Front Burner (42 page)
Authors: Kirk S. Lippold
Eight days after the release of the USS
Cole
Commission Report, Secretary Danzig, in a January 18, 2001, memorandum to the secretary of defense, organized his comments on the command investigation report into three main areasâthe issues that concerned him; the implications requiring action within his responsibilities for training, organizing, and equipping the Department of the Navy; and finally the implications of the analysis for the commanding officer of the
Cole
.
Cole
Commission Report, Secretary Danzig, in a January 18, 2001, memorandum to the secretary of defense, organized his comments on the command investigation report into three main areasâthe issues that concerned him; the implications requiring action within his responsibilities for training, organizing, and equipping the Department of the Navy; and finally the implications of the analysis for the commanding officer of the
Cole
.
Secretary Danzig noted that although there had been substantial intervals between successful terrorist attacks, they were happening again and again, and succeeding. He cited the Navy as a whole for six failings:
(1)
Coordination of intelligence efforts and policy decisions.
While intelligence can never be perfect, in the three months since the attack on
Cole
, the intelligence community had ascertained that more than a dozen people had participated over eighteen months
in a plot against Navy ships in Aden; yet, the intelligence community had failed to detect this ongoing terrorist operation.
Coordination of intelligence efforts and policy decisions.
While intelligence can never be perfect, in the three months since the attack on
Cole
, the intelligence community had ascertained that more than a dozen people had participated over eighteen months
in a plot against Navy ships in Aden; yet, the intelligence community had failed to detect this ongoing terrorist operation.
(2)
Operations risk assessment.
The original decision to use Aden for brief refueling visits had been carefully weighed, but Secretary Danzig could find no indication that any organization compared the risk associated with limited intelligence about terrorist activity in Aden against the alternative risks to the
Cole
of proceeding with less than a 50 percent fuel supply, or conserving fuel by proceeding at slower speeds, or by refueling elsewhere or at sea. While THREATCON BRAVO measures may have been deemed appropriate for those permanently stationed in Aden, there was inadequate consideration of raising the THREATCON level for the short duration of
Cole
's visit.
Operations risk assessment.
The original decision to use Aden for brief refueling visits had been carefully weighed, but Secretary Danzig could find no indication that any organization compared the risk associated with limited intelligence about terrorist activity in Aden against the alternative risks to the
Cole
of proceeding with less than a 50 percent fuel supply, or conserving fuel by proceeding at slower speeds, or by refueling elsewhere or at sea. While THREATCON BRAVO measures may have been deemed appropriate for those permanently stationed in Aden, there was inadequate consideration of raising the THREATCON level for the short duration of
Cole
's visit.
(3)
Security cooperation with host nations.
The Yemeni authorities did not provide significant inport protection and the commanding officer was not well informed about the support to expect.
Security cooperation with host nations.
The Yemeni authorities did not provide significant inport protection and the commanding officer was not well informed about the support to expect.
(4)
Navy Force Protection Training.
Even in light of the lessons learned from the attack at Khobar Towers, force protection training still placed too much emphasis on known scenariosâthe kinds of attacks, like truck bombs and car bombs, that had taken place before. There was a tendency to focus force protection plans and assets against attacks like that rather than against a kind of attack that had never happened before.
Navy Force Protection Training.
Even in light of the lessons learned from the attack at Khobar Towers, force protection training still placed too much emphasis on known scenariosâthe kinds of attacks, like truck bombs and car bombs, that had taken place before. There was a tendency to focus force protection plans and assets against attacks like that rather than against a kind of attack that had never happened before.
(5)
Counter-terrorist equipment.
Despite robust research and development efforts directed towards defense against familiar forms of military attack, the Navy and Department of Defense were underperforming in the development of equipment that could detect, thwart, or insulate units against terrorist attack.
Counter-terrorist equipment.
Despite robust research and development efforts directed towards defense against familiar forms of military attack, the Navy and Department of Defense were underperforming in the development of equipment that could detect, thwart, or insulate units against terrorist attack.
(6)
Maintaining situational awareness.
The commanding officer could reasonably alter force protection measures to account for the unique circumstances in Aden. While some had been vigorously implemented to minimize risk, others were not, which resulted in a reduced level of situational awareness. That said, even if all measures had been implemented, the attack would not have been thwarted.
31
Maintaining situational awareness.
The commanding officer could reasonably alter force protection measures to account for the unique circumstances in Aden. While some had been vigorously implemented to minimize risk, others were not, which resulted in a reduced level of situational awareness. That said, even if all measures had been implemented, the attack would not have been thwarted.
31
As he put it in a press conference the next day:
In general, I am in many respects impressed by the conscientiousness of the commanding officer with respect to thwarting certain kinds of terrorist attacks. The challenge lies in the words “certain kinds.” I believe that our training program sensitized him in many ways, but may have produced the disadvantage of a somewhat blinkered vision. When this commanding officer underwent his training program, and the
Cole
as a whole did, it was commended for its work in countering land-based attacks on the ship. When it went to Slovenia, the CO instituted particular force protection measures that were highly successful, again, against land attack, and were substantially beyond what may be the norm. Going through the Suez Canal, he was diligent with respect to a number of issues. And when he was in Aden, in my view, he vigorously protected against attack that might come from the dolphin at which he was refueling. The problem, I think, is that by focusing so intently on that particular set of scenarios that he had been specially trained for, he may have lost some situational awareness with respect to other kinds of scenarios, like attack from the sea. We need to make sure that uncertainty is broadly appreciated by our commanders, and that in fact, we recognize that we're not trainingâinevitably, there will always be a risk out there that we will not train for some scenario that some people will think of. And we need to become more muscular with respect to expecting that kind of level of surprise and being prepared to deal with it.
32
Cole
as a whole did, it was commended for its work in countering land-based attacks on the ship. When it went to Slovenia, the CO instituted particular force protection measures that were highly successful, again, against land attack, and were substantially beyond what may be the norm. Going through the Suez Canal, he was diligent with respect to a number of issues. And when he was in Aden, in my view, he vigorously protected against attack that might come from the dolphin at which he was refueling. The problem, I think, is that by focusing so intently on that particular set of scenarios that he had been specially trained for, he may have lost some situational awareness with respect to other kinds of scenarios, like attack from the sea. We need to make sure that uncertainty is broadly appreciated by our commanders, and that in fact, we recognize that we're not trainingâinevitably, there will always be a risk out there that we will not train for some scenario that some people will think of. And we need to become more muscular with respect to expecting that kind of level of surprise and being prepared to deal with it.
32
Secretary Danzig's memorandum addressed the Navy's, as well as USS
Cole
's, force protection training as required by his responsibilities under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
Cole
's force protection measures implemented in the Mediterranean, during the Suez Canal transit, and even in Aden before the attack were diligent, but the ship had not trained to defend itself against a small boat attack of this nature while in port. He ordered Navy training immediately expanded to include a broader range of scenarios
and to make commanders aware of the need for higher levels of alertness and vigilance in situations where uncertainty is high.
33
He specifically cited the need to do better in risk assessment and management, and to balance that process against the available intelligence. He stressed the need for the chain of command, which typically possessed experts with greater experience, to use their talents and supplement the needs of commanding officers and force protection officers in the protection of their units. He stressed that “one size does not fit all” and that each force protection plan must receive the benefit of being specifically tailored to the circumstances encountered by each individual ship or unit.
34
Investments specially crafted to thwart terrorist threats must receive high priority to improve both lethal and non-lethal weaponry and improved methods of surveillance, threat identification, interdiction, and physical protection.
35
Cole
's, force protection training as required by his responsibilities under Title 10 of the U.S. Code.
Cole
's force protection measures implemented in the Mediterranean, during the Suez Canal transit, and even in Aden before the attack were diligent, but the ship had not trained to defend itself against a small boat attack of this nature while in port. He ordered Navy training immediately expanded to include a broader range of scenarios
and to make commanders aware of the need for higher levels of alertness and vigilance in situations where uncertainty is high.
33
He specifically cited the need to do better in risk assessment and management, and to balance that process against the available intelligence. He stressed the need for the chain of command, which typically possessed experts with greater experience, to use their talents and supplement the needs of commanding officers and force protection officers in the protection of their units. He stressed that “one size does not fit all” and that each force protection plan must receive the benefit of being specifically tailored to the circumstances encountered by each individual ship or unit.
34
Investments specially crafted to thwart terrorist threats must receive high priority to improve both lethal and non-lethal weaponry and improved methods of surveillance, threat identification, interdiction, and physical protection.
35
Finally, he made his assessment of my accountability as commanding officer. In his view, command of a U.S. Navy warship was the greatest privilege the Navy can bestow on an individual. In Navy regulations, the responsibility of command is cleanly and simply defined: the responsibility of the commanding officer for his or her command is total; the authority of the commanding officer is commensurate with that responsibility. It restsâwhether for success or failureâsquarely on the commanding officer's shoulders.
36
36
But, he continued: “This does not mean that it follows inexorably that when bad things happen to, or on, a ship, the commanding officer must be punished. Terrorists are attempting to wage war on Americans. We will suffer additional casualties as a result of their criminal acts. If commanders were regularly sanctioned whenever we suffered casualties, we would compound the injuries to our crew by crippling the will, and, for that matter, the willingness to serve, of our commanders. Furthermore, those commanders we retrained might be more concerned with preparing for the aftermath, than with preventing the occurrence, of an attack.”
37
37
He agreed with the three admirals' comments in their endorsements of the command investigation report that the conduct of
Cole
's officers was not so deficient as to warrant criminal punishment by courts-martial or other measures. The additional investigation into the post-attack damage
control measures that saved the ship, he found, established that the commanding officer was exceptional both in training the crew in damage control measures and in leading them through the horrific hours and days after the attack. But the Navy had not provided the ship with the information and training that might have prepared it to deal with the attack it had sustained. And, Secretary Danzig wrote, while I as commanding officer was keenly focused on the threats I had trained for and understood, I had fallen short in anticipating the unexpected and adjusting the level of preparedness to deal with the unknown.
Cole
's officers was not so deficient as to warrant criminal punishment by courts-martial or other measures. The additional investigation into the post-attack damage
control measures that saved the ship, he found, established that the commanding officer was exceptional both in training the crew in damage control measures and in leading them through the horrific hours and days after the attack. But the Navy had not provided the ship with the information and training that might have prepared it to deal with the attack it had sustained. And, Secretary Danzig wrote, while I as commanding officer was keenly focused on the threats I had trained for and understood, I had fallen short in anticipating the unexpected and adjusting the level of preparedness to deal with the unknown.
In closing, the secretary said, in order to adequately judge my suitability for future assignments and promotions, the sum total of my performance must be considered. Consequently, in consultation with the Chief of Naval Operations, he took the unusual step of ordering that the investigation, his memorandum, and any other memorandum the CNO chose to write should be included in my permanent service record.
The last person to comment on the investigation prior to its release was Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen. He took a much broader and strategic approach in his comments. In a memorandum to virtually every level in the Department of Defense, including the service secretaries, undersecretaries of defense, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he delivered his assessment of accountability arising from the attack on USS
Cole
.
Cole
.
From the start, he assumed responsibility for the Department of Defense's failure to fully appreciate the danger posed to in-transit naval forces by waterborne threats in restricted waters, such as during a port call or refueling stop. It was the terrorists' exploitation of a “seam” in our force protection efforts that allowed the attack to succeed.
38
38
“Both the JAGMAN [command] investigation and the
COLE
Commission make clear that force protection was indeed a priority issue both at the shipboard level and above,” Secretary Cohen wrote. “Nonetheless, all of us who had responsibility for force protection of USS
COLE
âincluding the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman, the CNO, CINCCENT, CINCLANTFLT, COMUSNAVCENT, and CTF-50, as well as the Commanding Officer of USS
COLE
âdid
not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.”
39
He enjoined the Department to seek to identify, in advance, the potential vulnerabilities where a determined adversary is most likely to strike. Commanders at every level should continually test and probe every aspect of our force-protection plans, including the assumptions underlying those plans, in order to identify the “seams” that make the United States vulnerable to terrorist attack. He also pointed out one other aspect of this incident as deserving special mentionânamely, the extraordinary professionalism and heroism of the
Cole
's captain and crew in the aftermath of the attack. Noting the earlier comments of the Chief of Naval Operations, he paid tribute to the crew's heroic actions that had saved the lives of many shipmates and the ship itself.
40
COLE
Commission make clear that force protection was indeed a priority issue both at the shipboard level and above,” Secretary Cohen wrote. “Nonetheless, all of us who had responsibility for force protection of USS
COLE
âincluding the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman, the CNO, CINCCENT, CINCLANTFLT, COMUSNAVCENT, and CTF-50, as well as the Commanding Officer of USS
COLE
âdid
not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.”
39
He enjoined the Department to seek to identify, in advance, the potential vulnerabilities where a determined adversary is most likely to strike. Commanders at every level should continually test and probe every aspect of our force-protection plans, including the assumptions underlying those plans, in order to identify the “seams” that make the United States vulnerable to terrorist attack. He also pointed out one other aspect of this incident as deserving special mentionânamely, the extraordinary professionalism and heroism of the
Cole
's captain and crew in the aftermath of the attack. Noting the earlier comments of the Chief of Naval Operations, he paid tribute to the crew's heroic actions that had saved the lives of many shipmates and the ship itself.
40
In the last paragraph, he closed with these words: “Finally, I join the endorsers of the Navy's JAGMAN investigation in paying tribute to the seventeen men and women of USS
Cole
who made the ultimate sacrifice in service to their country. Their performance of duty was in the highest tradition of the U.S. Navy, and their sacrifice a vivid and somber reminder of the traditions and heritage of the United States Armed Forces. I extend my deepest sympathy to each member of every family whose loved ones were lost or injured in this act of terrorism. Our nation shall not forget their sacrifice, and we will not rest until all the perpetrators are identified and held accountable.”
41
Cole
who made the ultimate sacrifice in service to their country. Their performance of duty was in the highest tradition of the U.S. Navy, and their sacrifice a vivid and somber reminder of the traditions and heritage of the United States Armed Forces. I extend my deepest sympathy to each member of every family whose loved ones were lost or injured in this act of terrorism. Our nation shall not forget their sacrifice, and we will not rest until all the perpetrators are identified and held accountable.”
41
After all this, however, the official U.S. government response to the attack was far from quick or decisive. Instead of ordering retaliation, officials in Washington deliberated inconclusively. As the staff of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the 9/11 Commission, reported several years later: “After the attack on the USS
Cole
, [White House] National Security Adviser [Samuel (“Sandy”)] Berger asked General [Hugh] Shelton for military plans to act quickly against bin Laden. General Shelton asked General Tommy Franks, the new commander of CENTCOM, to look again at the options.... Documents show that, in late 2000, the President's advisers received a cautious presentation of the evidence showing that individuals linked to al Qaeda had carried out or
supported the attack, but that the evidence could not establish that bin Laden himself had ordered the attack. DoD prepared plans to strike al Qaeda camps and Taliban targets with cruise missiles in case policymakers decided to respond. Essentially the same analysis of al Qaeda's responsibility for the attack on the USS
Cole
was delivered to the highest officials of the new administration five days after it took office.”
42
Cole
, [White House] National Security Adviser [Samuel (“Sandy”)] Berger asked General [Hugh] Shelton for military plans to act quickly against bin Laden. General Shelton asked General Tommy Franks, the new commander of CENTCOM, to look again at the options.... Documents show that, in late 2000, the President's advisers received a cautious presentation of the evidence showing that individuals linked to al Qaeda had carried out or
supported the attack, but that the evidence could not establish that bin Laden himself had ordered the attack. DoD prepared plans to strike al Qaeda camps and Taliban targets with cruise missiles in case policymakers decided to respond. Essentially the same analysis of al Qaeda's responsibility for the attack on the USS
Cole
was delivered to the highest officials of the new administration five days after it took office.”
42
Apparently, even bin Laden was frustrated by the long inaction after the attack on
Cole
, according to the 9/11 Commission's final report: “In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to bin Laden) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source, bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger.”
43
Cole
, according to the 9/11 Commission's final report: “In February 2001, a source reported that an individual whom he identified as the big instructor (probably a reference to bin Laden) complained frequently that the United States had not yet attacked. According to the source, bin Laden wanted the United States to attack, and if it did not he would launch something bigger.”
43
14
The Long Journey Home
B
Y EARLY DECEMBER, the crew had been back almost a month, including the well-deserved period of convalescent leave. Many had given media interviews, but now they were less interested in talking to the press than in refocusing their minds on their shipmates and the future. The crew also understood that an intensive investigation into their actions was ongoing. While some worried about what that might mean for them, we made a concerted effort to assure everyone that the focus was not on the actions of the crew at large, but on the senior leadership of the ship, and especially on my actions as commanding officer. Admiral Natter and Rear Admiral Foley had made recently renovated barracks available, which was a great way to welcome home the crew. But since there was no ship, there were no offices or duties for the crew to focus on for work.
Y EARLY DECEMBER, the crew had been back almost a month, including the well-deserved period of convalescent leave. Many had given media interviews, but now they were less interested in talking to the press than in refocusing their minds on their shipmates and the future. The crew also understood that an intensive investigation into their actions was ongoing. While some worried about what that might mean for them, we made a concerted effort to assure everyone that the focus was not on the actions of the crew at large, but on the senior leadership of the ship, and especially on my actions as commanding officer. Admiral Natter and Rear Admiral Foley had made recently renovated barracks available, which was a great way to welcome home the crew. But since there was no ship, there were no offices or duties for the crew to focus on for work.
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