My Share of the Task (77 page)

“decided to declare a total war”:
“Leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq Al-Zarqawi Declares ‘Total War' on Shi'ites, States That the Sunni Women of Tel'afar Had ‘Their Wombs Filled with the Sperm of the Crusaders,'” Middle East Media Research Institute, September 16, 2005.

wounded in that day's blasts:
Casualty figures are from “Iraq Timeline 2005,” Council on Foreign Relations,
October 13, 2005.

nihilistic revenge
on a wide scale:
In his July 2005 interview with Al Jazeera, Maqdisi said, “My plan is not to blow up a bar or a movie theater. My plan is not to kill an officer who tortured me. My plan is to restore the nation to its glories and establish the Islamic state for all Muslims” (Brooke, “The Preacher”). Zarqawi acknowledged these criticisms in his July 5 audiotape: “Some of those [
ulama
] want us to stop our Jihad in Iraq, claiming that the Jihad in Iraq is merely a Jihad which causes harm to the enemy but is not a Jihad that can lead to the establishment of Islamic government, and therefore there will be those who reap the benefit of this Jihad and achieve power at the expense of the blood of the Jihad fighters” (Yehoshua, “Dispute in Islamist Circles”).

three hotels in Amman, Jordan:
Michael Slackman and Suha Ma'ayeh, “Attacks at U.S.-based Hotels in Amman Were Minutes Apart,”
New York Times
,
November 9, 2005.

The deadliest attack:
Hassan Fattah and Michael Slackman, “3 Hotels Bombed in Jordan; At Least 57 Die,”
New York Times
,
November 10, 2005.

an Iraqi
from Anbar:
“Bomber's Wife Arrested in Jordan,” BBC,
November 13, 2005.

mingling quietly with the partygoers:
“Jordan Says 3 Iraqis Linked to al-Zarqawi Carried Out Amman Bombing,”
New York Times
, November 13, 2005.

unable to set hers off:
Fattah and Slackman, “3 Hotels Bombed in Jordan.”

on hotel
luggage carts:
Ibid.

claimed responsibility for the attack:
“Al Qaeda Explains Amman Bombings,” Middle East Media Research Institute,
December 8, 2005.

in and around those buildings:
Cordesman,
Iraq's Insurgency
,
94. Cordesman notes elsewhere in his volumes the links that began surfacing between jihadists captured in Europe and Zarqawi, such as the eighteen suspected Ansar al-Islam adherents picked up in Germany and the “Chechen-trained group” in Paris arrested in 2002 (ibid., 161).

throughout
Jordan, Iraq, and Syria:
Hussein, “Al Zarqawi, Part 2.” The Arabic name for this greater Syria region is “Bilad al-Sham.”

forbade Salafists from praying there:
Lake, “Base Jump.”

“was an unintended accident”:
“Al Qaeda Explains Amman,” MEMRI.

“This is our Achilles' heel”:
Dana Priest reports that upon touring our screening facility at BIAP, I commented, “This is how we lose.” Dana Priest and William M. Arkin,
Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State
(Little, Brown, 2011), 248.

“information was reported”:
“TF 6-26 Update,” FBI e-mail retrieved from “Documents Released Under FOIA,” American Civil Liberties Union website, June 25, 2004.

each time we acted:
The
New York Times
reported that on December 9, 2004, a Pentagon spokesman said four SOF personnel had been given “administrative punishments” for “unauthorized use of [a] Taser.” Thom Shanker, “For Abuse of Detainees, Military Disciplines 4 in Special Unit,”
New York Times
,
December 9, 2004.

help spur civil war:
Stathis Kalyvas makes the case that given how infrequently insurgents control cities (preferring rural areas), the inability for the United States to “pacify” cities (like Samarra or Ramadi) from 2003 to 2005 was an indicator of far too few troops spread too thinly around Iraq. Stathis N. Kalyvas,
The Logic of Violence in Civil War
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 133.

from or around the sites:
Additional details regarding Named Area of Interest 152 came through interviews with four task force members involved in intelligence.

90 percent Sunni population:
Multi-National Force–Iraq, “Operational Update,” February 23, 2006.

before his disappearance
:
Robert F. Worth, “Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq,”
New York Times
, February 23, 2006.

seven o'clock that morning:
Ibid.

Thousands of men:
Ellen Knickmeyer and K. I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq,”
Washington Post
,
February 23, 2006.

backs of flatbed trucks:
Worth, “Blast at Shiite Shrine.”

torched or strafed with bullets:
Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, “Toll in Iraq's Deadly Surge: 1,300,”
Washington Post
,
February 28, 2006.

a thousand Iraqis:
Ibid.

bag used to suffocate them:
Ibid.

teams landed at NAI 152:
Additional details, including the exact times and casualties at NAI 152, come from interviews with members of the task force, including a senior intelligence official.

bound for Baghdad's streets:
Interview with task force member involved in intelligence.

knew something was awry:
Significant details regarding the interrogation of these detainees came from extensive interviews with multiple task force members.

eighteen thousand detainees:
Michael O'Hanlon and Ian Livingston, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, January 31, 2012, 12.

aliases was Yusif al-Dardiri:
Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Maliki Aide Who Discussed Amnesty Leaves Job,”
Washington Post
,
June 16, 2006.

“en route to that objective”:
Quoted in Sean Naylor, “SpecOps Unit Nearly Nabs Zarqawi,”
Army Times
, April 28, 2006.

raising al-Masri's profile:
On May 16, 2006, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Hadley, Rice, Negroponte, Pace, Abizaid, Ambassador Zal Khalilzad, and Eric Edelman on this subject: “Have received a proposal from George Casey and John Abizaid recommending that we make some adjustments in the current $25 million reward for Abu Musab al Zarqawi (AMZ). Their goal is to try to marginalize AMZ in the eyes of the Iraqi people by reducing his stature and forcing him to act to regain it, with the thought that this might increase his visibility and vulnerability.” He sent a second memo on May 24, 2006, outlining how it would be publicly announced. Both have the subject “Reward for Zarqawi” and are available from the Rumsfeld Papers website.

CHAPTER 13: HIBHIB

auditorium inside the Green Zone:
Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraqis Form Government, with Crucial Posts Vacant,”
New York Times
, May 21, 2006.

group of Sunnis storming out:
Ibid.

Nouri al-Maliki:
Details of Maliki's biography are drawn from “Leader Profile: PM Nouri al-Maliki,” Islamic Dawa Party website, 2012.

both interior and defense:
Filkins and Oppel, “Iraqis Form Government.”

abducting and killing them:
See the description detailing these actions in Dexter Filkins,
The Forever War
(Vintage Books, 2008), 315–18.

a thousand corpses:
Bobby Ghosh, “Why Iraqis Aren't Cheering Their New Government,”
Time
, May 20, 2006. Iraq Body Count breaks down Baghdad deaths by month and similarly finds 1,066, 1,315, and 1,090 Baghdad deaths in February, March, and April, respectively. “Iraqi Deaths from Violence 2003–2011,” Iraqi Body Count website, January 2, 2012.

The Exorcist:
The movie begins in northern Iraq (Mosul), so it became a joke with Mubassir that Mosul was the source of evil in the world.

below the operational tempo:
A close participant estimated that the squadron hit thirty-two targets in twenty-one days.

eighty thousand Iraqis:
Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” May 26, 2006, 41.

victims of the city's bombs:
Louise Roug, “Baghdad Morgue Reports Record Figures for May,”
Los Angeles Times
, June 4, 2006.

that Sunday,
June 4:
The best estimate is that the squadron positively identified Abd al-Rahman on Sunday, June 4, though it may have been on June 3. Several interviewees remember strongly that the event occurred over the weekend but cannot recall whether it was on Saturday or Sunday.

The next morning:
The events of June 7 are based upon my recollection as well as multiple interviews with participants at all levels of the task force.

Al Qaeda enjoyed alarming
support:
Around this time frame, the
New York Times
accurately labeled the area “one of the most violent in the country.” Sabrina Tavernise, “Gunmen in Iraq Execute 20 Bus Passengers,”
New York Times,
June 4, 2006.

together in banana crates:
Roug, “Baghdad Morgue Reports Record.”

take their final exams:
Tavernise, “Gunmen in Iraq Execute 20.”

what we've been waiting for:
We ran kinetic-strike profiles on every building that we would potentially strike. Any time we sent troops to an objective, we ran kinetic-strike approvals so that if things went bad, we already had a head start on the approval process. This was no different. As Rahman stopped at this location, the squadron fires NCO ran the kinetic-strike numbers to the Combined Air and Space Operations Center for a Collateral Damage Estimate.

At 4:55
P.M.
:
Multi-National Force–Iraq (Major General William B. Caldwell IV), “Iraq Operational Update” (briefing), June 15, 2006.

had been improperly worded:
When the JTAC had told the pilot he was “cleared to engage,” he provided one type of authorization that was incorrect and resulted in the abortive bombing run. He should have authorized the run by telling the pilot he was “cleared hot.” “JFIRE Multi-service Tactics Techniques and Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower,” Air Land Sea Application Center, December 2007, 56.

second hit the house:
MNF-I (Caldwell), “Operational Update,” June 15, 2006.

out of his
nose and ears:
Multi-National Force–Iraq (Major General William B. Caldwell IV), “Iraq Operational Update” (video), June 26, 2006.

air sacs in his
lungs:
Zarqawi's autopsy and means of death were discussed in the MNF-I press briefing on June 12, 2006.

Five other bodies:
MNF-I (Caldwell), “Operational Update,” June 26, 2006.

Zarqawi
gurgled blood:
Multi-National Force–Iraq (Major General William B. Caldwell IV), “Iraq Operational Update” (briefing), June 12, 2006.

Zarqawi was dead:
Time lines emerge from Caldwell's June 12 and June 15 press briefings.

minutes after 3:
30
A.M
.:
Multi-National Force–Iraq (Major General William B. Caldwell IV), “Iraq Operational Update” (briefing), June 8, 2006.

announcing Zarqawi's death:
John F. Burns, “Leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq Has Been Killed,”
New York Times
,
June 8, 2006.

“Although the designated leader”:
“Statement by U.S. Forces in Iraq,”
New York Times
,
June 8, 2006.

parliament dropped their vetoes:
“The killing of Mr. Zarqawi brought immediate political results in the form of parliamentary approval, immediately after the news conference, of Mr. Maliki's nominees”
(John Burns, “U.S. Strike Hits Insurgent at Safehouse,”
New York Times
, June 8, 2006).

relieved to see him go:
Lawrence Wright, author of
The Looming Tower,
wrote in
The New Yorker
following the strike, “Among those quietly celebrating the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi last week, no doubt, were Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of Al Qaeda, who have watched their nominal ally wreck the standing of their organization among Muslims around the world” (“The Terrorist,”
New Yorker,
June 19, 2006). Some commentators went further. Michael Scheuer, who ran the CIA's Alec Station during the late 1990s, claimed that killing Zarqawi had been a strategic error—that our enemy was making such grand mistakes we should not have interrupted him. I find this untenable.

“fight the apostate infidels simultaneously”:
Nibras Kazimi, “Zarqawi's Anti-Shi'a Legacy: Original or Borrowed?”
Current Trends in Islamist Ideology
, August 2, 2006, 53–54.