Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (24 page)

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Goals and Themes of Nazi Propaganda

The illegal Nazi press could not be described in any literal sense as “news” papers, because the stories consisted almost entirely of opinions. Nor was it really any more effective at winning converts to National Socialism than its legal predecessor had been. Its essential goal was to maintain morale during the five years the party was outlawed. To a discouraged Parteigenosse, frustrated over his inability to topple the hated government, making and distributing propaganda had a certain therapeutic value as a means of reconfirming his own dedication to the cause
.
⁸¹

The illegal press made repeated exhortations to the faithful to believe in the party’s leadership and to maintain unity. Certain anniversaries, like Hitler’s birthday, 19 June (the day on which the party was outlawed), or later, the 25 July Putsch of 1934, were celebrated by special issues. On 19 June 1937, for example, the
Osterreichischer Beobachter
declared that “the whole world” knew that “the Nazi freedom fighters [had] been brutally mistreated by a shameless dictatorship.” The paper went on to say that the Austrian Nazis would never succumb to brute force
.
⁶⁸
$i '■

^ Although attacks on the “political” clergy were still commonplace in the flfa/i'press, care was taken to use this weapon only where the population was j^i&idered receptive, as in Vienna, in other large cities, and in Carinthia. In !other* more religious areas (like the Tyrol), the Nazis posed as friends of the Direct attacks on the Catholic religion itself were verboten in order to fi‘
facilitate
a reconciliation with the Church once power was achieved. Party I members who forgot this rule could expect a severe reprimand
.
⁶³
| ; .fhe Nazi press pointed out that National Socialism
insisted
merely that t
there
is an inequality of bodies between the races whereas the Catholic Church
_W
as concerned only with the equality of souls
.®
⁴
When a woman wrote to f
Gauleiter
Frauenfeld protesting Nazi racism, he replied by quoting Jesus' f
statement
that he had not come to bring peace
on
earth
but
the sword. Never-'!• theless, the Nazi effort to win over Catholics was far from being a complete success. Many Austrians continued to believe that “all forms of Christianity
[were]
endangered [in Germany] by a new hedonistic paganism
.”
⁶⁵
; These and other themes expressed in the illegal Nazi press did not differ radically from those of the legal press prior to June 1933. There were, however, a few changes in the contents of the Nazi propaganda during the five years between 1933 and 1938. After 1934 the connections between the Austrian and German Nazis were played down
.
⁶⁶
Peasants were assured that the Nazis respected the sanctity of their property whereas in Vienna and other industrial areas the alleged socialist character of National Socialism was stressed. Just prior to the outbreak of the Ethiopian War, Nazi propaganda against Italy ceased and Italy’s differences with Britain and France were noted

in the Nazi press
.
⁶⁷

Illogical as it may seem for a party that had been bitterly denouncing democracy since 1919, the Nazis suddenly became staunch defenders of the
Rechtsstaat
idea (a state based on the rule of law) once they had been outlawed. The Nazi press of both Austria and Germany invariably depicted the Austrian Nazis as “freedom fighters” bravely fighting against the “system,” which lacked any legal basis or popular mandate
.
⁸⁸

Humor was another useful weapon in the Nazis’ propaganda arsenal. Although Nazis in general were known primarily for their deadly seriousness, the Austrian Nazis shared the barbed wit of their countrymen. Dozens of jokes ridiculing the government originated in Nazi ranks and circulated throughout the general public
.
⁶⁹
Many of these stories were plays on words and therefore are untranslatable.

An exception was known as “The Last Triumph” and purported to be a conversation between the German and Austrian chancellors. Hitler told of all the things that were being done in Germany. Schuschnigg at first couldn’t

think of a good comparison. Finally he blurted out: “We hang more people in a week than you do in a whole year!”    /

In another story, an Austrian state minister asked a German party leader how strong the opposition was in Germany. “ ‘Unimportant,’ was the answer. ‘Just over
6
million/ Excitedly the Austrian shot back: ‘It’s no larger than that in our country, too.’ ”

Still another tale described three different types of brassieres. One, called the “Hitler bra,” was used for uplifting the masses. The “Mussolini bra” was good for holding the masses together. The “Schusschnigg bra,” on the other hand, was used for covering false pretenses.

Finally, to illustrate Austria’s dependence on Italy, there was an anecdote of how God asked Hitler, Pierce Laval (the foreign minister of France), and Schuschnigg what their favorite wishes were. Hitler said he wanted to bring all Germans under his leadership. Laval wanted all people to become Frenchmen. Schuschnigg at first didn’t know what to say. He fumbled around in his pockets for a long time and then at last said: “Mussolini gave me a piece of paper with everything on it, but I lost it.”

Illegal Nazi Propaganda: How Effective?

It is far easier to describe Nazi propaganda than it is to evaluate its effectiveness. Although it is unlikely that even true believers swallowed all the material, its credibility was enhanced by two factors. First, the Austrian people distrusted the legally published periodical press because they knew it was highly censored. Consequently, there was a tendency, not uncommon in dictatorships, to disbelieve official publications even when they were completely accurate
.
⁷⁰
This lack of confidence in their own press somehow made the Austrian people receptive to articles and even rumors put out by the Nazis
.
⁷¹
Nevertheless, Austrians were by no means totally naive about Nazi propaganda. They were well aware, for example, of the suppression of all criticism in Germany; and they knew that one could not believe everything printed in the German newspapers
.
⁷²

Secondly, much of the Nazi propaganda contained more than a particle of truth. And as two specialists on the subject have put it: “No propagandist worth his mettle will prefer an untruth to a truth, if the truth will do the job
.”
⁷³
There were plenty of achievements in Germany that Nazi propagandists could “point to with pride.” Hitlers foreign policy successes in the Saar, rearmament, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland were indisputably fl' i impressive. German economic progress, particularly in the area of unemploy-lljlii
⁵
' ment, was equally concrete and stood out in stark contrast to the dreary i : conditions in Austria.

■iSi-rS Even if the Nazis’ propaganda did not have as its sole or even primary goal
¹
1
   the winning of new converts, there can be no doubt, as Austrian officials

!•'•
^;
   themselves admitted, that it helped to maintain the morale of party members

'I    while sowing distrust and pessimism among government loyalists
.
⁷⁴

All in all, political power, which seemed tantalizingly close to the Austrian Nazi party in the spring of 1933, remained beyond their grasp during the ;! succeeding year. All the proven methods, employed so successfully by the
_h
;    Nazis in Germany, failed to bring about the
Macht'ubernahme
(takeover of

P    power) in Austria. Although encouraging progress was made by the Nazis in

local elections in the spring of 1933, that road to power was blocked by Chancellor Dollfuss, who prohibited further elections and allowed Parliament to “dissolve itself.” The Nazis were forbidden from wearing their uniforms, inarching, giving public speeches, or printing newspapers. Finally, the party itself was outlawed on 19 June and large numbers of Nazis were sent to detention camps. These actions by the Dollfuss regime presented the Nazis with a totally new situation. Never had a government in Germany shown such determination to suppress the NSDAP.

The Nazis retaliated in every conceivable way. Backed by a virtual economic boycott of Austria by Germany they bombed public facilities and private businesses, and launched a “massive propaganda offensive” that utilized every technological device possible. But neither radio broadcasts nor legal and illegal newspapers, nor various adolescent pranks worked. By the summer of 1934 political power was becoming an ever-receding mirage. Chancellor Dollfuss had crushed a Socialist uprising and exiled or imprisoned most of the Nazi leadership. To the befuddled Nazis, only some extraordinary action could reverse this situation and realize their long-anticipated dream of power.

CHAPTER VIII THE PREMATURE PUTSCH

By the end of 1933 and the beginning of 1934 Theo Habicht and his Austrian Nazi followers were becoming increasingly frustrated. The buoyant optimism of the previous spring had steadily dissipated as legal propaganda, terror, economic pressure, and finally illegal propaganda all failed to intimidate Chancellor Dollfuss and the Austrian government. Their original objective of an Austro-German Anschluss had given way in the face of Germany’s overall foreign-policy goals, to the more subtle policy of Gleichschaltung. But by the end of 1933 the Austrian chancellor’s growing strength had forced Habicht to scale down his immediate ambitions once more to mere participation in the federal government. When even this modest ambition was not attained, Habicht, in desperation, resorted to a Putsch, only to fail once again. It would take a virtual revolution in the European balance of power in 1935—36 to improve the fortunes of the Austrian Nazi party.

The Habicht-Dollfiiss Negotiations

Habicht had turned to negotiations as a means of subverting the Austrian government in the spring of 1933. The talks went nowhere, however, as Habicht was not interested in the two ministerial positions Doll-fuss offered him, and the chancellor rejected the Nazi demand for new elections. Not until September would serious discussions begin anew.

Both Dollfuss and the Nazis imagined that they would be the big winners in any negotiated agreement. The Nazis, with the example of the Hitler-Papen coalition and the Gleichschaltung of Danzig in mind, were convinced that they could dominate any coalition by means of their growing and dynamic organization
.
¹
Dollfuss, on the other hand, believed a settlement with the

The Premature Putsch • 123

•jM

pjil Nazi
^s
would soothe strained Austro-German relations, solidify his position i,|-
_v
j
_s
.&-vis the restless Heimwehr, and reduce his dependence on Italy. He j;|: also expected that such an agreement would increase the army’s reliability.

chancellor feared, and with good reason, that if he did not reach an 11?"
understanding
with the Nazis, the Heimwehr would, and
at
his expense.* jpr These negotiations, the first phase of which extended from September to
? I - November
1933, were initiated by Habicht from his Munich Landesleitung, lii although neither he nor Dollfuss actually took part in the discussions them-■ji selves. The Nazi demands, which remained fairly consistent throughout the talks, were outlined by an official in the German Foreign Ministry:

[1]    Complete equality of rights for the two partners, i.e. the new Austrian cabinet to be made up of the Dollfuss group and the Habicht group, fifty percent each, with Dollfuss receiving the post of federal chancellor and Habicht that of vice-chancellor with enlarged responsibilities.

[2]    . . . Lifting the ban on the party, the SA, the SS, the National Socialist press; cancellation of the expulsions. . . .

[3]    Naturalization [of Habicht]. . . .

f    [4] The most vigorous [joint] struggle against Marxism. . . .

[5] The establishment of a friendly relationship with the Reich
.
³

Dollfuss, for his part, remained adamant that any agreement had to include the renunciation of all organizational ties between Germany and the Austrian NSDAP, the abandonment of any encouragement or toleration of propaganda directed against the Austrian government, and the end of all German interference in the internal affairs of Austria
.
⁴
A letter by the German consul in Linz to the Foreign Ministry reported that Dollfuss was willing to lift the ban on the Nazi party, but not to allow new elections
.
⁵

The first phase of the Habicht-Dollfuss negotiations remained fruitless allegedly because the chancellor felt the Nazis’ terms were too high. But the real reason was more likely that neither side regarded a compromise as absolutely necessary at the time. Dollfuss changed his mind, however, when Mussolini put pressure on him to eliminate the Social Democratic party. The Duce was hoping that such a move by the Austrian chancellor would offend France and Britain and thus make Dollfuss more dependent on Italy. The chancellor’s response was to strengthen his hand by reopening negotiations with the Nazis.