Complete Works (80 page)

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Well, anyone who willingly and voluntarily undertakes to hold office under such conditions would fully deserve to suffer any [b] penalty whatever and to pay back any amount.

V
ISITOR
: And further still it will be necessary to establish a law against all the following things. Suppose anyone is found inquiring into steersmanship and seafaring, or health and truth in the doctor’s art, in relation to winds and heat and cold, above and beyond the written rules, and making clever speculations of any kind in relation to such things. In the first place one must not call him an expert doctor or an expert steersman, but a stargazer, some babbling sophist. The next provision will be that anyone who wishes from among those permitted to do so shall indict him and bring him before some court or other as corrupting other people younger than [c] himself and inducing them to engage in the arts of the steersman and the doctor not in accordance with the laws, but instead by taking autonomous control of ships and patients. If he is found guilty of persuading anyone, whether young or old, contrary to the laws and the written rules, the most extreme penalties shall be imposed on him. For (so the law will say) there must be nothing wiser than the laws; no one is ignorant about what belongs to the art of the doctor, or about health, or what belongs to the art of the [d] steersman, or seafaring, since it is possible for anyone who wishes to understand things that are written down and things established as ancestral customs. Suppose then these things came about, Socrates, in the way we say, both in relation to these sorts of expert knowledge, and to generalship, and all the art of hunting, of whatever kind; to painting, or any part whatever of all the art of imitation; to carpentry, the whole of tool-making, of whatever kind, or again farming and the whole of the expertise that deals with plants. Or again, suppose we imagined a sort of horse-rearing [e] that took place according to written rules, or all of herd-keeping, or the art of divination, or every part included in the art of the subordinate, or
petteia
, or all the science of numbers, whether perhaps dealing with them on their own, or in two dimensions, or in solids, or in speeds. If all of these were practiced in this way, and they were done on the basis of written rules and not on the basis of expertise, what on earth would be the result?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: It’s clear both that we should see all the various sorts of expertise completely destroyed, and that they would never be restored, either, because of this law prohibiting inquiry; so that life, which even
[300]
now is difficult, in such a time would be altogether unliveable.

V
ISITOR
: But what about the following consideration? Suppose we required each of the things mentioned to be done according to written rules, and we required the person elected or appointed to office by lot, on the basis of chance, to oversee these written rules of ours: what then if this person were to take no notice of what is written down, in order either to profit in some way or to do some personal favor, and were to take it upon himself to do different things, contrary to these, when he possesses no knowledge? Would this not be an evil still greater than the previous one?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, very true.
⁶⁴

[b] V
ISITOR
: Yes, for if, I imagine, contrary to the laws that have been established on the basis of much experiment, with some advisers or other having given advice on each subject in an attractive way, and having persuaded the majority to pass them—if someone were brazen enough to act contrary to these, he would be committing a mistake many times greater than the other, and would overturn all expert activity to a still greater degree than do the written rules.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes—how would he not?

V
ISITOR
: For these reasons, then, the second-best method of proceeding, [c] for those who establish laws and written rules about anything whatever, is to allow neither individual nor mass ever to do anything contrary to these—anything whatsoever.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Correct.

V
ISITOR
: Well, imitations of the truth of each and every thing would be these, wouldn’t they—the things issuing from those who know which have been written down so far as they can be?
⁶⁵

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: Now we said—if we remember—that the knowledgeable person, the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship, would do many things in relation to his own activity by using his expertise, without taking any notice of the written laws, when other things appear to him to be [d] better, contrary to those that have been written down by him and given as orders to people who are not currently with him.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, that’s what we said.

V
ISITOR
: Well, any individual whatever or any large collection of people whatever, for whom there are actually written laws established, who undertake to do anything at all that is different, contrary to these, on the grounds that it is better, will be doing, won’t they, the same thing as that true expert, so far as they can?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Absolutely.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, if they were to do such a thing without having expert knowledge, they would be undertaking to imitate what is true, but would [e] imitate it altogether badly; but if they did it on the basis of expertise, this is no longer imitation but that very thing that is most truly what it sets out to be?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: I agree completely—I think.

V
ISITOR
: But it is established as agreed between us—we agreed to it before, at any rate—that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expertise whatever.
⁶⁶

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, it remains agreed.

V
ISITOR
: Then if some sort of kingly expertise exists, neither the collection of people that consists of the rich, nor all the people together, could ever acquire this expert knowledge of statesmanship.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: How could they?

V
ISITOR
: The requirement, then, as it seems, for all constitutions of this sort, if they are going to produce a good imitation of that true constitution of one man ruling with expertise, so far as they can, is that—given that
[301]
they have their laws—they must never do anything contrary to what is written or to ancestral customs.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Very well said.

V
ISITOR
: In that case, when the rich imitate it, then we shall call such a constitution an ‘aristocracy’; when they take no notice of the laws, we shall call it an ‘oligarchy’.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Possibly.

[b] V
ISITOR
: And, in turn, when one person rules according to laws, so imitating the person with expert knowledge, we shall call him a king, not distinguishing by name the one ruling on his own with expert knowledge or the one doing so on the basis of opinion, according to laws.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Possibly we shall.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, if in fact some one person rules who really possesses expert knowledge, in every case he will be called by the same name of king and not by any other one. As a result of this the five names of what are now called constitutions have become only one.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: It seems so, at any rate.

V
ISITOR
: And what of the case when some one ruler acts neither according [c] to laws nor according to customs, but pretends to act like the person with expert knowledge, saying that after all one must do what is contrary to what has been written down if it is
best
, and there is some desire or other combined with ignorance controlling this imitation? Surely in those circumstances we must call every such person a tyrant?

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Of course.

V
ISITOR
: Then it is in this way that the tyrant has come about, we say, and the king, and oligarchy, and aristocracy, and democracy—because people found themselves unable to put up with the idea of that single individual of ours as monarch, and refused to believe that there would [d] ever come to be anyone who deserved to rule in such a way, so as to be willing and able to rule with virtue and expert knowledge, distributing what is just and right correctly to all. They think that a person in such a position always mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever of us he wishes; although if there were to come to be someone of the sort we are describing, he would be prized and would govern a constitution that would alone be correct in the strict sense, steering it through in happiness.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Quite.

V
ISITOR
: But as things are, when—as we say—a king does not come to be [e] in cities as a king-bee is born in a hive, one individual immediately superior in body and mind, it is necessary—so it seems—for people to come together and write things down, chasing after the traces of the truest constitution.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Possibly.

V
ISITOR
: Do we wonder, then, Socrates, at all the evils that turn out to occur in such constitutions, and all those that will turn out for them, when a foundation of this sort underlies them, one of carrying out their functions
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according to written rules and customs without knowledge—which if used by another expertise would manifestly destroy everything that comes about through it? Or should we rather wonder at something else, namely at how strong a thing a city is by its nature? For in fact cities have suffered such things now for time without limit, but nevertheless some particular ones among them are enduring and are not overturned. Yet many from time to time sink like
⁶⁷
ships, and perish, and have perished, and will perish in the future through the depravity of their steersmen and sailors, who have acquired the greatest ignorance about the greatest things—although [b] they have no understanding at all about what belongs to the art of statesmanship, they think they have completely acquired this sort of expert knowledge, most clearly of them all.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Very true.

V
ISITOR
: So which of these ‘incorrect’ constitutions is least difficult to live with, given that they are all difficult, and which the heaviest to bear? Should we take a brief look at this, although a discussion of it will be a side-issue in relation to the subject now set before us? And yet, at any rate in general, perhaps everything that all of us do is for the sake of this sort of thing.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: We should certainly look at it.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, what you should say is that, if there are three sorts [c] of constitution, the same one is at the same time exceptionally difficult and easiest.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: What are you saying?

V
ISITOR
: Just this: monarchy, I’m saying, rule by a few and rule by many—there were these three sorts of constitution we were talking about at the beginning of the discussion with which we have now been deluged.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, there were.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, let’s divide these, each single one into two, and make six, separating off the correct one from these on its own, as a seventh.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: How so?

V
ISITOR
: Out of monarchy let’s make kingly and tyrannical rule; out of [d] the sort that doesn’t involve many, we said there was
⁶⁸
the auspiciously named aristocracy, and oligarchy, while out of the sort that does involve many, there was democracy, which we then called single and put it down as such, but now in turn we must put this too down as double.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: How, then? And dividing it by what criterion?

V
ISITOR
: By one that is no different from the other cases, even if
its
name, [e] ‘democracy’, is now double; but certainly ruling according to laws and contrary to laws belongs both to this and to the others.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Yes, it does.

V
ISITOR
: Well, at the time when we were looking for the correct constitution, this cut was not useful, as we demonstrated in what we said before; but since we have now set that correct constitution to one side, and have put down the rest as necessary, in the case of these, certainly, the criterion of contrary to and abiding by laws cuts each of them in two.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: It seems so, given what has now been said.

V
ISITOR
: Well then, when monarchy is yoked in good written rules, which we call laws, it is best of all six; but if it is without laws, it is difficult and heaviest to live with.

Y
OUNG
S
OCRATES
: Possibly.
[303]

V
ISITOR
: And as for the rule of those who are not many, just as few is in the middle between one and a large number, let’s suppose it to be middling in both ways; while that of the mass, in its turn, we may suppose to be weak in all respects and capable of nothing of any importance either for good or for bad as judged in relation to the others, because under it offices are distributed in small portions among many people. For this reason, if all the types of constitution are law-abiding, it turns out to be [b] the worst of them, but if all are contrary to law, the best; and if all are uncontrolled, living in a democracy takes the prize, but if they are ordered, life in it is least liveable, and in first place and best by far will be life in the first, except for the seventh. For of all of them,
that
one we must separate out from the other constitutions, like a god from men.