Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (43 page)

The British were also not likely to press charges "against former Axis agents," among whom the report included Haj Amin el-Husseini. The report recalled that his involvement with the Axis preceded his radio career in Berlin. In Baghdad between 1939 and 1941, Husseini was in contact with Italian and German agents and pro-Axis Iraqi leaders who seized control of the Iraqi government in the coup of April 10, 1941. The OSS estimated that he received about $400,000 from Italy and Germany, more than $75,000 from the Iraqi government, and a monthly stipend of $4,000 from the Iraqi secret services. These funds helped him "to organize his Palestinian collaborators into an efficient anti-Allied machine which helped foment, and actively participated in, the Iraqi revolt of May 1941."11

The report discussed the participants in the 1941 coup. Some reached Axis territory and worked on Axis propaganda.12 Others escaped to neutral countries and were a liaison between the Mufti in Berlin and his supporters in Palestine. Six were arrested by the British in 1941 in Iran and deported to Southern Rhodesia because they were considered dangerous, the most important being Jamal al-Husayni. The British arrested seven others but considered them "harmless" and permitted them to return to Palestine on condition that they not "misbehave themselves."' 3 In 1944, when confidence in an Allied victory led the British Mandate government in Palestine to relax restrictions on political activity, some members of this group played key roles in the early days of postwar Palestinian politics. Musa al Alami had studied law at Cambridge University, had practiced law in Palestine since 1923, and was on friendly terms with leading British officials in the Middle East. In 1944 he became the Palestine member of the Arab League Council and was charged by it to create Arab propaganda bureaus in Washington, London, Cairo, and Jerusalem. Also in the group was Tawfiq Salih al-Husayni, who took the initiative to reorganize the Palestine People's Party (PAP). He became its acting president until his brother Jamal was released from British interment in Rhodesia. The PAP put "constant pressure" on Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab countries to request that Britain release the five pro-Axis Palestinians interned in Rhodesia.

The OSS officials thought that neither the British nor the French were likely to indict Husseini on war crimes charges.

Even in the early years of the war, when Palestine itself was threatened by invasion, British officials did nothing to discredit the Mufti and his co-workers. This inaction on the part of the Government has given rise to the feeling among Palestine Arabs in general that nothing will be done in the future. Consequently, the Palestine Arab Party, which derives its political power almost exclusively by virtue of its association with Haj Amin, has been endeavoring to canonize him as a martyr among the masses. Nearly every public rally is made to assume the character of a demonstration demanding the Mufti's return; even road gangs in Palestine are alleged to work to the refrain of"Haj Amin, sayf al-Muslimin" (Haj Amin, sword of the Muslims). Under these circumstances, it is hardly likely that, even if the British should be anxious to bring these former Axis agents to trial, they would care to risk antagonizing Palestine Arab public opinion by such a move.

The probability, therefore, is that the Mufti will eventually be allowed to resume his pre-war status in Palestine. Since he is not likely to become less intransigent either toward the British or the Jews, his return may be expected to contribute nothing to the overall solution of the Palestine problem.14

This prescient OSS analysis underscored the continuity between wartime mentalities and the founding period of postwar Palestinian politics. For the Mufti's followers in the PAP, his wartime activities remained a source of pride, not shame.15

The OSS report crisply synthesized developments in Iraq. Between March 1940 and January 1941, during the eleven-month premiership of Rashid Ali Kilani, the foundations were laid for the overthrow of the government. By May 1, Kilani had signed a secret treaty with Italy and Germany, declared war on Britain, and begun to expel the British from Iraq. Within a month, the British intervened and suppressed the revolt. Kilani, his cabinet, and leaders of the regime fled to Iran, where they found refuge in the German Embassy. When the Soviet Union and Britain occupied Iran in August 1941, Kilani and some of his associates were able to escape to Turkey and then to Italy and Germany. The leaders of the revolt were tried in absentia by a court martial in Baghdad (November 1941 to January 1942), which passed death sentences on Rashid Ali, Ali Mahmud Al-Shaykh (minister of justice), Unis al-Sab'awi (minister of economics), three colonels of the "Golden Square" revolt, and Amin Zaki Sulay- man (former chief of the Iraqi General Staff). In 1944, the Iraqi government sentenced one of the conspirators to death and four others to prison terms ranging from three months to five years. There was "no indication in Iraq of strong public feeling against" what the OSS called "the three leading Iraqi war criminals," Kilani, Younis Bahri, and Salah al-Din al-Sabbabh. Bahri had been a newspaper editor before the war. He became the leading Arab announcer on wartime Berlin radio.'6

The OSS report also described wartime support for the Germans among the "Mellium Iran" (Iranian Nationalists) movement, which included military leaders, members of parliament, and other prominent Iranians. In August 1943, the British arrested the principal Nazi agent in Iran, Franz Mayer, as well as 137 Iranians suspected of supporting the Axis powers. Those detained included three generals, an ex-prime minister, and a supreme court judge. In February 1945, 88 were still in custody. The OSS thought there was reliable evidence against most of the detainees. Both the British and Soviets thought that Iranian judicial officials were corruptible and that many internees had influential relatives or patrons able to influence the verdict in favor of the accused. The analysts wrote that when the British and Soviets thought it was safe to do so, the internees would be released, presumably without trials.17 Public sentiment in Iran also presumed their innocence. In Iran as throughout the Middle East, the spectrum of opinion about the actions of pro-Axis Arabs and Persians ran from indifference and apathy to support.

The German officials who had worked with the pro-Nazi exiles in Berlin did not do too badly after the war. Indeed, they played key roles in the reconstruction of the West German diplomatic corps dealing with the Middle East. Wilhelm Melchers was asked to assist the Adenauer government in organizing and staffing the new Foreign Ministry. In 1951, he became the director of its office dealing with the Middle East. From 1953 to 1957, he directed the German legation in Baghdad and Amman and was the German ambassador to Iraq from November 1956 to May 1957.18 From 1946 to 1948, Kurt Munzel, the former director of the Orient Office, completed a doctorate in Islam studies and Islamic and Semitic philology at the University of Erlangen, later teaching Arabic and Turkish there (1947-49); in 1949 he was an assistant at the Orient Seminar of the University of Cologne. In 1983, he published a phrase book for Arabic in Egypt. Like Melchers, he was called back to the reemerging West German Foreign Ministry in 1950. From 1951 to 1953, he worked in the ministry's Office III with responsibilities for the Near and Middle East. He worked in the German Legations in Baghdad (1953-55) and Amman, Jordan (1954-55), and returned to work in Cairo in the German Legation (1955-61). He was promoted to the rank of German ambassador to the Congo (Leopoldville, 1961-64) and to Lebanon (Beirut, 1964-65) before returning to the Foreign Ministry in Bonn in 1965.19

In the first months after the war, it became clear that the revelation of the scope of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe was not bringing about a reassessment of the Palestine issue among Arab and Islamic radicals. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt took a leading role in articulating the continuing intransigence, promoting "Balfour Day;" which had become an annual occasion of protest in the region against the Declaration. Despite the efforts of Britain's Royal Navy to prevent further Jewish immigration after the war, about 70,000 Jews managed to get to Palestine between August 1945 and May 1948.20 As the Jews sought to realize the dream of a state in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood took a leading role in opposition. On November 2,1945, anti-Jewish riots took place in Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, and Port Said; 12 people were killed and 250 wounded. A U.S. Naval Intelligence official reported that the members of the Muslim Brotherhood had "scattered all over the town on Thursday night exciting mobs in cafes to participate in the rioting on Friday morning." During the rioting, in the agent's view, it was "definitely established that students and other members of the Akhwan el Muslemin [Muslim Brotherhood] headed the hooligans and professional burglars (who carried their tools) to pillage Jewish property. The mob carried out indiscriminate breaking and ransacking." Government authorities received about one thousand complaints of theft and destruction from shop owners .21 The police were reportedly slow to respond to reports of rioting and destruction.

On November 3, 1945, U.S. Naval Intelligence agents in Port Said, Egypt, dispatched to Washington translations of two statements by Ikhwan al-Muslimin, one of which had been sent to the governor of the Suez Canal, the other to Egypt's prime minister. The first statement, with 106 signatures, regarded "the Palestine problem as an Arab and Islam problem." It noted "with extreme regret" the "unfair attitude now adopted by the United States of America as well as Great Britain siding with Zionism" although "they know exactly" that the Arabs "are the rightful side." The statement denounced the Balfour Declaration and "Zionist immigration" to Palestine and affirmed the Brotherhood's support for Palestinian youth who were "sacrificing their souls for the victory of the Palestine cause." The second, with 120 signatures, was a "Protest against the Jewish imperialism" and the Balfour Declaration. Ikhwan al-Muslimin was launching a "protest against the Jewish efforts at colonizing Palestine." Palestine was "an Arab state and should remain as such forever." The British Mandate over Palestine should end and be replaced by "an Arab Democratic government." Jewish immigration was to be "categorically prohibited and those who got into Palestine clandestinely to be evicted forthwith." "Political prisoners" should be "released, especially the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin El Husseini, and other leaders in detention." In addition, Jews should be prevented from entering Libya, Tunisa, Algeria, "and all Arab territories."22

On November 6, Lieutenant Commander Bernard A. Facteau, working in Naval Intelligence in Egypt, wrote what may be the first American assessment of Islamist violence and terror. His focus was on events taking place in Egypt, as well as in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, on that Balfour Day. "Anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic feeling ran particularly high in Egypt." Mass meetings by Arab and Islamic organizations "rapidly degenerated into rioting and disorder." He placed the number of total casualties at 9 dead and 520 injured. Property damage was especially heavy. Although the Egyptian prime minister deplored the violence and sought to minimize its importance, Facteau wrote, "The seriousness of these demonstrations must not be underestimated." They indicated that "the Arab World" was "slowly but effectively organizing" and that more violence could be expected if changes, presumably in Palestine, were "in any way prejudicial to the Arab cause."Yet Facteau also saw a wider significance to the anti-Zionist uprisings in Egypt: "While they were no doubt precipitated by traditional Arab fear and hatred of Jewish encroachment in the Middle East, they are apparently also part of a general pattern of anti-foreign sentiment on the part of Moslems which has manifested itself in various ways within the past few weeks. The growth and development of this anti-foreign feeling, fundamentally based on religious principles, is a dangerous symptom, and if it continues to spread throughout the Middle East, may well threaten the peace of the world.."23

During summer and fall 1945 the executive committee of the Palestine People's Party called for Husseini's return to Palestine. The PAP claimed that the Mufti had not collaborated with the Nazis but had only sought concessions from them in the event they won the war. In November, the Arab Higher Committee was reestablished. Husseini was chosen to be its president upon his return. Officials in the American Embassy in Cairo commented on the PAP's prominence. They regarded the party as "the most active political organization in the country and [one that] retains the allegiance of the vast majority of Palestinian Arabs. There can be no doubt that the party machine continues to cultivate all of the contacts which were built up during the primacy of the Mufti and that its propagandistic activities show initiative and skill." The PAP profited from "the great respect and esteem which Hajj Amin al-Husayni enjoys in all levels of society" and gave no indication that it wanted or needed unity with other parties or factions. It continued to be "the most extreme of all parties in its uncompromising fight against Zionism;" never accepted that Jews had any rights in Palestine, and was doing all it could "to have Jamal al-Husayni and Hajj Amin returned to lead the Arab cause."24 In November 1945, Palestinian Arabs knew Husseini both from his activities in the 1930s in Palestine and from his speeches on Axis radio during the war. His actions and beliefs were a matter of very public record. Yet, far from bringing his political career to an end, Husseini's wartime actions contributed to his appeal in the postwar years.

In winter and spring 1946, Islamist political extremism took its toll on Egyptian political life. On January 5, the political moderate Amin Osman Pasha, minister of finance in the Wafd regime from 1942 to 1944, was assassinated. Miles Lampson wrote that his death meant "the disappearance of the only man who was in a position consistently to influence [Prime Minister] Nahas Pasha in the sense of moderation as regards Great Britain." The murder was "a major misfortune for both countries."25 On March 1o, a grenade exploded in a Cairo cinema frequented by British soldiers and foreign and non-Muslim persons. Two people died and thirty-seven were injured.26 On June 12, assassins tried but failed to kill Prime Minister Nahas Pasha.27 Twelve students, between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four, were arrested and confessed to participating in the assassination of Ahmed Osman Pasha and the attempted murder of Nahas Pasha. That spring, demonstrators, including students from Al Azhar University and members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Young Egypt, attacked European shops and rioted against the British.