Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun (14 page)

A PBY Catalina found Tanaka’s convoy that morning, but lost it in squalls. Fletcher launched an afternoon strike anyway, with planes led by
Saratoga
air group boss Commander Harry D. Felt, another future CINCPAC. Major Richard C. Mangrum’s VMSB-232 dive-bombers took off from Cactus too. Along the storm front neither unit found the convoy. Both flew to Henderson, since Tanaka’s reported position put Commander Felt’s planes too far afield to return to the ship.

Under pressure to neutralize Henderson so troops could land, Yamamoto ordered
Kido Butai
to detach a carrier to rush ahead and smash it. He knew American flattops were present. There had been carrier air attacks and sightings, and submarine
I-122
had reported attack by carrier aircraft off the Santa Cruz islands on August 20 (U.S. carrier aircraft claimed a record number of attacks on submarines during this period). But weather aborted strikes from Rabaul for two days running. In the predawn hours of August 24, Nagumo sent Hara Chuichi forward with light carrier
Ryujo
. Lookouts on Tanaka’s flagship
Jintsu
actually spotted the
Ryujo
with heavy cruiser
Tone
, wearing Admiral Hara’s flag, passing along the eastern horizon. That was before the main action, for daylight brought what has since been known as the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.

Both sides worked at a disadvantage. The Imperial Navy lost its surprise when U.S. air scouts spotted Vice Admiral Kondo’s Advance Force, as well as Hara’s detachment speeding to its attack position at twenty-six knots. So far the Japanese had no direct information. But Admiral Fletcher had his own disadvantages. The previous evening he had detached the
Wasp
’s unit to refuel (!), reducing Task Force 61 to
Saratoga
and
Enterprise
—and now part of
Saratoga
’s air group was at Henderson Field. These planes needed to return and rearm before Fletcher could strike. Their departure from Cactus was duly observed by Japanese troops at 9:30 a.m. Tanaka received that report and prepared for a mass assault, but really the Americans were merely regrouping aircraft.

The
Ryujo
launched her Cactus bombing, which led to a swirling dogfight
over Guadalcanal so fierce that the JNAF barely touched Henderson. Aboard escort destroyer
Amatsukaze
, skipper Hara Tameichi watched the
Ryujo
with increasing apprehension. Her flight activity appeared sluggish, seeming to confirm Navy scuttlebutt that the best aviators were never assigned to these older carriers. Everyone knew
Ryujo
had been spotted. Commander Hara (no relation to the admiral) had just wolfed down lunch when a half-dozen B-17s appeared. They missed. Meanwhile Fletcher had launched Harry Felt’s air group against
Ryujo
at 1:45 p.m. On the Japanese side, fighters were preparing to launch when Felt’s
Saratoga
planes appeared from the southeast.
Ryujo
stood little chance. Quickly hit by four bombs and a torpedo, the carrier’s starboard engine room flooded. The vessel leaned to expose her waterline. Though fires were extinguished, she had no power. The inclination increased until
Ryujo
heeled over and sank. No Allied aircraft witnessed this, so the Americans launched a repeat strike, finding nothing. Only a month later, in late September, did U.S. intelligence report the
Ryujo
as sunk. They never knew for sure until intercepting an early 1943 notice striking the vessel from the Imperial Navy list.

With
Saratoga
’s strike in progress,
Enterprise
scouts discovered the Nagumo force an hour later. Some of “Big
E
’s” scout bombers dived on cruiser
Maya.
Two others, about to attack lesser warships, suddenly saw carriers in the distance. They shifted to Captain Arima Masafumi’s
Shokaku.
Lieutenant Ray Davis and Ensign Robert C. Shaw piloted the Dauntless aircraft that went after Arima at 3:15 p.m. The
Shokaku
, newly equipped with radar, actually detected the planes, but ignored the warning until lookouts also spotted them. At the last minute Captain Arima turned his vessel, and the American bombs were near misses, one barely a dozen yards away. It had been an awfully close call.

The Japanese made frantic efforts to locate Fletcher’s carriers. That morning two JNAF scouts got close to Task Force 61, but its radar-directed fighters blasted them before they could report. The Nagumo force dispatched a morning search of nineteen “Kates” and seven “Jakes” while readying an attack wave. Japan’s carrier admiral had learned some things from Midway. But the snoopers found nothing. A later floatplane from cruiser
Chikuma
finally discovered Task Force 61. It too was shot down—in the middle of transmitting, before sending the position. Sharp staff work by Nagumo’s air officer and navigation specialist estimated Fletcher’s location by computing where the scout must have been along its allotted course. The
Kido Butai
immediately began launching—this rapidity was another Midway lesson. Indeed,
Shokaku
was doing that when the Americans bombed her. She sent up eighteen Vals and nine Zeroes led by Commander Seki Mamoru. The
Zuikaku
contributed six more Zeroes and nine Vals. Nagumo hastened a second strike, led by Lieutenant Takahashi Sadamu, totaling twenty-seven Vals and nine Zeroes from both aircraft carriers.

Reports of Nagumo’s carriers reached Fletcher with
Saratoga
’s air group away for its attack on
Ryujo
, and half of
Enterprise
’s bombers still completing searches. The
Saratoga
managed to field a small group of seven bombers and torpedo planes, and another unit of twelve TBF “Avenger” torpedo planes for the repeat attack on
Ryujo
. They never found Nagumo, but attacked Vice Admiral Kondo’s group instead, inflicting some damage on the seaplane tender
Chitose.

At 3:36 p.m. Admiral Fletcher approved Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s recommendation to catapult the available
Enterprise
planes. She put up thirteen Dauntlesses to attack
Ryujo
. But the carriers needed more Wildcats for combat air patrol. The task force was completing its fighter launch when Commander Seki’s strike wave appeared on
Enterprise
radar. Defense went to the fore. The aerial melee failed to prevent Japanese pilots from pressing home their attack.
Shokaku
planes concentrated on
Enterprise
, while
Zuikaku
’s bombers went after the
Saratoga.
Interceptors followed the JNAF planes right into the hail of the American AA fire. Lieutenant Elias B. Mott, an
Enterprise
gunnery officer, recalled, “We were completely unable to see the planes, due to the fact that they were so high and so small, and that it was late in the afternoon and the sky was considerably bluer than it would have been earlier.” At 4:44 p.m., one of the Japanese dive-bombers connected, putting a 550-pound bomb through the “Big
E
’s” number three elevator. Two minutes later another bomb holed her flight deck. More dive-bombers scored near misses, one so close it dented the side of the carrier. The planes headed for
Saratoga—
obscured in a squall—attacked battleship
North Carolina
instead. Only thirteen Japanese planes returned, but
Enterprise
was out of commission. She could not attack.

Lieutenant Takahashi’s second wave missed the Americans. Pursuit into the night by Admiral Kondo’s surface ships did not catch Fletcher. The
Saratoga
emerged
untouched. On the
Enterprise
, skillful damage control restored ship handling. Refugees of “Big
E
’s” Air Group 10, foiled in attacking
Ryujo
because they could not find her, flew to Henderson, where they would fight alongside Marine air. The vessel herself would be
hors de combat
for weeks.
North Carolina
and a destroyer suffered minor damage. The Japanese incurred the loss of light carrier
Ryujo
, and damage to
Shokaku
,
Chitose
, and a few other vessels, but seventy planes were destroyed and precious aircrew killed. American aircraft losses were just twenty-three. Fletcher’s task force steamed south to refuel. In his roundup to Admiral King, Nimitz reported, “INTERCEPTS INDICATE TWO CARRIER GROUPS GENERALLY NORTHEAST OF MALAITA AND LAST NIGHT WITHIN 150 MILES OF THAT PLACE.
RYUJO
IN WESTERN GROUP DAMAGED AND REPORTED BURNING FIERCELY.
SHOKAKU
AND
ZUIKAKU
IN EASTERN GROUP…DURING THE NIGHT 7 DDs SHELLED CACTUS.”

Meanwhile, at about noontime Admiral Nagumo had detached Rear Admiral Abe Hiroaki’s Vanguard Force with its battleships. Both Abe and Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake—his Advance Force also with battlewagons—dashed for the reported position of Fletcher’s carriers. Late that day they actually reached the place where the
Enterprise
had been damaged, but by then the Americans had retired and there remained no game for the hunters. Kondo and Abe turned back, marking the end of Japanese offensive action at the Eastern Solomons.

The worst happened with Admiral Tanaka’s convoy the next day. Lousy weather kept Rabaul-based bombers from Henderson, and a destroyer bombardment (by five ships, not seven) was ineffectual. Now the Cactus Air Force showed its mettle. Major Mangrum’s Marines and
Enterprise
’s Navy dive-bombers were up with the dawn. The half dozen floatplane fighters that Captain Takeda Kakuichi sent from his
Sanuki Maru
and the
Sanyo Maru
to patrol over the convoy never saw the Americans. Cactus planes damaged a destroyer searching for
Ryujo
survivors. Five Marine Dauntlesses broke out of the clouds above Tanaka’s flagship, the
Jintsu
, and dived on her. Second Lieutenant Lawrence Baldinus put his bomb into the light cruiser’s bow, impacting between the two forward guns. Tanaka takes up the story: “A frightful blast which scattered fire and splinters…spread havoc throughout the bridge. I was knocked unconscious, but came to happy to find myself uninjured. The smoke was so thick that it was impossible to keep one’s
eyes open…. I stumbled clear…and saw that the forecastle was badly damaged and afire.” Fortunately sailors flooded the forward magazines before any ammunition cooked off, but twenty-four were killed, and necessary repairs would take five months. Tanaka shifted his flag to destroyer
Kagero.
In the meantime U.S. Navy dive-bombers went after aviation ship
Kinryu Maru
, the biggest transport in the convoy, and holed her too. Destroyers and patrol boats stood alongside. As they worked to rescue the soldiers and crewmen, B-17s arrived overhead and plastered the sea with high explosives, wrecking destroyer
Mutsuki.
Both ships sank. Admiral Tanaka withdrew his battered force to Shortland. Combined Fleet canceled the operation. It would need some new formula.

THE WAY IT WAS

Now came expedients to rush Japanese soldiers to their destination. Before Tanaka even reached Shortland, he got instructions from Tsukahara to send some troops forward on destroyers. Hours after the warships left, Eighth Fleet directed him to recall them. Furious, Tanaka perhaps felt the world was mad. It was the third time his superiors had issued conflicting orders. Tanaka could not understand why Tsukahara and Mikawa, both at Rabaul, could not coordinate. But it turned out more was involved. Confusion also resulted from the advent of General Kawaguchi’s 35th Infantry Brigade. Admiral Mikawa had sought to leapfrog part of it while arranging to move the rest. The Cactus Air Force frustrated that initial reinforcement with thirteen Dauntlesses that sank a destroyer and damaged two more. Guadalcanal had begun to cost dearly. Capping these headaches, on August 29, the U.S. minelayer
Gamble
depth-charged Ueno Toshitake’s
I-123
and sent her to the bottom.

Kawaguchi paused briefly at Rabaul, then headed for Shortland to huddle with Tanaka. The latter had moved his flag to cruiser
Kinugasa
to utilize its more ample radio room. Aboard Tanaka’s flagship, Kawaguchi proposed sending most of his men to New Georgia on transports, proceeding from there aboard barges. Tanaka, with orders to use destroyers, was dumbfounded. Each consulted superiors.

Here, within weeks of the Watchtower landings, were proposals for both methods that would sustain Japan’s war in the Solomons. The basic parameters
were determined by airpower, at that time the Cactus Air Force. A destroyer that left Shortland before noon and steamed at speed could be off Guadalcanal by midnight and well on her way home by dawn. With its surface ships vulnerable to planes, the Imperial Navy had either to move reinforcements quickly, exiting the Allied air umbrella before daylight—hence the use of destroyers—or stealthily in small packets—thus barges (and in due course, submarines for small supply shipments).

By trial and error the Navy evolved tactics to operate in the face of enemy airplanes. Both methods were used. The destroyer operations were called “rat” (
nezumi
) sorties, the barge voyages “ant” missions. General Vandegrift and his Marines quickly appreciated these Japanese tactics, and began calling warships offshore the “Rat Patrol” or the “Cactus Express.” As journalists began using the term, some wag of a censor, anxious to preserve Guadalcanal’s code name “Cactus,” changed that to “Tokyo Express.” Thus was born one of the best-known phrases of the Pacific war.