Crossfire: The Plot That Killed Kennedy (100 page)

Phil Willis summed up his experience in a 1988 British TV interview:

All they wanted to know was that three shots came from the Book
Depository. That's all that got into the Warren Commission [Report]. . . .
I'm certain that at least one shot came from the right front. I'll stand by
that to my grave!

Chester Breneman and Robert West, the two Dallas surveyors who
produced the height and distance figures for the Commission's reenactment
of the assassination in May 1964, were shocked to find their figures "at
odds" with the figures published by the Warren Commission.

Breneman told this author:

Looking at [the surveyors' map of Dealey Plaza] you will notice small
numbers with tiny circles by them. Each number represents a frame
of the Zapruder film that we inked on in sequence. Our map shows 171.
The Warren Report changed this to 166 before they used it in the report.
The Warren Report shows a 210 where we show a 208. The Warren
Report says that Kennedy and Connally were shot somewhere between
Frame 206 and 225 (approx.). [Our] investigation shows Kennedy
getting a rear entry wound at a place marked "K" on the map between
frames 186 and 207.

The consequence of these altered numbers was to make the controversial
single-bullet theory more plausible by simply moving back the time when
both Kennedy and Connally were wounded.

The experience of former Texas senator Ralph Yarborough also sheds
light on the manner in which the Commission allowed key witnesses to be
handled. The fact that Yarborough was riding beside Lyndon Johnson in
the motorcade may explain his treatment in the summer of 1964. He
described it this way:

After I wrote them, you see, a couple of fellows came to see me. They
walked in like they were a couple of deputy sheriffs and I was a bank
robber. I didn't like their attitude. As a senator I felt insulted. They
went off and wrote up something and brought it back for me to sign.
But I refused. I threw it in a drawer and let it lay there for weeks. And
they had on there the last sentence which stated "This is all I know
about the assassination." They wanted me to sign this thing, then say
this is all I know. Of course, I would never have signed it. Finally, after
some weeks, they began to bug me. "You're holding this up, you're
holding this up" they said, demanding that I sign the report. So I typed
one up myself and put basically what I told you about how the cars all
stopped. I put in there, "I don't want to hurt anyone's feelings but for
the protection of future presidents, they should be trained to take off
when a shot is fired." I sent that over. That's dated July 10, 1964, after
the assassination. To my surprise, when the volumes were finally
printed and came out, I was surprised at how many people down at the
White House didn't file their affidavits until after the date, after mine
the 10th of July, waiting to see what I was going to say before they filed
theirs. I began to lose confidence then in their investigation and that's
further eroded with time.

Yarborough also was shocked to find that all vital assassination information was sent to President Johnson before it ever went to the Warren
Commission or even Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Perhaps one of the most shocking statements regarding treatment at the
hands of the Warren Commission came from witness Jean Hill. Fearful to speak out for years, Hill came forward in the spring of 1986 and told her
story to a group of assassination researchers at the University of Texas at
Arlington.

After witnessing a rifleman firing from the Grassy Knoll and immediately being grabbed by two men who claimed to be Secret Service agents,
she was advised by friends in the Dallas Police Department to keep quiet
about what she knew. Even after receiving a subpoena to appear before the
Warren Commission, the same friends urged that she not go to Washington. She recalled: They seemed to feel that there might be some danger if I
was to leave Dallas. They told me I wouldn't come back."

After Hill refused to go to Washington, Commission attorney Arlen
Specter sent FBI agents to take her to make a deposition. She recalled
that experience for this author:

The FBI took me to Parkland Hospital. I had no idea what I was doing
there. They escorted me through a labyrinth of corridors and up to one
of the top floors of Parkland. I didn't know where we were. They took
me into this little room where I met Arlen Specter. He talked to me for a
few minutes, trying to act real friendly, then this woman, a stenographer, came in and sat behind me. He had told me that this interview
would be confidential, then I looked around and this woman was taking
notes. I reminded him that the discussion was to be private and he told
the woman to put down her notebook, which she did. But when I looked
around again she was writing. I got mad and told Specter, "You lied to
me. I want this over." He asked me why I wouldn't come to Washington, and I said, "Because I want to stay alive." He asked why I would
think that I was in danger and I replied, "Well, if they can kill
the President, they can certainly get me!" He replied that they already had the man that did it and I told him, "No, you don't!"
He kept trying to get me to change my story, particularly regarding the number of shots. He said I had been told how many shots
there were and I figured he was talking about what the Secret Service told me right after the assassination. His inflection and attitude
was that I knew what I was supposed to be saying, why wouldn't I just say
it. I asked him, "Look, do you want the truth or just what you want me to
say?" He said he wanted the truth, so I said, "The truth is that I heard
between four and six shots." I told him, "I'm not going to lie for you."
So he starts talking off the record. He told me about my life, my family,
and even mentioned that my marriage was in trouble. I said, "What's
the point of interviewing me if you already know everything about
me?" He got angrier and angrier and finally told me, "Look, we can
make you look as crazy as Marguerite Oswald and everybody knows
how crazy she is. We could have you put in a mental institution if you
don't cooperate with us." I knew he was trying to intimidate me. I kept
asking to see that woman's notes, to see what she was putting down. I knew something was not right about this, because no one who is just
taking a deposition gets that involved and angry, they just take your
answers. He finally gave me his word that the interview would not be
published unless I approved what was written. But they never gave me
the chance to read it or approve it. When I finally read my testimony as
published by the Warren Commission, I knew it was a fabrication from
the first line. After that ordeal at Parkland Hospital, they wrote that my
deposition was taken at the U.S. attorney's office in the Post Office
Building,

Considering the information presented in this section, it appears the sins
of the Warren Commission went far beyond a few omissions and distortions. Little wonder that the vast majority of Americans today place little
credence in the Commission's findings of a lone assasin and no conspiracy. Once again the charge of coverup can be laid at the feet of the federal
government.

During the April 30 Commission meeting Rankin openly admitted that
the June 1 date for closing the investigation was unreasonable.

A brief discussion was held regarding Jack Ruby, who had been found
guilty and had been sentenced to death. However, his attorneys were
appealing the conviction on the grounds of his mental incompetence.
When one member asked if Ruby would go to prison, Commissioner
McCloy responded: "He goes to a mental institution. It is perfectly clear
we cannot examine him at this stage." Warren, however, said the Commission probably had to interview Ruby, insane or not, but agreed ".. .
not to do it at this stage."

Rankin again referred to the problems arising from the contradictory
medical evidence and suggested that some Commission members and a
doctor should study the autopsy photographs ".. . so that they could
report to the Commission that there is nothing inconsistent with the other
findings .. ." Warren added: ". . . But without putting those pictures in
our record. We don't want those in our record . . . It would make it a
morbid thing for all time to come ... "

The inaccessibility of Kennedy's autopsy X-rays and photographs has
been a cornerstone of criticism of the Warren Commission.

Before adjourning, commissioners agreed on the necessity of including
a biography of Lee Harvey Oswald in their final report. At this time-five
months before their final report-it is significant to read Rankin's explanation for the inclusion of Oswald's background: "Some of it will be
necessary to tell the story and to show why it is reasonable to assume that
he did what the Commission concludes that he did do."

Oswald's guilt was already decided-despite the questions, contradictions, and gaps in the evidence at hand.

The greatest problem for the Warren Commission was its attempt to
reconcile the ballistic and medical evidence by supporting the idea that
both President Kennedy and Governor Connally were struck by the same
bullet.

The idea on its face is unpalatable. To believe the single-bullet theory,
one must believe that a single, high-powered rifle slug penetrated two men
causing seven wounds, shattering a rib and a wrist bone, then emerged
almost totally unscathed to become the pristine Commission Exhibit 399.

Yet, to disbelieve the single-bullet theory means rejecting the Warren
Commission's entire version of the assassination. Despite the testimony of
many witnesses, the Warren Commission concluded that only three shots
were fired during the assassination, solely on the basis that three spent
shells were found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository.

Having concluded that only three shots were fired-the absolute maximum allowable for only one assassin-commissioners set about to determine the timing and effects of each shot.

In late 1963 and early 1964 there was no problem. Since the FBI early
on had established an assassination time sequence by studying the Zapruder
film and Zapruder's 8mm camera, the Commission had a certain time
frame to work within.

The original FBI and Secret Service reports made it clear that Kennedy
was struck in the back by the first shot, Governor Connally hit by the
second, and the President's head wound caused by the third. While this
stretched the allowable time for such shooting to the limit-and despite the
contradiction of Connally, who testified he was hit after the first shot-this
believable scenario was accepted by the Commission for a time.

Then came the problem of James Tague, the man who was struck by a
piece of cement while standing near the Triple Underpass. Initially both
the FBI and the Warren Commission tried to ignore Tague. But after an
assistant U.S. attorney in Dallas sent commissioners both an account of the
Tague wounding and a Dallas news photograph of the bullet mark on the
curb, the Commission was forced to action.

In the spring of 1964-at a time the FBI was denying any curb shot in
Dallas-Commission attorney Arlen Specter (today a U.S. senator from
Pennsylvania) began conceiving the idea that both Kennedy and Connally
were struck by the same bullet.

At this same time information from Dallas concerning the curb shot
reached the ears of the Commission and invalidated the carefully constructed scenario of one lone assassin firing only three shots. Hence the
only plausible explanation was that both Kennedy and Connally had been
struck by the same bullet.

The presumption of Oswald's guilt was the first topic of the next
Commission meeting on June 4, 1964. The Commission had met on May
19, 1964, but records of that meeting were kept from the public on the
grounds that it only dealt with "personal and medical files."

Also in May, Rankin had told Commission attorneys to "wrap up" their
investigations and submit their area chapters by June 1 so that the final
report could be issued by June 30. By June 1, however, only two attorneys
had completed a draft and the deadline had to be moved back.