Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (15 page)

Mao and Zhou, Nixon and Kissinger

In 1969 China and the United States, which had been trading partners for two centuries, World War II allies for four years, and Cold War enemies for two decades, began to consider rekindling a diplomatic relationship. Mao, concerned about the risk of Soviet invasion after the 1969 border clashes, had for the first time since the Korean War decided to increase contacts with the West, and had assigned Zhou Enlai to carry on the negotiations. Nixon, who was looking for a way to resolve the Vietnam conflict and was seeking long-term cooperation against the Soviet Union, assigned Henry Kissinger to be Zhou's counterpart in negotiating the new overtures to China. Kissinger's dramatic trip from Pakistan to Beijing in 1971, to prepare for the Nixon visit, and the Nixon visit in February 1972 were breathtaking events that helped set the stage for the rapid expansion of U.S.-China contacts during the Deng era.

Deng had nothing to do with the 1966–1969 deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations that had led to the 1969 conflict. But he had led the team that drafted the famous nine polemical letters to Moscow from 1961 to 1963, and he had personally delivered the last major Chinese speech in Moscow in 1963 that had capped those angry exchanges. Deng also had nothing to do with the opening to the United States that took place while he was still in Jiangxi, although by late 1973 he was at Zhou's side, helping to carry on negotiations. No, Deng's contributions would come later.

Restoring Deng Slowly, January 1972–April 1973

Not until February 1973, sixteen months after Lin Biao's death, did Mao invite Deng Xiaoping to return to Beijing. Having criticized Deng so severely in 1966, Mao could not expect others to be ready to accept Deng quickly, and he had not yet decided how to use him. Deng had been attacked so vehemently for taking the “capitalist road” that it was a challenge for Mao to explain to others why he would welcome him back. Mao's strategy was to explain that Deng, the highly respected general secretary, had been “mistreated by Lin Biao.” At the memorial service for Chen Yi in January 1972, Mao said to Chen Yi's family that Deng was different from Liu Shaoqi: his situation was less serious. Zhou Enlai then suggested to Chen Yi's family that they should let Mao's appraisal of Deng be more widely known.
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When word of Mao's comments reached Deng, it was the first indication that Mao had received his letter of September 1971. More hints were coming, however. In early April 1972, Deng was informed by the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee that, in line with his wishes expressed in the letter to Mao, his youngest son, Zhifang, had been admitted to Jiangxi College of Science and Technology and his youngest daughter, Rong, would be allowed to enter Jiangxi Medical University.
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With these positive signals, on April 26, 1972, Deng was emboldened to write to Wang Dongxing, explaining that since his two children had gone off to college, he wondered if he might be allowed to hire someone to help Zhuo Lin and him to look after Pufang. He concluded the letter saying, “As for myself, I am still awaiting instructions from you allowing me to do a few more years of work.”
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Deng received no direct response or communication, but within a month the salaries of both Deng and Zhuo Lin were restored to their original levels.
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Deng Rong later wrote that these signs that Deng's political situation had
improved were enormously encouraging for the entire family. The extent to which the Deng family waited for any positive signal reveals how completely Mao Zedong, even when he was sick and disheartened by Lin Biao's crash, could control the fate of the people under him. Indeed, Chen Yun had been allowed to return to Beijing from Jiangxi on April 22, 1972, yet Mao kept Deng in Jiangxi for almost another year.

On August 3, 1972, after several months with no response from Mao or Wang Dongxing, Deng again wrote to Mao, trying to clear up the doubts that he suspected Mao might be harboring about him. Deng began by writing that he had just heard the reports given to all workers in his factory about the crimes of Lin Biao and Chen Boda. He reported that although Lin was a shrewd general, on the Long March he had once teamed up secretly with Peng Dehuai against Mao and recalled that Lin Biao had refused Mao's request to lead the army during the Korean War. Deng confessed that Lin Biao was better than he was at understanding Mao's wishes, but that he could not agree with the way Lin had simplified Mao's thinking by stressing only three articles, because more of Mao's works should be used. Deng also wrote that both Lin Biao and Chen Boda would be happy only if Deng were dead, and Deng therefore thanked Mao for protecting him during the Cultural Revolution. Deng had no compunctions about telling Mao what he thought Mao wanted to hear.

In his letter, Deng reinforced the message that everything he wrote in his self-criticism of June and July 1968 was correct. In addition to explaining again his error in leaving the Guangxi troops in 1931, he also admitted that there were weaknesses in his performance as general secretary of the party because he sometimes failed to seek Chairman Mao's opinion. In 1960–1961 he had not been able to eliminate his capitalist thinking. He had also failed to implement effectively Chairman Mao's decision to build up the “third front” by moving defense-related industries inland. And he did not in a timely fashion ask Chairman Mao's permission before making reports. Deng acknowledged that it had been correct for the Cultural Revolution to have revealed his errors. In the letter he also tried to relieve Mao's worries about one critical issue: he wrote that he would never reverse the verdicts on people criticized during the Cultural Revolution. He also indicated that he would return to the Chairman's proletarian revolutionary line.
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This message from Deng was apparently what Mao was waiting to hear. On August 14, 1972, only a few days after receiving Deng's reassurances, Mao wrote Premier Zhou Enlai, instructing him to arrange Deng's return to
Beijing. Mao reiterated that Deng's case was different from that of Liu Shaoqi. Deng had never surrendered to the enemy and he was never suspected of passing on secrets to the Guomindang. In addition, Deng had supported General Liu Bocheng in battle and had made many other contributions to the party and the country.
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The very day Zhou received Mao's memo, he circulated it to the Central Committee.
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But because Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, dragged her feet on bringing Deng back, at that point no action was taken.
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In September 1972, Deng, sensing he might be allowed more freedom, asked for and received permission to visit the old Jiangxi Soviet base areas, including Ruijin. It was the first time he left his house in three years. He visited for five days, and was hosted with the same courtesy given a provincial leader. Deng also received permission to spend two days visiting Wang Ruilin, his office director since 1952, who was then in Jinxian county, Jiangxi, performing physical labor at a “May 7 Cadre School” for reeducating officials. Later, when Deng returned to Beijing, Wang was allowed to return as well, to serve Deng as before. On December 18, 1972, Zhou Enlai asked Wang Dongxing and Ji Dengkui why Mao's August instruction regarding Deng had not been carried out, and on December 27, after checking with Mao, they responded that Deng could return to Beijing at last.
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The next month, in January 1973, Bai Dongcai, party secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee, brought Deng the good news, and on February 20, after workers from Deng's factory came to bid him farewell, Deng and his family were driven by car to Yingtan, where they boarded a train for Beijing.
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As he left Jiangxi, Deng said, “I can still work for twenty years.”
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Indeed, it was not until nineteen years and eight months later, after the 14th Party Congress, that Deng would retire from the political stage.

Deng Returns to Beijing, 1973

When a person who had been criticized was to take on an important position in the Chinese leadership, it was standard practice first to hint that he was once again in good favor: that way, others would have an easier time accepting the new appointment. After Deng returned from Jiangxi on February 22, 1973, he was not immediately given an assignment, even though his appearance in Beijing implied that he would again play a major role. As word of his return began to spread, Deng visited some old acquaintances but for some weeks he still did not attend any formal meetings or assume any responsibilities, nor did he meet with either Mao or Zhou.

Mao gave Zhou the task of convening a series of Politburo meetings to discuss Deng's future. Members of the Cultural Revolution Small Group—as well as Zhang Chunqiao, a potential rival for succeeding Zhou as premier, and Zhang Chunqiao's supporter Jiang Qing—strongly opposed Deng's being given a major role. But Mao insisted that Deng should return to work and participate in regular party meetings.
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At the end of the deliberations, the Politburo proposed that Deng be assigned to the
yewuzu
, the leadership group under Zhou Enlai and vice head Li Xiannian that had maintained regular government functions during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and that he be allowed to attend regular weekly party meetings.
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On March 9 Zhou forwarded to Mao a document summarizing these decisions, Mao approved it, and the document was distributed to Deng and party committees down to the county level and to military officials down to the regimental level.
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Deng's first meeting with Zhou after his return to Beijing occurred on the evening of March 28, 1973, and was also attended by Li Xiannian (see Key People in the Deng Era, p. 731) and Jiang Qing. Immediately after the meeting, Zhou reported to Mao that Deng was in good spirits and in good health, and seemed ready to return to work. The very next afternoon, Mao met with Deng for the first time in six years, telling Deng, “Work hard. Stay healthy.” Deng responded that he had remained healthy because he had faith in the Chairman and had been awaiting his call.
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That evening, Zhou, at Mao's behest, chaired a Politburo meeting during which it was announced that Deng would be made vice premier and take part in foreign affairs activities. Deng was not yet to be made a regular member of the Politburo, but he was to attend its meetings when important matters were to be discussed. Zhou sent a letter to Mao summarizing the Politburo discussions, Mao approved it, and Deng formally took on the position.
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Deng's first official appearance after 1968 was on April 12, 1973, at a banquet for Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia. There he was introduced as vice premier. Deng and others acted as if his attendance were perfectly natural, though some remained reserved as they greeted him. Following his appearance there was a great buzz among officials and foreign correspondents about what role Deng might play.
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Clearly, Mao wanted Deng to be given important work. During 1973, as we will see, Deng gradually became a more prominent leader, first by being allowed to attend high-level meetings, then by being apprenticed to Zhou Enlai, next by becoming a member of the Central Committee at the August
10th Party Congress, and then, in December, after proving his loyalty to Mao, by becoming a member of the Politburo and a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

As an apprentice to Zhou Enlai, beginning in April 1973 Deng would accompany Zhou when greeting guests from Cambodia, Mexico, Japan, North Korea, Mali, Nepal, Congo, Philippines, France, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere at the airport, welcoming them and then seeing them off. He did attend some of the meetings with foreigners, but as yet he still was not responsible for carrying out any discussions with them.
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Mao Cultivates Wang Hongwen, 1973–1974

Mao, like all other senior Chinese leaders, devoted great attention to cultivating young leaders as successors. After the death of Lin Biao and with Mao's own health declining, the issue of a successor became more pressing. Mao drew on his deep knowledge of how Chinese leaders throughout the centuries had dealt with succession when crafting his own strategy. That is, Mao kept his options open: while giving hints and signs of his intent, he continued to observe, maintain his own authority, and ensure that he could always change his mind. Between 1971 and September 1972, Mao brought three promising young officials to Beijing to work at the party center: first Hua Guofeng, then Wang Hongwen and Wu De. By late 1972 he had singled out as especially promising Wang Hongwen—a young, strong rebel with a fierce loyalty to Mao and the Communist Party. Mao liked Wang's worker background, his service as a soldier, and his bold confident leadership style (see Key People in the Deng Era, p. 738).

Mao knew that Wang Hongwen did not have the knowledge or background to lead the government, but he believed that Wang's proven radical commitment and leadership potential made him a prime candidate to become a high-level party leader. Indeed, Mao began to lean toward the idea of keeping Wang as a party leader while at the same time finding someone else to replace Zhou Enlai as head of the government.

Mao Makes Deng an Apprentice to Zhou

Throughout Chinese history, as emperors aged and their energy declined, they often stopped seeing a broad range of officials and narrowed their contacts to an inner cabinet of fawning eunuchs. After Lin Biao's death, Mao
similarly rarely saw any officials, including Deng, and relied primarily on three women to keep him posted about the outside world: Zhang Yufeng, an assistant who lived at his residence, and the “two ladies,” that is, Tang Wensheng (“Nancy”), his interpreter, and Wang Hairong, Mao's “niece” (actually his cousin's granddaughter). Mao had met Zhang Yufeng when she was assigned to be an assistant on his special train. She was attractive, intellectually sophisticated, and politically astute, although she did not have the depth of experience to understand all the complexities of high-level politics. The “two ladies” had originally been sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist Mao when meeting foreign guests. Mao conversed with them before and after he met the foreign visitors, and the two gradually acquired a broader role as go-betweens with the outside world. Whatever their personal views, they had no choice but to be thoroughly loyal to Mao in their dealings with outsiders, who came to regard them as representatives of Mao's leftism. When Mao was attacking Zhou Enlai, for instance, the two ladies were responsible for conveying Mao's views. This situation posed a serious problem for their relationship with Zhou when Mao became critical of Zhou, for the two ladies became in effect Mao's mouthpiece in dealing with Zhou, and they were expected to report to Mao any possible problems in his behavior. By 1973, Mao, suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease, had difficulty holding his head up straight and mumbled. In February 1972 he once fell unconscious, but he was still able to meet Nixon nine days later. Mao was preoccupied with stories from Chinese history and literature. But on issues he cared about, like major personnel appointments, his reputation, and managing relationships, he was as shrewd, devious, and cunning as ever. On those issues, he remained firmly in charge and made calculating use of go-betweens.