Lethal Trajectories (49 page)

Mustafa took a swig of water and paused before adding, “What I am most troubled about is what I see as a weakening of our protectorate relationships with Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. We know, for instance, that all three are selling more oil on the black market than called for by our agreement. We also know that Kuwait has not been able to completely evict the Western military forces from their northeastern territories. These forces have emboldened our so-called allies, and they have become more defiant. Withdrawing our armored forces to our borders has not helped the situation, and I am concerned.

“Your Excellency,” interjected General Jabar in an uncharacteristically aggressive manner. “Would it make sense to drop a dirty bomb on one of Kuwait’s smaller oil fields as a lesson to others to not deal with our enemy?” The others waited, nervously, for Mustafa to respond.

“General,” said Mustafa, “I have been thinking myself along those very lines, and I think it might be a good idea. Do we have any available dirty bombs, and can we deliver them effectively?”

“Yes, King Mustafa, we do,” answered Ali Jabar, a wide grin on his face. “Surely such a move will convince our erstwhile allies that the infidels can not protect them from our wrath.”

“I would like to think about this, my brothers,” Mustafa replied thoughtfully, “but we must seek ways to regain the initiative and get back on course both inside and outside our borders. We can not let our plans for global jihad die through inaction.”

Though it had been a somber meeting, General Ali Jabar was relieved that Mustafa had not probed further into the death of Al Mishari.
No one will ever know of the things I unwisely told Al Mishari. Still,
he rationalized,
if I had not brought him into the loop, we would not have had the radioactive material we need for the dirty bomb I hope we’ll drop on Kuwait. As for Al Mishari, he is a thing of the past.
Or so he thought.

A
electrifying sense of excitement filled the crowded Situation Room as the NSC team arrived for the 9:00 a.m. meeting. The addition of several top military officers added to the speculation already fueling many hushed conversations. Unlike recent meetings, called all too often in
reaction
to a crisis, this gathering had a proactive tone.

Only a handful of people—most of them in the room—had been advised of the defection of Major General Aabid ibn Al Mishari and the treasure trove of information he was providing. The implications for Operation Steel Drum, the plan developed for the liberation of Saudi Arabia, were clear. The buzz of conversation stilled as everyone rose to their feet at the arrival of the president and his chief of staff.

“My friends,” the president said with determination in his voice, “for almost six months now we have planned diligently for the liberation of Saudi Arabia. We’ve amassed our forces throughout the Persian Gulf and gathered every scrap of intelligence we could find. King Mustafa’s dirty-bomb shield has been the only barrier to our operation. We now believe that we have the ability to take that shield out, and today’s meeting will be geared to activating Operation Steel Drum.”

Clayton could sense the excitement as he thought,
This is like the ninth inning of the seventh game of the World Series—everything is on the line.

“I’d like to start with a briefing from the CIA,” the president continued. “Tony, what’s the latest on the Al Mishari debriefing?”

“Thank you, Mr. President. It is no exaggeration to say that Al Mishari has literally given us the keys to the kingdom. He was privy to top security secrets, and for months he collected vital information to provide to us when the time was ripe. We have good reason to believe that Al Mishari’s defection is authentic, based on a deep disappointment in the regime and triggered by his superior officer’s refusal to intervene in the execution of his niece by stoning.”

A murmur ran through the room, and Clayton, thinking about his two daughters, wondered,
What went through that poor woman’s mind as she was trapped in the ground, waiting to be hit by the stones that would snuff out her life?
He shivered at the thought.

“Al Mishari claims to be one of only four people who knew the exact placement of the dirty bombs, the defenses around them, and the frequency codes to detonate them,” Mullen continued.

“With his departure,” asked an Army general, “why wouldn’t the Saudis just change the sites and frequencies?”

“Good question, General. For those who don’t know: to avoid any suspicion of a defection, Al Mishari ingeniously concocted an escape that was made to look like his F-15 fighter-bomber exploded in midair over the Persian Gulf. Our operatives reported that Al Mishari’s bailout was precision-perfect with nothing left to suggest his survival. This guy was no slouch behind the stick. It seems that Al Mishari’s commander, General Ali Jabar of the RSAF, shouldn’t have shared that information with him in the first place. Any change in their emplacements would require Ali Jabar to admit to his security breach—an act that would most surely lead to his immediate execution. As a precaution, Al Mishari gave us the satellite coordinates and advised us on the protocols to identify whether a location change is being made. We’ve seen no activity.”

The three- and four-star officers in the room nodded their heads in admiration of Al Mishari’s professionalism.

“That accounts for the locations, Tony, but what about the defense systems protecting the emplacements?” asked the president. “Surely they must be well guarded.”

“We asked that same question, Mr. President, and Al Mishari told us that once he made his decision to defect last November, he set out to learn everything he could about the dirty-bomb defenses. Access to these facilities was not a problem because his commander ordered him to visit all sites and report back to him. They were apparently searching for any excess radioactive material they could find to build more bombs. While there, he found the facility commanders all too eager to brag about their defense capabilities, and he found weaknesses in every site. He believes that all of the sites can be taken out, if approached properly.”

Jack McCarty asked, “Even if our forces were to penetrate the sites, wouldn’t the Saudis be able to electronically detonate the dirty bombs as soon as they were approached?”

“We believe our electronic warfare boys can jam all signals in and out of the facility without disrupting communications elsewhere. As a point of reference, after heavy convoy losses in our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq due to wirelessly activated IED bombs, the R&D boys at DARPA went to work on electronically jamming communications in a highly concentrated area—like within a hundred-meter diameter—without disrupting other communications. It’s called “PREW” technology, which stands for Precision Electronic Warfare. Anyway, long story short, with the right coordinates, frequencies, and beaming devices, we can jam Saudi communications with pinpoint accuracy. Al Mishari has given us the information we need to prevent detonation signals from ever reaching the dirty bombs—thus neutralizing them.”

“Al Mishari also showed us how to dismantle the dirty bombs—which are pretty plain vanilla in design—and our Navy Seal and Special Forces demolition teams are practicing the techniques as I speak. Further, he has strongly recommended we take out communications in the command post in Riyadh as an added fail-safe precaution. We are now targeting this site for electronic warfare; we’ll use a converted B-2 stealth bomber flying at 42,000 feet near Riyadh to jam signals.”

“One other detail, Mr. President,” Mullen continued, “and it’s important. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991, the Saudis recognized how vulnerable they were. As a defensive deterrent, they extensively mined their oil infrastructure with conventional explosives. The idea was to render their oil fields inoperable for an extended time, leaving little but sand for any would-be conquerors. Some explosives may still be in place, and we could have some collateral damage to the fields. Unlike dirty bombs, however, damage from conventional bombs could be quickly repaired.”

“Thanks, Tony,” said the president, fascinated by the intelligence and countermeasures proposed. “What else did Al Mishari tell us?”

“He literally mapped out the Saudi order of battle: their troop dispositions, fortified lines, defense plan, air and ground assets, and most important, he outlined how to penetrate the secret base in the southern desert where four atomic bombs are in storage. He also confirmed our intelligence reports that most of the Saudi armored units deployed earlier in the protectorates of Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE had been pulled back and redeployed along the borders.”

“Thanks Tony. Now, Thurmond, would you and your team go over the main battle plan for Operation Steel Drum?”

“Yes, Mr. President, glad to do so,” SecDef Thompson eagerly replied.

“As you know, we’ve been building up our land, sea, and air forces in the Middle East over the past half year, and we’ve worked closely with the Brits, China, and others in the effort. Combined, they’ll be contributing the equivalent of seven divisions to the effort. Our forces alone are more than enough to do the job, but if there’s one thing we learned from the Iraq War, it’s that there has to be a sufficient troop density to occupy the territory after the battle is won so that security can be maintained.”

Clayton recalled his many discussions with Lin Cheng on postwar security in Saudi Arabia. The 2003 Iraq War taught them the folly of disbanding an entire army and putting tens of thousands of angry young soldiers out on the street, jobless and packing weapons. By taking out a couple of layers of the officer corps and disbanding the elite Royal Saudi units, they could maintain internal security by channeling those soldiers into a military police force. China also agreed to supply security forces under UN direction.

“Are our forces ready, Thurmond?”

“They’ve been in a high state of readiness for some time, Mr. President, and they can launch an attack within 96 hours—four days,” Thompson declared with obvious pride.

“How will this dovetail, from a timing point of view, with the preliminary dirty-bomb demolition movements Tony has just described?” Clayton asked.

Secretary Thompson brought up a map of Saudi Arabia on the wall screen. “Mr. President, in keeping with Operation Steel Drum, six hours prior to the main attack a number of preparatory actions will take place. It will start with a major electronic jamming effort over key Saudi oil fields, in the Riyadh Control Center, and the nuclear facility in the south Saudi desert. We are confident that we can take out their ability to detonate the dirty bombs remotely as well as disrupt general communications.”

Thompson gestured to the map and continued, “Within minutes of this effort, a large number of Seal and Special Forces teams will be dropped on the preassigned targets in these locations. They’ll eliminate local security forces, and the specially trained dirty-bomb disposal teams will go into action. We’ll also send additional teams in to dismantle any conventional explosives. With respect to the nuclear facility in the south, we’ll air-drop several companies of the 101st Airborne Division to capture the nukes and establish a defensive perimeter. We risk early detection, but we can’t let those nukes fall back into their hands.”

Excitement mounted as the screen played out the inexorable movement of allied troops in a twenty-first-century blitzkrieg. Clayton nodded and then recognized the feeling of the slight tic in his right cheek that usually signaled extreme tension.

Thompson continued, “Now, with the dirty-bomb disposal operations well underway and communications cut off between the central command in Riyadh and their key military units, we’ll launch a massive aerial bombardment. Our top three priorities will be taking out any cruise missile sites or platforms capable of launching dirty bombs, crippling the Saudi Air Force, and eliminating their command and control structure. British fighter-bombers will concentrate on troop formations, military installations, and supply depots. We’ll use smart bombs to avoid collateral damage to the infrastructure. In terms of sheer concentrated firepower, it will be the most powerful military attack ever launched. We anticipate the morale and fighting ability of Saudi forces will be severely degraded by the airstrikes.”

The president, though captivated by the presentation, seemed perplexed.

“With no airpower,” Thompson continued, “and a command and control system in ruins, they’ll be unprepared for our ground actions. If you’ll refer to the screen, I’ll highlight the three attack points from eleven, one, and three o’clock around Riyadh.”

“The force and fury of the attack will make the ‘shock and awe’ attacks of the Iraq War look like child’s play. Within minutes, the broken Saudi forces will be faced with a three-pronged armored juggernaut coming from the northeast out of Israel, north out of Kuwait, and east out of Bahrain—all pushing for Riyadh at breakneck speeds. The Bahrain force will also send armored columns south to cut off Saudi forces stationed near the borders of Qatar and UAE, and they will meet up with the troops of the 101st Airborne Division guarding the perimeter of the nuclear facility. A small diversionary attack will be made south of Jeddah near the Red Sea to tie down forces there. We expect to reach the suburbs of Riyadh within twenty-four to forty-eight hours, leaving them little time to organize an effective defense of the city.”

Clayton thought about the hours of difficult negotiations with Jordan that had gained permission for American forces to cut across their territory from Israel to attack the Saudis. The Jordanians had no love for Mustafa, and they had finally agreed, provided that Israeli forces were excluded from the operation. Kuwait, though technically a protectorate ally of Mustafa’s, agreed to look the other way as long as Mustafa was prevented from dropping a dirty bomb on their oil fields.