Blind Ambition: The End of the Story (64 page)

March 8, 1972
: The President asked Haldeman if there was “anything on the Miami investigation?” As the recorded conversation reveals, the President rhetorically inquired: “Why can’t we find some dirt on Democrats? We should be able to counter attack, put them on [the] defensive.” Because this conversation had not previously been transcribed, I listened to it in order to prepare a partial transcript. Nixon was very unhappy with the media flak he and his former Attorney General were getting over the ITT matter, which he believed to be totally unjustified. The following exchange occurs during the conversation:

NIXON: One thing I was going to tell you to do, and I assume our boys are smart enough to do, they may be smart enough but they aren’t doing it—has anybody thought to check to see what Miami Beach hotels have underwritten the [Democratic] Miami convention, and second, this is what they have to check. There probably is more than one or two over there that doesn’t have gangster money, have they thought of that?

HALDEMAN: We’re, we’ll get…the Miami story on, on, the, their support thing...

NIXON: I advised Mitchell and his gang, and Ehrlichman all along, and they have not followed through when I ordered this two years ago, go after the bastards, you know, we’ve got to have dirt to throw at them, correct? I’ll tell you, I don’t know what they’ve done. I don’t know where it is? Anything, throw it up there.

March 8, 1972
: Following this session, Haldeman issued another Action Memo. After suggesting options to deal with the news media, Haldeman added: “In any event, we need a counterattack. We must not let them get away with the only attack on this. We’ve got to build up the Miami story and anything else we can... We’ve got to find a way to turn around the PR on this. We’re getting taken unfairly and we should be taking some initiative ourselves.” Haldeman added in a handwritten note to Colson: “We need an attack on the Democrats for the contributions for individuals and to the party. There should be a careful investigation of the financial support of their convention and that should be put together as material for an attack.” Haldeman wanted a fast follow-up on all this.

According to the records of the Watergate Special Prosecutor’s office, at this time Jack Caulfield dispatched Tony Ulasewicz to Miami. Ulasewicz met with two men from the IRS (Caulfield had extensive contacts in the Treasury Department and the IRS). Ulasewicz told the IRS men that “he was investigating rumors concerning who was paying for the Democratic Convention and that there might be some mob connections.”

March 13, 1972
: The President dictated a lengthy memorandum to Haldeman in which he explained why he was so troubled by the adverse publicity from the charges regarding ITT:

This brings me to the point. It is very much in our interest, of course, to keep the China story alive in terms of the enormous public impact that it has had... As a matter of fact, the IT&T case I think was deliberately surfaced at this time for the purpose of knocking down public interest and coverage of the China visit. In that connection, it was a brilliant success although not a total success due to the fact that we had a few announcements to make after the IT&T story broke. But make no mistake about it. This is exactly why Kennedy et al. broke that story at this point. They have had it for a long time and they saved it up for right now so that they could torpedo the China visit. I am sure that Henry [Kissinger] and others concerned would not understand that this is what the deal was all about, but I could see it the moment that I saw the stories begin to surface on Friday after we had returned from China on Monday.

March 14, 1972
: Again, in a recorded conversation, the President pushed Haldeman for negative information about the Democrats: “Do we have anything new on the investigation into the Miami Beach, ah, convention?” the President asked. Haldeman replied that there was nothing yet. That afternoon, the frustrated President pressed further: “Can’t we find some dirt on the Democrats?” Haldeman started to reply, “Yep. We sure—,” when he was interrupted by the President, who was clearly giving an order, although that is not clear on the tape, except when he curtly added: “You better.” Haldeman wrote in his diary that Nixon wanted to start counter-attacking the Democrats, “instead of just reacting” to them.

March 15-16, 1972
: At about this time, Caulfield provided me with newspaper clippings that Ulasewicz had gathered during his investigation in Florida, none of which indicated any improper funding by the Democrats of their convention. In addition, Magruder hand-carried a copy of a March 15, 1972 memorandum that Gordon Liddy had written to John Mitchell, reporting on the investigation that Magruder had instructed Liddy to undertake into the Democrats’ convention funding and the alleged kickback operation. Liddy’s memorandum contained a sweeping conclusion, based on information purportedly given to Howard Hunt by “an experienced political correspondent for major news media in the Miami area,” that the DNC would be “receiving a 25 percent kickback from the funds raised through the exposition to be held at the Fontainebleau Hotel
and Convention Hall” during the July 1972 Democratic National Convention. Magruder delivered this memorandum to me because of Higby’s earlier instruction, not to mention the fact that John Mitchell, who had resigned as Attorney General effective March 1, 1972, was extremely busy helping his successor, Dick Kleindienst, win Senate confirmation, which had been stalled by the ITT flap. Magruder wanted my opinion as to whether he should leak Liddy’s information to the press, charging the Democrats with operating a kickback scheme. After reading Liddy’s memorandum, I concluded that the information was ambiguous at best, and advised Magruder to do nothing without better information. Because Liddy’s conclusion was attributed to an unnamed newsman, I suggested to Magruder that he get more information about that newsman so he could assess it. I jotted a note—“need more info”—on the memorandum to make a record of why I had killed any idea of leaking the information, and filed it. (Later, I turned it over to the Senate Watergate Committee.)

Liddy’s plans for illegal intelligence-gathering were not approved by Mitchell until the end of March, when Magruder met with Mitchell, who was vacationing in Florida, as the political attacks by Larry O’Brien and the Democrats regarding ITT continued. Magruder testified before the Senate Watergate Committee that when Mitchell approved Liddy’s plans on March 30, 1972, those plans called for “initial entry into the Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington, and that at a further date, if the funds were available, we would consider entry into the Presidential contenders’ headquarters, and also potentially at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami.”
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A year later, during an interview with the Watergate Special Prosecutor, Magruder explained (according to the prosecutor’s notes) what it was that Liddy was to look for at the DNC, and why the Fontainebleau Hotel:

Liddy understood that photographs were to be taken of any documents in the DNC that would be valuable in terms of the intelligence that Liddy was supposed to be providing at that time, which included, in particular, anything that would demonstrate that the Democrats had agreed to the kick-back scheme at the Fountainblue [sic] that Kevin [sic] Phillips had previously reported.

I must pause for just a moment to note the extraordinary nature of the activity that was transpiring in March 1972. Because the president wanted dirt on the Democrats, and wanted to counter the negative charges regarding ITT, Haldeman had Colson (and his staff) working on it; he had Caulfield send Ulasewicz to Florida to dig up information; he instructed Magruder to turn Liddy loose to dig up what he could find; and I had been instructed to evaluate the information before anything was leaked. In addition, Kleindienst’s confirmation hearings were ongoing. In fact, witnesses appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 2, 3, 6-10, 14-16, 26, 29 and April 10, 11, 13, 14, 17-20, and 27, 1972, which provided the grist for daily headlines and nightly television network news. The Nixon Administration was taking a political beating. It is long forgotten now, but by the time Kleindienst was confirmed by the Senate on June 8, 1972, the Nixon Administration had been hammered, day in and day out, for months, and been badly stung by the Democrats’ charges.

It was a presidential election year, and Liddy’s intelligence-gathering activities were approved at the height of the ITT controversy, at a time that Haldeman (acting for the President) was still pressing hard for negative financial information concerning the Democrats and their convention. Magruder has testified repeatedly and consistently to these facts. When cooperating privately with the prosecutors (as noted above), he told them the same facts, explaining that they were looking for information to run down the alleged kickback scheme.

The Burglars Were Looking for Financial Information

The events that followed the approval of Liddy’s plans are best recalled by those who were directly involved in the two break-ins at the DNC. Because Liddy was running this operation, I have started with his memory of the events. Liddy wrote in
Will
that his team broke into the DNC’s Watergate office, the first time, on May 28, 1972, and that, when doing so, he was acting at the request of Jeb Magruder, who had asked him a very direct question, “near the end of April,” when ITT was still making headlines: “Gordon, do you think you could get into the Watergate?” Liddy answered that he could. Magruder then asked: “How about putting a bug in O’Brien’s office?” After discussing the fact that O’Brien was in Miami preparing for the Democratic National Convention, Magruder—according to Liddy—said he wanted “to know whatever’s said in his office.” In addition, Magruder said to Liddy, “And while you’re in there, photograph whatever you can find.” In short, there was no specific information sought. Rather, Magruder was merely seeking whatever a bug planted in O’Brien’s office might produce, and whatever the documents they found and photographed might reveal. It was another fishing expedition, but because this operation was screwed up beyond belief—bungled every step of the way—many overlook the lack of specificity as to what it was that they were fishing for, thinking that there must have been more going on than has been revealed. In fact, the operation was even more badly botched than has been reported.

There were five people who entered the DNC on May 28, 1972: four Cuban-Americans and Jim McCord, a former FBI agent and retired CIA electronics specialist. Virgilio Gonzales, the locksmith, and Frank Sturgis, were to be lookouts once they got inside. Bernard Barker was to locate documents, and Eugenio Rolando Martinez was to photograph them. Those involved in the first entry at the DNC were told by Hunt to look for financial documents—anything with “numbers on them.” To make it appear to be a national security operation, Hunt told the Cuban-Americans (who knew Hunt as a CIA operative who had been involved in the Bay of Pigs invasion) to look for foreign contributions, particularly from Fidel Castro. Hunt understood that this deception would produce financial information. Hunt and Martinez, the most knowledgeable, have repeatedly testified to these facts.

Howard Hunt, notwithstanding his admission that he initially lied, has testified consistently as to what he told the Cuban-Americans whom he recruited for the Watergate break-ins. Hunt, who first agreed to testify truthfully during the
United States v. Mitchell
trial, succinctly explained what they were looking for in the DNC:

[Testimony regarding the first break-in at the DNC]

Q: Now, can you tell us what instructions were given to the men under your command, to Mr. Barker and his men?

A: That they were to make the entry and photograph anything with a figure on it.

Q: When you say a figure, you are referring to financial type material?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: This is in the office of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about Mr. McCord? Did you know what Mr. McCord was supposed to be doing in there?

A I knew that Mr. McCord would either be bugging or wiretapping.

[The questioning here moved to cover the second break-in at the DNC]