Complete Works (319 page)

C
LINIAS
: Indeed.

A
THENIAN
: So surely, anything done
to
us, which has the quality of
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justice, is to that extent agreed to be ‘good’? This wouldn’t involve our argument in any contradiction.

C
LINIAS
: True.

A
THENIAN
: If we agree that something done to us is just, but at the same time shocking, the terms ‘just’ and ‘good’ will be in conflict with each other—the reason being that we have termed ‘just’ actions ‘most shameful’.

C
LINIAS
: What are you getting at?

A
THENIAN
: It’s not difficult to understand. The injunctions of the laws we laid down a little while ago would seem to be in flat contradiction to what we are saying now.

C
LINIAS
: How so?

[b] A
THENIAN
: Our ruling was, I think, that the temple-robber and the enemy of properly established laws would suffer a ‘just’ death. But then, on the brink of establishing a great many such rules, we held back. We saw ourselves becoming involved with penal suffering of infinite variety and on a grand scale. Of all sufferings, these were particularly just; but they were also the particularly shocking ones. Thus, surely, one minute we shall find ‘just’ and ‘good’ invariably turning out to be the same, and the next moment discover they are opposites.

C
LINIAS
: Likely enough.

[c] A
THENIAN
: This is the source of the inconsistency in the language of the ordinary man: he destroys the unity of the terms ‘good’ and ‘just’.

C
LINIAS
: That is indeed how it looks, sir.

A
THENIAN
: Now, Clinias, we ought to examine our own position again. How far is it consistent in this business?

C
LINIAS
: Consistent? What consistency do you mean?

A
THENIAN
: Earlier in our discussion I think I have said quite categorically—or if I haven’t before, assume I’m saying it now—that…

C
LINIAS
: What?

[d] A
THENIAN
: …all wicked men are, in all respects,
unwillingly
wicked. This being so, my next argument necessarily follows.

C
LINIAS
: What argument?

A
THENIAN
: That the unjust man is doubtless wicked; but that the wicked man is in that state only against his will. However, to suppose that a voluntary act is performed involuntarily makes no sense. Therefore, in the eyes of someone who holds the view that injustice is involuntary, a man who acts unjustly would seem to be doing so against his will. Here and now, that is the position
I
have to accept: I allow that no one acts unjustly [e] except against his will. (If anyone with a disputatious disposition or a desire to attract favorable notice says that although there
are
those who are unjust against their will, even so many men do commit unjust acts voluntarily, I would reject his argument and stick to what I said.) Well then, how am I to make my own arguments consistent? Suppose the two of you, Clinias and Megillus, were to ask me, ‘If that’s so, sir, what advice have you for us about laying down laws for the city of the Magnesians? Do we legislate, or don’t we?’ ‘Of course we legislate’, I’d say, and you’d ask: ‘Are you going to make a distinction for the Magnesians between voluntary and involuntary acts of injustice? Shall we impose stiffer penalties
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on voluntary wrongdoing and acts of injustice, and smaller penalties on the involuntary? Or shall we treat them all on an equal footing, on the grounds that there simply is no such thing as an act of voluntary injustice?’

C
LINIAS
: You are perfectly right, sir. So what use shall we make of this position we have just taken up?

A
THENIAN
: That’s a good question. First of all, we shall make this use of it—

C
LINIAS
: What?

A
THENIAN
: Let’s cast our minds back. A few minutes ago we were quite right to say that in the matter of justice we were in a state of great muddle and inconsistency. With that in mind, we may go back to asking questions of ourselves. ‘We have not yet found a way out of our confusion in these [b] things. We have not defined the difference between these two categories of wrongs, voluntary and involuntary. In all states, every lawgiver who has ever appeared treats them as distinct, and the distinction is reflected in his laws. Now, is the position we took up a moment ago to overrule all dissent, like a decision handed down from God? Shall we make just this one assertion and dismiss the topic, without adducing any reasons to show that our position is correct?’ Impossible. What we must do, before we legislate, is somehow [c] make clear that there
are
two categories, but that the distinction between them is a different one. Then, when one imposes the penalty on either, everybody will be able to appreciate the arguments for it, and make some kind of judgment whether it is the appropriate penalty to have imposed or not.

C
LINIAS
: We think you state the position fairly, sir. We must do one of two things, either stop insisting that unjust acts are always involuntary, or, before going any further, demonstrate its validity by means of a preliminary distinction. [d]

A
THENIAN
: The first of the two alternatives, denying the proposition when I believe it to represent the truth, is absolutely unacceptable to me. I should be breaking the laws of both God and man. But if the two things do not differ by virtue of being ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’, how
do
they differ? What other factor is involved? That is what we have to try, somehow or other, to show.

C
LINIAS
: It is surely impossible, sir, to approach the problem in any other way.

A
THENIAN
: So this is what we shall try to do. Look: when citizens come [e] together and associate with each other, they obviously inflict many
injuries
; and to these the terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ can be freely applied.

C
LINIAS
: Of course.

A
THENIAN
: But no one should describe all these injuries as acts of injustice, and conclude that therefore the unjust acts committed in these cases of injury fall into two categories, (a) involuntary (because if we add them all up, you see, the involuntary injuries are no less numerous and no less great than the voluntary ones), and (b) voluntary
as well
. Rather than do
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that, consider the next step I am going to take in my argument: am I on to something or just driveling? My position, Clinias and Megillus, is not that, if someone hurts someone else involuntarily and without intending it, he is acting unjustly but involuntarily. I will not legislate so as to make this an involuntary act of injustice. Ignoring its relative seriousness or triviality, I shall refuse to put down such an injury under the heading of ‘injustice’ at all. Indeed, if my view is sustained, we shall often say of a [b] benefactor that ‘he is committing the injustice of conferring a benefit’—an
improper
benefit. You see, my friends, in effect we should not simply call it ‘just’ when one man bestows some object on another, nor simply ‘unjust’ when correspondingly he takes it from him. The description ‘just’ is applicable only to the benefit conferred or injury inflicted by someone with a just character and outlook. This is the point the lawgiver has to watch; he must keep his eyes on these two things, injustice and injury. He must use [c] the law to exact damages for damage done, as far as he can; he must restore losses, and if anyone has knocked something down, put it back upright again; in place of anything killed or wounded, he must substitute something in a sound condition. And when atonement has been made by compensation, he must try by his laws to make the criminal and the victim, in each separate case of injury, friends instead of enemies.

C
LINIAS
: So far, so good.

A
THENIAN
: Now to deal with unjust injuries (and gains too, as when one man’s unjust act results in a gain for someone else). The cases that are curable we must cure, on the assumption that the soul has been infected by disease. We must, however, state what general policy we pursue in our cure for injustice.

C
LINIAS
: What is this policy?

[d] A
THENIAN
: This: when anyone commits an act of injustice, serious or trivial, the law will combine instruction and constraint, so that in the future either the criminal will never again dare to commit such a crime voluntarily, or he will do it a very great deal less often; and in addition, he will pay compensation for the damage he has done. This is something we can achieve only by laws of the highest quality. We may take action, or simply talk to the criminal; we may grant him pleasures, or make him suffer; we may honor him, we may disgrace him; we can fine him, or give him gifts. We may use absolutely
any
means to make him hate injustice and embrace [e] true justice—or at any rate not hate it. But suppose the lawgiver finds a man who’s beyond cure—what legal penalty will he provide for this case? He will recognize that the best thing for all such people is to cease to live—best even for themselves. By passing on they will help others, too: first, they will constitute a warning against injustice, and secondly they
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will leave the state free of scoundrels. That is why the lawgiver should prescribe the death penalty in such cases, by way of punishment for their crimes—but in no other case whatever.

C
LINIAS
: In one way, what you have said seems eminently reasonable. However, we should be glad to hear a clearer explanation of two points: first, the difference between injustice and injury, and secondly the various senses of ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ that you distinguished so elaborately in the course of your argument.

[b] A
THENIAN
: I must try to meet your request and explain these points. Doubtless in the course of conversation you make at least this point to each other about the soul: one of the constituent elements (whether ‘part’ or ‘state’ is not important) to be found in it is ‘anger’, and this innate impulse, unruly and difficult to fight as it is, causes a good deal of havoc by its irrational force.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, indeed.

A
THENIAN
: The next point is the distinction we make between ‘pleasure’ and ‘anger’. We say Pleasure wields her power on the basis of an opposite kind of force; she achieves whatever her will desires by persuasive deceit that is irresistibly compelling.
³

C
LINIAS
: Quite right.

A
THENIAN
: Thirdly, we would be saying nothing but the truth if we [c] named ignorance as a cause of wrongdoing. The lawgiver would, in fact, do a better job if he divided ignorance into two: (1) ‘simple’ ignorance, which he would treat as the cause of trivial faults, (2) ‘double’ ignorance, which is the error of a man who is not only in the grip of ignorance but on top of that is convinced of his own wisdom, believing that he has a thorough knowledge of matters of which, in fact, his ignorance is total. When such ignorance is backed up by strength and power, the lawgiver will treat it as the source of serious and barbarous wrongdoing; but when [d] it lacks power, he will treat the resultant faults as the peccadilloes of children and old men. He will of course regard these deeds as offenses, and will legislate against these people as offenders, but the laws will be of the most gentle character, full of understanding.

C
LINIAS
: Your proposals are perfectly reasonable.

A
THENIAN
: Most of us agree that some people are ‘conquerors of’ their desire for pleasure and feelings of anger, while others are ‘conquered’ by them. And that is in fact the situation.

C
LINIAS
: It certainly is.

A
THENIAN
: But we have never heard anyone say that some people are ‘conquerors of’ their ignorance, while others are ‘conquered by’ it.

C
LINIAS
: Very true. [e]

A
THENIAN
: But we do say that each of these influences often prompts every man to take the opposite course to the one which attracts him and which he
really
wishes to take.

C
LINIAS
: Yes, times without number.

A
THENIAN
: May I now clearly distinguish for you, without elaboration, what in my view the terms ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ mean. My general description of injustice is this: the mastery of the soul by anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy and desires, whether they lead to any actual damage or not. But no
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matter how states or individuals think they can achieve the good, it is a conception of what the good is that should govern every man and hold sway in his soul, even if he is a little mistaken. If it does, every action done in accordance with it, and any part of a man’s nature that becomes subject to such control, we have to call ‘just’, and best for the entire life of mankind—and this in spite of the popular belief that damage done in such circumstances is an ‘involuntary’ injustice. However, we are not engaging now in a captious dispute about terminology. But since it has [b] become clear that there are three kinds of basic faults, we ought first to impress these upon our memory even more firmly. Our first kind is a painful one, and we call it anger and fear.

C
LINIAS
: Yes.

A
THENIAN
: The second kind consists of pleasures and desires. The third, which is a distinct category, consists of hopes and opinion—a mere shot at the truth about the supreme good.
⁴
If we divide this last category twice,
⁵
we get three types; and that makes, according to our present argument, a total of five in all. We must enact different laws for the five kinds, and we must have two main categories.