Hannibal (5 page)

Hannibal, acclaimed universally by the army as Hasdrubal’s successor, seems also to have been accepted by the Senate in Carthage without demur, and the personal nature of the Barcid rule in Spain seemed thus confirmed: first Hamilcar, then Hasdrubal the Handsome, and now Hannibal. This led to a somewhat natural misunderstanding of the real situation by the Romans—that the ultimate authority rested with the Carthaginian Senate, and not with Hannibal. When, within three years of taking command, he went to war with Rome he had consulted Carthage in advance. The fact that, when later challenged by Rome, Carthage did not surrender Hannibal as requested but accepted war reveals that there were more influential Carthaginians in favour of a war of revenge on Rome than there were against. The anti-war element, however, always remained strong in Carthage; it was composed not only of enemies of the Barca party but of others who saw a senseless diversion of their country’s new wealth and strength into this expensive military expedition. Yet in the final analysis the judgement of Polybius remains true: ‘Of all that befell both the Romans and the Carthaginians, the cause was one man, and one mind—Hannibal’s.’

V

THE GREAT DESIGN

Hannibal’s first task on taking command in Spain was to enlarge and consolidate the territorial gains that had been made by his brother-in-law Hasdrubal and his father. Not until he felt that Carthaginian influence was securely established in the area south of the Ebro could he embark upon that great plan which he had always had in mind (if not inherited). As yet, he was not ready for war with Rome. His involvement during the first year, taming the tribesmen in the area of the Tagus in order to secure the river-line behind him, may have served to allay Roman suspicions of his intentions, or to convince them that he had enough problems to cope with in Spain itself. In the following year, 220 B.C., he moved further north again and captured Salmantica (Salamanca).

A foretaste of Hannibal’s brilliant usage of his cavalry was given to a massive combination of two tribes on the Tagus, where he showed how a brave and much larger enemy force can be confused by a night crossing. Hannibal was always to show that he had an appreciation as a cavalry commander that his enemies never had; at the same time he did not make the mistake of thinking that everything could be left to the horsemen. He knew that their dash and sudden violence must always be reinforced, and ultimately consolidated, by a hard core of disciplined infantry.
 

The cavalry that he used in Spain, and later in France and Italy, consisted of two basic units, still found centuries later—the heavy brigade and the light brigade. The heavy brigade was composed of Celtiberians, and later of Gauls, riding the powerful horses of the country, and having as weapons a short lance that could double as a javelin and a two-edged sword, slightly curved so as to make it suitable to cut as well as thrust. The light brigade was formed by the Numidian horsemen from North Africa. They were akin to those Arab horsemen who were to inflict such casualties upon the Crusaders many centuries later: mounted on wiry small horses, lightly armed, accustomed to mountains and desert alike, they were used to harass the enemy and then withdraw, creating among infantrymen a state of confusion which the heavy brigade could then exploit. Another arm which was to prove disconcerting to the Romans was provided by the famous Balearic slingers (whom Rome was later to incorporate into her own armies). These consisted of a corps of ‘Davids’, hurling round stones or lead bullets, who would open fire in the early stages of any conflict, withdrawing to join the light infantry before the major engagement took place.

The main body of the infantry, drawn from Carthage, Libya, and now Spain, were heavily armed in the Greek fashion with large shields, breastplates, helmets, greaves, cutting swords for close work and long spears for the first encounter. After a series of defeats had been inflicted on the Carthaginians during a Roman landing in North Africa in the First Punic War, their army had been completely reorganised by Xanthippus, a Spartan commander. He had introduced the disciplined order of the phalanx, which had triumphed over nearly all of the East in the campaigns of Alexander the Great. In the phalanx the men stood shoulder to shoulder, each man’s right side being covered by his neighbour’s shield, presenting a bristling wall of long spears to the enemy. While admirable for use in open country and against an ill-disciplined enemy, the phalanx had the disadvantage of being somewhat unwieldy. Hannibal was soon to learn from the Romans the use of more mobile tactical units, just as he was to adopt the use of Roman arms, especially the legionary’s sword in place of the cutting swords of his Iberians and Gauls. The great Carthaginian weapon which was new to Europe, though long familiar in the East, was the elephant—so long a part of Hannibal’s legend that it must be separately described in the account of his great invasion.

‘From the day on which he was proclaimed commander-in-chief,’ wrote Polybius, ‘as though Italy had been assigned to him for his field of operations and he had been instructed to make war on Rome, Hannibal felt that no postponement was permissible, lest he too, like his father Hamilcar, and afterwards Hasdrubal, should be overtaken, while delaying, by some accident, and resolved upon attacking the people of Saguntum.’ His hand was probably forced by evidence that the Romans were betraying a new interest in Spain; new in that recently their attention had been concentrated on northern Italy where the Cisalpine Gauls, who had settled on the Italian side of the Alps, had swept down south and even laid waste to Etruria. This brave but undisciplined enemy had gone on to defeat a Roman army—news of which must have encouraged Hannibal—and had threatened the city itself. Until Rome had mastered them and had established colonies in their area (laying the foundations of a new province, Cisalpine Gaul) they were too distracted to pay close attention to events in Spain. But in the first two years of Hannibal’s command reports from Massilia, and no doubt from Saguntum, had renewed their concern about the Carthaginian threat from the west.

They had taken due note that Saguntum, lying about halfway between the Ebro and the new Carthaginian port and capital of Nova Cartago, might serve as a possible bridgehead in the event of any operations against the Carthaginians. Its close ties with Massilia and the fact that the Romans had control of the sea in the western Mediterranean meant that they could maintain good communications with Saguntum. It was probably not long after their agreement with Hasdrubal the Handsome over relative spheres of influence that they entered into a diplomatic relationship with Saguntum, based on their alliance with Massilia. Their foot was now in the door, and about two years later they took advantage of a political dispute in Saguntum to set themselves up as arbitrators of the affair. The fact that they were interfering in political issues well south of the Ebro line does not seem to have troubled them. Their action followed the same pattern as their previous interference in Sicily, which had precipitated the First Punic War. This ‘benevolent interference’ was a technique that the Romans would often employ in the centuries to come: it is one which expansionist powers have always used to provoke a conflict or to extend their territory. The inevitable result of Roman intervention in the politics of Saguntum was that a party favourable to them seized power in the city.

Hannibal, after dispersing his troops at the end of the year 220, had spent the winter in Nova Cartago. There was much to attend to, for he could hardly ignore the fact that Saguntum was to all intents and purposes a Roman enclave in Carthaginian territory. Whatever the Romans might say about having concluded a treaty with the party in power in Saguntum, guaranteeing them Roman protection, the original treaty made with Hasdrubal had made no mention of Saguntum being a special case—and within the Roman sphere of influence. Hannibal had never had any cause to doubt the untrustworthiness of the Roman bond and he had no reason to do so now. He needed no justification for the steps that he was about to take.

Throughout that winter, in company with his brother Hasdrubal, who had now joined him (it is possible that his brother Mago, the youngest, had also left Carthage for the new family home), Hannibal laid his plans. ‘The Lion’s Brood’, as the brothers were known throughout the army, were preparing for the most audacious military move in history—nothing less than an invasion of their enemy’s homeland by way of the forbidding and hitherto untried route over the Alps. It is true that the Gauls had long used the Alpine passes to make their way into Italy, but theirs was the migration of clans or tribes. No one had ever conceived that a whole army could be moved from the west, through the passes, and down into Italy. Prior to the arrival of the Carthaginians in Europe, there had been no coordinating intelligence to see the possibility of such a move, nor indeed any reason for it.

It is clear that Hannibal had a ready-made intelligence service, both in Gaul to the north and Cisalpine Gaul in Italy, among these violent but freedom-loving people who resented the Roman yoke quite as much as Hamilcar had resented the treatment of Carthage, so that while the people of Massilia and Saguntum were keeping Rome posted as to Carthaginian activities in Spain, Hannibal was receiving military missions from the Gauls. He and his staff were collating all the reports reaching them as to their numbers and intentions, the relationships between one tribe and another, and their disposition towards Rome. He had plenty of evidence of their fighting abilities (fearless but undisciplined) but he needed also to know how deep was their hatred or resentment of Rome and of the threat to their liberty. The tribes who were in Italy had reason enough to fear Roman arms and to hate the Romans because of recent events. On the French side of the Alps the situation was more difficult to assess. Although some of the chieftains could appreciate the threat of Rome—troops being transported from Italy to Massilia and thence spreading out to annex all the countryside to the north—there were others who could not look ahead nor understand such a complex threat. As far as many Gauls living in the area of the Rhône valley were concerned, Rome was far away, but the neighbour with whom they were at variance was close at hand. Hannibal needed to know whether payment or the thought of plunder would induce them to join him against the Romans, and what supplies and what numbers of men were to be found in the areas through which he would pass. Some of the tribes from the western side of the Alps had joined the Boii and Insubres in Italy in their revolt a few years before, and Hannibal knew how their initial success had taken them as far south as Etruria-only to be defeated by Roman arms and discipline. The fact that wild tribesmen could achieve so much must have proved an encouragement to a man who was bent on attempting what to some seemed impossible. He was well informed, and he was lucky that the regular passage of Gauls between Italy and France could keep him up to date as to the exact state of things in the land of his enemies.

In 219 B.C. Hannibal took the first step to war and attacked Saguntum. The old city was strong, well defended, and enclosed by Cyclopean walls; its inhabitants were far from prepared to yield at the sight of the army encamped against them. In advance of Hannibal’s move, preparations for which can hardly have gone undetected, two Roman envoys reached him with the message that the city came under Roman protection. This he knew, but he could also claim that the fact had not been mentioned in the treaty with Hasdrubal, and that the Romans had been meddling in affairs well south of the Ebro. The envoys, coldly dismissed, made their way to Carthage, where they hoped to convince the peace party that Hannibal had broken faith and that the senate in Rome was threatening war. Meanwhile the siege of Saguntum continued, the city holding out bravely for all of eight months, to fall with the inevitable rapine and massacre that marked the end of long-disputed sieges. A large portion of the spoil was set aside to be sent to Carthage as an earnest of the riches of further conquest. The news of Saguntum reached Rome at about the same time as the return of their envoys from Carthage, bearing the message that the Carthaginians had no regard for any treaty between Rome and Saguntum.

There followed a confused debate in Rome, some of the nobles declaring for war immediately and others favouring negotiations, while the assemblies of the people voted for peace. A compromise was finally reached and a delegation sent to North Africa to inquire whether Hannibal had been acting under his own initiative over Saguntum, or on the orders of the Carthaginians. If they disavowed Hannibal, then he must be handed over to Roman authority. Much argument followed, the Carthaginians denying that Hannibal had committed any offence against Rome and maintaining that, to their knowledge, there had never been any treaty of alliance between Rome and this city, which in any case was well within the sphere of Carthaginian influence. In conclusion they refused to surrender Hannibal and asked the Roman envoys what was now their intention. Fabius, the leader of the delegation, placed his hand in his toga with a melodramatic gesture and asked them to choose: ‘Peace or war?’ After some consultation with the senate, the elder of the two Carthaginian suffetes (the senior administrators and judges) told the Roman to make the decision himself. When Fabius said ‘War’, the Carthaginians replied, ‘We accept!’ The Second Punic War, the Hannibalic War as it came to be known, had been declared.

The news that Carthage was officially at war with Rome reached Hannibal when he was back at New Carthage. With a successful campaign behind him, and with his men well paid and snug in their winter quarters, it was pleasant to receive the reassurance that Carthage supported him. It was not difficult to arouse enthusiasm among the troops for a long and hazardous expedition (though it is doubtful if as yet he disclosed their real destination), for the news that the arrogant Romans had demanded the surrender of their general was enough to infuriate them and the thought of further plunder lured them on. The successful record of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal the Handsome and the infinite promise held out by this young Carthaginian lion made recruitment easy. The thought of a campaign beginning in the new year of 118 B.C. was as attractive as the thought of spring itself. The fact that the Romans had been unable to save Saguntum had so reduced their reputation that a Roman mission to northern Spain was sent back contemptuously to Gaul. Here they found little if any more friendliness. The Gauls were determined in any ensuing conflict between Rome and Carthage to remain neutral although, aware of the treatment of their kinsmen in Italy, their inclination was to take sides with the Carthaginians.