British Voices (13 page)

To increase their strength, a number of ex-soldiers were enlisted in England and drafted to the various local Barracks; these were nicknamed the ‘Black and Tans'. They were generally a very fine lot of men, and would have done well under other conditions.

(b) The Military

The country was divided up into Divisional Brigade. and Battalion areas, each unit being responsible for the area allotted to it. These areas were usually much too large to control effectively – for instance – my own Battalion at the beginning of 1920 was responsible for an area stretching from Queenstown to Castletownbere, a distance of approximately 100 miles in length, and the Battalion only had strength of about 600 men! These areas were subsequently reduced by the arrival of fresh Battalions, but even at the end our Battalion area stretched from Carrigaline on the east to Ballineen on the west, and from Crookstown on the north to the sea on the south – an area of 400 square miles.

Our Battalion headquarters was at Kinsale, but in consequence of the large area, it was necessary to form a number of Company Detachments; these were established at Queenstown, Bantry and Bandon, but the two former were handed over to other units early in
1920 and other detachments formed as will be seen later.

The duty of the military at this time was to act in ‘Aid of the Civil Power', ie, to support the RIC with troops as required, especially when they were attempting to arrest some of the ringleaders of the Sinn Féin movement. The Military at this time had no authority to act alone except in the cases of emergency, but had always to be accompanied by a number of the RIC.

(c) The Auxiliaries

This body was formed in the summer of 1920 and, though affiliated to the RIC, they had an independent organisation under their own officers. They consisted entirely of ex-officers and worked by companies, each company being allotted a district to work in where the rebel organisation appeared to be strongest. They eventually came under the Military area commander for tactical purposes, and were of assistance in the taking over responsibilities for the parts of the Military areas, but their independent status did not always make for smooth working, and the old difficulty arose of a force being under one commander for tactical purposes and another for administrative.

I now come to a description of the struggle between the IRA and the Crown Forces between January 1920 and April 1921, and I will divide this into three periods.

January – September 1920

The object of Sinn Féin at this time, as has been pointed out, was to take over all administrative control of the country and to overthrow all British authority. To enable them to do this, it was necessary to prevent the Crown Forces from interfering with their courts, Local Government meetings, etc. The Activities of the IRA were, therefore, directed at that time against the RIC as being the representatives of the British Government and the only force which knew sufficient about the local activities of Sinn Féin to be able to take action against 
them. At this time the IRA leaders undoubtedly wished to avoid contact with the military. Their activities took the form of attacks on RIC Barracks at night, murder of policemen and a boycott of the RIC, ie, all shopkeepers were warned not to supply them with goods under penalty of death.

The government retaliated during the early part of this period by the arrest of a selected number of the IRA leaders; these arrests were carried out at night by the police assisted by military, the greatest care had to be exercised in approaching the houses of the wanted men, as they immediately made off if they got warning of the approach of Crown Forces. Troops usually proceeded out in lorries, which were left a mile or so from the house to be raided.

In May 1920 the morale of the RIC was badly shaken by the release of all the men who had been arrested, as these men immediately returned to their homes and organised the murder of those members of the RIC who had been instrumental in effecting their arrests. Attacks on the RIC Barracks increased and were of almost nightly occurrence. It, therefore, became the chief duty of the Military to protect the police by sending out relief parties in lorries whenever news was received that a police barracks was being attacked. To enable this news to be received in time wireless sets were erected on all RIC Barracks and were of great value in transmitting information.

When organising an attack on a Barracks, however, the IRA invariably blocked all approaches by felling trees across the road, this work being carried out by labour impressed locally, and it was therefore practically impossible for the military parties to arrive in time to attack the IRA before they had made off. On the other hand they were not often successful in capturing a barracks except when they managed to get an explosive charge under the wall and blow them up.

In consequence of these continual attacks and the powerlessness of the few RIC in each barracks for offensive operations, a change of policy was decided on, and a number of the smaller barracks were
closed down the men being concentrated on the larger barracks and, to assist them in their offensive operations, Military Detachments, usually of one or two platoons, were formed in the vicinity of each RIC barracks. The commander of these detachments had a considerable responsibility and also scope for initiative. It was during this period that the really systematic collection of military intelligence was commenced, which proved to be invaluable for the operations carried out the following year. All officers were instructed to patrol their district freely and to get to know the country and the inhabitants thoroughly.

The following is a good example of the sort of thing which happened during this period.

On Sunday 25 July, Sgt. Mulhern, the Crime Special Sergeant of the RIC at Bandon, was entering the Catholic Church for Mass, when two men stopped him in the porch and shot him dead. They then quietly walked off, and though a large part of the congregation had seen and no doubt recognised them, they one and all refused to give evidence as to their identity.

The following night, I took a picked man and proceeded to the house of the local IRA leader, which was situated only about 500 yards from our barracks, with a view to watching it; on entering the garden a shot rang out and the man with me fell dead, shot through the head by a fellow armed with a shot-gun loaded with slugs; we had walked on to the top of an IRA picquet which was protecting the house.

At dawn the following morning we carried out a raid on the house of one of the local IRA leaders, hoping to find some of the gunmen there, but without success. The same evening, however, we again raided the same house and on this occasion we were met in the farmyard by two well-dressed men, who said they were on holiday from Dublin. After we had been talking to them for some time. I was informed by the Cpl. in charge of my patrol that he had noticed the man I was talking to slipping pieces of paper from his pocket into the hedge
behind. On investigation we found papers, which proved that this man was an important officer in the IRA and further search disclosed a box hidden in a bank, which contained most valuable information about the local IRA organisation. The two men were subsequently proved to be the commandant of the local IRA battalion and his quartermaster, the two men who had doubtless organised the murder on the previous day.

During this period the troops carried out a great number of searches for arms, but usually without result. It is so easy in a country of this nature to hide arms and ammunition that it is almost impossible to find them and I am of the opinion that it is in reality a waste of time to carry out too many searches unless very definite information has been obtained.

Bloodhounds were used in the endeavour to track down the culprits after a police murder, but although they gave several very good ‘runs', there was seldom a kill.The difficulty was to get the dog on the ground soon enough after the murder had been committed.

October-December, 1920

About the commencement of October 1920, the IRA decided that they could no longer ignore the military, but must include them in their operations. With this end in view they decided to strengthen their forces by the formation of Flying Columns. These columns were composed of those men who were permanently ‘on the run', ie, these who could not live at their homes for fear of being arrested and included, therefore, all the most desperate men in the IRA. A column consisted of about 25 men and moved about the country billetting on different farms – usually those occupied by Loyalist farmers. They were well armed and very mobile, travelling on bicycles or in light country carts, and used entirely for offensive operations. It was about this time that they first began to ambush military lorries, and I will describe to you one of the first of these ambushes that took place, in which I happened to be concerned.