Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (68 page)

The Norwegian attack began in the evening of May 9. The forward movement was assisted by snow and fog but when the company closed on the initial objective, it came under heavy fire from Hill 676, Hill 664, and Ørnefjell. The attack faltered and stopped. Friendly supporting fire did not work out as anticipated because of poor visibility and poor cooperation between the two nationalities. A misunderstanding of the attack plan may have contributed to the failure of the attack. The French unit refused to advance, insisting that they were in reserve, and despite repeated requests for fire support, their six mortars failed to open fire until late in the day.

The weather prevented effective artillery support and the four Norwegian mortars failed to silence or dampen the enemy fire. Norwegian machineguns that could have provided covering fire for the attack were not leapfrogged forward and found themselves 2,000 to 2,500 meters from their targets. Consequently, the attacking company was pinned down the whole day, unable to move either forward or fall back. It managed to disengage and withdraw to Roasme after darkness.

A mountain howitzer was brought forward to Roasme during the night of May 11. In a remarkable achievement, the horses were outfitted with snowshoes and managed to pull the howitzer to the top of Roasme, an 1800 feet difference in elevation from their start point. The 7th Mountain Artillery Battery and the 9th Motorized Artillery Battery were brought forward to new positions at the north end of Storevann to provide better support for a planned French attack on Ørnefjell from Roasme. This attack was cancelled due to changes in plans for Allied operations in the Narvik area.

The Norwegian-French Offensive in Retrospect

The Norwegian-French attacks on the northern front took place during a period of continued Allied inactivity except for the French operations on Ankenes Peninsula. It was a grueling experience for the troops, especially the French. They were not trained or equipped for the conditions that existed in the Narvik area. They were unable to conduct effective off-road operations and the troops suffered enormously. The Norwegians were better equipped for winter warfare and most had lived under these climatic conditions. Nevertheless, as Major Hunstad’s report illustrates, the units suffered many hardships: “The days and nights were cold and wet up there, with little food and no heat. In the beginning, the battalion had nothing but holes dug into snow-banks for shelters since the tents had to be left behind in Gressdal because of their weight.” The situation was the same in Major Hydlmo’s battalion (2/15th) in the Roasme area:
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The offensive operations were carried out in a roadless winter wilderness where survival alone was a major challenge. The enormous effort required to keep men and machines of two brigades functioning under these conditions cannot be overstated. The supply operation was a daunting task and a major accomplishment. It took 12–14 hours to bring provisions and ammunition to the 1/16th Inf during the fighting around Britatind from the battalion trains located near Hill 437. Each man carried a load of 90 lbs up the steep mountainsides in deep snow.

Prior to resuming their offensive on April 29, the Norwegians could look back on a series of disastrous defeats at the hands of the Germans: Narvik, Bjørnefjell, and Gratangen. While these defeats had instilled in them a sense of caution, they had not broken the morale of the leadership or the troops. The two brigades had become veterans by the second week in May. The leaders had learned not to underestimate the Germans and they and the troops had learned the hard way the price paid for disregarding basic military principles and by neglecting security for personal comfort. Two weeks of operations in the mountains northwest of Narvik restored much of their self-confidence and did much to boost their morale. They discovered that they could operate successfully against German mountain troops and were able to drive a well-trained, battle-hardened, and determined enemy from excellent defensive positions.

The primary British writers about the fighting in and around Narvik—Derry, Moulton, and Ash—devote little space to the enormous effort undertaken by the French and Norwegians on the northern front. Derry writes that, “It had taken ten painful days to advance five miles towards Narvik.” This statement is not only dismissive of the actual achievement in the mountain wilderness, but it fails to mention the crisis the advance caused for the German command and its commitment of forces that could otherwise have been used against the forthcoming Allied amphibious assault. Derry, in describing the ascent of Fjordbotneidet by the 1/12th Inf in a snowstorm on April 23, writes “… a Norwegian battalion native to the country and expert on skis, not cumbered with heavy equipment, took eight hours to move two miles with a rise in height of about 300 feet.”
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The unit making the ascent, the 1/12th Inf, came from Trøndelag, not North Norway and the troops were not all expert skiers. The men carried loads of 60 lbs as they struggled forward at night in blizzard conditions in snow that was chest deep at times. They brought with them not only mortars and artillery but basic loads for those weapons. The ascent was not 300 feet but 1,200 to 1,500 feet.

The German sources, as we have seen, give a far better appreciation of the difficulties facing them on the northern front, and the extraordinary effort required to overcome them. In its situation report to OKW on May 4, Dietl stated that reconnaissance and experience led him to conclude that defense of the mountains in the north would not be possible with the forces he had at his disposal in the face of a numerical superior enemy.
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Group XXI, to which Dietl’s forces had again been transferred, concluded on May 6 that the situation for the troops in the Narvik area had become critical and was not surprised by a message from Dietl two days later stating that his forces could not hold the northern front without immediate reinforcements and strong support from the Luftwaffe.

The Government and General Ruge Arrive

The Norwegian King and Government arrived in Tromsø on May 1. The defense and foreign ministers continued on to England in the cruiser and from there to France. The campaigns in southern and central Norway had caused a deep skepticism within the Norwegian Government about Allied plans and intentions. These two ministers had the task of finding out how the Allies viewed the situation in Norway and what their plans were for the future. They were to demand official assurances that the Allies would continue the campaign in Norway and guarantees of immediate and effective assistance. The prime minister made it clear that, without such assurances, he would be compelled to recommend to the king that negotiations be initiated with the Germans for a cease-fire.
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The government members were spread throughout the area near Tromsø at first but found that arrangement unworkable and by the middle of May, all major governmental offices were moved to Tromsø. General Ruge and HOK (Army High Command) arrived on May 3, with a reduced staff of about 30 officers and civilians.

Ruge had written a memorandum for the government on his way to North Norway. The memorandum laid out Ruge’s view of the situation and recommendations for the future and became the basis for governmental policy for the remainder of the campaign. It assumed that the Allies would soon evacuate Nord-Trøndelag and that this would compel the government to make the vital decision of whether or not to continue the war. Ruge pointed out that the war would not end until the great powers concluded peace. His personal views, political as well as moral, were that the Norwegians should continue the war.

Providing the government decided to continue the war, General Ruge made a series of proposals that he considered imperative for success. He identified German air superiority as the single-most important factor in the defeat in southern and central Norway. It was therefore imperative that the Allies bring in sufficient fighter aircraft to neutralize the German air threat that would become serious after the Luftwaffe had a chance to become fully operational in Trøndelag. The expected German drive from Trøndelag had to be met and this required the early elimination of General Dietl’s forces. He emphasized that it would not be possible to hold a line south of Bodø without a significant increase in forces in that area. The size of the Norwegian Army had to be increased and they needed to be better equipped. He realized that a significant increase in size was not possible before Trøndelag was recaptured and that equipment had to come from Allied sources. All recommendations were based on the assumption of continued Allied assistance.

General Fleischer was not overjoyed by the arrival of the government and General Ruge. Up to then, he had been the commander-in-chief in North Norway, with full authority over both military and civilian affairs. He had to expect that this situation would now change, that the government would take over the civil administration, and that Ruge would become his military superior in fact as well as in name. His greatest concern was that he would lose control of military operations.

Fleischer was therefore both anxious and skeptical when Ruge showed up at his headquarters for their first meeting on May 6. His anxiety was relieved after Ruge presented his views on how he saw their division of responsibilities. Ruge stated that he had no intention of becoming involved in Fleischer‘s command of operations against Narvik. The role of HOK would be to take over coordination with the Allied military authorities and acquire supplies and materiél for current and future operations. In addition, the operation of airfields, mobilization, and organizing and equipping additional forces would remain the prerogative of HOK. Fleischer was authorized to continue operational coordination with Allied military leaders. Ruge’s decision on these points was laid out in a paper prepared by HOK that same day. The British command in Harstad was informed about the new arrangements.
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Fleischer was relieved and pleased by the results of his meeting with Ruge. Ruge had also decided that HOK did not need all the general staff officers it had assigned and some of these were placed at the disposal of the 6th Division. Among those were Lieutenant Colonel Berg who became the 6th Brigade commander and Lieutenant Colonel R. Roscher-Nielsen, the General Staff’s chief of operations, who took over as local commander in Mosjøen on May 13 from Lieutenant Colonel Nummedal.

Hovland writes that, “Fleischer’s happiness would soon turn to dismay and bitterness. Ruge did not keep his promises, and Fleischer’s position as commander-in-chief in this part of the country was systematically undermined in the following weeks until he no longer even had control of his own division.”
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As examples, Hovland mentions the fact that Fleischer lost command of the naval forces as well as the army air corps. While Fleischer would undoubtedly have preferred to retain his position as civilian and military leader in North Norway, that preference was unrealistic. The government was entitled to pick up civil leadership and it was sheer fantasy to expect that General Ruge or Admiral Diesen (who arrived on May 4) had come to North Norway to sit on their hands.

Hovland’s contention that Fleischer no longer had control over army aircraft and his statement that “From the end of May the division again commanded the Hålogaland Air Group after having had to manage without Norwegian air support from May 7,” are misleading.
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What Hovland fails to mention is that Ruge turned all air resources, except for Captain Reistad and two other individuals, over to Hålogaland Air Group on May 8, an organization that remained under Fleischer’s operational control. The 6th Division directive of May 11 ordered Norwegian naval and army aircraft to support Norwegian troops attacking from the north during the Bjerkvik landing. Norwegian aircraft also supported the French attack on Hill 220 on May 13/14. The air resources available consisted of 12 aircraft and personnel that escaped from south and central Norway.
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These were later joined by other aircraft from the southern part of the country.

Ruge wrote later that his meeting with Fleischer reinforced his decision not to make any immediate changes in the command structure, since Fleischer seemed to have his affairs in order and because of the latter’s obvious disappointment at no longer being the senior commander in the area. He goes on to note that Fleischer’s personal feelings and resentment played an important role in the weeks that followed.
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2
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OUNTAIN
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IVISION TO THE
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ESCUE

“It was [seemed] evident that if the French Chasseurs could not retire along this route, the Germans could not advance along it.”

G
ENERAL
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ASSY’S DISPATCH AS QUOTED BY
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HURCHILL.

The Way North

The news coming from southern and central Norway in late April caused Fleischer to be concerned. The possibility of German forces moving north from Oslo linking up with those in Trondheim was real and information about the operations in the Steinkjer area was disheartening. It was becoming more and more obvious that a threat was looming in the form of a German advance that could bring them into the southern part of Nordland Province.

The straight-line distance between Namsos and Narvik is about 480 kilometers. Much of the sparsely populated Nordland Province consists of a relatively narrow sliver of land between the Norwegian Sea and the Swedish border. The terrain is difficult. It is mountainous, was covered with snow, and the north-south route is cut by a number of fjords. Namdal, the area between Grong and Mosjøen, was especially tough to traverse. There are numerous islands off the coast and in the fjords. The Arctic Circle cuts through the province and the differences between high and low tides are very pronounced at these latitudes. Fjords with narrow entrances have treacherous currents. The north-south road, Route 50, was in poor condition. Ferries were required at several points along the route and there was no road at all for the last 140 kilometers before reaching Narvik. Most of this area was a mountain wilderness. There was no railroad north of Mosjøen and the portion between the southern provincial boundary and Mosjøen was not completed. To make matters worse, there were hundreds of lakes of various sizes and the terrain was heavily forested in some parts.