Broken Doll (18 page)

“So,” concluded Judge Thorpe, “the evidence will not be allowed.”

Ron Doersch wasn't giving up. He made one more plea. “Your Honor, may I remind the court,” he said, citing case law, “that when an individual devises a plan and [it is] used repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar crimes, that's not quite the same as common scheme, plan, or design, and the passage of time is relatively irrelevant.”

Thorpe was unmoved. “Had there been another similar event between the two . . . I just don't think that the two events, seven years apart, that there is sufficient similarity to warrant its admissibility in the trial phase. We may have to argue about it again later. So that means we have no more witnesses for today?”

“That is correct,” said Doersch.

“Bring in the jury,” said the judge, “we will work them harder tomorrow. My understanding is that the defense has perhaps one witness tomorrow, if indeed the state rests.”

The jury returned to the courtroom, and Judge Thorpe assured them that neither he nor the attorneys had been idle in their absence. “We have honest-to-God been working ever since you went out, just ask my reporter, who is complaining about it. I have good news and bad news. The bad news is we won't work you anymore today. The good news is you may leave. We will be in recess until nine-thirty tomorrow morning.”

The following morning, and for reasons that William Jaquette firmly believed were more than sufficient, the defense moved for the complete dismissal of all charges against Richard M. Clark.

“My understanding,” began Jaquette, “is that the state has rested, and we would be moving at this time to dismiss every one of the charges in this case. I don't have extensive argument to present to the court. I think the court has to, in making this decision, determine if the state has provided sufficient evidence to conclude that the crimes were committed beyond a reasonable doubt. It would be our position that they have not done so.”

The defense then focused on the most significant issue: premeditation. “In order to convict Mr. Clark of aggravated first-degree murder they would have to prove, as the court is aware, that the killing was premeditated. There was really no evidence in this case, as to what occurred after the child went to bed until the body was found. There is evidence as to what occurred in that interim period, but no evidence to indicate who did what, when, and why, or what happened in what order, or what exactly occurred. And therefore it would be our position that the state has not established its obligation to prove premeditation.”

Ronald Doersch anticipated Jaquette's motion, and his response was both immediate and fluent. “The mere obtaining of a weapon to kill someone presumes premeditation,” he insisted. “The moving of a victim from one location to another to commit rape upon her, in this case, proves premeditation. Again, we have evidence that the defendant was at the residence prior in the day, at least snooping or hanging around, that indicates premeditation. The fact that she is secreted and hidden indicates premeditation. The method of obtaining her without essentially leaving any trace, by his fingerprint on a window, indicates premeditation. The state submits that premeditation has eminently been established in [this] case.”

Judge Thorpe, carefully considering each point from both attorneys, turned again to Bill Jaquette. “Your Honor,” said the defense, “all of those things that Mr. Doersch points out establish only an intent to commit the other crimes of kidnap and rape. Sufficient evidence of deliberation prior to the decision to execute the killing—sufficient to constitute premeditation—is not established by the fact that the rest of the crime appears to have been a part of a series of events.”

“No,” countered Doersch, “in order to kill this person, the knife had to be obtained, had to be employed, stabbing this person seven or eight times in a series of multiple stab wounds around her neck, that certainly indicates premeditation. It does not indicate, for example, the kind of second-degree murder, where a gun that was drawn in the heat of a moment and discharged, it does not—say a brick is picked up and in the heat of anger and smacked against the side of one's head. These are the wounds that killed her and they occurred after the rape.”

Thorpe nodded in apparent interest and possible agreement before offering Jaquette the floor. “Again,” insisted Jaquette, “there is no evidence as to what actually happened in the moment of the death, and a knife that was employed for purposes of threats is not proof of premeditation for killing.”

Judge Richard Thorpe, wanting to make sure he understood Jaquette's position, asked, “Are you suggesting that all of the evidence that could persuade a jury that the kidnapping and the rape were intentional has to be more or less set aside, and that there must be additional, clear evidence that the decision to kill was formed far enough in advance of the killing to be premeditation?”

“Yes,” Jaquette responded. “Yes, that is exactly correct.”

“And you,” said Thorpe, turning his gaze to the prosecutor, “suggest that having a knife there meets that criteria?”

Doersch nodded. Jaquette buttressed his position. “I can create a scenario in which a knife used for a kidnap and rape would not be involved in an intent to kill. Something could happen—a struggle or some other event—that triggers an instantaneous decision to kill. I think the prosecution must present evidence that proves premeditation, and they have not done so.”

“Oh, I agree,” said Judge Thorpe. Had he stopped there, Jaquette would have emerged victorious. His Honor, however, continued. “But I don't think your ability to come up with some scenario that would negate premeditation is the criteria. The criterion is whether or not there is sufficient evidence, sufficient circumstantial evidence. Obviously, that is all we have is circumstantial evidence in this case, to persuade a finder of fact of premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.

“I am not persuaded that there isn't sufficient evidence,” said the judge. “She obviously wasn't killed in her bedroom. She obviously was removed from there, granted it could be for the purpose of kidnapping and for rape, but that along with the circumstances of the abduction, with the circumstances of the disposal of the body and that sort of thing and the fact that there was weapon all taken together, I think there is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which an independent trier of fact could find this beyond a reasonable doubt that there was premeditation. The motion will be denied.”

That settled that. Jaquette simply responded, “Your Honor, we have one witness to call. It will be very brief. Linda Hein was a patron at the Dog House Tavern. We will then be done with the testimony that we have available. We would like to reserve an opportunity to formally rest on Monday. We don't anticipate anything, but we want to be completely sure that everything that we can and want to present can be presented. I would anticipate this would not affect scheduling of events that we sort of come up with for Monday.”

“Well,” responded the judge, “unless you got yourself a blockbuster. In that situation, they might be tempted to put on some rebuttal.”

“You can bet money on that,” said Ron Doersch. “If there is a blockbuster, then all . . .”

“. . . bets are off,” Jaquette said, completing Doersch's sentence for him. “But I can give the court very strong assurances that will not happen.”

“Any overwhelmingly and persuasive objection to that, Mr. Doersch,” asked Thorpe.

“I guess not,” he replied.

With that, defense attorney Errol Scott called their only witness.

“I've known Neila D'alexander ever since we were in grade school. We pretty much grew up together,” testified Linda Hein.

“Do you recall where you were on the night of March 31, 1995?”

“Yes, I do. I was at the Dog House Tavern on C twenty-second and Colby,” she testified. “I got there about seven in the evening, and Neila came in between seven-thirty and eight
P.M.
”

“Concerning Richard Clark,” asked Scott, “and about what time did you see Mr. Clark in the Dog House?”

“Approximately nine or so,” said Hein. “I'm not real certain, but that's pretty close.”

“Is there anything that happened that night around that time to give you an idea of what time it was?”

“Well, yeah,” she replied, “the gentleman that was standing next to Richard Clark was arguing with the barmaid about not being drunk, when he really was drunk. The barmaid wasn't going to serve him, that's why I noticed him. I'm not a clock-watcher or anything, but I happened to glance at my watch just before the incident occurred.”

According to Hein, she saw the two men—Richard Clark and Jimmy Miller—talking to the barmaid. The condition of Clark's companion, she said, was “not good. He had trouble even standing up. He was not standing too straight, he was having a hard time standing. That's because I believe he was drunk—not just intoxicated, I mean drunk.”

“What was Mr. Clark doing?” asked Scott.

“He was standing there next to the fellow that was complaining.”

“Did you see them leave?”

“No, I don' t remember them leaving at all.”

“Now, did you talk with Ms. D'alexander anytime later that night?”

“I carried on a conversation with her until she left,” Hein said.

“Now, anytime later that night, did you see Mr. Richard Clark?”

“Yes,” she answered. “I think I saw him around midnight. That was about an hour before I left.”

“Now, you were obviously in a tavern. Were you drinking alcohol then?”

“Yes, I was. I hadn't had that much to drink. At most, I had two beers the entire evening. Sometimes I don't drink alcohol at all, but drink Pepsi instead. I was there from seven
P.M.
until closing. Richard Clark came in about an hour before Neila left, and she left around one-thirty
A.M.
”

The importance of Linda Hein's testimony can
not
be overstated. If she were correct, Richard Clark had enough of an alibi to create reasonable doubt. He could not have been at the Dog House and committing the crime at the same time.

On cross-examination, Ronald Doersch had few questions, but they were also of vital importance. “What is it that drew your attention to Richard Clark when he supposedly came back at twelve-thirty?”

“Just the door opening,” she said. “I turned and looked.”

“At that time you had what, two beers to drink?”

“At that time? Well, maybe three beers,” said Hein.

“Maybe more?”

“I don't drink all that much at all,” she said again. The expression on Doersch's face expressed his opinion, unverified by evidence, that Hein was mistaken by virtue of alcohol ingestion.

The testimony concluded, the defense and prosecution prepared for their ultimate arguments for the guilt or innocence of Richard Mathew Clark.

“We will now have closing argument of counsel,” said Judge Thorpe. “First for the plaintiff, Mr. Doersch.”

“It's every parent's worst nightmare,” began Doersch, and he brought that nightmare vividly to the courtroom. “You have been introduced to the dark side, the underside of the world you live in. It's a world where grandparents outlive their grandchildren. It's a world where a parent is too tired or too drunk to do anything to save his daughter. It's a world where the friend of a seven-year-old's parents gives her stuffed animals, lets her play with his puppy and smiles and smiles. And he's a villain. He takes her away, he rapes her, and he kills her.

“You see how close evil is. And you see how commonplace evil can look. Take a good look, right there,” he said, pointing to Richard Clark. “Commonplace, evil, brutish, nasty, and as this case overwhelmingly demonstrates, stupid.

“You know what he did, and how he did it, and how badly he did it. In this case, evil has already won. Roxanne is dead.”

Doersch then reminded the jury of the state's extensive physical evidence, including the controversial bloody shirt. “Consider what was done to that shirt in an attempt to keep that away from you, to prevent you from considering it as evidence,” said Doersch. “It's laundered; it's kept away from the police for eighteen days after the occurrence. Carol Clark tries to tell you that it doesn't look like the shirt. Two police officers testified that's certainly the shirt she gave us, and we know, not just because we recognize it, but because we wrote down all the identifying characteristics of the shirt, and we got it from her—the defendant's shirt that has Roxanne's blood on it.

“Do you really think there was a crisis of conscience that caused that shirt to be turned over?” he asked rhetorically. “Or was it more a fear of being somehow more deeply involved in this homicide, in its cover-up?”

A litany of evidence, recited by Doersch, kept the jury tight-jawed and attentive. “Van evidence, pieces of carpet, blood is detected, two socks removed—there is saliva on one, probably from Roxanne—in fact, on both of them, spermatoza and blood on them, brown sleeping bag, clean, large bloodstain on it. PGM ST and EMG testing, consistent with Roxanne Doll's, her blood is on the sleeping bag. That's Urness's sleeping bag, as you will recall, the one the defendant borrowed the day before. There is blood on the yellow pillow, some blood on the blankets, an air mattress.”

There were more charges against Clark than murder, and Doersch dealt with each of them. “One of the counts involved here is one in essence of forcible rape,” he remarked. “And you know from the damage to Roxanne, and from the damage to that pair of pants, that she was forcibly raped. Greg Franks examines and sees sperm cells on the anal swab, the vaginal swab, and the vaginal wash. Hair evidence is examined. Long, light brown hair is found on one of the socks.

“There is fiber evidence from the training bra and the diapers, fibers from golden brown carpets. Using a microscope much more powerful than they use to compare rifling characteristics on fired bullets, photographing the results, this is what it comes up with. Note the similarities. Remember the testimony. Similar microscopic, chemical, and color characteristics to the van, the brown van carpets, and it could have originated from the gold brown carpet and from the other carpet as well, and that's as strong as you can get apparently in fiber testing.”

Doersch piled on fact after fact, test result after test result. “The DNA from the sperm on the anal swab is consistent with Richard Clark's genetic profile. You heard the numbers,” said Doersch emphatically, “only one in fifty-four-hundred Caucasians have that genetic profile. Other people are excluded, including Iffrig and Miller.

“In the excess of caution,” he reminded the jury, “testing is done on people in order to exclude them, to show that it can't be them. The DNA from the sperm in the vaginal wash is consistent with Clark's genetic profile. Again, Iffrig and Miller excluded. The DNA from the bloodstained shirt that Richard Clark wore the night Roxanne Doll was murdered is consistent with Roxanne's genetic profile—not Clark's, Iffrig's or Miller's. Only one in twenty-nine hundred people have that same genetic profile.