B00BY4HXME EBOK (22 page)

In discussing Kim Jong Il’s alleged choice, the media named a number of allegedly approved candidates—including all three known sons of Kim Jong Il, his brother-in-law, his sister, his daughter, and his current mistress. But until 2008 all these reports were proven to be false. For some reason, Kim Jong Il was not in a hurry to anoint an heir designate until almost the end of his reign.

For a while during the 1990s, most people expected that Kim Jong Il would choose his eldest son Kim Jong Nam as a successor. This didn’t
happen, however. In May 2001 Kim Jong Nam was apprehended by the Japanese immigration service when he tried to enter Japan on a fake Dominican passport. He was accompanied by two women, one of whom was obviously his wife while another was likely to be a servant, as well as by a child. When questioned by the immigration authorities, Kim Jong Nam admitted his true identity and explained that he just wanted to visit Disneyland.

It was widely reported that this incident led to a falling out between Kim Jong Nam and his father, but these claims are based on hearsay. It is clear, however, that over the last decade Kim Jong Nam has spent most of his time in Macao and China, seldom visiting Pyongyang. He was not even seen at his father’s funeral in December 2011. Reputedly, he runs the Kim family’s finances from these locations, but the exact nature of his activities in Macao remains murky.

When Kim Jong Il finally made his choice for successor, he decided to promote his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, who was probably born in 1983—his exact age was never known with certainty. Kim Jong Un was educated in Switzerland, where all children of Marshal Kim attended high school. Not much is known about the youngest Kim—even his name for a long time was misspelled in the media. Obviously, after a few years in Switzerland, Kim Jong Un was brought back home and received some individual training at Kim Il Sung University.

Kim Jong Il finally made up his mind in late 2008, soon after he suffered a serious health problem—apparently, a stroke. This might have reminded him about his own mortality, so in early 2009 he spread word among North Korea’s bureaucrats and the party faithful that a new genius of leadership had emerged from within the ancient lands of Korea. By the summer of 2009, the propaganda began to target virtually everybody and the name of the “Young General Kim” or “New Star General” was frequently invoked at regular indoctrination sessions. Propagandists did not explicitly state that the new shining star of political wisdom was somehow related to Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung.

The succession became semiofficial in September 2010, when the Korean Workers’ Party held its conference, the first official convention of the party top-brass since the 1980 KWP Congress. On the eve of the
conference, Kim Jong Un and his aunt Kim Ky
ǒ
ng-h
ǔ
i were promoted to the rank of four-star general (becoming, perhaps, the world’s youngest person and the world’s only woman, respectively, to hold such rank). At the same conference, Kim Jong Un was appointed deputy chairman of the Central Military Committee of the Party, a previously unimportant institution that has now been brought to the administrative forefront of the North Korean government.

Since then, the North Korean media began to report Kim Jong Un’s activities. He often appeared in the company of his father while visiting military units and model factories, or chatting with steel workers and tractor drivers. Paeans to his wisdom and talent began to appear in the media with increasing frequency.

When Kim Jong Un was first introduced to the North Korean public in September 2010, he appeared clad in a Mao suit, which was completely identical to the attire his grandfather used to sport in the 1950s. Nowadays such a suit is decisively out of fashion, so the Young General’s choice of clothes had clear political connotations—it showed that he was a rightful successor to the dynasty once founded by his grandfather. It helps, of course, that Kim the Third has a striking resemblance to Kim Il Sung (and not just because he is also unusually stout for a North Korean). To emphasize Kim Jong Un’s connections to his father, a similar visual message was employed. In winter the youngest Kim appeared before cameras in a gray parka and fur hat that were completely identical to those of his father. In such ways, the average North Koreans were reminded that their country would eventually be run by a reincarnation of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

The choice of Kim Jong Un as the successor was somewhat unexpected. Prior to 2008 his candidacy was not seriously considered by Pyongyangologists, since he was seen as excessively young and lacking in tangible experience. He spent a large part of his childhood overseas, while as a youngster he led a secluded life in the palaces of the Kim family. He probably doesn’t know much about the country he has to run, and most of the top North Korean dignitaries, in their late 60s, 70s, and 80s, could easily be his grandparents. It was most likely assumed that for a while, Kim Jong Un would remain a figurehead, assisted by a team of experienced advisers.

It is important that 2009– 2010 was a time when Kim Jong Il’s sister, Kim Ky
ǒ
ng-h
ǔ
i, and her husband, Chang Song-t’aek, rose to the summit of political power in North Korea. Kim Ky
ǒ
ng-h
ǔ
i, who spent most of her life as the top manager of North Korea’s light industry (not exactly a success area), was in 2010 promoted to the rank of full (four-star) general. In all probability Kim Jong Il reasoned that the relatively young Kim-Chang couple (they are in their mid-60s) would make the best regents for his inexperienced son.

Probably such an arrangement was also welcomed by the entire old guard, who assumed that a young and inexperienced leader would have no choice but to hew to their advice—so that even after Kim Jong Il’s death, they would run the country as they pleased, at least for a few years.

Not everyone was happy about the decision, but no sane North Korean would express his or her doubts openly. The only exception was Kim Jong Un’s semi-exiled half-brother Kim Jong Nam, who hinted that the decision might be problematic while still confirming his loyalty toward the family. In October 2010, during an unusually long and frank interview with the Japanese Asahi TV, he said: “Personally I oppose the hereditary succession for three generations, but I presume there were internal reasons. We should abide by such reasons if there are any.”
²²
In January 2011, during a short interview with
Tokyo Shimbun
, he was even more frank. Reportedly, he said: “Even Chairman Mao Zedong of China did not enforce hereditary succession. [Hereditary succession] does not fit with socialism, and my father was against it as well. […] My understanding is that [the power succession] is intended to stabilize the internal system. North Korea’s instability leads to instability in the region.”
²³
In the second half of the same interview he allegedly added that “in the peculiar situation of North Korea,” reforms and openness might lead to the regime collapse.

When, at noon on December 19, 2011, the people of North Korea saw the clothes of the new anchorwoman from their TV set, they probably guessed instantly what had happened. Clad in mourning attire and tearful, the
announcer delivered the big news. North Koreans were informed that Kim Jong Il had died two days earlier, during the morning of December 17. It was stated that he was on his famous palatial train en route to provide on-the-spot guidance somewhere in the countryside. This statement has since been put into doubt, but the exact circumstances of his death are not that important. Whenever and however he died, the 17-odd years of his rule came to an abrupt end.

At the time of Kim Jong Il’s demise few doubted that Kim Jong Un was meant to become his successor. Nonetheless, it was by no means a foregone conclusion that the second dynastic transition would go smoothly. It seems that Kim Jong Il had been expecting to live a few years longer than he actually did. Obviously he and his entourage assumed that they would have three to seven years at their disposal to prepare a smooth transition and train Kim Jong Un for his new duties and responsibilities.

It is often overlooked that Kim Jong Un had not been explicitly proclaimed the successor to his father. Of course, the way the media treated him left no doubt about his destiny. Nonetheless, at the moment of Kim Jong Il’s death, Kim Jong Un was technically merely a four-star general, one of a dozen top military officers, four-star generals, vice marshals, and marshals of the Korean People’s Army (even though, admittedly, by far the youngest of them all). He was also a vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, a rather obscure part of the Korean Workers’ Party structure, which has played only a minor political role since the mid-1970s. Obviously, it was assumed that in the near future Kim Jong Un would be finally proclaimed successor and officially made second-in-command to his father.

It might be surmised that Kim Jong Un’s official promotion to heir designate was initially scheduled to take place amidst the expected gala celebrations of Kim Il Sung’s 100th birthday in April 2012. However, Kim Jong Il died before these plans could be brought to fruition.

However, this uncertainty had little immediate impact on subsequent events. Within days after Kim Jong Il’s death, the North Korean media extolled the masses to switch their loyalty to Kim Jong Un. In quick
succession, Kim Jong Un was immediately made Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and acquired the title of Supreme Leader. His name began to appear in bold script in the official publications. In a curious and Orwellian twist, the North Korean propagandists edited the older copies of the regime’s official newspaper, so in the online PDF archive the name of the Supreme Leader appears in bold even in the issues from early 2011 when it was not actually spelled this way.

Perhaps the most surprising thing about the dynastic transition is that it went so smoothly, without anything unexpected occurring. Everything happened more or less completely in line with what was predicted by Pyongyangologists. Kim Jong Un inherited power without any visible challenge—even though his immediate inferiors in the hierarchy could easily be his parents and even grandparents. As expected, for the first months of his rule Kim Jong Un was surrounded by a trio of advisers, Chang Song-t’aek, Kim Kyong Hee, and Lee Yong Ho (Kim Kyong Hee has been slightly pushed aside by her husband and has featured less prominently than most experts expected).

In most other dictatorships, such an embarrassingly young and politically inexperienced dictator would almost certainly face a challenge from within the inner circle. This did not happen in North Korea (so far), and with good reason: the Pyongyang decision makers are aware that any instability might have grave consequences for all members of the elite. An open clash at the top is likely to provoke political chaos, in which winners and losers alike will perish. In other words, it seems that North Korean leaders have internalized the dictum of Benjamin Franklin, who famously said, “Gentlemen, we must now all hang together, or we shall most assuredly all hang separately.”

With his own shortcomings, this young and somewhat comical-looking, rotund man is the embodiment of legitimacy in North Korea. He belongs to the Paekdu bloodline and he is the son and grandson of the top leaders. In the modern world, this might appear to be a weak, even bizarre foundation to build a political power structure upon. But the North Korean leadership, surrounded by a hostile world and presiding over potentially dangerous subjects, have nothing better.

The North Korean media had no time to build up a sufficiently impressive personality cult of their new leader. After all, Kim Jong Il was successor for 20 years before his father’s death but Kim Jong Un had just over a year. So one should not be surprised that Kim Jong Il still remains the most frequently mentioned personality in the North Korean media, and soon after his death, Marshal Kim Jong Il even got a promotion—on February 14, 2012, he became a Generalissimo.

Kim Jong Un began to follow his father’s routine. He has been frequently shown doing on-the-spot guidance in military units and collective farms across the country. His wisdom and warmth have been much extolled and North Korean TV has hastily produced a documentary about his greatness. This is where we can see footage of the “Supreme Leader” getting out of a tank and toying with a rifle. In other words, everything has continued much as before—the only difference initially being that Kim Jong Un, unlike his father, was quite willing to deliver public speeches.

Soon after Kim Jong Un’s ascension, on December 30, the National Defense Commission issued a statement where the North Korean top leadership said explicitly: “We declare solemnly and confidently that the foolish politicians around the world, including the puppet group in South Korea, should not expect any change from us.”

There were some unusual occurrences nonetheless. For instance, on February 29, 2012, North Korea signed what became known as the “Leap Day Agreement” with the US representatives in Beijing. This agreement was concluded after years of near complete breakdown in the lines of communication between Pyongyang and Washington. The agreement gave North Korea 240,000 tons of food aid in exchange for their assurances that they would refrain from testing nuclear devices and/or missiles. To the great surprise of all observers, and to the great annoyance of the doves in Washington, North Korea almost immediately reneged on the agreement and announced what it called a “peaceful satellite launch.” The test was carried out on April 13. The reasoning behind the launch following such an agreement remains unclear. The agreement was broken within weeks of it being signed and did not seemingly bring any benefit to Pyongyang—not a single ton of food was delivered. Infighting in the
bureaucracy or a lack of communication between different agencies in the North Korean government seem to be plausible explanations.

The missile launch, along with the fallout following its failure, was rather unusual in and of itself. North Korea announced its intention to launch a satellite into space well in advance and even invited foreign journalists to come and witness these momentous events. The rocket failed 90 seconds after launch. In an unprecedented move, the North Korean government explicitly and almost immediately admitted the failure.