*
Dan Lufkin. a close friend of Herbert's and an oc
casional participant in politics
, had gone on the Columbia board of directors at Herbert's instigation j
ust before the first
of the year and had not participate
d actively in the fight over Begelman. Lufk
in had become wealthy in the sixties as a fou
nding partner of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
a Wall Street investment house.
"Well, think it over. Meanwhile,
I
think we should get together on a public statement of unity. We—Matty and I—would endorse you, express support for you. You would express your support for Begelman. We would make clear that you
are
to get a new long-term contract. We've got to have a united front to get all this behind us."
"That I agree with," Hirschfield said.* "But what if David's indicted? As far as I'm concerned, he'd have to go."
"If he's indicted and pleads guilty, he'd have to go, but I doubt if it'll go that far. I doubt it'll be a problem. They'll settle it in some way."
"Well, in any event," Hirschfield said, "it is critical that my situation vis-a-vis the board be clarified if we're to have any chance of landing the United Artists group. I've been in touch with Pleskow and I'm seeing him again this week. It's one of the most important deals we could ever do. It would be a bonanza for this company. But we've got to move on it. They're talking to other companies, so we've got to make a positive move now."
Herbert promised to call UA's top officer, Arthur Krim, whom he had known for years as a fellow fund raiser for Democratic Party candidates, as soon as Hirschfield and Pleskow had met.
"But the important thing now," Herbert said, "is an announcement to clear the air between all of us here."
"I agree,"
Hirschfield
said, "but I think we've still got some tough sledding ahead in the press."
"I think it'll soon be over. The worst is behind us."
At half past noon, the regular monthly meeting of the Columbia board of directors was convened in the boardroom across the hall. The meeting was not an "emergency session," as Earl Wilson's column had said, but was extraordinary nonetheless. Although David Begelman was no longer a director or officer of the parent corporation, he was the unchallenged star of the meeting, displaying a degree of power and influence surpassing that of most board members and officers. There was no reference to his crimes or the disgrace he had caused the company. On the contrary, he was
*
A month
having passed since Begelman
's restoration. Hirchfield was less concerned about
his own potential new contract
would
he perceived as a payoff, and more concerned that
he was being perceived as a lame-duck
chief executive. He fell that t
he stronger he appeared to be—an offer of a new contract would he ev
idence of his own strength—the better would be his
chances of attracting an outsid
er to wrest control from the All
ens.
greeted and hailed as an almost heroic figure who had been absent for a time and had been sorely missed. While letting it be known that he had flown in on the red-eye, as if to imply that he hadn't wanted to waste a minute, he looked well and, as always, was meticulously dressed, groomed, and coiffcd. He was his old self again, or so it seemed.
With typical lucidity, and an extra touch of briskness, Begelman briefed the board on eight new motion-picture and television deals, including new product
ion arrangements with Peter Gube
r, the producer of
The Deep
and
Midnight Express,
and with Leonard Goldberg, Begelman's close friend and a principal of Spelling-Goldberg.
Hirschfield and Fischer exchanged chagrined looks. It was company policy for all movie and TV transactions to be discussed thoroughly with, and be approved by,
Hirschfield
and Fischer before being presented to the board. Normally, memoranda on pending transactions were sent to New York several days before board meetings. In this instance, however, most of the deals had not been cleared in advance.
Begelman
had shown them to
Hirschfield
and Fischer only a few minutes before the meeting. There had been little time for discussion, and
Hirschfield
had serious questions about several of the deals, especially those with Peter Gubc
r and Leonard Goldberg. The Gube
r deal was unduly lucrative for Guber, Hirschfield felt. The board had issued a harsh warning to Hirschfield to maintain certain restrictions in the Gubcr contract. That was in December, before
Begelman
's reinstatement, when it appeared that
Hirschfield
would handle the Gube
r negotiations himself.
Begelman
, however, had subsequently negotiated the more lucrative deal that
Hirschfield
had been warned against, and now no one was objecting.
As
Begelman
was finishing his presentation, Fischer expected
Hirschfield
to object, to call for a recess, to indicate somehow that the top management of the corporation disapproved of, or at least had reservations about, most of the transactions that
Begelman
had brought to the meeting. But
Hirschfield
said nothing. He simply stared glumly straight ahead.
Matty Rose
nhaus spoke up: "Isn't that great! David is only back three weeks, and he's accomplished all these things which nobody else has been able to do." The board passed all eight deals with only br
ief discussion. Fischer and Adle
r, who had no authority to say anything, looked at each other in dismay. They knew they had just witnessed a reaffirmation of the power of Begelman and the emasculation of Hirschfield.
After Begelman left the room, the board authorized Leo Jaffe to conclude contractual arrangements with Ray Stark. With Begelman again running the studio, Stark had signaled his willingness to resume negotiations toward a new production deal. It was indicated that Begelman would not participate directly in the negotiations with Stark.
The board's discussion then turned to the necessity for drafting and disseminating a public statement of unity. Rosenhaus and Allen agreed that the statement should include expressions of the board's support for
Hirschfield
—including its intention to give him a new long-term contract—as well as stating
Hirschfield
's support for
Begelman
.
Hirschfield
asked what the company's position would be if Begelman were prosecuted. Several board members said that Columbia should, as a matter of policy, fight any indictment. The company already had declined to prosecute. Begelman had repaid the money and was under psychiatric care. Criminal action against him would be unwarranted and unfair.
Hirschfield
got angry. "Don't expect me to be David
Begelman
's defender. I agreed to bring him back in order to try to bind up the wounds in the company, but I'm not going to be his defender, in the sense of leading his defense if he's indicted."
"Let's not worry about an indictment now," Herbert suggested. "It'll probably never happen. It's just newspaper talk, essentially a PR problem."
"It will be a lot more than a PR problem if Mr. Van de Kamp decides to indict Mr.
Begelman
,"
Hirschfield
retorted. "He'll have to plead guilty, and then we'll be the only company in the United States with a convicted, admitted crook running our biggest divisions."
"Let's wait and see
," Herbert said, and the meeting broke up. It was clear, however, the price of the board's support of
Hirschfield
was
Hirschfield
's support of
Begelman
, even in the event of an indictment.
More Rumors Than Clarity Mark Begelman Case
said Wednesday's
Variety.
And Earl Wilson wrote: "David
Begelman
, Columbia Pictures' controversial executive, emerged smiling and with seeming confidence from a meeting of Columbia
's board of directors. Leo Jaffe
said nothing drastic was done but said he 'couldn't answer' whether the
Begelman
case was taken up."
* * *
Hirschfield had lunch at Le Cirque Wednesd
ay with his friend Herbert Siege
l, the chairman of Chris-Craft Industries. Siegel, an ex-agent and would-be mogul who had bought and sold a number of substantial investments in movie companies over the years, had just purchased a major block of stock in Twentieth Century-Fox.
"For the money," Hirschfield said, "you could have Columbia easier than you can have Fox." Siegcl replied that he felt that Fox's balance sheet and asset values were superior to Columbia's. Hirschfield tried unsuccessfully to persuade him otherwise.
Herbert Allen called Hirschfield that afternoon. "I hear you had lunch with Herb Siegel. Are you trying to sell him the company?"
"I'd love to sell him the company," Hirschfield said, "but he's got one more movie company than he can handle already."
On Thursday, the New York
Daily News,
the
Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
and dozens of other papers published a lengthy Liz Smith interview with Cliff Robertson. "In an exclusive, two-hour interview," Smith wrote, "Oscar-winning actor Cliff Robertson told me that during the first months of 1977, after discovering that someone had forged and cashed a $10,000 Columbia Pictures official check in his name, he came to fear for his life. And to worry about the safety of his wife, actress
Dina Merrill, and their young
daughter.
"Under advice from his Los Angeles attorney, Robertson, at one point when passing through Hollywood, did not stay as usual at the Bel-Air Hotel but went anonymously to the home of a friend. Then, during the making of a film in London last fall, the actor was constantly checked on by the FBI, which advised him to be wary, to watch his step, and to report anything mysterious immediately.
" 'It was all like a dime novel," says the actor, who blew the lid off the puzzle that is Hollywood's own miniature Watergate
..."
The interview contained little that Robertson had not said to
The Washington Post
on Christmas. Liz Smith felt, however, that it bore repeating since so few people had actually read the
Post
story. And she did add a few new details, asking, for example, about rumors that Robertson was conducting a "vendetta over a past falling-out when
Begelman
was act
ing as his agent. Cliff said: 'I
knew they'd find something to cloud the issue here. Listen, my conscience is clear. It is true we were involved in a contractual thing where he represented me. I shot some aviation footage in Ireland for a company that went out of business. Later they said I had an obligation to continue the project. I had first rights to it, but no obligation. But when depositions were taken, David waffled and did not tell the truth. He did not want to be my witness in the deal. It disillusioned me but it was just one of those things. We never quarreled over it. . . . It was just an ugly, unfortunate incident.* But
I
would not take a reprisal on David Begelman and I am just amazed, that's all, amazed that he refers now "to the unfortunate use of my name," which is—after all—a new way to refer to forgery. David's public statements and those of others in Hollywood depict hi
m as a victim. He is Joan of Are
at the gates of Paris, or the tragic Irving Thalberg.' " Smith dropped Robertson a note late that day: "Response to the column today has been tremendous. . . . Everyone is saying to me what balls you have. And I just want to tell you I think so too. I was told today that Ned Tanen of Universal says he would hire you anytime
...
in answer to Sue Me
ngers' assertion that you will never work again. (All of this is off the record. Michael Black will tell it to you himself.) Sue called Michael this morning and told him he also was ruined for being quoted. I told Michael to tell her, 'I am Cliff's agent and I would still be his agent if he had been in an accident, and I am still his agent and still telling the truth even though he has been involved in something not his own fault.' Thank you, Cliff, for giving me a great story a
nd for your integrity."
*
For
details see pages 37
*Mengers later denied having said that Robertson would never work again, and Mengers and Bluet, both denied that Mengers had threatened Black.