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It was scheduled to start at 1530 and last one hour. Although every attendee processed through the North Visitors Entrance and was walked toward the North Portico, the meeting was actually held in a conference room across the street on the second floor of the Eisenhower Executive Office Building. Given the purposefully short notice, only families within a few hours' drive of Washington, D.C., were able to attend. In total, about sixty
Cole
and September 11 family members attended. From
Cole
, eight families were able to attend: Wibberleys, Gunns, Clodfelters, Saunders, Tripletts, Kate Brown (Fireman Roy's mother), Ruxs, and Parletts.

In the conference room, tables were placed end to end to form a large rectangle with chairs around the perimeter. The President arrived twenty-three minutes late but took time before speaking to walk around the entire table to introduce himself to every family member, shake their hands, and accept the occasional hug of appreciation. Talking for only fifteen minutes, he devoted the remaining thirty-five minutes of the meeting to answering questions. While everyone was respectful and deferential to the President in what they said and asked, there was clearly an underlying tone of anger and frustration at the decisions he had unilaterally made without consulting those who were directly affected by it—the families who had lost loved ones at the hands of the terrorists. At the end of the meeting, the President pleaded for patience to allow the review process to work, and for understanding of his reasons for wanting to close Guantanamo Bay. For the most part, most families remained unhappy with his decision and over the coming weeks expressed their frustration in the media. In their eyes, the politics of the moment were once again delaying justice.

Over the next year, the process slowly played out as country after country refused to accept most of the detainees held in Guantanamo, especially after they learned the true nature and background of the individuals they
were being asked to integrate into their societies and provide a new life for outside of Guantanamo Bay. I found myself speaking out on every media outlet that would host me on the poorly conceived decision to close Guantanamo Bay. On the Joint Staff, I vividly remember why we had created this particular facility in the first place: as the United States and its allies fought this new type of warfare, it would serve as “an intelligence center of excellence,” where terrorists captured from around the world could be held so that we could learn how they recruited, equipped, trained, and financed terrorists, and could conduct planning and operations across the globe. It was obvious to any military person that if you understand your enemies and how they operate, only then can you adequately plan and target them for defeat; otherwise, the old methods of warfare would not work against them. It was a clear shift in how warfare would be fought, and Guantanamo Bay would now be a key pillar in how the nation put itself on a war footing. The President and his new administration clearly thought otherwise and from the view of many, including me, were effectively undermining our nation's ability to fight the war.

A year later, when Obama's plans should have shuttered the facility at Guantanamo Bay, the public outcry and political firestorm created by the President's executive orders resulted in the facility's staying open, but essentially wasted on the purpose for which it was envisioned—a crown jewel in the world of intelligence—now unused. It had become essentially just a detention facility for the worst of al Qaeda's operatives, despite over $300 million invested in state-of-the art intelligence-gathering facilities being built there. On a positive note, however, the process of using Military Commissions would slowly begin to grind forward again. Despite Attorney General Holder's attempt to subvert the will of Congress and the American people by bringing the Guantanamo Bay terrorists to the United States for trial, eventually there was no choice left; Military Commissions would become the de facto legal mechanism for holding terrorists accountable for their actions.

On April 24, 2011, the charges against al Nashiri were sworn: terrorism; attacking civilians; attacking civilian objects; intentionally causing serious bodily injury; hazarding a vessel; using treachery or perfidy; murder in violation
of the law of war; attempted murder in violation of the law of war; conspiracy to commit terrorism and murder in violation of the law of war; destruction of property in violation of the law of war; and attempted destruction of property in violation of the law of war. The process of moving toward a hearing and trial started once again in earnest. Someday, the families will see justice; I just hope it happens in their lifetime.

The work of capturing or killing those responsible for the attack on
Cole
went on for years after the attack, but life for the crew also moved forward. With the inexorability of time, many would promote and retire, including some of the key leaders on the ship: Chief Larson, Master Chief Parlier, Master Chief Jacobsen, Master Chief Lorenson, Master Chief Abney, and Petty Officer Butte. Retirements are always a good time to remember the exploits and achievements of a career of service to the nation. There is also the equally important aspect of seeing your officers, those who had performed so brilliantly to prepare the ship for combat or endure the aftermath of a terrorist attack, achieve their own opportunity to excel in command, including John Cordle, Chris Peterschmidt, Rick Miller, Frank Castellano, Derek Trinque, Debbie Courtney, and Joe Gagliano. As any former commanding officer will tell you, nothing is more gratifying than to see the achievements of those who served under you as they become the next generation of leaders in the Navy.

My opportunity to continue my career and contribute to the nation came while on the Joint Staff. My work involved the creation of policy and long-range strategy out of whole cloth and without any real legal or historical references for fighting al Qaeda and bin Laden's followers. New challenges arose constantly. Despite the long but very satisfying hours with this work, there were other
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issues that I kept attending to: awards for the crew, disposition of crew remains, talking with various crew members as they adjusted to new ship and shore assignments where their peers could not begin to relate to their experiences . . . and, of course, wondering what my own long-term prospects were in the Navy.

After spending a career in the Navy, I always held in my heart that at its core, my Navy and the U.S. government would ultimately decide what is best for those who choose a life of consequence in service to the
country. Integrity had always been the bedrock of my existence and now, with the nation at war, it was more of an imperative than at any point in my life short of my experiences leading
Cole
. The leadership of the Navy had recognized me with the award of the Legion of Merit, the second highest peacetime award that can be bestowed, for my service and actions while in command of USS
Cole
during the time of the attack in its immediate aftermath. I had been given a career-enhancing staff assignment on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although not officially sanctioned by the Navy, I had been sharing the lessons I had learned on
Cole
with the future leaders of the Surface Warfare force in Newport, and now the litmus test for all that work and my future as a naval officer was rapidly approaching. My career in the Navy had developed in me an odd philosophical outlook: I was a professional pessimist (always plan and train for the worst) and a personal optimist (work hard and hope for the best). Quietly, several admirals assured me that while no one can ever predict how a promotion board will ultimately choose those who will lead the Navy into the future, they had every confidence I would be among those selected.

After being on the Joint Staff for about a year and a half, the annual selection board for my year group's promotion to captain met on January 10, 2002, to select those officers who would be promoted during fiscal year 2003. Prior to every board, Secretary of the Navy Gordon England issued a precept to the officers who would be reviewing records as part of the proceedings. In it, he stressed,

In addition to a career's worth of fitness reports, including my time as commanding officer of
Cole
, the entire JAGMAN command investigation had been ordered by the chief of naval operations and the secretary of the Navy to be made part of my officer record to be considered by the promotion board. I had requested that a message on accountability, issued by Admiral Clark, the chief of naval operations, to the entire U.S. Navy outlining his standards for accountability and personal responsibility and his reasons for handling the
Cole
investigations in the manner he did, also be included as part of my record.

The board convened and met in early January 2002. It was led by a vice admiral and included thirteen one- and two-star admirals. After months of review of each selected officer by both the military and civilian sides of the Navy, Secretary of the Navy England released the FY-03 Active Duty Captain Line Selections results on June 12, 2002. I was on the list! Within the Navy, many of my friends sent me notes of congratulations, seeing my selection as a vindication of the finding that nothing the crew or I could have done would have prevented the attack. As with any controversial decision, there were some disgruntled senior Navy officers less than enamored with the result who saw it as a lowering of the standard of accountability that, in their view, set our service apart from the other military services.

Regarding any officer promotion, the U.S. Constitution is very clear about the process and delineates it in Article II, Section 2:

The promotion list would be submitted by the secretary of the Navy for review and approval by the secretary of defense and the President before submission to the Senate to give their constitutionally empowered advice and consent. But while I was on the list, I was aware that there was a very real possibility that I would never be promoted, having already been informed that several more senior active duty and retired admirals were actively working behind the scenes with politicians on Capitol Hill to ensure that my promotion would never see daylight. In addition, several family members, still distraught at having lost a loved one who had been under my command, reached out to their respective senators and expressed concern that I was going to be promoted to a higher pay grade. Their loved ones had died on my watch and some still sought blame and retribution for their loss.

As the list moved forward, there was a separate addendum included that delineated very specific reasons why my name should remain on the promotion list and why I was deserving of a future in the Navy. Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark, and Secretary of the Navy Gordon England stood firmly in support of my promotion. Over the next two months, both Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and the Commander in Chief, President Bush, also supported my nomination for promotion by signing off and forwarding the promotion list. By August 2002, the list arrived at the Senate for consideration during the 107th Congress.

Now, politics came into play. The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), Senator John Warner (R-VA), openly questioned and challenged the Navy on its judgment in selecting me. Coincidentally, he was running for reelection that fall, and at least two Virginia
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families had contacted him and urged him to oppose my promotion.

Senator Warner clearly understood the importance of officer promotion boards and how they directly affected the future leadership of the Navy; he had been a secretary of the Navy during the Ford administration. In short order, he put a condition on the Navy; unless the Navy removed my name from the promotion list, he would convene a full Senate Armed Service Committee hearing, reopen the investigation into the attack on USS
Cole
, afford the Navy the opportunity to explain its views on accountability regarding how the attack was allowed to occur, and now, also include the issue of my suitability for promotion as part of that hearing.