Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (38 page)

Chen Yun, sober, prudent, totally dedicated to the party, and highly respected for his enormous contributions to the party, made a strong statement to the Southwest group to which he was assigned, advocating the return of Deng. As usual, Chen prepared his presentation carefully. He had Hu Qiaomu write a draft of his statement, and before he presented it he met with Wang Zhen and others at Geng Biao's home to identify any possible problems in the presentation. In the report, Chen Yun stated, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping had nothing to do with the Tiananmen incident. In response to the needs of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, I hear that some comrades in the party center have proposed that Comrade Deng Xiaoping return and take part in the leadership work of the party center. This is completely correct, it is completely necessary, and I completely support it.”
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In another small group, “Bearded Wang” (Wang Zhen), crusty and rustic but loyal, blunt, and even endearing to many of the party faithful, also spoke out in favor of Deng's return. By quoting comments Mao had once made praising Deng, he made it extremely awkward for the Maoists to oppose what he said. Quoting Mao, he said that Deng's political thinking was strong, he had rare talent, he was an able warrior, and he firmly opposed revisionism. Wang Zhen went on to say that in leading the work of the party and State Council in 1975, Deng had carried out Mao's line and had achieved great successes. He had spearheaded the fight against the Gang of Four. And now, Wang said, the whole party, the whole army, and all the people warmly wish for him to return early to the leadership of the party.
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In the small group discussions, many supported the comments by Chen Yun and Wang Zhen, but Wang Dongxing controlled the final editing of the reports of the conference, and Chen's and Wang's comments and the ensuing discussions were not included. Wang Dongxing told them that if they revised their comments, they could be included in the summaries for publication. Chen Yun and Wang Zhen, with qualifications due to their long service to the party that far exceeded those of Wang Dongxing, replied that if their views were not included in the minutes, then so be it. Though not included
in the official summaries, their comments, unaltered, were widely circulated inside and outside the conference.
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During the conference, Hua made some conciliatory comments to the many delegates who passionately wanted to reverse the verdicts on the April 1976 Tiananmen incident. He acknowledged that it was the Gang of Four who had suppressed the masses from mourning Zhou Enlai's death in April 1976, that Deng Xiaoping had played no part in the Tiananmen incident, and that it had been reasonable for the masses to flock to Tiananmen. Nonetheless, Hua still called the event a counter-revolutionary incident and said that a small number of participants were counter-revolutionaries. He also said that the rightist reversal of verdicts—which everyone knew Deng had favored—should be attacked.
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In response to the widespread support at the work conference for Deng's return, Hua said, “When the rain falls, a channel for transporting the water is formed automatically”
(shuidao qucheng)
, and “when the gourd is ripe, it falls off the vine”
(guashu diluo)
. His meaning was clear: when nature was ready, a way for Deng to return to work would become apparent, but they shouldn't try to rush it. As a concession to Deng's supporters, however, Hua said that at the Third Plenum (of the 10th Party Congress) and at the 11th Party Congress (to be held that summer), it would be appropriate to make a formal decision on Deng's return.

In this shifting political landscape, Hua sought to reinforce his interpretation of Mao's thought by controlling the editing of Mao's writings to be included in volume 5 of Mao's
Selected Works
. On April 7, the Central Committee released Hua Guofeng's guide on how to read the volume, which approved a passage of Mao's urging the pursuit of revolution to the end. A week later, on April 15 under Hua Guofeng's imprimatur, volume 5 of Mao's
Selected Works
was published.
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Neither the guide nor the publication of volume 5 itself, however, would stop the growing support for Deng's return to a high-level position.

Deng made it clear, meanwhile, that he would not support Hua's “two whatevers.” On April 10, in a letter to Hua Guofeng, Marshal Ye, and the rest of the Central Committee, Deng laid out his views on the controversial editorial. He said that from generation to generation we should use a “correct” and “comprehensive” understanding of Mao's thought to guide the Chinese party, army, and people.
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By using this clever formulation, Deng accepted the authority of Mao, while asserting, in effect, that Hua Guofeng was not the only one who had the authority to interpret Mao's views; rather, any particular
issue had to be seen in a broader context, and those senior party leaders who had worked with Mao far longer and more closely than Hua had were in a better position to judge Mao's views in this “broader context.” Deng then thanked the Central Committee for clearing his name from involvement in the Tiananmen incident. He wrote that as for his personal work assignment, “what I do and when it is appropriate for me to start work, I will completely follow the considerations and the arrangements decided by the Party Center.” Deng suggested that his letter, as well as his October 10, 1976, letter to Hua Guofeng supporting Hua's leadership, be circulated within the party.
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By the time Hua received Deng's letter, he realized that he had to respond to the rising level of support for Deng's return. Accordingly, he sent Wang Dongxing and Li Xin, high-ranking party officials loyal to him, to negotiate with Deng on issues concerning his return.
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By this time, because Hua Guofeng had affirmed the positive role of the April 1976 demonstrations, Deng was telling close friends that he was confident that the Tiananmen demonstrations would soon be considered a revolutionary movement.
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In this context, Deng was in no mood to support the request by Wang Dongxing and Li Xin that in preparation for his return he affirm the “two whatevers.” If the “two whatevers” were to become doctrine, Deng told them, it would be difficult to explain the reason for the reversal of judgments on him and on the Tiananmen Square demonstrations.
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Deng went on to explain that it would not do to take what Mao did on one occasion and to make that the explanation for something Mao did in a different place and time. Mao himself admitted he made errors; anyone who does things makes mistakes. If what a person did was 70 percent correct, that is very good. If after my death people say that what I did was 70 percent correct, Deng said, that would be quite good.
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It was expected that in order to return to work, Deng would write a letter that would be made public showing that he accepted Hua Guofeng's leadership. Deng went along with this request, writing in his letter, “Not only is Hua Guofeng the most appropriate person to succeed Mao in terms of his politics and his ideology, but at his age … he can provide stability for at least fifteen or twenty years.”
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On April 14, after Deng had made minor revisions to the letter, Hua Guofeng approved its distribution to party members, and on May 3, it was circulated throughout the party down to the county level, and within the army down to the regimental level.
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Hua had delayed Deng's
return as long as he reasonably could, but in the end, with Deng's written acceptance of his leadership, Hua yielded to the atmosphere among the powerful senior officials who wanted Deng back.

Although Deng's return would not become official until the July plenum, circulation of his letter praising the leadership of Hua, in effect, constituted a notification to the mid-levels of the party and above that in the near future Deng would be returning to work.
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Party members expressed high expectations that Deng as a tested leader would play a major role in keeping order and bringing about modernization. Party members also whispered privately about what the foreign press speculated about more openly: the future of the relationship between Hua and Deng.

By May 12, it was understood that Deng would be returned to all his former positions, which would entail taking responsibility for military and foreign affairs. As before, he would be vice premier. Deng also volunteered to take special responsibility for science, technology, and education, for he considered science to be the most crucial of the four modernizations, the one that would drive the other three (industry, agriculture, and national defense). After his offer was accepted, Deng invited Fang Yi and Li Chang to his home, where they discussed what they could do to promote science and technology.
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Given the prevailing mood in China, Deng would have to begin by overcoming some lingering anti-intellectual views. He told Fang Yi and Li Chang that they must emphasize that people who worked with their minds would be considered members of the politically respected working class.
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On May 24, preparing for his return, Deng invited his confidantes Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun to his house to talk about reviving his writing group and also about promoting science, technology, and education. Deng still valued the small writing group he had assembled in the Political Research Office, and he wanted to have a preliminary discussion with some of its former members about how to organize his writing team. Deng Liqun was one of the few who during the campaign to attack Deng Xiaoping had absolutely refused to join in the criticism and had suffered the consequences by being sent to labor in the countryside. He brought with him a letter from Hu Qiaomu, former head of Deng's writing group, apologizing for having joined in the criticism of Deng. Deng did not look at the letter. Instead he told Deng Liqun to return it, that Hu's criticism was not a problem: Hu Qiaomu had merely repeated what was generally known and that was understandable; there was no need to apologize for such gestures. Deng went on to praise Hu
Qiaomu's editing of Mao's speech “On the Ten Great Relationships” (included in volume 5 of Mao's
Selected Works
). He said he would welcome him back to the writing group.

After Marshal Ye and Deng conferred, the two vice chairmen of the CMC agreed to share responsibility for military affairs. Deng resumed working on the issues he had addressed in 1975: promoting downsizing, bringing in better-trained recruits, improving training and discipline, and upgrading military science and technology so that the military would be prepared for modern warfare. In his addresses to military groups, these remained central themes, but he also addressed broad political issues: “seek the true path from facts.”
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But he spent far less time on military affairs than on science, technology, and education.

Nor did Deng spend much time on foreign affairs. He agreed to take part in important policy decisions but said he did not want to be responsible for the day-to-day direction of foreign affairs; it was, he said, too tiring. Deng added that he really wanted to work on science, technology, and education, which he considered the most critical areas for modernization.

Deng estimated that China's science and technology lagged two decades behind that of the rest of the world; for example, he mentioned that China at that time had about 200,000 people working in science and technology, whereas the United States had 1.2 million. To catch up, Deng said, China would need to acknowledge that it was far behind and begin to develop its own talent. Resuming the policies he supported in 1975, Deng said China must use examinations to select the brightest elementary and secondary school students and give them the best training in the best universities and training schools.
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By offering to take responsibility for science and technology, Deng was also making it clear that in the near future he would not challenge Hua in his core political areas. But to develop science, Deng did not hesitate to touch on political questions that remained sensitive. In contrast to Maoists who insisted that politics must come before expertise, Deng dared to declare that scientists with little interest in politics could still be useful, and that the military also needed to educate talented people.
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Deng's Return

On July 17, the Third Plenum of the 10th Party Congress passed “The Decision Concerning the Return of Comrade Deng Xiaoping to Work.” Formally,
the decision required the final approval of the party congress that followed one month later, but at the plenum, Deng was officially returned to all the positions he had held before April 5, 1976: member of the Central Committee, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, vice chairman of the party, vice chairman of the CMC, vice premier, and chief-of-staff of the PLA. Of the five members on the Standing Committee, Deng ranked third, behind Hua Guofeng and Marshal Ye but ahead of Li Xiannian and Wang Dongxing.
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In what was in effect his acceptance speech, on July 21 Deng declared, “As for my return to work, one can take one of two approaches. One is to be an official, one is to accomplish something.” No one was surprised at Deng's choice: he wanted to accomplish something. Yet given Mao's lingering aura in the months after his death, Deng still had to be cautious in charting his course. Deng first repeated the mantra: “Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought constitute the guiding ideology of the party.” Only then did he go on to address what he wanted to accomplish: first, improvement in the treatment of intellectuals, and second, party building. He repeated his argument for flexibility in drawing lessons from Mao. Some, he said, had distorted Mao's ideas by taking certain statements made in one context and claiming that they applied to other situations. But Mao had different solutions at different times, and one must have a correct and comprehensive understanding of Mao to apply his prescriptions correctly in each circumstance. Deng also argued that the Chinese leadership should promote inner-party democracy.
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Four years later, after Deng had consolidated his power, critics would say that Deng was no longer as enthusiastic about inner-party democracy and had centralized power in his own hands.