Guantánamo (24 page)
Authors: Jonathan M. Hansen
As for the contention that Platt was consistent with Cuban sovereignty since it was Cuban sovereignty that Platt aimed to protect, Gómez replied simply that no nation could be considered sovereign whose internal affairs were subject to review by another nation. Lest skeptics doubt Gómez's authority on questions of politics, he cited three world-renowned theorists who defined sovereignty as ultimate, unlimited, and inalienable power. The Platt Amendment, by making “the dictates of the United States the supreme power in the land,” plainly violated the Teller Amendment's pledge to leave Cuba in the hands of its people. A Cuba under the Platt Amendment “could only inappropriately be called the Republic of Cuba.”
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Gómez argued that there was no separating clause three from clause sevenâon naval stationsâ“the most vulgar of the provisions,” and “absolutely unacceptable.” In the first place, there were “the moral considerations that prompt us to look with unshakeable repugnance at the idea of foreign strongholds installed on our coasts.” Then came the plain fact that American bases could only bring conflict to Cuba, both between Americans and Cubans themselves and between Americans, Cubans, and any third party that the United States engaged from Cuban shores. As if anticipating the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gómez feared that Cuba would become a site of political hostility originating elsewhere, thereby “inexorably drawing us into conflict not of our own making and in which we have no stake.”
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In short, American bases in Cuba would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of conflict on the island. It wasn't Cuba but America that seemed most likely to plunge the nation into international war. Cuba had no international problems (its “great desire is for peace”). Peace is what Cuba had been promised by the congressional resolution of April 1898 and the Teller Amendment. Once promising, the future of Cuba was now uncertain, Gómez lamented, and “one can't help but see dark horizons and sad prospects for our country.”
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No wonder, then, that “of all the clauses of the Platt Amendment, none so injures the sentiments of the country, or displeases the people as that which refers to the selling or leasing of land for naval stations. The shout âNo coaling stations' is the dominant one in all the popular demonstrations against the Platt Amendment.” Gómez and his colleagues on the Committee of Relations could not “help but take note of this popular sentiment.” As obnoxious as was clause three, clause seven was worse. It “involves not only the mutilation of our home, but a permanent threat to our internal peace.”
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No wonder, then, that “of all the clauses of the Platt Amendment, none so injures the sentiments of the country, or displeases the people as that which refers to the selling or leasing of land for naval stations. The shout âNo coaling stations' is the dominant one in all the popular demonstrations against the Platt Amendment.” Gómez and his colleagues on the Committee of Relations could not “help but take note of this popular sentiment.” As obnoxious as was clause three, clause seven was worse. It “involves not only the mutilation of our home, but a permanent threat to our internal peace.”
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Gomez's report on the Platt Amendment won the support of a majority of Cuban delegates and the Cuban public at large, bringing discussion to a standstill. In early April, Wood solicited from Root a statement clarifying the terms of intervention entailed in clause three, which, along with seven, was the biggest stumbling block for Cuban delegates. “You are authorized to state officially that in the view of the President the intervention described in the third clause of the Platt Amendment is not synonymous with intermeddling or interference
with the affairs of the Cuban government,” Root wrote back, but rather “the formal action of the government of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence,” the protection of life, liberty, and property, and so on.
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Meeting none of Gomez's objections, Root's response accomplished nothing so much as convincing the delegates that if they really wanted to be heard they would have to travel to Washington themselves.
with the affairs of the Cuban government,” Root wrote back, but rather “the formal action of the government of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds, for the preservation of Cuban independence,” the protection of life, liberty, and property, and so on.
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Meeting none of Gomez's objections, Root's response accomplished nothing so much as convincing the delegates that if they really wanted to be heard they would have to travel to Washington themselves.
On April 24 a delegation of Cubans arrived in Washington, D.C., to address the question of U.S.-Cuban relations face-to-face with U.S. administration officials. Greeted courteously by President McKinley, the Cuban delegation spent most of its time with Secretary Root. Root repeated what he had written before. Platt was intended to maintain rather than erode Cuban independence. It merely confirmed by law what the Monroe Doctrine had long asserted by proclamation: that the United States would not allow European states to compromise the independence of Cuba. Root never addressed the Cubans' concern that Platt would make Cuba subservient to the United States, thereby impeding international recognition of Cuban independence.
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For that Root had no acceptable answer.
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For that Root had no acceptable answer.
Asked if the naval bases were really essential, Root replied that indeed they were, both for the good of Cuba and for the United States. Cuba might have a navy of its own one day, the secretary allowed, but never would that navy be strong enough to defend Cuba against the navies of Europe. Moreover, even a country such as Italy made alliances with stronger powers to safeguard its independence. The United States sought only a few strategic positions from which to defend both parties. The bases would never be adapted to other uses. Suppose another country intended to attack Cuba or the United States, Root argued; they would have to begin by taking Cuba, and Cuba had no means to defend itself. U.S. bases in Cuba conferred no right to the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs, nor to diminish its independence, but exactly the opposite: to ensure Cuba's independence. The United States had similar treaties with other sovereign nations, Root observed. Never, he promised, would the U.S. sites be a point of departure for U.S. intervention in the interior of Cuba.
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Impressed by Root's patience in answering their questions and flattered by a state dinner and elaborate lunches, the Cuban delegates
departed Washington feeling “strongly supported” by American officials, though without having moved the McKinley administration a millimeter in their direction.
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The emptiness of Root's responses would be appreciated only later. He promised, for instance, that the United States would never intervene in Cuba via Guantánamo Bay, something it did repeatedly in the first three decades of the naval base's existence. Root's refrain that the purpose of Platt was to promote Cuban independence and his references to other nations having similar treaties only obscured Platt's coercion. In the end, he fell back on coercion itself: this was simply not an arrangement Cuba was free to reject. Passed by Congress in March 1901, Platt was American law. It must become Cuban law before the United States would end its occupation of Cuba.
departed Washington feeling “strongly supported” by American officials, though without having moved the McKinley administration a millimeter in their direction.
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The emptiness of Root's responses would be appreciated only later. He promised, for instance, that the United States would never intervene in Cuba via Guantánamo Bay, something it did repeatedly in the first three decades of the naval base's existence. Root's refrain that the purpose of Platt was to promote Cuban independence and his references to other nations having similar treaties only obscured Platt's coercion. In the end, he fell back on coercion itself: this was simply not an arrangement Cuba was free to reject. Passed by Congress in March 1901, Platt was American law. It must become Cuban law before the United States would end its occupation of Cuba.
On May 28, a little over three weeks after receiving the report of the delegation to Washington, the Cuban Constitutional Convention voted on the Platt Amendment. In a 15â14 vote, the convention endorsed the majority report of the Cuban Committee on Relations, which accepted the Platt amendment with qualifications based on the delegates' recent discussions with Root. To Platt's simple wording in clause seven, that “the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States,” the Cubans added, “for the sole purpose of defending American waters” from foreign aggression. At first, U.S. officials and periodicals greeted the Cuban vote with relief. Upon reading the fine print, however, Wood quickly informed the delegates that their qualifications were unacceptable. The law passed by Congress authorized McKinley to withdraw the military from Cuba after the Cuban Constitutional Convention had adopted the Platt Amendment into the new Cuban constitution, Root reminded Wood to remind the Cuban delegates. The Cubans themselves had no say in the matter. It was all or nothing for Cuba: Platt as originally worded or continued U.S. military occupation.
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On June 12 the Cuban Constitutional Convention adopted the Platt Amendment, unamended, in a 16â11 vote. Compared with the uproar Platt had generated in February and March, its final passage was greeted by an ominous calm. “FREE BY CHRISTMAS,” ran a headline
in the
Grand Rapids
(Michigan)
Press
. “Cuban Independence Is Now at Hand.” If Cubans did not know otherwise, Leonard Wood certainly did. “There is, of course, little or no real independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment,” Wood wrote the new American president, Theodore Roosevelt, in October 1901. “The more sensible Cubans realize this and feel that the only consistent thing now is to seek annexation.”
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in the
Grand Rapids
(Michigan)
Press
. “Cuban Independence Is Now at Hand.” If Cubans did not know otherwise, Leonard Wood certainly did. “There is, of course, little or no real independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment,” Wood wrote the new American president, Theodore Roosevelt, in October 1901. “The more sensible Cubans realize this and feel that the only consistent thing now is to seek annexation.”
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GUANTÃNAMO BLUES
“How many know that the United States has a plant of extraordinary value and efficiency at the Bay of Guantánamo?” Herbert Corey asked readers of
National Geographic
in June 1921. “Or what it means to the Atlantic fleet each year?” Corey, a veteran travel writer, acknowledged that until recently he certainly had not. Oh, he “had a vague idea that the fleet each winter visited a cactus-bordered beach on which the men walked for health's sake, and that from time to time it went outside for practice.” And he had heard talk of towns near the naval base where a fellow could enjoy a good drink and then some without having to duck federal agents (1921 was the second year of Prohibition, and Americans were thirsty). But Corey had also heard that a trip to Guantánamo wasn't worth the trouble. “The background to the picture was always bare white sand and cruelly hard sunlight and scrubby bushes, with a restless surf beating at an inhospitable strand.”
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Such was hardly the case, Corey discovered while accompanying the Atlantic Fleet on its winter cruise. It was as if the navy had been trying to suppress news of a good thing.
National Geographic
in June 1921. “Or what it means to the Atlantic fleet each year?” Corey, a veteran travel writer, acknowledged that until recently he certainly had not. Oh, he “had a vague idea that the fleet each winter visited a cactus-bordered beach on which the men walked for health's sake, and that from time to time it went outside for practice.” And he had heard talk of towns near the naval base where a fellow could enjoy a good drink and then some without having to duck federal agents (1921 was the second year of Prohibition, and Americans were thirsty). But Corey had also heard that a trip to Guantánamo wasn't worth the trouble. “The background to the picture was always bare white sand and cruelly hard sunlight and scrubby bushes, with a restless surf beating at an inhospitable strand.”
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Such was hardly the case, Corey discovered while accompanying the Atlantic Fleet on its winter cruise. It was as if the navy had been trying to suppress news of a good thing.
By June 1921, when Corey's piece came out, the events that briefly made Guantánamo Bay a household name back in the steamy summer of 1898 were twenty-three years old and had well-nigh been forgotten. Over the course of those intervening years, the base slowly expanded, so that by the time Corey paid his visit to Guantánamo Bay, it housed
roughly eleven hundred marines and laborers on a regular basis and could accommodate up to twenty thousand sailors when the fleet pulled in. Still, compared with the base of Admiral Mahan's dreams, Guantánamo remained underdeveloped. Its most touted feature was a rifle range capable of engaging upward of three hundred men at once. An old golf course had been converted into a training facility for new seaplanes. There was a launching ground for dirigibles. There were roads, “pleasant walks and charming gardens.” There were hospitals, clubhouses, canteens, tennis and handball courts. And there were baseball diamondsâten of themâwith more on the way.
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roughly eleven hundred marines and laborers on a regular basis and could accommodate up to twenty thousand sailors when the fleet pulled in. Still, compared with the base of Admiral Mahan's dreams, Guantánamo remained underdeveloped. Its most touted feature was a rifle range capable of engaging upward of three hundred men at once. An old golf course had been converted into a training facility for new seaplanes. There was a launching ground for dirigibles. There were roads, “pleasant walks and charming gardens.” There were hospitals, clubhouses, canteens, tennis and handball courts. And there were baseball diamondsâten of themâwith more on the way.
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Between December 1903 and June 1921 one would have had to be a pretty close reader to keep up with developments at Guantánamo Bayâa fan of naval appropriations hearings, perhaps, or a follower of ships' movements. News of Guantánamo reached the United States during the 1912 “racial insurrection,” when marines left the base to protect U.S. property and restore order; and again in 1916 as political tension rose in the Dominican Republic and Guantánamo swelled with marines bound for the American intervention there. Still, Corey might as well have been introducing Americans to a new place. He was certainly introducing them to a new thing: the colonization of the nation's overseas bases, and the cultural contact and social interaction that this entailed.
Joining the crew of the USS
Black Hawk
in the late autumn of 1920, Corey surprised the ship's commander by being more interested in ships than in sailors. “A navy isn't ships,” the commander chided. “A navy is the men.” His attention properly directed, Corey began to focus on the navy's “production of personnel of extraordinary intelligence.” At sea, “the American is made into an excellent sailor, as a matter of course,” Corey acknowledged, “but it is likewise the navy's effort to make him into a better American” that really counted. To this end, sailors were educated, introduced to foreign ports, well fed, well clothed, and physically and morally “guarded.” The sailor's life at sea paid political as well as martial dividends. “Upon his return to civilian life he has attained a higher and more intelligent standard of citizenship.”
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Black Hawk
in the late autumn of 1920, Corey surprised the ship's commander by being more interested in ships than in sailors. “A navy isn't ships,” the commander chided. “A navy is the men.” His attention properly directed, Corey began to focus on the navy's “production of personnel of extraordinary intelligence.” At sea, “the American is made into an excellent sailor, as a matter of course,” Corey acknowledged, “but it is likewise the navy's effort to make him into a better American” that really counted. To this end, sailors were educated, introduced to foreign ports, well fed, well clothed, and physically and morally “guarded.” The sailor's life at sea paid political as well as martial dividends. “Upon his return to civilian life he has attained a higher and more intelligent standard of citizenship.”
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Just as the world would know Americans by the behavior of their sailor ambassadors, so Americans would come to know the world by
these cultural encounters. In one photograph accompanying Corey's story, white sailors in white uniforms “barter with natives in one of the West Indies,” the sailors' arms laden with fruits and vegetables, as if confirming Mahan's belief that the navy was not only the protector but also the point man of American overseas commerce. The message here was not only one of a power disparity, with white male sailors from U.S. gunships juxtaposed against black female marketers from a barter economy; there were goods to be had, but also an economy to transform, the local labor force already in place. The American-male-versus-colonial-female juxtaposition suggested another form of exchange that remained inchoate in this image, and with which Guantánamo would become quietly synonymous: prostitution. The coincidence of what look like yuca or other tubers scattered in front of avocados or other egg-shaped fruit seems more than a little contrived.
these cultural encounters. In one photograph accompanying Corey's story, white sailors in white uniforms “barter with natives in one of the West Indies,” the sailors' arms laden with fruits and vegetables, as if confirming Mahan's belief that the navy was not only the protector but also the point man of American overseas commerce. The message here was not only one of a power disparity, with white male sailors from U.S. gunships juxtaposed against black female marketers from a barter economy; there were goods to be had, but also an economy to transform, the local labor force already in place. The American-male-versus-colonial-female juxtaposition suggested another form of exchange that remained inchoate in this image, and with which Guantánamo would become quietly synonymous: prostitution. The coincidence of what look like yuca or other tubers scattered in front of avocados or other egg-shaped fruit seems more than a little contrived.
The contrast of Americans to natives, whites to blacks, civilization to savagery, capitalist to barter economyâwith the valorization it impliedâwas susceptible to a kind of internal critique or inversion. In its proper place, civilization is all well and good, but these sailors were supposed to be steeling themselves for battle. To prepare for battle, they would have to become not only tougher but darker. Beneath a photograph of sailors amusing themselves on a Guantánamo beach reads a caption: “It is here that the enlisted man begins in earnest to lose the pallor, the narrow shoulders, the white knobs, and bony angles of the civilian and to take on the saddle-colored coat of tan and other attributes of husky health.”
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What a relief to see elbows “sharp as boat-hooks” and forearms “puny and pale as the stems of clay pipes” yield to “blotches of bright and inflammatory red upon their shoulders.” There was “virtue in sunburn.”
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What a relief to see elbows “sharp as boat-hooks” and forearms “puny and pale as the stems of clay pipes” yield to “blotches of bright and inflammatory red upon their shoulders.” There was “virtue in sunburn.”
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At Guantánamo, and more specifically at the nearby port of Caimanera, just outside the northern limit of the U.S. base, the husky health of the Atlantic fleet confronts its sable Cuban counterpart for an extended stay. Where a pigsty installed on the U.S. base inspires “fond recollections” of “wistful” sailors (“there is something homey and comfortable under this Cuban sun about the grunt of a Duroc Red lady whose children are gathering sustenance while she sleeps in the shade”
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), the streets of Caimanera “assail the nostrils” with “one thousand
assorted smells.” In Caimanera, “small dogs sleep in the sun or scratch themselves with an irritated vigor rarely manifested by other dwellers of the town.” Meanwhile, “little naked gourd-shaped babies permeate the principal thoroughfares and make excellent mudpies between showers.”
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), the streets of Caimanera “assail the nostrils” with “one thousand
assorted smells.” In Caimanera, “small dogs sleep in the sun or scratch themselves with an irritated vigor rarely manifested by other dwellers of the town.” Meanwhile, “little naked gourd-shaped babies permeate the principal thoroughfares and make excellent mudpies between showers.”
Why endure the squalid town? Alcohol. It's still 1921, after all, and “âSis's Place' and âThe Two Sisters' and âThe American Bar' woo thirsty callers by a display of backbars stacked with bottles. There are no fronts to the saloons,” writes Corey, “so that one pauses on the pavement, so to speak, to wet an arid whistle.” Many of Caimanera's bars sit on pilings out over the water. Nearby, “on their verandas,” also over the water, “one sees dark-skinned women, dressed in flowing white, languidly fanning themselves as the ship's barge pulls in.” The bars, the water, the nearby Guantánamo River, the languid localsâall call to mind “Conrad's African backgrounds.” Everything has such “a remote and exotic air.” As if succumbing to temptation, Corey seems relieved to encounter “the black and green badge of the [U.S. Navy] shore patrol,” mistaking its presence as evidence that the nearby streets and alleys of Caimanera “are emphatically out of bounds.”
At the time of Corey's visit, only officers, not enlisted men, enjoyed the liberty of Caimanera. To extend Corey's Conrad analogy, they play the part of Marlow to the Cubans' Kurtz; there is a desperation to the officers' imbibing that clashes with the exotic, as if Prohibition could last twelve more years. Arriving at five o'clock, the officers depart by six, their calls for drinks causing their Cuban hosts to “rain perspiration from their dark brows as they shake 'em up.” And “so it goes down the dingy, dusty, sometimes flagrantly muddy street, with its weird multitude of vicious odors.” The Cubans and Americans regard one another with bemusement. “It is not the Cuban temperament to hurry so over a handful of drinks. Nor does the Cuban need to hurry. Big negroes, with the strong features of the Arab, look one squarely in the eye.”
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A booze-soaked outpost, its tawdrier side lurking just offstageâthis is not the Guantánamo of navy mythology. Yet it is the salient feature of virtually all journalistic and eyewitness accounts of the U.S. naval base from the 1920s until the coming of Castro, which ended U.S. “liberty” tours of Cuban villages and towns around the base. Most
of these narratives describe these cultural encounters as innocent. The boys just want to have fun. Long after the inconvenience of the venereal disease has passed, the memories endure.
of these narratives describe these cultural encounters as innocent. The boys just want to have fun. Long after the inconvenience of the venereal disease has passed, the memories endure.
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At the close of the nineteenth century, historian Frederick Jackson Turner warned Americans that the frontier was filling up. The opportunity and prosperity Americans had come to take for granted on the continent must now be won overseas. In the aftermath of the Cuban War of “Independence,” Americans of all stripes flocked to Cuba as if hearkening to Turner's warning. No sector of Cuban commerce and industry was left untouched: real estate, agriculture, mining, finance, engineering, construction, education, the professions, gambling, prostitution, and so on were all overrun by opportunistic Americans who arrived in Cuba often with extended families in tow. It is hard to exaggerate the scale of the migration. By 1905 some thirteen thousand Americans had bought land in Cuba valued at $50 million. By 1919 forty-four thousand Americans had moved there, prompting one southern journal to remark, “Little by little the whole island is passing into the hands of American citizens.” And why not? In U.S. journals and newspapers, Cuba was depicted as “a land of perpetual sunshine, flowing with milk and honey,” “an all-the-year-round country” with “no unproductive season.”
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Oriente province, the least developed region of Cuba, was the target of intense foreign investment. After the War of Independence, the development of Oriente proceeded at an exhilarating pace, spurred by U.S. entrepreneurs who at long last responded to the calls of the early Americans who first sang Guantánamo's praises. Historians describe the Americanization of Oriente in terms of an “invasion.” Much of this invasion took place in the Guantánamo Basin, where low population combined with cheap real estate to set off a land rush.
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In the first decade after independence, U.S. capital investment in Cuba soared from $80 million to $220 million; by 1923 it had reached $1.3 billion, over half of which was devoted to sugar. Much of this sugar capitalization happened in Oriente, which by the third decade of the new century had become Cuba's second most populous province and its second leading sugar producer. Between 1907 and 1919, when
Cuba's population increased by slightly over 40 percent, Guantánamo's rose by an astounding 60 percent. By 1929, foreign sugar growers, most of them American, owned 64 percent of Oriente province.
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Three quarters of foreign investment in Oriente was devoted to sugar production, which by the second decade of the century pushed aside smaller homegrown industries such as coffee and tobacco, displacing local farmers and workers and replacing them with cheaper Haitian, Jamaican, and West Indian labor. Coming so quickly on the heels of what was supposed to have been Cuban independence, the social upheaval entailed in transforming Oriente into Cuba's leading sugar-producing region would have been untenable but for Platt and the proximity of the new U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay. Together, the two acted as an insurance policy for U.S. and foreign businesses, maintaining order and tamping down agitation for political and economic reform. It took nearly half a century for Guantánamo to become the place of Admiral Mahan's dreams. In the meantime, it functioned quite efficiently as American capital's private guard not only in Cuba but throughout the Caribbean region.
Cuba's population increased by slightly over 40 percent, Guantánamo's rose by an astounding 60 percent. By 1929, foreign sugar growers, most of them American, owned 64 percent of Oriente province.
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Three quarters of foreign investment in Oriente was devoted to sugar production, which by the second decade of the century pushed aside smaller homegrown industries such as coffee and tobacco, displacing local farmers and workers and replacing them with cheaper Haitian, Jamaican, and West Indian labor. Coming so quickly on the heels of what was supposed to have been Cuban independence, the social upheaval entailed in transforming Oriente into Cuba's leading sugar-producing region would have been untenable but for Platt and the proximity of the new U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay. Together, the two acted as an insurance policy for U.S. and foreign businesses, maintaining order and tamping down agitation for political and economic reform. It took nearly half a century for Guantánamo to become the place of Admiral Mahan's dreams. In the meantime, it functioned quite efficiently as American capital's private guard not only in Cuba but throughout the Caribbean region.
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“The difficulty of our colonial possessions [is] beginning to weigh heavily on our deliberations,” U.S. navy secretary John Long confided in his diary at the Paris peace talks in December 1898. “What an immense task it is to change our whole system of government in Cuba.” On the one hand, Long recognized that the United States “must establish naval stations” on the island; on the other hand, he knew that seizing Cuban land would violate America's promise to leave Cuba to its own devices at the end of the war with Spain. Wary of alienating the Cuban and American public, the McKinley administration refused to take up the matter of naval stations in the Treaty of Paris. What was a navy secretary of an up-and-coming liberal empire to do?
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Enlist the help of his subordinates. Before the United States intervened in the Cuban War of Independence, Alfred Mahan had been in the minority in calling insistently for overseas bases. By the end of the war in August 1898, very few Americans did not concede that overseas bases had become a necessity. With the war barely drawing to a close, government officials were debating which offshore coaling stations the
United States ought to acquire, tacit acknowledgment that Americans were ready to forsake what Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called the nation's “blundering” policy of isolation.
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United States ought to acquire, tacit acknowledgment that Americans were ready to forsake what Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called the nation's “blundering” policy of isolation.
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Passing the Naval War Board's findings on to Secretary Long, Admiral Mahan suggested that there were two regions in the world where U.S. and foreign interests were sure to collide: the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. To safeguard U.S. access to the increasingly lucrative Asian trade, the board recommended establishing coaling stations at Guam, Manila, Hawaii, and Samoa; to control Pacific Ocean access to the much-anticipated isthmian canal, it suggested occupying Ports Culebra and La Union in Costa Rica and El Salvador, respectively. In the Caribbean, meanwhile, the board urged the establishment of stations at San Juan, Puerto Rico, and in eastern Cuba (at either Santiago de Cuba or Guantánamo Bay). “The Caribbean Sea is one of the most interesting and vital regions in the world to the United States, considered from the point of view of commerce and of war,” the board remarked; “there our interests may be most seriously interrupted by hostile navies in time of war.”
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