Kursk Down (6 page)

While a man of his rank did not take sides, he must have wished the
Kursk
luck in her final hunt. Demonstrating the ability to defend an aircraft carrier against a determined submarine attack was fine. However, Russia only had one carrier on active service. With operating expenses for a carrier so high, it was a miracle they still had one afloat. The Navy did have submarines, though. So a successful sub attack on the carrier was, politically, a far better outcome.

A submarine sinking a carrier would show that the Russian Navy was capable of protecting the homeland. More, it would demonstrate that carriers were not as vital to modern naval warfare as most believed. If, that is, the enemy was confronted with vessels as deadly as the
Kursk
. The ability to nullify the usefulness of the West’s aircraft-carrier-based fleets was a blow struck at the heart of their tactics.

It would be unfair to aid Captain Lyachin in some way. Lyachin was a highly capable man and needed no assistance. Even so, one could hope for the most beneficial outcome.

By rules of the simulated war games, Captain Vladimir Kasatonov and the crew of the
Peter the Great
would consider themselves in hostile seas and under potential attack from 1130 hours to 1800 hours. At the end of that time frame, all precautions would be dropped and they would stand down, with the exercise completed.

The
Kursk
, as an additional safety measure, would then depart her defined attack area, break radio silence, and report to Fleet Command.

The procedure was straightforward. The
Kursk
was not to leave its perimeter during the operation and could not attack until the
Peter the Great
entered the prescribed zone.

If everyone followed the rules, the program was safe. Still, as any military man knew, there were dangers in coordinating huge submarines and ships in close proximity.

To make matters worse, American, NATO, and Norwegian vessels were also operating in the area. The Russians maintained a running tally of all foreign assets deployed for observing their activities. The result clearly demonstrated the interest other nations were taking in the Russian games. The U.S. had two subs, the USS
Toledo
and the USS
Memphis
, working near the maneuvers. And there was a U.S. TAGOS electronic surveillance ship, USNS
Loyal
, gathering underwater acoustical data, about 200 miles away. A Norwegian research vessel, the
Marjata
, also in the hunt, had similar capabilities. Finally, they had traced the British submarine, the HMS
Splendid
, as well. Five spies on and under the water plus more eyes in space and a sea floor dotted with hydrophones to catch their every move. That degree of attention was irritating. Then again, if the
Kursk
’s attack was successful, it would certainly be a demonstration of Russian submarine capability.

The most critical part of the exercise would start in a matter of hours. As an experienced submariner Admiral Popov could easily have pictured the activity inside the
Kursk
. Concentration. That was the watchword. The crew needed to focus attention on every detail, especially in the first compartment torpedo room. The tin fish were dangerous.

0848 Hours—Aboard the Kursk

In the Combat Control Center, Captain Lyachin would have been busy, taking reports from his many section chiefs. In just a few minutes he had to meet the requirements of the maneuvers orders by making a mandatory position and status report. At 0851, the
Kursk
contacted the onshore Northern Fleet Operations Center. After providing the necessary information, Lyachin formally requested permission to load and fire a training torpedo. The reply from the Ops Center was again
“Dobro!”

Armed with this permission, the crew had two and a half hours before the 1130 start time for the exercise. While the torpedo room party made final preparations, Lyachin directed the sub to patrol his assigned 300square-mile area. He ordered the
Kursk
south, to the extreme edge of his sector, as a navigation proficiency problem. Running in combat patrol mode, the boat then turned to the northwest. On this leg, the vessel slowed to a speed of about eight knots, ran as silently as possible, and ascended to a depth of 60 feet.

After extending the periscope, Lyachin must have ordered the radio antennas for communications as well as their satellite global positioning system raised. And as an added precaution, he utilized the snorkel air intake to fill their high-pressure air tanks. If they had to surface fast, compressed air could instantly be shot from these reservoirs into the water ballast tanks. The “blow” would eject tons of water in seconds, giving the mighty sub greater buoyancy and popping her to the surface. With those preparations complete, Lyachin held course. Next, he posted a visual watch to spot their targets, which at this point were moving toward the designated war zone.

1058 Hours—Aboard the Peter the Great

The
Kursk
’s request to Northern Fleet HQ to load and fire a torpedo had been quickly relayed to Admiral Popov and his group. The “enemy carrier” understood. Captain Lyachin was moving the
K-141
into an attack mode.

With the mock combat about to begin, a
“Vse po mestam!”
(battle stations!) signal was given. This set fullalert scanning of all radar, sonar, and other electronic submarine-detection devices into motion. Designed with submarine hunting as part of its total mission package, the cruiser was well equipped for that purpose. Her position, still some 30 miles from the engagement zone, meant she was over-the-horizon from the
Kursk
. So they had no visual contact with the now-hostile sub.

As part of the antisubmarine warfare activity, missiles were readied for launch. And the flotilla of ships surrounding the
Peter the Great
tightened their defensive screen. Actual firing could take place at specified times.

Admiral Popov, according to reports, was annoyed by the incessant NATO, British, and American scrutiny of their activities. Especially bothersome was the daily presence of a Norwegian Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion airsea patrol plane. As the spies were in international waters, there was little the Russians could do about this intrusion into their operations. A few were probably tempted to try their new Anti-Sub Warfare Vodopad missiles on the Americans. A near miss, perhaps? Just to show them their positions were known?

1103 Hours—Aboard the USNS Loyal

In addition to using its full array of onboard sonar gear for monitoring Russian activity, the
Loyal
’s crew had expanded their ship’s capabilities. Besides a towed array of underwater detection devices, they had released free-floating sensors that enhanced their information-gathering/processing techniques. After two days of intense activity, technicians on board were functioning at peak efficiency. Keeping a respectable distance from the action, they were intercepting all manner of radio communications.

1104 Hours—Aboard the USS Memphis

Following standing orders, the
Memphis
had taken station for a regular duty tour in the Barents Sea. As a matter of course, the United States maintains two submarines in this area year round. For the war games, a third submarine, the British
Splendid
, had been brought in to perform added reconnaissance duties.

Having so many Russian vessels together in a relatively small zone offered an irresistible intelligence opportunity. One of the most useful surveillance sources for submarines is a library of digitally recorded sounds of individual ships and undersea boats moving through the water. The noise from a given vessel is unique to that vessel. So each electronic “fingerprint” can be automatically accessed and matched against real-time incoming sonar data. These data profiles allow accurate identification, which, in turn, provides information on the combat capabilities of the ship or submarine in question.

During the
Kursk
’s Mediterranean cruise, her distinctive sound pattern had been captured. This allowed operators on the
Memphis
to single her out from background disturbances and readings from other boats. Trailing the
Kursk
from a safe distance became a relatively simple matter.

One submarine tailing another while underwater is a dangerous game. According to Russian reports, during the years between 1967 and 2000, there were 11 documented collisions between Russian subs and those of other nations. Eight of those incidents took place in Northern Fleet test areas. The most recent accidents occurred in the early 1990s. The USS
Baton Rouge
, a Los Angeles-class boat, crashed with a Russian Sierra-2-type boat in February 1992. Both subs were severely damaged. Then in March 1993, the USS
Greyling
collided with a Russian Delta-3 class. Again, both suffered significant damage.

In order to prevent such incidents, and to keep U.S. submarines out of the Russian firing ranges, parameters had been established for proximity to other vessels. These mandated a safe margin of distance while still allowing for continuous observation.

1105 Hours—Aboard the Kursk

The practice torpedoes were in their loading racks and one would be transferred into its tube and made ready to shoot when directed. The captain had to be mentally focused on the tactics and countertactics of the mock attack. Like the rest of the crew, he undoubtedly craved action. Orders were orders, though, so for a while longer it was a waiting game. And waiting was hard.

Visual and electronic scans of the assigned sector still indicated no sign of the
Peter the Great
and her protective cordon of ships. Yet all on board the
Kursk
knew they were coming and what a reception they were going to get.

1109 Hours—Aboard the Peter the Great

Prepping a missile before a shoot is a complex procedure involving three separate teams. The launch party conducts the actual liftoff. While the projectile is in flight, the control party directs its attitude, altitude, speed, and path through the air. The target designation party has the responsibility for precisely defining where the warhead should strike. Bringing all these elements together takes time. If a single person involved in the process is even a little out of practice, the entire operation is drastically slowed. Rehearsal on dry land with simulators is not a strong substitute for performing the tasks on a moving, rocking ship. And sea time had been cut.

Due to this handicap and other equipment difficulties, the missile parties, by some reports, took longer than anticipated to set up their shots. So they found themselves in a serious situation.

Operations orders contained a specific time schedule. They were now an hour past the stated deadline. No one wanted to say why they were behind. And no one was eager to take the blame.

Being late for launching was especially troubling because the delay occurred on the operation’s flagship. Worse, it happened while the Northern Fleet commander was on board. If at all possible, the missile launch had to be completed. Fear of repercussions for not firing could have become stronger than the need to follow the exacting exercise time schedule.

1120 Hours—Aboard the Kursk

The real game of undersea stalking and evasion began the instant a sonar operator on the
Kursk
reported being pinged by the fleet’s massive sonar sweep. This first detection triggered a counteraction to determine the location of the vessel originating the ping. Within seconds, hunter and hunted knew each other’s positions. Moving through the pitch-black sea at a depth of 90 feet, the
Kursk
immediately took evasive action. The submarine swung onto a course that would take them away from the approaching flotilla. Staying within the boundary of their assigned patrol sector, they slipped toward the zone’s western edge. The idea must have been to disengage, run, hide, and then attack from a new direction.

Captain Lyachin must have decided that he wanted to intercept the
Peter the Great
at the earliest time allowed by the rules of the exercise. If all went well, he would shoot his torpedo just moments after the approved 1130 engagement hour. The apparent strategy was to attack quickly to surprise their opponent.

It was now imperative the
Kursk
remain undetected. Rigged for silent running, the submarine came to an almost full stop, holding at 90 feet below the surface. Lyachin maintained only enough momentum to give them seaway to maneuver in the slow current. He then ordered ballast adjustments to keep them exactly level in the water, and they waited.

1127 Hours—Aboard the Peter the Great

Reports indicate that in spite of the standing operations orders, commands were issued, and firing sequences for three missiles were started. With an ear-straining roar, the first Vodopad-type weapon blazed into the air, leaving behind a white cloud of smoke and steam. Then one more, tail spouting red flame, punched through the remnants of the earlier launch and disappeared into the deep blue sky.

The third missile, also equipped with an antisubmarine-warfare exploding head that would allow it to seek out a target lying submerged at a shallow depth, was released moments later.

Later comments claim that Captain 1st Rank Sergey Ovcharenko and his associates followed the path of the last Vodopad and watched it drop into the sea.

1127 Hours—Aboard the Kursk

An emergency warning klaxon, reverberating like an electronic car alarm gone berserk, was the first sign of a problem. Shocked, those in the Command Center must have been frozen in place as the first compartment torpedo section leader’s voice came yelling over the intercom.

One of the liquid propellant torpedoes was leaking. Everyone instantly understood the danger. There was no time to think. Trained action was required. The faulty weapon had to be loaded into a tube. While this was being done, Lyachin reportedly requested immediate radio contact with Northern Fleet HQ. Russian Navy rules called for jettisoning the torpedo as quickly as possible. This one, however, was probably no practice weapon. It was a live combat model and the
Kursk
was in relatively close proximity to other fleet vessels.