City of Scoundrels: The 12 Days of Disaster That Gave Birth to Modern Chicago (35 page)

This was, for all intents and purposes, the equivalent of a municipal insurrection. And it wasn’t long before the rebel general himself was on the attack. Firing off a telegram to the governor, Mayor Thompson demanded a full report containing the “secret record” of the commission’s closed-door deliberations in the days before the end of the strike. This request, of course, was pure bravado. As one of the commissioners later remarked, “The Mayor could have ascertained
that no such written report had been made by the commission if he had seen fit to inquire here.” But the move, however disingenuous, did succeed in commandeering the public’s attention. And over the next few days—as the commission hearings went on—Big Bill rose to new heights of demagoguery. Calling the fare hike a “vicious public holdup,” he loudly insisted that the alleged report would show that “corporate cooties” had set out to rob the poor by breaking “solemn contracts with the people.” In alliance with the governor and his commission of “toadies,” they had schemed to pick the pockets “of shop girls, washerwomen, and scrub women” to preserve returns on their obscenely overvalued capital shares. “What do the people of Chicago think,” he asked, “when they pay their added fares and realize that they are contributing to dividends on over $75,000,000 in watered stock, and to the upkeep of traction officials drawing salaries from $40,000 to $60,000 a year and who hold utter disregard for the public welfare?” This outrage, however, would not be allowed to stand, because Big Bill would not give up on the five-cent fare. “The people of Chicago may rest assured that their mayor will fight to the last ditch this latest attempt to plunder the people.… I so promised in my mayoralty campaign, and my word is good.”
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Blindsided by the vehemence of these attacks, the governor could only respond with dry statistics and expert opinions showing that the fare hikes were both justified and legal. And when, in defiance of the mayor’s threats, the commission issued a temporary order allowing fares to rise on August 8, the battle was on. Thompson responded by filing a petition with the Circuit Court to reverse the commission’s order and return to the five-cent fare. To the governor’s consternation, the petition was granted, but then was almost immediately overturned by the Illinois Supreme Court, which held that the commission was legally entitled to alter the terms of the 1907 ordinance. To this the Thompson forces had an answer, too. If the transit companies had the right to break their long-standing
contracts, Cleveland announced, then the court must logically agree that the city had the same right. Therefore, the Corporation of Chicago would scrap all existing transit franchises, legally impound any fares collected above the five-cent limit, and seize control of the lines under a public-ownership scheme to be presented by the mayor at some future date.
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This, of course, was a recipe for fiscal disaster, given the state of the city’s finances, but the free-for-all was having the desired effect. “When you pay seven cents today for a surface line ride or eight cents for a ride on the ‘L,’ ” the
Daily Journal
advised in an August 8 editorial, “be sure to thank Governor Lowden and his public utilities commission for the ‘blessing’ thus conferred upon you. They are responsible, and you want to remember it.… A grievous wrong has been done to the rights and liberties of the city.” Outraged by the size and high-handedness of the fare hike, thousands of commuters began to boycott the transportation lines, walking to work rather than “digging up” the higher fares. “To blazes with your robbing system,” one passenger shouted when a streetcar conductor asked for the extra two cents. “Gimme back my nickel. I’ll walk.”
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In early September, Thompson revealed the outlines of his public-ownership plan, proposing the formation of yet another Chicago “government”—yet another independent taxing and bonding entity—to fund and run the transit lines according to the will of the people (that is, at five cents a ride). “It is futile for the people to expect representative government that represents them only through a so-called public utility commission, appointed by a power itself distant from the people immediately concerned [meaning, the governor],” he announced on September 9. “I suggest that a new local government be formed to be known as ‘The Transportation District of Chicago’ ”—said district, of course (with all of its patronage possibilities), to be controlled by the city and not by the state or any privately owned corporation.
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To 1919 American ears, this was a radical proposal, an affront to all capitalist notions of free enterprise. Governor Lowden condemned the public-ownership plan as “state socialism.” Victor Lawson was nearly apoplectic. “The present proposal is simply a bald-headed fraud,” he fumed to one of his editors. “Public ownership is the demagogic politician’s meat.… It proposes to give people a five-cent fare when everybody knows that, under the present standards of cost of production, transportation in a city like Chicago cannot possibly be produced at five cents a ride.… What the country sorely needs is a renaissance of honesty.”
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But such a renaissance was not in the immediate offing. And although the mayor’s grand transportation plan would eventually end up going nowhere—in fact, Chicago would not exercise meaningful control over its own transit system for decades to come, until the creation of the Chicago Transit Authority in 1947—the ultimate outcome of the fare battle was of less interest to Big Bill than was the battle’s effects. Win or lose, the mayor was once again able to go on the offensive and play the role of defender of the common man against the greed of big corporations and the politicians in their pockets. After suffering a severe blow for his performance in the July crisis, “the People’s David” was now on his way to a comeback.
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At the same time, the aftermath of the race riot was also miraculously turning in his favor. Maclay Hoyne’s tendentious and one-sided prosecution of the riot cases was actively alienating large sections of the population, redirecting much of the public’s ire toward himself. The alleged rioters on the state’s attorney’s prosecution list, the
Evening Post
noted acidly, were “all the shades of black and chocolate and tan, but … no sign of white.” Even the all-white grand jury was soon denouncing the prosecutor. After hearing Hoyne present thirty-four consecutive riot cases—all with black defendants—the jurors staged a “strike,” refusing to hear any more cases until at least one white defendant was brought in. “What the [hell] is the matter
with the State’s Attorney?” one juror complained. “Hasn’t he got any white cases to present?” Some jury members even vowed to go out into the streets on their own initiative to gather evidence against white rioters.
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But Hoyne was defiant. “The State’s Attorney will do his duty and does not need any suggestions from anyone regarding the performance of that duty,” he lectured the rebellious jurors. In fact, so eager was Hoyne to tie the riots to Black Belt politics that he was soon broadcasting accusations that made even his earlier outrageous claims seem tame. Citing reports of “large quantities of firearms, deadly weapons, and ammunition” cached throughout the neighborhood, he charged that blacks had been “arming themselves for months” before the riot, and that a secret organization with ties to high city officials had been counseling blacks to “obtain what they regard as social equality, by force if necessary.” On August 23, while the mayor was conveniently away at Fred Lundin’s country house, Hoyne staged a high-profile raid on numerous homes and businesses in the Black Belt, confiscating arms and ammunition and making almost three dozen arrests. “These raids are the beginning of revelations which I believe will stir the City Hall from the roof to the basement,” he announced. “Neither the Mayor of Chicago, by his appointed officers, or the police can plead ignorance of these conditions.”
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Such tactics, of course, were being met with considerable outrage in the city’s African American community. “State’s Attorney Runs Amok with Flimsy Evidence in Riot Probe,” the
Defender
charged in an August 30 headline. The NAACP was incredulous. Eager to elevate the profile of the riot cases, the organization had hoped to hire no less a lawyer than Clarence Darrow to represent the black defendants. Darrow had been eager to get involved—he wanted to make a sociological argument for his notion of “aggressive self-defense”—but ultimately his fee proved too expensive for
the financially strapped NAACP and the plan fell through. But now Hoyne’s grandstanding was doing more to bring attention to the trials than Darrow’s philosophizing ever could have. In a heated public statement, the NAACP was harshly critical of the state’s attorney, declaring that “Chicago has outdone even Mississippi in its unjust treatment of colored people.”

Local black organizations also united in protest. On the first of September, ten thousand blacks gathered at the Eighth Regiment Armory to protest Hoyne’s “vicious methods” and seek his dismissal from the investigation. Ida Wells-Barnett—who had been sending black riot witnesses to the prosecutor for weeks, only to find that he ignored them—was particularly galled by his resort to “storm-trooper” raids on the Black Belt. “[Hoyne] sends his hand-picked confederates to raid gambling houses and homes,” she said, “then rushes into print with a ‘discovery’ which he will not dare to submit to any grand jury in Cook County.” Depicting the raids as an act of desperation by a man “either woefully incapable or criminally derelict in his duty,” she demanded that he be replaced by a special prosecutor. At the same time, county officials such as Coroner Hoffman and Sheriff Charles W. Peters were also disputing Hoyne’s alleged findings, and even Attorney General Brundage admitted that the prosecutor was tracking down black perpetrators “more relentlessly than the equally guilty whites.”
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The effect of Hoyne’s campaign was to widen divisions in an urban population that was already dangerously polarized. More and more references to some kind of “voluntary segregation” of the races began appearing in the press and in the statements of public officials and prominent citizens. “We cannot dodge the fact that whites and blacks will not mix any more than fire and tow,” the editors of the
Evening Post
argued in one editorial. “They cannot live peaceably as next-door neighbors, and any solution of the problem … must be built upon these basic facts.” In an open letter to Mayor Thompson, the Hyde Park–Kenwood Property Owners’ Association argued that
“the prudent leaders of the Negroes of Chicago make no claim for social equality, but content themselves with asking for the right of opportunity, which should be accorded them. Some of the things that led up to the recent outburst of feeling can be attributed to the promiscuous scattering of Negroes throughout the white residential sections of our city.” A letter writer to the
Chicago Daily News
, meanwhile, was more direct: “The sooner the Negro realizes that the two races cannot enjoy the same privileges together, the better it will be for all concerned. The only solution of the colored question in this city, and [in] all other cities where they are in large numbers, is segregation.”
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Then, at a special city council meeting on August 5, Alderman Terence F. Moran of the Thirty-first Ward introduced a resolution that carried black fears to a new level. “Resolved by the City Council,” it read, “that a commission composed of members of both races be formed … to ascertain if it is possible to equitably fix a zone or zones which shall be created for the purpose of limiting within its borders the residence of only colored or white persons.”

Black alderman Louis B. Anderson immediately objected to the resolution, and Mayor Thompson himself, presiding over the meeting, managed to have it ruled out of order on a technicality. But Moran vowed to reintroduce the measure at the next regular council session. And for the black population of Chicago, the message was clear: A significant number of people in this white-dominated city were determined to deny blacks their basic constitutional rights, and there was apparently only one man powerful enough and sympathetic enough to stop them.
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Mayor Thompson did not fail to see the opportunity for redemption in all of this segregation talk. When James G. Cotter, Illinois’s black assistant attorney general, began accusing Governor Lowden’s riot commission of conspiring to bring about an official system of segregation, Big Bill eagerly took up the cry, accusing the governor himself of “prejudicial conduct against the Negroes.” The
always-incendiary
Chicago Whip
was even more alarmist. “Segregation measures are in the air,” the paper warned. “Lowden’s forces are at work.
BEWARE, BEWARE, BEWARE!”

Such accusations were not entirely ungrounded; the governor’s race attitudes were not impeccable, and when a white Chicago clergyman had suggested that he broker “a common understanding” by which race-specific beaches and parks might be created, Lowden had actually reported the idea to the press with apparent approval. But Big Bill probably didn’t care much whether the governor and his commission truly did have a segregation agenda. For the mayor of Chicago, the controversy was another welcome distraction, another exploitable hullabaloo to transform the city’s summer crisis from a referendum on his own failed leadership into something quite different. As always, he and Lundin worked best in an environment of divisiveness and confusion. They took advantage of every opportunity to misrepresent facts and use them to attack their enemies and redeem themselves in the eyes of their supporters. And as in any street fight, it was the toughest brawlers, not the fairest fighters, who came out on top.
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