Belisarius: The Last Roman General (28 page)

Belisarius now returned to Carthage. Once back in the city, a messenger arrived, claiming that mutiny had broken out in Sicily and that his return was urgently required. Leaving Carthage in the hands of Ildiger and Theodorus, Belisarius returned to Sicily.

Stotzas retired to Gazophyla (Ksantina) in Numidia. Learning of his presence, and attempting to gain a victory before all of the mutineers could assemble, Marcellus, the newly–appointed dux, led his army against the mutineers. In his forces were the
foederati,
led by Cyril (the same who had overseen the conquest of Sardinia and Corsica), cavalry under Barbatus, and infantry under Terentius and Sarapis.

Once the two armies had camped near to each other, Stotzas entered the Byzantine camp alone and repeated the claims of the mutineers, asking that the army should join him rather than fight him. When it was clear that the troops were going to join Stotzas, the commanders took refuge in a sanctuary in Gazophyla. Finding them, Stotzas made pledges for their safety, but when they emerged he had them all killed.

When Justinian learned of this, he sent his nephew, Germanus, to take control of the province and bring the mutineers to justice. Using a combination of promises and bribes, as well as bringing the troops’ pay, Germanus slowly restored the situation, regaining the loyalty of the majority of the troops. Stotzas marched on Carthage, hoping that his presence would tempt the troops to rebel again. When this failed, he retired, his army being caught at Scalae Veteres and defeated. Stotzas sought sanctuary in Mauretania, marrying a daughter of one of the chiefs and settling down. Germanus was recalled to Constantinople and Africa was left under the control of Solomon.

With Germanus in charge in Africa and the mutiny slowly being suppressed, Belisarius was now free to deal with events in Italy. He waited for word from the envoys surrounding Theodahad, knowing that the conflicts in Africa and Dalmatia meant there would be little in the way of reinforcements available to him.

The Start of the Gothic War

Theodahad was waiting for news from the emperor when he learned of the Gothic defeat in Dalmatia, coupled with the death of the Byzantine generals Mauricius and Mundus. Immediately regaining his courage and reversing his policy, he refused to sign the agreement handing Italy to the emperor and instead placed the envoys under guard.

When news came to Justinian of the victory in Dalmatia, the death of Mauricius and the imprisonment of the envoys, he sent Constantinianus into Illyricum to defend Salona. At the same time, Belisarius was ordered to invade mainland Italy.

As Constantinianus gathered his army, Gripas again led a Gothic force intent on capturing Salona. This time, he succeeded. However, when his spies reported the approach of the army led by Constantinianus, emphasising its great size, he abandoned the city – as the walls were in a poor state of repair -and withdrew to the nearby plains. Constantinianus learned of the retreat of the Goths and immediately advanced to take the city. Once inside, he began to make repairs to the walls. Recognising the futility of his position, Gripas returned to Ravenna, Constantinianus proceeding to gain control of Dalmatia and Liburnia, and the allegiance of the remaining Gothic inhabitants.

The Invasion of Italy

Upon receiving the orders to invade Italy, Belisarius acted. Leaving garrisons in Panormus and Syracuse, he sailed across the narrow strait to Rhegium. Facing him was Ebrimuth, who was married to Theodahad’s daughter, Theodenanthe. Ebrimuth had been sent by Theodahad to guard the Straits of Messina when Belisarius had captured Sicily. In a surprise move, Ebrimuth and all his followers now surrendered to Belisarius. He was immediately sent to Constantinople, where he was given gifts and rewarded with the title of
patnaus.
It is interesting to note that Gelimer had also been offered the rank
of patricius,
but this was only open to Catholics and Gelimer had refused to renounce his Arian faith. Ebrimuth obviously had no such religious conviction.Belisarius advanced further into southern Italy. Due to the defection of Ebrimuth, the area was now without Gothic defenders. The towns in the south of Italy, unused to war, also had no walls and therefore could not resist his advance. They soon surrendered. Belisarius quickly moved through Bruttium, Lucania and Campania until he reached the city of Naples.

Naples was excellently sited for defence and possessed walls that were in good repair. Moreover, it also had a Gothic garrison. Belisarius ordered his ships to enter the harbour, but to remain out of range of artillery sited on the walls. A fort in the suburbs of the city surrendered to him and he then requested the presence of envoys from the city.

Three of the envoys are named by Procopius. Stephanus appears to have been in favour of surrender to the Byzantines, especially when Belisarius promised him a large reward if he could convince the Neapolitans to surrender without a fight. Pastor and Asclepiodotus were friendly with the Goths and argued that the city should remain loyal to Theodahad.

Following the advice of Pastor and Asclepiodotus, the citizens sent a large list of demands to Belisarius. Only after he had agreed to them would the city surrender. No doubt the Gothic sympathisers believed that he would never agree to them When Belisarius agreed to all of the points, the citizens were about to accede to his requests when Pastor and Asclepiodotus reminded them of what would be in store for the city if they surrendered to the Byzantines but the Goths were ultimately victorious. The citizens refused to surrender and the siege began.

During the course of the siege Belisarius lost many men in fruitless and costly assaults, and, although he cut the aqueduct leading into the city, the inhabitants were able to survive on water from wells in the city. They also succeeded in sending a message to Theodahad asking for aid.

Part of Belisarius’ strategy had been to take Rome before winter set in, and as the siege extended he began to make plans to lift the siege and advance on the ancient imperial capital. At this point he had a stroke of luck; an Isaurian had wanted to look at the workmanship of the ancients, and so had wandered in to the now-dry aqueduct. He quickly realised that, with a little work, a section of the aqueduct that was almost blocked by natural rock could be widened and so permit entry to the city. Belisarius sent workmen to complete the task, and, when the preparations had been made, he gave the Neapolitans one last chance to surrender before their city was put to the sack. Stephanus carried his message but the citizens refused to believe him.

Accordingly, Belisarius sent 400 men through the aqueduct, led by Ennes the Isaurian leader and Magnus, accompanied by 2 trumpeters and a large quantity of torches. In the dark, 200 of these men lost their nerve and returned with Magnus to Belisarius. Belisarius chose 200 replacements, and, gathering their courage, the 200 who had fled also returned to the aqueduct. The 600 men now made their way in to Naples.

In order to distract the guards from any noise the troops in the aqueduct might make, Belisarius had Bessas converse with those nearest the aqueduct in Gothic, urging them to yield and gain large rewards. Amidst the jeers of the guards, the 600 men advanced unnoticed into the city. After three quarters of the night had passed, the invasion party finally emerged from the aqueduct. They seized two towers in the northern wall, opposite Belisarius, blowing their trumpets and lighting the torches. Belisarius ordered an immediate assault, with attacks on all sides of the walls in order to pin down the defenders and to stop them sending reinforcements to the north wall. Finally, the gates were opened and the city was sacked, the women and children being taken as slaves and the soldiers acquiring vast amounts of booty.

After the initial frenzy, Belisarius was able to gradually restore order. He commanded that the women and children be returned to their families in order to cultivate the good will of the citizens. However, the booty was declared the prize of war and the soldiers were allowed to keep it as a punishment to the citizens for failing to surrender. Due to the stress of the siege, the Neapolitan envoy Pastor died of natural causes, but Asclepiodotus was killed by the citizens for giving advice that allowed the city to be sacked.

The Death of Theodahad

Hearing of the circumstances surrounding the loss of Naples, the Goths turned against Theodahad, since he had done nothing to send aid to the city. Meeting near Tarracina, they elected Witigis as leader of the Goths. Theodahad fled towards Ravenna, but a Goth named Optaris was sent by Witigis to bring him back dead or alive. Optaris decided upon the former. He caught up with Theodahad before he could reach Ravenna and killed him. The Goths now had a new, energetic leader. They prepared for war.

Chapter 9

The Siege of Rome

The Gothic Army

Numbers

The number of troops available to the Gothic kings is debatable. Procopius claims that during the siege of Rome Witigis led 150,000 men to assault the city (Proc,
Wars,
V.xvi.ll). This is an extremely large number of men for the Goths in Italy to have available. The suspicion that it is an exaggeration is inadvertently supported by Procopius himself when he states that even with 150,000 men the Goths did not have enough troops to completely besiege the city; out of fourteen large gates, they only had enough troops to put pressure on five gates (Proc,
Wars,
V.xix.2–3). With 150,000 men, they should have been able to enclose the whole city wall, which is less than 15 miles long, with an average of 10,000 men per mile.

Since Procopius’ figures have been found to be unreliable, we must turn to conjecture. Roy Boss,
in Justinian’s Wars
(1993), states that the highest figure likely for the Gothic army would be 40,000 men, but that this would shrink due to the poorer members of the Goths losing their ‘Gothic’ status and becoming assimilated with the native Italians. He also notes that the number of troops available for field actions would be further diminished by the need to maintain garrisons at strategic points around Italy.

It is probable that Boss’s estimates are near to the reality. First, his figures make sense when we are told that Witigis left a garrison of 4,000 men under Leuderis in Rome (Proc,
Wars,
V.xi.) 26). This would be a reasonable number of troops to defend Rome given the size of the city and its significance both morally and strategically. It is also a significant proportion (approximately 10%) of the overall available forces that he was forced to leave behind. Any less and the city would be indefensible, any more and his own forces would have been seriously weakened. Furthermore, despite Belisarius having invaded with only around 15,000 men, he had no difficulty in establishing control of Sicily and Southern Italy. After Belisarius had left garrisons in the south, Witigis was to realise that Belisarius had only a small force in Rome and hurried to attack him whilst he was heavily outnumbered.

It is possible to suggest, therefore, that following the desertions in the South and in Samnium, Witigis had at the most 20 – 25,000 men available for the siege. This would explain why he could not surround the whole city but only force Belisarius to defend the northern section. It would also allow for Witigis to send detachments to other areas, as will be shown, whilst still maintaining a heavy numerical superiority. However, if we increase the number of men available to a higher level, neither the strategy nor the tactics of either Belisarius or Witigis make sense – mainly due to Belisarius being heavily outnumbered and so taking unconscionable risks. Given his cautious nature, it is unlikely that Belisarius would take such risks regularly in the way that would have been required.

Organisation

The organisation of the Gothic army is unknown, but, given the evidence from the other Germanic nations in the west, it is also likely to have been based upon the decimal system. Therefore, the Goths may also have had their equivalent of a Vandalic
thusundifath
in charge of roughly 300 fighting men, with 100 men led by a ‘centurion’, and 10 men led by a ‘decurion’. As is usual, the figures are conjectural but do align themselves with the practice of both the other Germanic nations and those of the reorganising Byzantines.

Equipment

Unfortunately, there is little evidence for the manner in which the Goths armed themselves, and what there is remains open to interpretation. Accordingly, three different views as to the arming of the Gothic cavalry still exist.