for launching and recovering all the search aircraft, ASW patrols and CAP needed. The other carrier would spot all possible aircraft on the flight deck ready to launch a “full deck” strike. As aircraft got larger, not all the aircraft could fit on deck, so the full deckload would be launched and then orbit the carrier while the remaining aircraft were brought up from the hangar deck (where they had already been warmed, allowable in the Americans’ open hangar deck design). The process was awkward and cut down the range of the strike. Eventually the Americans adopted what they called a half-deck strike, which was similar to the Japanese doctrine but employed mixed groups of bombers.

7
.
Chapter 12
contains a more detailed discussion of the experience level of the Japanese aircrew.

8
. Prange, 1981, 163, relates that Japanese naval fighters before 1941 never operated more than 100 miles from its base or carrier, which was also the maximum range of their radiotelephone. Since the Pearl Harbor raid would be at a range “250 to 300 miles from the carriers,” fighter pilots were trained in morse code. These statements appear to be erroneous, since fighters were not equipped with CW radios, and Japanese radiotelephones are reputed to have a much shorter range.

9
. Werneth, 35.

10
.
Operational History of Naval Communications, December 1941—August 1945
.

11
. Werneth, 214.

12
. The Roundtable Forum, the Official Newsletter of the Battle of Midway Roundtable. Issue 2010-07, 21 February 2010.

13
. Lieutenant Commander William Widhelm, quoted in Belote and Belote, 168.

14
. In all the interviews and reminiscences of the Pearl Harbor attackers, the author has not found one reference to the use of voice radio, and many places where voice radio ought to have been used if it was available, but was not.

15
. Sakai.

16
. Prange, 1990, 28.

17
. Prange, 1981, 161.

18
. Prange, 1990, 27–8.

19
. Prange, 1981, 160–162.

20
. Prange, 1981, 268.

21
. Aiken.

22
. Not all the planned aircraft launched due to deck aborts. One fighter crashed on takeoff. Aircraft totals that hit Pearl Harbor were 183 in the first wave and 167 in the second. Arakaki and Kuborn, 61, 67.

23
. Czarnecki, et al. Order of Battle Pearl Harbor 7 December 1941.

24
. Lambert and Polmar, 40.

25
. The accuracy standard for Japanese dive bombers is not known, but is likely as good or better. This estimate is taken from results achieved by Western dive bombers of the period. Smith, 1981, 37, 41, 53, 68, 69. CEP, Circular Error Probable, is a circle of a radius where 50% of the bombs would fall inside the circle.

26
. Prange, 1981, 415.

27
. McFarland, 99.

28
. Mondey, 36, 73–77.

29
. Lambert and Polmar.

30
. Prange, 1981, 403.

31
. Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3, para. 3a: “The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.”

32
. Genda, in Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 25.

33
. Haleiwa, Wheeler, Kaneohe, Bellows, Hickam, Ford, and Ewa.

34
. Prange, 1981, 366.

35
. Smith, 2001, 40. Note that the total of fighters shown is the 45 planned. There were 2 deck aborts, one from the
chutai
assigned to the torpedo bombers and one from the groups assigned to Kaneohe Field.

36
. Carrier Striking Task Force Operations Order No. 3.

37
. Sakai, 48.

38
. Clarke, 15.

39
. Arakaki and Kuborn, 47.

40
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 63.

41
. Willmott, et al, 2001, 63

42
. Goldstein and Dillon, 1993, 101.