December 1941 (23 page)

In the
Washington Star
, only one story was devoted to the Far East while the rest of the war and foreign news was about the Russian Front, North Africa, and the North Atlantic. The other news of the day covered sports, the weather, traffic reports, human-interest stories, metro articles, editorials, and columns. The most human of human-interest stories ran across the wires on Sunday morning about the death of a ninety-seven-year-old man, “Ray Fritman, who had spent a lifetime seeking his true identity. . . . He became lost during a parade in New York in 1852 and never saw his parents again.” He got his name from an orphanage in New York, fought in the Civil War, and later taught school in Indiana.
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When there was news in some papers about the crisis with Japan, it was tucked between all sorts of other stories. However, buried on page three of the
New York Times
was an ominous piece dateline “Tokyo, Sunday, Dec. 7.” The headline read, “Japanese Herald ‘Supreme Crisis.'” The account was on the United Press wire. “Japan indicated early today that she was on the verge of abandoning efforts to achieve a settlement of Pacific issues by diplomatic negotiation [in] Washington.” The story further detailed Tokyo's anger over Russia's apparent decision to throw in her lot with the “ABCD” powers of America, Britain, China, and the Dutch and oppose Japan in the Far East. But also a Japanese government official said, “[T]he time for alteration of the Thai Government's neutrality is believed at hand.”
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The Thai government announced a state of emergency, and despite the claims of Tokyo, the Thais said they were not worried about the British. However, the British were worried about the Japanese. Civilians throughout the Far East had been told to evacuate and all British troops had been recalled, some picked up in bars and clubs in Singapore and taken back to their respective bases and ships. Twenty Japanese nationals had been taken off of a ship headed for Bangkok and detained by the British.
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England's military commanders planned an “all hands on deck” meeting for December 8 to game out the dire situation.
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One fact was becoming increasingly clear: Britain was now incapable of defending its Far Eastern prizes—especially oil, the greatest prize of all. To defend its empire against the resource-hungry Japanese, the British desperately needed the assistance of its rich cousins across the Atlantic, something President Roosevelt well understood.

On Saturday evening, December 6, FDR sent a message directly to Emperor Hirohito, “an unprecedented action—as disturbing reports reached the State Department that two large and heavily escorted convoys were seen yesterday morning steaming into the Gulf of Siam, which washes the shores of Thailand.”
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The contents of the president's message to the emperor were not revealed at the time. Later it became known and was utterly respectful and solicitous of the emperor. Words such as “friendship” and “virtue” and “wisdom” littered the missive, but also words like “fear” and “concern.”
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“Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation. Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. These developments contain tragic possibilities.” Roosevelt politely raised the subject of China
and
Indo-China and expressed concern over Japan's military incursions in those two countries. “During the past few weeks it has become clear
.
. . that Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.” Roosevelt reviewed other matters in the area including the Philippines, the East Indies, and Malaya and the apparent Japanese designs on these countries as well. “I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these people is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military
.
. . bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.” He assured Hirohito that the United States and the other countries of the region had no warlike designs on Japan.
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Roosevelt closed with a plea. “I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.”
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The telegram was sent at 6:00 p.m. Washington time on the sixth, but there was no evidence Hirohito ever saw it.

Even with the details of the message then unknown to the public, it was clear to most that the Roosevelt administration felt some sort of breakthrough was still possible in the Far East that might relieve the pressure cooker it had become. “The dispatch of the President's message was announced after a day in which appeared some slight hopes that the crisis with Japan would subside and that conversations could be resumed . . . on some satisfactory lines.”
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Only once before, on December 13, 1937, had Roosevelt communicated with Hirohito. That was when the Japanese had bombed an American ship, the gunboat
Panay
, while she sailed in Chinese waters. That message was delivered orally to the Japanese ambassador in Washington and “it produced results, and the United States received satisfaction for the
Panay
attack.”
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The new Roosevelt initiative was interpreted to reflect his dissatisfaction with Tokyo's military maneuvers in the Far East and as a last ditch effort to restart the talks.

Following FDR's plea observers agreed, “The next step, it was felt, is wholly up to Japan . . .”
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“The message also was viewed as possibly a step of last resort to avert an open break with Japan since it was considered unlikely that Mr. Roosevelt would communicate directly with the Emperor unless virtually all hope had been abandoned of a satisfactory adjustment of Japanese-American difficulties through the usual diplomatic channels.”
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While coverage might have otherwise been slight, every radio newspaper in America covered in detail Roosevelt's olive branch to Japan the morning of December 8, though not all reported on the “two large and heavily escorted Japanese convoys . . . steaming toward the Gulf of Siam (Thailand) this morning.”
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Another large convoy featuring six aircraft carriers heading southeast from Japan and briefly reported on six days earlier had not been seen or heard from since. Kimmel had received a notice on December 2 that this Japanese task force, moving at flank speed, around 24 knots per hour, had been lost to American trackers.
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The American military policy in the Far East had never been completely clear, and Roosevelt never articulated specifically that if Japan went ahead and invaded Thailand the United States would get into a shooting war with Tokyo. But everybody assumed Thailand was the line in the sand, especially since the British had made clear their intention to attack Japan if Thailand were invaded.
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The Japanese press meanwhile continued to pound the United States, accusing Washington of stalling and “insincerity,” though without elaborating.
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Domei, the government-owned news agency, announced that the Japanese government, from Premier General Hideki Tojo to the foreign minister to the navy minister Vice Adm. Shigetaro Shimada “‘would speak the whole truth about the current international situation as well as the Japanese-American talks' in speeches Monday.”
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The Japanese, having invaded China, incredibly called for “self-determination” for the Chinese and had used this as yet another reason to tell Washington to butt out of the affairs of the Far East.
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They also blasted the “sensationalism” of American “press and radio,” but that was nothing new. American politicians had complained of this for years.
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The War Department had done a little saber-rattling of its own and called attention to new bases it was building in the Aleutian Islands, a potential threat to Japan.
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Yet another Japanese spokesman, Dr. Morinosuki Kashima, unsurprisingly blasted the United States and its “offensive attitude diplomatically, politically and strategically.” News reports confirmed that “certain attaches of the Japanese Embassy in Washington had been shifted, but reasons for the move were not specified.” Other unexplained actions by the Japanese were reported, including the recall of the heads of steamship offices in Bombay and Singapore.
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Australia was actively preparing for war and ordered “nonessential” civilians to leave the Philippines immediately and that an evacuation might be necessary.
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The British were still furiously evacuating Singapore, sending trucks around the city to pick up soldiers and sailors.
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On the other side of the world, Great Britain declared war against Finland, which had become an “ally” of the Third Reich. “Each of the German satellite states had refused ultimatums that they halt hostilities against Russia, Britain's ally.” Immediately, the British government arrested 150 Finns “who will be removed later to concentration camps,” while “[n]ewly designated ‘enemy diplomats' prepared to leave London.”
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In concert with the British declaration of war, FDR put Finnish ships in American ports in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore under “protective custody.”
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Finland's president Risto Ryti received “a telegram of independence day congratulations from Adolf Hitler.”
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In the Mediterranean, another German ally, the Vichy government of France, activated its fleet there to assist the Nazis and Italians against “British piracy.”
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The British scored some heavy air wins over Libya, due to the new American plane, the Tomahawk fighter, obtained under Lend-Lease.
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Also under Lend-Lease—and because of the wheat surplus in America—a large shipment was headed for Russia that Moscow had purchased using American credit.
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But the relentless German counteroffensive on Moscow was scoring results, in spite of the claims from the Soviet-controlled state media. “Moscow appeared tonight to be in her direst peril . . . the Russian capital had become the target for 1,500,000 advancing troops, 8,000 tanks and 1,000 guns.”
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The Nazi panzer groups were a mere forty miles from the Soviet capital; the huddled residents of the besieged city could hear the Germans' heavy guns in the near distance. For the Russians, all appeared lost—until temperatures plummeted and the historical military asset that some refer to as “General Winter” emerged from his slumber. The “iron willpower” of the German Supermen, ill-protected in lightweight uniforms, was about to face the supreme test.

The day before, navy secretary Frank Knox released a report he'd prepared for FDR that stated America's fleet was “superior to any” in the world and that it had recently been “placed on a war footing with full personnel manning the ships of three fleets,” including the Pacific fleet in Hawaii. “I am proud to report that the American people may feel fully confident in their Navy.” It is, he said, “without superior. On any comparable basis, the United States Navy is second to none.” Knox concluded, “In the Pacific, the strategic importance . . . with development of the islands guarding the approach to the Navy's defense in the Hawaiian area with the resultant safety of the Pacific Coast, are obvious.”
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It was good PR, but there were problems, particularly with enlistments. Because of the ongoing recruiting difficulties of the navy, it was announced that physical standards would be reduced and young men heretofore disqualified for “varicocele, hydrocele, hernia, nasal deformity, seasonal hay fever not accompanied by asthma, and undernourishment,” would now be admitted. The navy had already lowered the standards for bad teeth.
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A December 2 memo from Knox spelled out the problem. In one month, the net gain for navy personnel from October to November of 1941 had gone up by only 6,921 men, from 280,184 to 287,105. His report to FDR was signed, “Very Respectfully.”
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Badly needed by the navy were men with radio experience, and a public plea was issued. “Men experienced either as amateurs or professionals in operation and maintenance of radio equipment are urgently needed by the navy and will be given ratings upon enlistment as radiomen, second class.” The navy had an immediate opening for one thousand enlistees, as long as they were high school graduates or “actively engaged in radio repair or service work . . .”
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The army, too, was having difficulty meeting its announced goal of 2 million men in uniform and a “new class of 21-year-old youths will be called up for possible military service at least by July 1 of next year.” The army was experiencing a “shortage of man-power . . . many local [draft] boards throughout the country are rapidly drawing to the end of their lists of potential Class 1-A registrants.” Class II-A and Class II-B men might be reclassified as 1-A. In Washington, over four thousand healthy young men were classified as II-A or II-B.
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