Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience (36 page)

BOOK: Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience
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Some prospective and many retrospective studies of near-death experience have shown that various aspects of an NDE correspond with or are analogous to some of the basic principles from quantum theory, such as nonlocality, entanglement or interconnectedness, and instantaneous information exchange in a timeless and placeless dimension. I believe that while quantum physics cannot explain the origins of our consciousness, nonlocal consciousness does have a lot of common ground with widely accepted concepts from quantum theory. So in my opinion, quantum physics could also help us understand the transition from consciousness in nonlocal space to our physical brain. In the next chapter I will try to find answers to the many questions about nonlocal aspects of consciousness and the mind-body relationship, based on principles of quantum theory.

The Brain and Consciousness
 

The progress of science is inhibited by imbuing young minds with an incorrect idea of the nature of reality, and the pernicious philosophical idea that man is made of classically conceived matter is not exposed as being incompatible with the empirical facts.

—H
ENRI
S
TAPP

 

A great deal has been published in recent years about the brain and consciousness. The philosopher David Chalmers, who specializes in questions of consciousness, has written an excellent overview of all the different theories about the brain-consciousness relationship.
1
He starts by describing three materialist and reductionist models, A, B, and C. The first model (A), which he labels “monistic materialism,” is based on the premise that everything is matter. Because the brain is made up of neurons undergoing physical and chemical processes, adherents of this theory believe that by explaining these processes in the brain they can also explain consciousness. The most commonly heard interpretation of this model posits that consciousness is merely an illusion. The second materialist model (B) is based on the premise that consciousness must be identical to processes in the brain because in a functioning brain there is a link between certain activities in the brain and certain experiences of consciousness. Adherents of the third model (C) admit that consciousness cannot be reduced to brain function just yet but believe that with scientific progress this will only be a matter of time.

Chalmers presents a detailed case against these three materialist approaches. His first counterargument is that while the structures and functions of the brain can be explained, this in itself is not enough to explain consciousness. His second counterargument involves zombies, imaginary creatures that are physically identical to human beings but lack a human consciousness. If zombies are a theoretical possibility, their brain function must be identical to the human brain, in which case the absence of consciousness in these fictional creatures means that consciousness is immaterial. His third antimaterialist argument invokes known facts about consciousness that cannot be explained on the basis of physiological brain activities. In theory, scientists could know everything there is to know about brain function and still not be familiar with all aspects of consciousness. Even with complete materialist knowledge, Chalmers suggests, we cannot know everything there is to know about consciousness.

Chalmers follows this with a description of three nonreductionist and immaterial models, D, E, and F, furnishing each model with commentaries from proponents and opponents. The fourth model (D) describes the “interactionist-dualism” developed by the Nobel Prize winner and neurophysiologist John Eccles and philosopher of science Karl Popper on the basis of the radical dualism of the sixteenth-century mathematician and philosopher René Descartes. Consciousness and the brain are radically different yet somehow highly interactive. According to Chalmers, this model is seen as incompatible with
classical
physics, whereas concepts from
quantum
physics, such as the collapse of probability waves caused by a deliberate observation or measurement, could actually support this model. As outlined in the previous chapter, not all quantum physicists accept the role of consciousness in quantum physics. Chalmers notes that philosophers usually reject interactionism with arguments from quantum physics, while physicists tend to reject the model on philosophical grounds (dualism).
2

The fifth explanatory model (E) for the mind-brain relationship is called “epiphenomenalism” or “weak dualism,” which posits that certain areas of brain function trigger certain experiences of consciousness, but that consciousness has no effect on brain or bodily function. This concept resembles the materialist vision. Consciousness is said to be the effect of chemical and electrical processes but cannot actually influence these processes. If so, the experience of pain could never cause a physical reaction, and people could never decide to take action. Neuroplasticity also argues against this model given that empirical studies have shown that the mind is capable of permanently changing the anatomy and function of the brain, as discussed earlier.

As his sixth and final model (F), Chalmers cites “phenomenalism” or “immaterial (or neutral) monism.” This model is also known as “panpsychism” or “idealism.” According to this model, all material, physical systems contain a form of subjective consciousness at an elementary or fundamental level, and all matter has phenomenal properties (that is, properties based on subjective observation). This model posits that consciousness has a primary presence in the universe and that all matter possesses subjective properties or consciousness. In this model consciousness is not only an intrinsic property of all matter, but physical reality is even formed by consciousness. Chalmers thus ascribes consciousness a distinctly causal role in the physical world. He mentions another theoretical possibility in which the intrinsic properties of the physical world
are
not phenomenal properties but rather
possess
phenomenal properties, which makes them protophenomenal properties. For this reason he prefers the term
panprotopsychism.

Not everybody will agree with the latter model, in which all matter possesses subjective properties or consciousness; most people will favor a materialist model to explain the brain-consciousness relationship. But Chalmers appears to support panprotopsychism and believes that it merits further study.

Empirical research into human consciousness during a loss of all brain function (NDE) also seems to corroborate model F. The content of an NDE suggests that consciousness may be nonlocal. When brain function is impaired, NDErs experience an enhanced consciousness detached from the body followed by a conscious reentry into the body, rendering a materialist explanation of consciousness highly unlikely. When the brain functions normally, an NDE with an out-of-body experience can be triggered by mortal fear or stress while spontaneous out-of-body experiences are not uncommon at a young age. Neurophysiological studies have shown that brain activity cannot account for the content of thoughts and feelings whereas there is incontrovertible evidence for the mind’s influence on the brain, given that the anatomical structure of the brain and its associated functions can change in response to experiences in the mind (neuroplasticity). On the basis of all these findings I personally have a strong preference for panprotopsychism, the nonmaterialist model of the fundamental or intrinsic relationship between consciousness and matter. In this chapter I will elaborate on this vision.

The Materialist Approach

 

A majority of contemporary Western scientists specializing in consciousness research, such as neuroscientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and philosophers, espouse a materialist and reductionist explanation for consciousness (model A, B, or C). The well-known philosopher Daniel Dennett, for example, adheres to model A, monistic materialism.
3
As I wrote in the introduction to this book, Dennett, like many others, is of the opinion that consciousness is nothing but matter and that our subjective experience of consciousness as something purely personal and distinct from other people’s consciousness is merely an illusion. According to Dennett, consciousness is produced by the matter that comprises our brain. This materialist hypothesis is supported by scientific patterns of thought and paradigms that he and many other scientists and philosophers deem absolutely unassailable and are therefore reluctant to challenge. Scientists often struggle to free themselves from prevailing paradigms. And such dogmatic convictions seem to beget prejudice. It prompted Albert Einstein to say, “It is harder to crack a prejudice than an atom.”

If the materialist standpoint were correct, everything we experience in our consciousness would be nothing but the expression of a machine controlled by classical physics and chemistry. In Dennett’s view, our behavior is the inevitable result of neuronal activity in our brains. The idea that all thoughts and feelings are no more than a consequence of brain activity obviously means that free will is an illusion. In response to this materialist position I cite neurophysiologist John C. Eccles:

I maintain that the human mystery is incredibly demeaned by scientific reductionism, with its claim in promissory materialism to account eventually for all of the spiritual world in terms of patterns of neuronal activity. This belief must be classed as a superstition…. We have to recognize that we are spiritual beings with souls existing in a spiritual world as well as material beings with bodies and brains existing in a material world.
4

 

The materialist approach, which is based on the premise that consciousness is a product or effect of brain function, is taught at many medical schools in the Western world. The approach is generally not made explicit and simply taken for granted without any kind of debate. Not surprisingly then, nearly all Western doctors believe that consciousness is the result of brain function. I myself am the product of an academic environment and was taught that there is a reductionist and materialist explanation for everything. I always blindly accepted this perspective, not just as a medical student and doctor, but also as the son of a neurologist. According to the materialist approach, the experience of consciousness during a spell of unconsciousness, cardiac arrest, coma, or a period of brain death is of course impossible. If, citing the results of empirical studies of NDE, somebody hints at the possibility of consciousness at a moment when all brain function has ceased, this is usually rejected as unscientific. Such a response from the scientific community is not new. Here is a quote from Dutch author and psychiatrist Frederik van Eeden from 1894:

The main concern is that the claims of a few scientists are fiercely disputed by most of their peers, not on the basis of research, but a priori; not even with rational arguments, but with emotional motives. Emotional motives with their aftermath of ridicule, contempt, and insinuation, based solely on an unphilosophical attachment to a closed system. It seems barely credible.
5

 

Sadly, the scientific community has changed little over the past hundred years.

Near-Death Experience, Consciousness, and the Brain

 

What have we read about the relationship between consciousness and the brain in the previous chapters?

 
  • Many serious and trustworthy people have reported that, to their great surprise, they were able to experience an enhanced consciousness, independently of their body.
  • On the basis of a few scientifically sound studies of NDE among cardiac arrest survivors, researchers have come to the conclusion that current scientific knowledge cannot offer an adequate explanation for the cause and content of a near-death experience.
  • Some prospective, empirical studies provide conclusive evidence that it is possible to experience an enhanced and lucid consciousness during a cardiac arrest.
  • We appear to have scientific proof that the cerebral cortex and brain stem are devoid of measurable activity during a cardiac arrest and that the clinical picture also reflects a loss of all brain function.
  • Brain studies have shown that under normal circumstances a functioning, collaborative network of brain centers is a prerequisite for the experience of waking consciousness. This is absent during a cardiac arrest.
  • Oxygen deficiency in itself provides no explanation because NDEs can be reported under circumstances that are not life-threatening, such as mortal fear or a serious depression.
  • Our mind is capable of altering the anatomy and function of the brain (neuroplasticity).
  • In many respects, both consciousness and brain function remain a huge mystery.
 

Some prospective and many retrospective studies of near-death experience have shown that various aspects of an NDE correspond with or are analogous to some of the basic principles from quantum mechanics, such as nonlocality, entanglement or interconnectedness, and instantaneous information exchange in a timeless and placeless dimension. Past, present, and future are everywhere at once (nonlocally). Earlier I outlined a few generally accepted principles of quantum physics because I am convinced that these are essential to our understanding of the brain-consciousness relationship. In my view, the quantum physics idea that consciousness determines if and how we experience our reality is particularly important for the further theoretical underpinning of this relationship. However, this radical interpretation of quantum physics is not yet commonly accepted.

The Continuity of Consciousness

 

Science challenges us to devise, test, and discuss new ideas that might explain the reported connection between one’s own consciousness and that of other living persons or deceased relatives. The same applies to nonlocal phenomena such as the life review and preview, in which past, present, and future can be experienced simultaneously and which elude our conventional embodied conception of time and space. For me the biggest challenge is to find an explanation for the fact that an enhanced consciousness can be experienced independently of the body during the temporary loss of all cortical and brain-stem function.

A final theoretical possibility, one that has not been mentioned so far, is the theory of transcendence, or rather the continuity hypothesis. It views the NDE as an altered state of consciousness in which memories, self-identity, lucid thought, and emotions can be experienced independently of the unconscious body and in which (extrasensory) perception outside the body remains a possibility. The Dutch study and other empirical studies have shown that NDErs can experience an enhanced consciousness independently of their normal, embodied waking consciousness. I am reluctant to use the word
transcendence
because it suggests something transcending or rising above the body. Transcendence is usually associated with the supernatural or with the concept of transcendental meditation; hence my preference for the term
continuity hypothesis.
Besides, because consciousness is continuous and nonlocal, I do not believe that consciousness rises above the body. It is always present outside and often inside the body. This chapter will shed further light on the concept of the continuity of consciousness.

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