God's Banker (39 page)

What is more, those pressures would remain. In December 1982 Rinaldo Ossola, another distinguished product of the Bank of Italy, where he had been general manager until the summer of 1976, was left with no choice but to resign as chairman of Banco di Napoli.

Ossola had been sent to what was notoriously a bank conditioned by the Christian Democrat political establishment in Naples, in the hope of bringing greater clarity and modernity to its workings. In the event, his ability and his reputation counted little against the en­trenched political interests with which an outsider had to contend. Before he left, his deputy chairman and fierce critic Aristide Savig- nano publicly stated that the real Mafia "was not to be found in Palermo, or even Naples but at the Bank of Italy". The turn of phrase was over-theatrical—but another sign of how the philosophy of the central bank was not universally shared. Later however Ossola would win redress of sorts. Early in 1983, he was appointed chairman of Credito Varesino, the bank which Calvi had dubiously acquired with the complicity of the IOR in 1972, and which would probably be sold by the Nuovo Ambrosiano group during 1984. There could be no greater symbol of changed times than the presence of Ossola at the helm of a bank once controlled by Calvi.

And finally, even the laborious renegotiation of the Concordat first signed in 1929 by Pope Pius XI, a relative of an earlier chairman of Banco Ambrosiano, could not escape the consequences of the deeds of its last one. All in all it was no mean legacy for a quiet diffident man from Milan.

And so we return, as we are compelled, to Calvi himself, elusive to the last. His story has made depressing, even tragic reading at times—quite apart from the horrible manner of his dying. All that was heroic about his fraud was its scale and its duration. The methods and ends of it were furtive, defensive, and in a curious way, second- rate.

In the financial dealings throughout his life Calvi was unprincipled and ambitious. But in that field he was beyond doubt a genius, however distorted, and whatever the social and human limitations to his character. In the early days the shortcomings did not matter; but later they did, as the need grew to protect financial spoils by non- financial means as well. Those to whom he was forced to turn, the politicians, Gelli, Pazienza, and at the end Carboni, trapped Calvi in a mechanism in which the plunderer became the plundered, the master the slave—and in some ways a most ordinary one. "Someone like Calvi simply could not be behind a mystery like this," Carlo De Benedetti, his unlikely colleague of two months, would remark after it was all over. And many shared the perplexity of De Benedetti. Calvi appeared to lack the dimension of the scandal he had brought about.

And yet such was the aura of financial infallibility which sur­rounded him that many, especially within his bank, were beguiled, trusting until the end. Italians can occasionally be as gullible as they are usually realistic; Calvi's own habit of giving little away only added to his mystique.
Piu uno non si fa capire, piu viene considerato intelligente,
was how Rosone, the last chief executive of Banco Ambrosiano, summed him up afterwards. "The harder someone makes himself to understand, the cleverer they're thought to be." Thus it was of Calvi, so long considered one of the most powerful men in Italy.

He also shared Gelli's gift of playing on both sides at once—the Fascist and Socialist party cards after return from Russia, the good relations with both Somoza and Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the em­ployment of Pazienza and Carboni for apparently different schemes. A double reality persisted to the end in his banking group as well; the seemingly prosperous Italian part, and the cracked mirror of it in Latin America.

So where did the key lie? Just conceivably, we should go back to before the beginning, to the Valtellina, those foothills of the Alps.
Scarpe grosse, cervellofino
, runs the Italian saying about people from such parts. Clumsy boots but a subtle mind. The aphorism fitted easily upon Roberto Calvi.

His humour was mostly that of the mountains; at best wry and understated. He knew the price of everything and of everyone, and yet the value of very little, beyond his family and the country weekends at Drezzo. Even his bank may have been only a vehicle for a purpose, a vehicle of which all the doors by the end were locked.

And then there were "the priests". A banker from Rome, with all the ancestral cynicism of that city about the Church, would surely not have trusted the Vatican and the IOR as Calvi did. For in his way, and despite his cunning, he undoubtedly did trust them, and felt betrayed when they did not stand by him as crisis deepened. In Calvi's eyes, the Church was not only of huge power and influence, and as such a secret key to the doors of success. It was also to be looked up to and relied upon, even vaguely feared, much as the peasant regards the village priest. Here again we are left with the two conflicting images of the man: suspicious yet ingenuous, untrusting, yet trusting to the last.

And so-for now the story ends. The fortunes of the various members of its cast differ considerably. In August 1983 Andreotti, the great survivor, returned to Government as Foreign Minister, his reputation intact as the shrewdest of the Christian Democrats. Craxi, the Socialist leader whose party had benefited so much from the largesse of Ambrosiano, became Prime Minister. Carboni was in prison in Italy; so was Tassan Din, whose health was reportedly giving way. Rosone, Leoni, Botta and Costa, all of whom had worked closely with Calvi, had been arrested. Angelo Rizzoli too spent 1983 in and out of prison. The magistrates in Milan were sifting through tens of thousands of pages of statements, documents and transcribed tape recordings to try and establish the truth.

Baffi would spend much of his time in Switzerland, working on a study of the Bank for International Settlements. Sarcinelli was director general of the Treasury Ministry in Rome, not entirely without prospect that one day he might become Governor of the Bank of Italy. In early 1984 Mennini and de Stroebel had taken refuge within the Vatican walls to escape the attentions of the magistrates. Marcinkus was still chairman of the IOR, but talking of his desire to end his career as a working parish priest, perhaps in a neighbourhood of the Chicago he had left for Rome in 1950.* Sindona was reading Nietzsche in upstate New York, while De Benedetti announced in March 1984 a rise of 73 per cent in the profits of Olivetti. From the Bahamas, Clara Calvi was persisting, bravely but increasingly for­lornly, with her campaign to clear her husband's name.

Roberto Calvi, of course, was no longer there. The successor to his Banco Ambrosiano was carefully feeling its way. It was a middling- sized Milanese bank of no great pretension—which the old Ambro­siano would have been to this day, had not Calvi entered it all those years ago. Afterwards many would still rub their eyes, and wonder

*Chicago Tribune, March 13,1983

whether he really had, whether the whole story had really happened at all.

But it did happen; and the ways of Italy have not greatly changed. Sometimes even now, as the cold fog of a Milanese winter's evening settles on those narrow streets behind La Scala, and a light burns smokily on the fourth floor above Via Clerici, it is easy to imagine Calvi still there; talking enigmatically of priests, and of strange banks without substance half a world away.

Bonn, March 25,1984

BANCO AMBROSIANO ANDINO S.A. LIMA
-
Peru          

Gentlemen:

This is to confirm that we
directly
or indirectly control the following entries:

-
 
Manic S.A., Luxembourg

-
 
Astolfine S.A., Panama

-
 
Nordeurop Establishment, Liechtenstein

-
 
U.T.C. United Trading Corporation, Panama

-
 
Erin S.A., Panama

-
 
Bellatrix S.A., Panama

-
 
Belrosa S.A., Panama

-
 
Starfield S.A., Panama

We also confirm our awareness of their

indebtedness towards yourselves as of June 10, 1981 as per attached statement of accounts.

MESSAGE NO. 352 APRIL 23, 1979 TO CALVIN

RE.» AGBC I PAYMENT VALUE 25 APRIL

FURTHER TO OUR VARIOUS TELEXES ON THE MATTER I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY MR LEONI THAT VALQE 25 AGBC HAS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING PAYMENT!

DLRS 3,000,000 TO NORDEUROPA

C/0 BANCA DEL GOTTARDO (ATTENZIONE MR BOLGIANI)

THE PERIOD OF THE LOAN IS 25TH APRIL - 25TH OCTOBER 1979, RATE 11.1/4

THESE 3 MILLION WILL BE GIVEN TO AGBC BY CISO UTILIZING 3,000,000 OF THE 7,500,000 RISED BY YOU AND MARCO, RATE 11.1/8. THE REMAINING FUNDS (DLRS 4,500,000 PLUS THE 15,000,000 RECEIVED FROM BCV AND CV) PLUS ANY OTHER AMOUNT WE CAN RISE (...7) WILL BE PAID OUT (INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW) WITH VALUE 30TH APRIL.

PLEASE SEND THE PAYMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE A/M 3,000,000 TODAY.

46638

I HOPE ALL IS IN ORDER. THANKS AND REGARDS. LICIA

One of the telexes from Montecarlo to Nassau

Lists of main shareholders in Banco Ambrosiano SpA (percentage holdings)

1
    
1973 (Bank of Italy inspection)

Locafid AG (Zurich)                           6.93

Kredietbank SA (Antwerp)                  3.33

IOR (Vatican City)                             1.37

Banca San Paolo (Brescia)                   0.50

B.B.B. Ind. Tessili SpA (Milan)           0.50

Invest SpA (Milan)                              0.50

2 1978 (Bank of Italy inspection)

Finprogram, Cascadilla, Lantana, Orfeo

La Fidele, Marbella (all Panama) 9.79 Sapi, Ulricor, Rekofinanz,

Sektorinvest, Finkurs, Sansinvest,

Ecke (all Liechtenstein) 6.80 Toro, Italfid, Italtrust (all

of Ambrosiano group)                          5.80

Suprafin (Milan)                                  4.02

Kredietbank (Antwerp)                        3.09

IOR (Vatican City)                             1.85

Veneranda Fabbrica del Duomo (Milan) 0.42

Infidfin (Lugano)                                0.40

3 1979 (Guardia di Finanza inspection)

Credito Overseas, Lantana, Cascadilla, La Fidele, Finprogram, Orfeo, Marbella

(all Panama) 9.54 Sapi, Rekofinanz, Ulricor, Ecke, Finkurs, Sektorinvest, Sansinvest

(all Liechtenstein)                               7.03

Toro Assicurazioni (Turin)                   5.11

Kredietbank (Antwerp)                        3.09

IOR (Vatican City)                             1.82

Cogebel (Luxembourg)                        1.00

Credit Commercial de France (Geneva) 0.46

4. 1982 (as listed in Bourse prospectus)

Italmobiliare SpA (Milan)                   3.62

Kredietbank SA (Antwerp)                 3.20

Credito Overseas (Panama)                 2.72

IOR (Vatican City)                            1.59

Fiduciaire La Tour SA (Panama)         1.59

Credit Commercial de France (Geneva)  1.37

Rekofinanz (Liechtenstein)                 1.22

Ulricor (Liechtenstein)                       1.18

Interpart SA (Milan)                          1.10

Cascadilla SA (Panama)                     0.93

Lantana (Panama)                              0.93

The main companies backed by the IOR's letters of patronage, the debts and the guarantees at June 30, 1982