Read Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews Online
Authors: Peter Longerich
battalions were either deployed in the context of a police regiment, sent in as
Extension of Shootings to Whole Jewish Population
239
support for Einsatzkommandos, or used for ‘special operations’ or ‘major oper-
ations’ by the Higher SS and Police Commander in which case for the duration of
the relevant ‘operation’ their subordination to a security division was suspended.
It sometimes happened, however, that police battalions undertook such ‘oper-
ations’ precisely within the context of a security division, as the example of
Reserve Police Battalion 11 makes clear.
In the activity report of Einsatzgruppe A for November 1941 the situation in the
whole of Reich Commissariat Eastland is described thus: ‘The Jewish question in
the Eastland should be regarded as solved. Large-scale executions have decimated
the Jewish population and the remaining Jews have been ghettoized. Special
measures have so far been necessary only for individual Jews who have been
able to escape the grasp of the Security Police.’
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The Role of the Local Voluntary Troops
(Schutzmannschaften)
The murder of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the newly occupied territories
during the first months of the war was only possible because the Germans
succeeded in recruiting willing executioners for their policies of racial annihilation
from the indigenous populations of the areas that had been conquered.
After German agencies had begun to set up auxiliary police formations in the
occupied zones during the first few weeks of the war,
143
Himmler gave an order on 25 July 1941 to set up ‘voluntary troop formations’.
144
These units were to be made up of Ukrainians, Balts, and Belarusians, but only men who had not been conscripted into the Red Army or non-Communist prisoners of war.
145
At the end of July 1941 the head of the Order Police, Kurt Daluege, decreed that these new
formations would be called ‘local voluntary troops’ or Schutzmannschaften, and
be run by reliable officers or sergeants from the German police.
146
In Lithuania and Latvia, such voluntary troop units were formed from the
local partisan units and auxiliary formations that had come together in the first
phase of the occupation as early as August. Ukrainian voluntary troops can be
documented from October 1941; Belarusian and Estonian from the beginning of
1942
.147
According to the head of the Order Police, Daluege, at the end of 1941
there were in the Reich Commissariat Eastland 31,652 local volunteers and 14,452
in the Ukraine. In the course of 1942 these forces would grow to a strength of
more than 300,000. Such troops therefore became one of the most important
organs of containment and repression within the German occupying forces and
played an indispensable role in the persecution of the Jews.
148
Whilst these bodies were initially recruited exclusively from volunteers, during 1942 more
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Mass Executions in Occupied Soviet Zones, 1941
and more pressure was put on the male members of local populations to join
these units.
149
Usually a distinction was made between local volunteer troops on individual
duties (in other words attached as auxiliaries to the local German police author-
ities) and battalions of volunteer troops,
150
which were mobile reserves that were often deployed outside their local areas.
151
In addition to guard and containment duties volunteer troops were mainly deployed in mass executions of Jews and
Communists, or for ‘cleansing’ and partisan ‘operations’ whose victims were
usually Jews who were under general suspicion as ‘supporters of armed gangs’.
There is detailed documentation for the participation of Lithuanian Volunteer
Battalion no. 12, which was under the immediate command of the German
Reserve Police Battalion 11, in the mass murders perpetrated by this unit in
Belarus—and in particular for its participation in the massacres of Smilovichi,
Rudensk, Koydanava, and Slutsk in October and November 1941.
152
Murders of the Mentally Ill, Gypsies, and ‘Asians’
The mass murder of the Jews in the newly occupied areas is at the heart of policies
of racial annihilation, but other groups also fell victim to them, notably the
mentally ill, the Gypsies, and so-called ‘Asians’.
As had been the case in Poland in 1939 and 1940, the inmates of medical and
care institutions in the newly occupied areas were also murdered in huge num-
bers.
153
Murders of this type can be documented for all four Einsatzgruppen.
Einsatzgruppe A, for example, murdered patients in a Lithuanian asylum in
Aglona on 22 August 1941 (claiming 544 victims),
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in asylums in Mariampole (also in Lithuania) and Mogutovo, near Luga (with 204 victims in total),
155
and in mental homes in Riga and Jelgava (Mitau), where 237 mentally ill Jews were
murdered.
156
Einsatzgruppe B also participated in such murders, as the incident report of 9 October 1941 indicates: ‘in Chernigov the mad will be treated in the
usual way. In Minsk 632 mentally ill patients were given special treatment, and in
Mogilev 836.
’157
After September 1941, Einsatzgruppe B, under the command of the head of the
Reich Criminal Bureau Artur Nebe, began to look for alternative methods for
murdering the inhabitants of the asylums. In Minsk there was an attempt made by
the Institute for Criminological Technology in September to use explosives to
murder the inmates; shortly afterwards in Mogilev asylum inmates were mur-
dered using vehicle exhaust fumes. On the basis of such experiments those
responsible made a decision to use gas as the method of choice, which, as part
of the ‘euthanasia’ programme, had already been responsible for the deaths of tens
of thousands of people. Gas vans such as those that had been deployed by Sonder-
kommando Lange in the Warthegau since the beginning of 1940 were now
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241
commissioned for use in the occupied Eastern areas. The murder of the mentally
ill in Mogilev using gas in October 1941 is an important step in the transfer of
killing techniques that had been developed in the context of the ‘euthanasia’
programme to the systematic murder of the Jews.
158
All the commandos of Einsatzgruppe C can also be shown to have murdered
the sick. In September 1941, at the request of the local commander’s office in
Vasilkov, Sonderkommando 4a shot 200 Jews but also a number of mentally ill
women; a sub-commando of the same unit shot 270 mentally ill patients on 24
October in Chernigov,
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Sonderkommando 4b shot 599 inmates from the Poltava asylum at the beginning of November,
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and Einsatzkommando 5 murdered 300
mentally ill Jews on 18 October in Kiev.
161
The incident reports say of Einsatzkommando 6 that ‘by 12 November 1941’ it had shot ‘800 of a total of 1,160
mentally disordered inmates of the asylum of Igrin near Dnepropetrovsk.
162
Murders of asylum inmates by Einsatzgruppe D during 1942 are widely documen-
ted.
163
Prisoners of war and civilians who in the eyes of the Einsatzgruppe troops had
an ‘Asiatic’ appearance also fell victim to the policies of annihilation.
164
The Soviet Commissars had already been described in the ‘Guidelines for the Treatment of
Political Commissars’ as ‘the originators of barbarian Asiatic methods of com-
bat’,
165
and the ‘Guidelines for the Conduct of troops in Russia’ had read, ‘the Asiatic soldiers of the Red Army in particular are inscrutable, incalculable,
guileful, and unfeeling’.
166
Behind the National Socialist stereotype of the ‘Asiatic’
enemy was the image that large sections of the originally Slavic peasant population
had been extirpated by the Soviet regime whilst, as a result of ‘intermingling’ with
Asiatic or Mongolian races, the remainder of the population represented a
worthless but latently dangerous ‘sub-humanity’ that ‘the Jews’ dominated with
the help of Bolshevist ideology. The danger supposedly emanating from this
conglomerate was elucidated by Himmler speaking in July 1941 to soldiers from
the Waffen-SS. According to Himmler, in the East ‘the same struggle against the
same sub-human peoples, the same inferior races’ that have sometimes gone
‘under the name of the Huns, at others . . . under the name of Magyars, or under
the name of Tartars, or under the names of Ghenghis Khan and the Mongols’.
167
The murder of ‘Asiatic’ people in the Soviet Union is one of the chapters in the
history of the Nazi regime’s policies of racial annihilation that have yet to be
written. Only a few isolated examples are currently available. The systematic
murder of ‘Asiatic’-looking people by the Einsatzkommandos can be documented
from the civilian prisoner camp in Minsk that had been set up by the Wehrmacht
in 1941, in which almost the entire non-Jewish male population of military age
had been imprisoned.
168
The ‘Asiatics’ were viewed there with the same suspicion and treated in the same undiscriminating manner as ‘Bolshevist functionaries,
agents, criminals’.
169
They were shot because their external appearance made them appear to be ‘elements of inferior value with a predominantly Asiatic
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Mass Executions in Occupied Soviet Zones, 1941
look’.
170
The same blanket justification was given by Einsatzgruppe B, for example, when they shot 83 men from the civilian camp in Mogilev on 15 October 1941.
These were said to be ‘racially inferior elements with an Asiatic look’ that ‘it would
not be responsible to allow to remain behind the lines any further’.
171
Gypsies living in the Soviet Union also fell victim to the Nazis’ policies of racial
annihilation, although they were not pursued with anything like the same merci-
less determination as the Jews. This was the case in 1941 and also for later periods.
Einsatzkommandos were shooting small groups of Gypsies on their advance in
summer and autumn 1941: Einsatzkommando 3 did so on 22 August, and Ein-
satzkommando 8 in the second half of September.
172
The group staff of Einsatzgruppe C reported in September that during the previous days ‘6 asocial elements
(Gypsies) and 55 Jews had been dealt with’, amongst others, and Sonder-
kommando 6 reported in October that it had apprehended a ‘band of Gypsies’
and executed 32 people.
173
The next evidence of the murder of Gypsies is for spring 1942, when large numbers were killed.
174
The Participation of the Wehrmacht in the Murders
It has already become clear as this part has progressed that the Wehrmacht
actively supported many of the ‘operations’ of the Einsatzgruppen and other SS
and police units. This prompts the question of how far the Wehrmacht itself
played an active and material role in the annihilation of the Jewish population of
the Soviet Union.
175
Numerous appeals from officers in the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht show quite distinctly that the ideological war of annihilation against
the ‘Jewish-Bolshevist complex’ was waged with the same intensity within the
ranks of the Wehrmacht itself as in the guidelines and orders issued by the
leadership at the beginning of the war.
According to an order for Panzer Group 4 of 2 May, the war that was by then
imminent was to be ‘the age-old battle of the Teutons versus the Slavs, the defence
of European culture in the face of a Muscovite-Asiatic deluge, resistance to the
onslaught of Jewish Bolshevism’. Every act in battle was to be ‘motivated by an
iron will to achieve the total, merciless annihilation of the enemy’, and there
should be in particular ‘no quarter given to the proponents of today’s Russian
Bolshevist system’.
176
The Commander of the 6th Army, Walther von Reichenau, spoke in an order dated 10 August of the ‘necessary execution of criminal,
Bolshevist, and mainly Jewish elements’ that would have to be carried out by
the organs of the Reichsführer SS.
177
The Commander of the 11th Army, Erich von Manstein, described ‘Jewry’ in an order of 20 November as ‘the middle-man
between the enemy at our backs and the remains of the Red Army that are still
fighting on and the red leaders’.
178
The Commander of the 17th Army, Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel, gave an order on 30 July not to take indiscriminate
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243
reprisal measures against the civilian population but—if the deed could not be
pinned on to the Ukrainians—to concentrate on ‘Jewish and Communist inhab-
itants’, amongst whom the ‘Jewish Komsomol members’ in particular were to be
‘regarded as perpetrators of sabotage and responsible for forming young people
into gangs’.
179
What effect did orders and guidelines such as these have on the conduct of the
troops? This part has already demonstrated a high degree of cooperation between
the Wehrmacht on the one hand and the Police and the SS on the other. It was not
merely the case that the Wehrmacht was informed in full detail about the
shootings perpetrated by the SS and Police formations, as can be shown from