Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (18 page)
Read Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis Online
Authors: Bruce F. Pauley
Tags: #Europe, #Presidents & Heads of State, #Hitler; Adolf; 1889-1945, #General, #United States, #Austria, #Austria & Hungary, #Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei in Österreich, #Biography & Autobiography, #History
time it was most advantageous.
were more
likely to be found in detention camps between
1933
and
1938, if. indeed
they had not been expelled from the country.
f
Nazi optimism also appeared to be weJI justified owing to the local elections; at the end of
1932
and during the first four monthiyof
1933
when the Nazis gained anywhere from 16 to nearly
42
percent of the vote
.
3
Nazi strength was greatest in Carinthia and Styria where they drew
20
and
16
percent of the votes for the provinces as a whole. However, in individual towns the Nazis sometimes attracted as much as
40
percent of the vote, as for example in the Lower Austrian town of Zwettl and in Innsbruck in March and April
1933.
On the other hand, the Nazis were weakest in Upper and Lower Austria and in the Burgenland.
^
Although no one will ever know the exact extent of Nazi popularity after April
1933,
because no more elections were held, an estimate of
20
to
25
percent would probably be reasonable. Perhaps another
10
percent supported the idea of an Anschluss with Nazi Germany without accepting other aspects of the Nazi ideology
.
4
Even though the Nazis continued to gain new members after the spring of
1933,
it is likely that their appeal among the general population was actually reduced by their willingness to resort to terror and assassination
.
6
The Nazis’ timing was also fortunate with regard to the Great Depression. When the crash came in 1929, the NSDAP was the only significant party in either Germany or Austria that had never belonged to a national (or even state) government; thus it could not be blamed for the Depression or any of the other disasters of the Republican period. Even after the great victory of April 1932 Walter Riehl advised Alfred Proksch to avoid any parliamentary involvement while the party was still weak. When the Nazis finally attained power in Germany in 1933 and Austria in 1938, the economic recovery had just begun in both countries and the Nazis naturally claimed full credit for it.
The Nazis left little to chance in their propaganda drive. Each Gau had its own Propagandaleiter, who had a wide variety of responsibilities. The Nazis believed that unity of propaganda leadership and careful planning would guarantee success. Propaganda in a brand new district was supposed to begin suddenly with posters, leaflets, newspapers, and marchers all asking: “Who is Hitler?” “What does Hitler want?” To give an impression of strength, the propaganda campaign in a new region was to begin with several meetings being held in different places on the same day, or within a short span of time. Because first impressions were often the longest lasting, only experienced speakers familiar with local conditions were to be used in a district’s first Nazi meeting. A “big city” speaker was considered unsuitable for a rural area and
vice versa.®
Propaganda leaders were supposed to follow the activities of Nazi opponents with great care. Quarrels and conflicts within a rival party were to be quickly publicized, and all contradictions between theory and practices, between promises and fulfillment, were to be pointed out. Comparisons favor-
ivi'jH':
!
;
i
taken
to remove posters after every meeting so new ones would be readily
[noticed
.
12
j|yTb provide a sharp contrast with traditional Austrian
Schlamperei
, Nazi
leaders
were instructed to begin meetings punctually regardless of the number 1 of people present. Introductions were to be kept short, and people at the head Ijli table were under orders to maintain strict silence and not to smoke during a speech or report. Hecklers and other disturbers of the peace who ignored
-
1
-- ^ * —j-i--------
u~a
able to the Nazis were also supposed to be made by the Propagandaleiter whenever possible
.
10
Because the Nazis far outstripped all their rivals in the number of public meetings they held, there was always an enormous demand for new party speakers. Here again, it was the duty of propaganda leaders to set up special speakers’ courses, lasting for four months, to train new speakers in both Nazi theory and in the practical aspects of public address. The trainee had to make thirty trial speeches culminating in one made in the presence of the local Gauleiter
.
11
Special leaders (called
Versammlungsleiter)
were in charge of the smooth operation of public meetings. Such meetings were to be well publicized several days in advance, first in the local press and then on wall posters. About a day before the meeting Hitler Youth distributed leaflets and pamphlets and a notice would again appear in local newspapers. Finally, on the day of the meeting itself “town criers” (
Sprechchore
) consisting of the SA, SS, and HJ, would march through the streets announcing the meeting. Care was also
----
warnings were to be thrown out by the SA, and those who insulted the Fuhrer or the movement were to be dealt with severely
.
13
Because factual statements generally make the best propaganda, Nazi |ii| r
speakers
were ordered to stick to the truth. Non-Nazi speakers were excluded from the meetings unless their views were indistinguishable from those of 11 National Socialism. If the leader of the meeting were absolutely convinced that the Nazis were in a majority of those present, the assembly would close with a “Heil Hitler,” the singing of the German national anthem, and the
Horst Wessel Song.'*
In short, the audience was to be left with an impression of efficiency, seriousness, and credibility.
Such civilized behavior, however, was confined only to the Nazis’ own
meetings.
One of the Nazis’ favorite pastimes was breaking up opposition party meetings by howling, screaming, prolonged applause, coughing, and various other assortments of noisemaking, employed to embarrass, confuse,
and
drown out the speakers
.
15
Similar techniques were used against pacifistic and pornographic movies, such as
All Quiet on the Western Front
and
Secrets from the Portfolio of a Sexologist.
In the latter case, however, the Nazis’ righteous indignation was somewhat slow in rising to the surface, as a performance in Graz was nearly over before a group of young Nazis unleashed their loud speakers, stink bombs, and generally raucous noise
!
18
Although the Nazis had few opportunities to use them, Theo Habicht outlined still more propaganda tactics for future electoral campaigns following the Nazis’ stunning success in April 1932. The party’s principal opponents were to be the pan-German parties (which, as we have already seen, were virtually destroyed during the next twelve months). The Nazis’ attack was to be especially sharp in those areas where their rivals still held a
Grundmandat.
The Christian Socials were to be accused of committing treason against the (anti-Semitic) ideas of Karl Lueger. In dealing with the Social Democrats, positive Nazi programs were to be emphasized. To speed important Nazi speakers from one rally to another and to utilize an impressive technological innovation, airplanes were to be used for the first time in Austrian campaign history. All party affairs not directly related to the election were to be set aside in the last five to six weeks of a campaign. The propaganda “storm” was to
increase two to four weeks before the election and to reach a peak during the last week
.
17
These techniques may help account for the Austrian Nazis’ greatest local election victory ever in April 1933. The municipal electi
6
ns held in Innsbruck gave the NSDAP a staggering 41.2 percent of the 36,400 votes cast
18
(thus nearly equalling the 43.9 percent won by the German Nazis in the Reichstag elections of
6
March 1933). In the meantime, the number of Nazi
Ortsgruppen
throughout Austria had nearly doubled between April 1932 and April 1933.
19
In view of the enormity of this victory it is hardly surprising that the Dollfuss government announced on 11 May that “to prevent economic damage during the tourist season” further elections would be prohibited until fiter
31 October
.
20
In fact, democratic elections were never again held during the First Republic. In one sense, of course, this prohibition was clearly an undemocratic and unconstitutional act. But given the Nazi view of democracy and constitutionalism in general, the chancellor’s move is at least understandable. Nazis in both Austria and Germany cynically and publicly announced their intention to use parliaments to destroy democracy. As Theo Habicht put it: “Where National Socialists enter a parliament their duty is not to conform to and respect the questionable ‘dignity’ of the high house, to walk softly and to speak softly so that ‘peace and quiet’ are preserved, but instead ... to change everything. The NSDAP is a fighting movement whose goal is to conquer power in the state. But conquerors don’t walk in felt slippers but instead in boots
.”
21
The people of Germany had to learn the deadly seriousness of these convictions the hard way.
It is also a fact that the Nazi party demanded an unending series of victories to maintain its heterogeneous following. In Austria and Germany where good economic and diplomatic news was in short supply, the Nazi electoral victories were themselves a startling contrast to governmental failures. To allow them to continue would give the Nazis still more prestige and social respectability. Habicht observed shortly after the local elections of April 1932, “The experiences in the Reich show that once a mass movement is set into motion it gains more momentum from election to election. After our great victory there can be no doubt that the next election will bring even greater success
.”
22
Therefore, the Nazis were probably justified in believing that their momentum and unscrupulous tactics, together with moral and financial resources of the Third Reich, were likely to produce ultimate success. But denying the Nazis the opportunity for still more electoral victories was demoralizing. A clash between government and party became inevitable.
The Social Composition of the Austrian Nazi Party
The nature of the five-year struggle between the Austrian regime
and
the Nazis is intimately related to the social composition of the
Austrian
NSDAP. National Socialism traditionally has been seen as a lower-middle-class movement, particularly by Marxist historians. In reality, however, it drew support from a wider social spectrum than the democratic or Marxist parties of either Austria or Germany
.
23
Nowhere was the breadth of this support more obvious than among Austrian youth.
Young People
It is reasonably well-known that fascist (as well as Communist) party members were substantially younger than those of bourgeois parties and the many Social Democratic parties of Europe. More than half of the fascist leaders of Europe were born between 1890 and 1910. We have already noted that Theo Habicht, Alfred Frauenfeld, and Hermann Reschny were all born in 1898, whereas Walter Oberhaidacher had been bom in 1896. Alfred Proksch was only slightly older, having been born in 1891. By contrast, of the forty-five Austrians who were cited in a Nazi enemies’ list in 1939, only four had been bom after 1900, fourteen had been bom between 1890 and 1899, seventeen during the 1880s, nine during the 1870s, and one in 1856.
24
The fascist leaders were all part of the “front generation” that had reached maturity during the First World War. They had learned to associate democracy with military defeat and parliamentarianism with frustrating ideological conflict and obstructionism. They had grown accustomed to making quick decisions in battle and had little patience with compromises. Their involvement in the war and their inability to find employment after its conclusion had in many cases prevented their firm attachment to any of the older parties or well-defined social classes
.
25
Although no statistics are available concerning the age structure of the Austrian Nazi party, nearly all contemporary observers as well as historians have noticed the disproportionately heavy concentration of young people between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five
.
26
In early 1932 the Nazis expected most of their new members and some of their new
Ortsgruppenleiter
to come from the youth. By 1933, their claim that two-thirds of the Austrian