De Valera's Irelands (10 page)

Extracts from de Valera's itinerary

While reference will be made to those speeches again later in this article, I wish to point out that historians operate with the gift of hindsight and the knowledge that the Civil War broke out on 28 June 1922. Despite the ominous signs, the inevitability of civil war may not have been that apparent to major actors such as de Valera in March 1922. His rhetoric reveals the confusion, the hurt and the fear of many people as they were turned to face each other in those months which have been described as the ‘ante-chamber of Civil War'.
35
I don't feel that it is possible to improve on Professor T. Desmond Williams' description of the origins of the Irish Civil War:

All wars are the product of indecision, chance, misunderstanding, and personal will. They come from the environment in which people work and the conviction of those in power … Perhaps the extremists on both sides alone knew their own minds and the contingent situation better than those of more moderate opinions. But moderation, reluctance to engage in a war with one's own countrymen may be of greater value than the confidence and arrogance of those who see right and wrong too clearly. The balance between the forces of liberty and order may have depended upon those who found it hardest to decide between black and white, even if muddle and panic deriving from these decisions greatly contributed to the origins and conduct of this particular war. A full state of war lasted for nearly a year, but its after effects for much longer.
36

Given the importance of those speeches delivered around 17 March 1922, it is very important to search the contemporary press accounts in order to determine the extent to which the reports in the
Irish Independent
were an accurate statement of what de Valera actually said on those occasions. How many journalists covered those events? Is it possible that one might find different versions in the provincial press? Or was it a member of the provincial press who was also filing the copy on the speeches to the
Irish Independent
? I don't know the answer to these questions. But a textual analysis of those speeches might reveal that de Valera was more cautious in his fiery rhetoric than was revealed in the national press. That point has been made earlier in this article. But it requires to be restated even if I don't hold any great expectation that the record would be substantially changed by cross-textual analysis. De Valera appeared to be less than his cautious self in March 1922: nowadays, his condition might be diagnosed as a nervous breakdown.

De Valera was more conscious than most of the polarisation that was taking place in Irish society during those weeks. While two distinctive camps had yet to be formed, many people remained confused in their own minds. However, there was no mythic line in the sand. Yet the march of events propelled even the most reluctant towards having to make a decision. That loss of unity was a source of bitter disappointment for de Valera. His political rhetoric in the United States and at home had stressed the national unity of Irishmen and women determined to achieve independence. The prospect of open division was a source of personal disappointment to de Valera. He had come to symbolise that unity of purpose. He had worked to achieve it. Now, on 14 April 1922, he was not even consulted by the military leaders of the anti-Treatyites when they occupied the Four Courts and other buildings in Dublin. Despite his rhetoric, de Valera did not act as if he believed that civil war was inevitable. The bombardment of the Four Courts by the national army under the leadership of Michael Collins on 28 June had not been preordained. The evidence does not support the claim that de Valera worked to foment civil war. However, his hagiographers also fail to prove that he does not hold any personal responsibility for the outbreak of violence. While working for a political outcome, de Valera failed to break ranks with the ‘anti-Treatyite' militants even when they repudiated the authority of Dáil Éireann and of the democratic system.

The working out of the details which led to the ‘Pact Election' on 20 May provided a false hope that de Valera and Collins together could stop the slide towards civil war. The ‘pact' provided a panel of pro- and anti-Treaty Sinn Féin deputies to contest the 16 June general election. This was yet another attempt to rebuild the national consensus that de Valera believed was central to the success of the struggle during the War of Independence. The electoral outcome was an overwhelming endorsement for the Treaty and for peace. The result weakened de Valera's capacity to bargain with his own militants and with the Irish Provisional Government.

Two events precipitated the turning of the armed stand-off between Treatyites and anti-Treatyites into civil war. On 22 June, an IRA unit murdered Sir Henry Wilson in London. Responsibility for the killing was correctly laid at the door of the IRA. But the question remains as to whether it was actually Michael Collins who, many months before, had given the order to the unit who carried it out. The background to the killing is not important in this context. But the outcome was to bring British government pressure on the Irish Provisional Government to dislodge the anti-Treatyites from their positions around the capital city of Dublin. The second event to force the Irish government to change policy was the kidnapping on 26 June of General J. J. ‘Ginger' O'Connell by the anti-Treatyite garrison at the Four Courts. That was seen as an act of provocation. The Four Courts were bombarded. Civil war was unavoidable.

De Valera, who said in response to the news of Wilson's death that it was only necessary for statesmen to have the will to be fearlessly just in order to find peace, found himself taken completely by surprise by the action of the Four Courts garrison. It is clear that the anti-Treatyite military leaders had not kept him informed of their plans. This is of importance as de Valera was the sole surviving commander of the 1916 Rising. It may have been that the military leaders did not think highly of de Valera's skills as a commander in the field. But more than likely the military leaders saw him as a temporiser and as somebody who did not have the stomach to go through with military action. When the time arose, he found himself isolated by the military people on his own side.

The Provisional Government did not trust him enough to seek him to intervene in a last-minute effort to pre-empt armed combat. De Valera was seen as being an intransigent anti-Treatyite. That was a mistake. But de Valera's powers of intervention and persuasion were irrelevant once Michael Collins had decided to use force to dislodge the anti-Treatyites from the Four Courts and other vantage-points in the capital. Paradoxically, de Valera's first instinct was to attempt to halt the fighting. This view is supported by an eye witness, Robert Brennan, who recorded that de Valera's first response when he got to his headquarters in Suffolk Street was to ask of Stack and Brugha: ‘Well, will we try to stop it? … I was thinking of trying to get hold of the Lord Mayor.' How reliable is this as a source? According to O'Faoláin, Childers rushed around to de Valera for a message on the new and terrible situation. ‘What shall we do? We must attack them', Childers said, to which de Valera replied: ‘No! No! No! Don't say a word. I'll settle it. I'll settle it.' O'Faoláin continues:

Thinking, as always of peace and unity, he may in that moment have gone too far in his efforts to conciliate Rory O'Connor. He confessed almost as much later, and afterwards he had to bear the blame and brunt for Rory O'Connor's action in hastening, if not originating that awful conflict.
37

Returning to the Brennan version, de Valera said to Brugha and Stack that he was going to issue a short statement.
38
He finally felt obliged to side with ‘the best and the bravest of our nation' who had been unwilling to abandon Irish independence ‘under the lash of an alien government'.
39

De Valera's influence on the course of events during the following days was negligible. He rejoined the Dublin Brigade's Third Battalion and was present for a time in the Gresham and Hammam Hotels. With the fall of the city to the Provisional Government, he went on the run. Dressed as a priest, he hid out in Rathgar.
40
He left 11 Upper Mount Street and made his way south on 11 July via Wicklow where, according to Bromage, a contingent of Liam Lynch men heard he was in their area, picked him up and brought him to Clonmel.

His personal papers reveal in very great detail his movements during July, August and early September when he returned to Dublin. Two months in the field illustrated how severely he had been marginalised by the militants. The following list, probably a contemporary note in his own hand, shows his itinerary.
41

There is a detailed note, probably dictated to his biographer T. P. O'Neill, of his activities during that period:

I left Dublin for the South on July 11th or 12th 1922. I was still in Callan on July 11th and probably reached Clonmel on July 12th. Liam Lynch and others were there. I heard news of how Jerry Ryan had outwitted our people at Thurles and that Major Prout in charge of the Free State troops was advancing from Kilkenny. I had news, also, of some truce arrangement that had been made at Limerick. As a result of news about Prout, Lynch and his officers decided to take the headquarters to Fermoy. I accompanied them to the new barracks. Shortly after my arrival there, it occurred to me that it was most unfair to leave Seamus Robbinson to face the Prout onslaught and I asked permission to go back to be with him. This was granted.

He then goes on to point out:

On the way back I was told that the barracks at Cahir, Tipperary, Carrick, Clonmel had been set on fire. I felt this was a mistake, and rushed to Clonmel where I succeeded in persuading Seamus Robbinson not to go on with the burning. I pointed out that the burning of the barracks would be an indication that we had left these areas and it would be an enemy advance by the Free State troops to take these towns. A substantial portion of the Clonmel barracks was, accordingly, saved, but when I went to Tipperary and Carrick I found the barracks had been destroyed … I stayed for a few nights in Cashel barracks and then went back to the headquarters at Clonmel. From Clonmel some of our men went out to hold Carrick-on-Suir.
42

De Valera, assigned as adjutant to Commandant General Seán Moylan, had little success when he talked of peace to an intransigent, Liam Lynch.
43
He learned in early August of the death of Harry Boland. In his diary he recorded on 11 August: ‘Waiting in F[ermoy] barracks to leave. One of the most if not the most miserable day I ever spent. Thoughts! Thoughts!'
44
On the day that Arthur Griffith died in Dublin, de Valera was visiting the retired veteran member of the Irish Parliamentary Party, William O'Brien, at his home near Mallow. While there is an extensive account of their conversation in Bromage,
45
his diary recorded:

He thought that not concentrating on Partition and later on breach by Collins of pact, we had the chance of bringing the country with us. He did not know how close my endeavours had been to his ideas. Had a ride with Hyde on ‘charger'. Slept at Kilpeadar House.
46

He learned of Griffith's death the following day. Bromage records how a woman in the house where he was hiding found him sobbing when she brought him food. He had just read the news of his death in the paper.
47
De Valera left the house without eating anything. He recorded in his diary:

Went for a walk in the fields – meditation. Any chance of winning? If there was any chance duty to hold on to secure it. If none duty to try to get the men to quit – for the present. The people must be won to the cause – before any successful fighting can be done. The men dead and gloomy – just holding on. How long will it last. Heard A. G. dead. He was I believe unselfishly patriotic – courageously. If only he had not stooped to the methods he employed to win.
48

The following day he asked the question in his diary: ‘I wish I could know his [Griffith's] ideas when he signed that treaty – Did he think when it was signed I'd accept the
fait accompli
?'
49

These were not the thoughts of a man in battle command of the anti-Treatyite forces. He was a political leader being passed – at considerable risk to local anti-Treatyites – from one safe house to the next until he found himself in west Cork
en route
to Kerry. But de Valera changed his mind and made his way back towards Dublin. He made his way to Miss Barry's of Ballylegan, near Glanworth. Crossing the ford there, he heard of the death of Collins. Taken to Dr Barry's of Kilworth, he stayed the night of 23/24 August. He made his way through Callan and Fr Kelly of Rathoe, where he stayed from Saturday 26 to Monday 28 August.
50
Lynch, in a letter of 30 August, turned down the idea of a meeting of IRA commanders with de Valera.
51
The forces of the anti-Treatyites were not under de Valera's control. According to Macardle, de Valera wanted the TDs who supported him to enter Dáil Éireann.
52