Confronting the Colonies (14 page)

It is widely acknowledged that the Cypriot intelligence organisation was ‘in decay' prior to the revolt.
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The police were poorly paid and unmotivated, whilst higher ranks were inexperienced, inefficient and failed to effectively monitor the situation within the Greek community after the Second World War. Meanwhile, there was little intelligence coordination in Cyprus prior to the violence. British intelligence at the outbreak of the insurgency was once again wholly unsatisfactory. According to Richard Aldrich, intelligence initially saw EOKA as ‘bearded mountain-dwelling variants of Chin Peng's MCP [Malayan Communist Party] guerrillas, which they most certainly were not'.
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As in Malaya, such inadequacy created complacency in London, where it was assumed that the Cypriot governor was ‘satisfied that the police and military available in the island are sufficient to quell any riots on a scale that can at present be considered even remotely possible'.
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Reform of local intelligence was clearly necessary.

During the early years of the Malayan Emergency, the Joint Intelligence Committee demonstrated some attempt at offering advice on intelligence reform. In doing so, it laid the foundations of a theoretical overseas intelligence management function. Building on this, the committee's 1955 charter stated that it was the JIC's responsibility ‘to keep under review the organisation and working of intelligence and defence security at home and overseas […] and to advise what changes are deemed necessary'.
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This is perhaps illustrated by a 1956 JIC directive seeking to strengthen local intelligence committees across the empire in an attempt to prevent further uprisings and insurgencies.
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Cyprus was an opportunity to put these newfound ambitions into practice.

By 1957, JIC operational procedure had tacitly further enhanced the committee's overseas managerial role. For operations mounted by commands overseas, it was assumed that the ‘intelligence organisation required […] will be within the capabilities of the Command concerned'. Officials naïvely presumed that such operations would be against small and disorganised forces. With local forces able to take care of themselves, it was therefore assumed that the role of the JIC would be limited to simply considering whether ‘any new requirements should be placed on the collecting agencies'.
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In practice however, this was not necessarily the case and counterinsurgency was more difficult than the planners assumed. As the intelligence organisation required grew beyond the capabilities of the local command, the JIC expanded its managerial role. More active input from London was deemed necessary.

However, the committee had to operate within an area dominated by a lead agency (MI5) and a lead department (the Colonial Office). This created a delicate balance between a department taking the lead and the need for interdepartmental coordination. Demonstrating increased centralised input, MI5 was undoubtedly active. It sought to raise imperial security standards in order to safeguard the circulation of intelligence as well as for purposes of preventative security. Accordingly ‘in the late 1940s and early 1950s, MI5 helped to overhaul security agencies in every major imperial and commonwealth territory', and, as Christopher Andrew suggests, the ‘pre-war vision of a great imperial security network dominated by the Service [MI5] began to become a reality'.
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Percy Sillitoe had earlier created an Overseas Service within MI5, headed by an experienced colonial administrator, John Shaw. Owing to his slight frame and amount of time spent jetting around the empire, Shaw earned the unflattering nickname of ‘the flying pencil'. However, his division had been abolished by the time of the Cypriot violence by Dick White, the incoming director-general, in 1953. Many within MI5 resented Shaw's interference in the channels of communication between security liaison officers and intelligence departments. Meanwhile, at the start of the conflict in Kenya, the ‘first XI of MI5' was despatched to face the Mau Mau.
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Regarding Cyprus, MI5 had taken the lead on police reform from 1954, prior to the outbreak of violence, by loaning the Colonial Office personnel to take up such posts as the security intelligence advisor (SIA). It was the SIA's responsibility to assist the Colonial Office regarding
imperial aspects of intelligence and to advise local administrations on the effective organisation of intelligence and security organisations. Alex MacDonald, who was the first incumbent from summer 1954, pressured the local authorities on the island into belatedly creating a Special Branch towards the end of 1954. Similarly, a director of intelligence, Donald Stephens, was appointed from MI5 in spring 1955. Slow progress was made, however, and Harding lamented that the inadequate intelligence services relied on gossip and lacked any clear information about EOKA's strength, tactics, or anything else for that matter.
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Intelligence gathering was particularly undermined by EOKA's penetration of the nascent Special Branch, Grivas's targeting of the police, and inter-communal tensions relating to the composition of the various police forces. As Calder Walton has recently written, MI5's recommendations for intelligence on the island ‘followed its usual formula'. Special Branch was separated from the rest of the police and attempts were made to recruit more Greek Cypriots to its ranks. As usual however, the reforms were ‘too little too late and only produced meagre results'.
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Perched on top of the intelligence pyramid, the JIC aided MI5 but was left with a largely coordinating role. The committee provided a forum for interdepartmental cooperation, facilitated the lead agency and ensured interdepartmental agreement on the foundations of discussion. It oversaw the British and imperial intelligence structure as a whole and sought to provide strategic direction. Before the outbreak of violence, however, it amounted simply to a passive role. The JIC was merely updated by MI5 on intelligence reforms, perhaps more out of a polite formality than an indication of active oversight. Whilst MI5 engaged in reforming intelligence collection through, for example, setting-up Special Branches, the JIC focused instead on other stages of the intelligence cycle, including intelligence assessment and dissemination. Again, however, the JIC only had the power to comment and suggest. It could not give orders, and so was never going to be able to execute a managerial function particularly well.

Patrick Dean, the committee's influential chairman, and Val Boucher, the director of military intelligence, flew out to Cyprus in October 1955. Inspecting the poor state of affairs, they swiftly recognised the local intelligence deficiencies. Dean and Boucher lamented that ‘it was not felt that the Colonial administration had the knowledge or the power necessary to deal with the situation'. Boucher complained that
‘up till the arrival of the new Governor [Harding] very little had been done to stop the rot', that ‘the situation deteriorated rapidly', and that ‘the past history of administration in the island has been deplorable'. Furthermore, they criticised the slow creation of the Special Branch, which despite first being raised as a possibility by Thomas Lloyd, the permanent under-secretary in the Colonial Office in 1953, was not operational until February 1955.
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Awareness of the local deficiencies gradually worked its way throughout Whitehall. It was a real problem hindering counterinsurgency efforts and Harold Macmillan later recalled that ‘the intelligence and security system was certainly inadequate'.
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The outbreak of violence and its intensification throughout 1955 clearly rendered the intelligence requirements beyond the capability of the local command. Once it became apparent that local actors were not up to the job, the JIC began to advise on intelligence organisation and to coordinate action for reform.

Despite MI5 input, Dean and Boucher concluded that intelligence requirements had grown beyond the local capability by late 1955. They argued that the newly reformed intelligence services could not keep up with the intensifying insurgency. Intelligence was still understaffed and underfunded. At the start of the conflict, Special Branch had only twenty-one gazetted officers whilst the police districts on the island could not communicate securely owing to a poverty of scrambler telephones.
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Consequently, the JIC continued to provide a mechanism for intelligence coordination between MI5 and the Colonial Office without becoming directly involved itself. In this sense, the JIC managerial function of providing a higher direction for intelligence can be interpreted in terms of the committee being kept updated by the intelligence agencies, rather than having a more active approach. As former JIC secretary Michael Herman writes, ‘managing the secret intelligence activities of civilian agencies probably did not fit easily into the operation of a Chiefs of Staff committee'.
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Ultimately, the JIC commended MI5-Colonial Office coordination. Members agreed that ‘the appointment of a security intelligence advisor to the Colonial Office has fully proved its worth' and had apparently resulted in a ‘marked improvement' in intelligence from the colonies.
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Yet use of the JIC machinery also allowed the Colonial Office and MI5 to better coordinate with military actors. This was highly necessary. According to Charles Jeffries, a former deputy under-secretary of state
at the Colonial Office, internal emergencies meant that the department had to be in ‘constant touch' with the chiefs of staff, in order to ensure that the chiefs had all the relevant information.
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Whilst MI5 and the Colonial Office took the lead regarding Cypriot intelligence, the JIC importantly allowed interdepartmental coordination between all interested parties.

The provision of interpreters and interrogators to Cyprus is a good example demonstrating JIC input. From London, the committee coordinated and directed complicated reforms involving the Colonial Office, the chiefs of staff and MI5. Cypriot authorities had drafted in officials with counterinsurgency experience from Malaya and Kenya in an attempt to learn from previous experience. But simply picking the same people up and moving them from one colony to another took the idea too far. They lacked detailed local knowledge, including language skills. This was vital in understanding conditions on the ground, in interrogating prisoners and developing psychological operations. Considering the issue a priority, Dean and Boucher expressed concern about ‘a considerable lack, at all levels, of people who can speak Greek or who know anything about the island', and therefore expressed an ‘urgent need' for people with a knowledge of Greek, in order to improve intelligence gathering capabilities through translation and interrogation.
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The JIC responded by emphasising the importance of Greek speakers to translate volumes of captured documents. This was particularly important regarding the EOKA campaign, for Grivas was quite the diarist. In June 1956, security forces recovered 250,000 words of the leader's verbose musings and somebody had to translate them.
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Demonstrating the committee's capacity as a forum for interdepartmental coordination, Dick White used a JIC meeting to suggest establishing a ‘task force of Greek translators from all Departments'. Initial Colonial Office scepticism of the idea was rebuffed by JIC members who urged MI5 and the Colonial Office to ‘consult together'.
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The issue rumbled on throughout the year and the JIC continued to provide a useful forum for managing efforts to recruit Greek speakers. JIC recognition of the ‘great urgency' of the situation helped to overcome certain obstacles such as low wages, which were increased by the Treasury. Additionally, the JIC suggested that Charles Carstairs, the Colonial Office representative, should send someone to scour Roman Catholic schools where ancient Greek was on the syllabus. Whitehall
was getting desperate. The committee saw success regarding interpreters, but despite the chiefs of staff taking the issue seriously little progress had been made regarding interrogators. Harding continued to complain about the lack of Greek speakers available to him. Military departments informed the JIC that they had done all they could and, after a year of JIC coordination, Harding ultimately had to settle for a ‘second-best' solution in relying on interrogation through interpretation. Eventually, the JIC unceremoniously declared that ‘this was not an intelligence, but primarily a manning problem' and subsequently passed the buck to the Colonial Office.
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The regional British military headquarters moved from the turbulence of Egypt to the relative tranquillity of Cyprus in 1954. However, as Richard Aldrich notes, ‘planners in London and Washington were wrong to think they had at last found a trouble-free outpost for strategic installations'.
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Organised violence broke out on the island at the start of April 1955, yet it is widely acknowledged that, as regarding Malaya, there was little advance warning of the impending troubles. Once again the British were unprepared. In fact, the Colonial Office exuded complacency prior to the violence when officials wrongly advised Alan Lennox-Boyd, the colonial secretary, that ‘it seems inconceivable that the Cypriots should become vicious like the Egyptians'.
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Similarly, Panagiotis Dimitrakis quotes a passage from a House of Commons debate in January 1955 in which it was expressed that
enosis
‘was all a paper agitation. There is no need for us to do anything about it […] They [the Greek-Cypriots] will never do anything violent or drastic. They do not really mean all this agitation about
enosis
'.
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Clearly this was wrong. There was, however, some limited awareness. The British government was apparently conscious from mid-1954 of an underground movement being planned, but felt that it was on a minor scale. Despite this, there was no specific warning of the impending violence.