Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (33 page)

The negotiations, which finally resulted in the Austro-German Agreement of 11 July 1936, can be considered the climax of three years of discussions between the Nazis and the Austrian government. The participants varied from time to time, beginning with Habicht and Dollfuss and ending with von Papen gild Schuschnigg. But the objectives remained remarkably the same: amnesty
and
equality of rights for Nazis and their representation in the Austrian gov
ernment
in exchange for the total end of terror, the resumption of normal diplomatic and economic relations between Germany and Austria, and a German promise to respect Austria’s independence.

J,|j- Many Austrians were still opposed to any deal with the Nazis in the summer of 1936. However, as Franz von Papen himself wrote to Hitler, these people, “Legitimists, Socialists [Heimwehr], fascists, and the democratic elements of Catholicism and liberalism, although all bitter enemies of German [and Austrian] National Socialism regard[ed] each other with almost greater il hatred than they [did] the Third Reich
.”
³⁹
It was a classic case, experienced earlier in Russia, Italy, and Germany, of the opponents of totalitarianism being unable to unite against a common foe.

The key sections of the
published
portion of the July Agreement declared that the German government recognized the “full sovereignty” of Austria and regarded “the question of Austrian National Socialism as an internal affair,” which it would not seek to influence either “directly or indirectly.” In return, Austria had to regard itself as a “German State.” This was simply a polite way of saying that it had to avoid any anti-German alliance
.*
⁰
Because Austria had no anti-German links after the German-Italian rapprochement, this publicized section of the July Agreement was an apparent victory for Schuschnigg. The Austrian chancellor had long been convinced that he had nothing to fear from the Austrian Nazis as long as they were cut off from German aid and comfort
.
⁴¹

Far more insidious for Austria was the unpublished “Gentlemen’s Agreement.” Its ten articles essentially provided for a resumption of normal cultural and economic relations between the two countries. On the surface, nothing could have been more beneficial to Austria, which had long suffered from a drastically reduced tourist trade. But “tourists” could spread Nazi propaganda as was now also possible through the resumed sale of Reich German books and newspapers in Austria
.
⁴²

Article IX of the Gentlemen’s Agreement was more political—and controversial. It called on the Austrian chancellor to grant an amnesty to all political prisoners. When this promise was fulfilled two weeks later, it involved the release of 17,045 Nazis, including most of the
Gauleiter
and higher leaders of the SAand SS
.
⁴³

The second part of this article provided that “for the purpose of promoting a real pacification,” representatives of the “National Opposition” enjoying the chancellor’s confidence would be included in the cabinet. This point was

to cause endless disputes in the future. Schuschnigg interpreted “National Opposition” to include non-Nazi, pan-German nationalists, whereas the Nazis assumed it meant only party members. Schuschnigg himself later admitted that there simply was no non-Nazi National Opposition
.
⁴⁴
✓

*

The Austrian Nazis and the Agreement

According to Nazi historians, writing years after the event, “There was great joy on both sides of the [German-Austrian] border over th€ Agreement
.”
⁴⁵
The contemporary reaction was a good deal less sanguine. To be sure, members of the party’s moderate Reinthaller faction “hailed the Agreement from the very beginning
.”
⁴⁰
Although they regretted its temporary renunciation of the Anschluss, the Agreement closely resembled the modus vivendi they had long desired.

Nazi radicals, on the other hand, were shocked and dismayed by the Agreement. As Papen later wrote to Hitler, “It was perhaps not easy psychologically for [the] Party . . . after three years of hard self-sacrificing struggle and endurance of all kinds, to see the Reich make its peace with the Schuschnigg government
.”
⁴⁷
Some Nazis in Carinthia were so angry about the accord that they switched over to the Communist party
.
⁴⁸

Illegal Austrian Nazi publications put on a brave front by telling their readers they should trust their leaders and maintain the party’s strength and discipline. Just as there had been, for tactical reasons, periods of quiet between battles on the Austro-Italian Isonzo front in World War I, so too was such a pause necessary in 1936. Some comfort was taken from the fact that the Agreement forbade Austria to pursue an anti-German foreign policy. The illegal
Mitteilung
of the Austrian Nazi Landesleitung credited the party’s struggle against the regime for making the Agreement possible
.
⁴⁹
But the Agreement’s actual conclusion by German
diplomats
could not have been very pleasing to them. The most radical Nazis felt betrayed by the Agreement and its recognition of Austrian sovereignty. Still others thought that Hitler had agreed to the treaty only for the sake of appearances and did not take it seriously himself
.
⁵⁰

As for Hitler, when Papen informed him by telephone about the signing of the treaty the Fiihrer poured out a “stream of invectives” to the startled envoy. Papen later recalled, “He said that I had seduced him to make too far-reaching concessions in return for only platonic concessions, which the Austrian government would not live up to anyway. He was just being taken for a ride. He seemed extremely upset and out of sorts. The only answer that I
could
make was that my office was at his immediate disposal, if he found my accomplishments so poor
.”
⁵¹
Nevertheless, Hitler soon changed his mind when reports of favorable world reaction to the treaty began to reach the
German
capital. From an opponent of the Agreement he became a partisan
.
⁵²
And Papen, far from being dismissed, was promoted from special envoy to ambassador.

/ To make certain his new policy was followed in Austria, Hitler, possibly at the instigation of Papen, summoned Odilo Globocnik and Friedrich Rainer to his mountain retreat near Berchtesgaden. The meeting of 16 July took place in the presence of Josef Goebbels and Martin Bormann (Hitler’s special deputy for personnel questions). The two Austrians were startled to hear an angry lecture by the Fiihrer on the mistaken policy pursued by the party in Austria. There had to be an end to the eternal arguments. One had to fit oneself into the framework of the Fatherland Front. The National Socialist idea had to be absorbed before any other actions could be taken. He would prefer it if Josef Leopold were already the chancellor of Austria. But because he wasn’t, one could only deal with realities
.
⁵³

The startled Rainer could only stammer: “Mein Ftihrer, our only task is to support you to execute your orders loyally until victory.” Hitler replied: “You have to help yourself with all kinds of means
”
⁵⁴
The Fiihrer went on to explain “clearly and in an ice-cold fashion” why he had concluded the treaty. “My foreign-policy actions cannot tolerate the burden of Austria. I am constantly receiving demarches from Paris and London and I must build a friendly relation with Italy and need time to enlarge the Wehrmacht. The German Wehrmacht must be the strongest in the world. I must build up the officer corps. I need two more years to make politics. For that length of time the party in Austria must maintain discipline
.”
⁵⁵

After Hitler had spoken for about twenty minutes, Rainer was finally able to interject: “Mein Fiihrer, we are not those at whom you are angry. We [the Carinthian Nazis] have endeavored to follow a reasonable policy in Austria, but it is very difficult because we are forbidden and have no connections.” Rainer added the pledge that he and Globocnik would influence the members of the party to conduct themselves as Hitler desired. At last, somewhat appeased, the Fiihrer became friendlier and said: “After all, Austria is my own home country, and I will never forget my home country.” But he still refused to order the Austrian party to be prepared for a German takeover of Austria
.
⁵⁸

Hitler’s instructions to the two Austrians reveal an all-too-seldom appreciated aspect of his foreign policy and perhaps even his character. His seemingly irrational behavior during the last four years of the Second World War has obscured his earlier cool calculations and extreme patience.,Once convinced that a premature grab for Austria would run high international risks, he exercised a restraining influence on the far more restive an

The Reich chancellor followed the same line with regard to Nazis in Danzig, the Memel territory of Lithuania, and in Yugoslavia. In each case Hitler’s unwillingness to intervene caused disillusionment among his followers. When the Nazi leader in the Memelland was released from a Lithuanian prison in July 1938, he was told by Reich authorities “to impose a stricter and more unequivocal discipline than before on the young hotheads in the Memel territory who hoped to be able to force a quick and violent solution of the Memel problem
.”
⁵⁷

❖

The July Agreement:

Its Impact on the Austrian Economy and the Fatherland Front

The doubts of most Nazi radicals concerning the July Agreement were soon laid to rest by their own propaganda and by the actual consequences of the treaty. Hitler had already won so many diplomatic victories that it seemed probable to many early critics of the treaty that it too would have a favorable outcome. Austrian Nazis soon realized that the Reich wanted to use the illegal party to pressure the Austrian government into still closer relations with Germany
.
⁵⁸
The underground
Osterreichischer Beobachter
pointed out how the Agreement ended Italy’s role as an anti-German power. It also provided the Viennese with an opportunity to escape the Jewish domination of their city’s culture. There would now be a flood of imported German films as well as concerts, lectures, and even sporting events having German performers
.
⁵⁸

From a purely economic point of view, the July Agreement did have some real value for Austria. The resumption of trade between the two Germanspeaking countries led to a surplus of 2 million Schillings (or $224,716) in the federal treasury by the end of the year. Prospects for the Austrian economy in

1937 were the best in eight years. The rise in the price of foodstuffs and raw materials led to a modest improvement in the income of peasants and miners. Unemployment dropped from a high of 550-600,000 in 1936 to 401,000 in

1937. The index of production for heavy industrial goods (1929=100) in-ijp
_crease
d from 74 in 1936 to 94 in 1937. On the other hand, the production of ff'
consumer
goods failed to increase, and overall the Austrian recovery remained |||, ^ behind that of Germany or Britain
.
⁸⁰
Nevertheless, the improvement may l|| have induced a few former Socialists to take a more positive attitude toward !f:;. ||j
_e
government
.
⁶¹
If these trends could have continued for a few years, the I'i;'
Schuschnigg
regime might have been able to establish a modicum of popular
1
j i tolerance,
if
not enthusiasm.

As it was, the short-term consequences of the Agreement were more benefits cial to Germany than to Austria. The revival of Austro-German tourism, for
l! example,
meant that Austrians could now travel to Germany for the first time since the imposition of the 1,000-Mark blockade. They actually took advan-tage of the open border in greater numbers than did the Germans. Those tourists from the Reich who did come to Austria were limited in the amount of lipk money they could spend. And in any event, they were careful to seek out the

■ inns of well-known pro-Nazis and avoided those of government supporters
.
^62
!
*'r| The relatively unrestricted travel also enormously reduced the previous dif-
i
ficulties that Austrian and German Nazis had had in communicating with one
t.
another
.
⁸³

Friends of the Austrian government were also surprised and dubious about the July Agreement. But unlike the Nazis’, their anxieties never entirely vanished. The government issued reassuring statements that the Agreement “in no way meant a change in direction” and was in the tradition of Dollfuss’s
1
. efforts toward a reconciliation with Germany
.
⁶⁴
Although some of their worst fears were calmed, many members of the Fatherland Front remained convinced that the treaty was the first step on the road to Austria’s Gleichschaltung
,
⁶⁵
as indeed it was.