"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (59 page)

The residence restrictions on Poles and the compulsory concentration of Jews were followed by a range of travel and transport restrictions as well as curfews, which further limited the freedom of movement of the “non-Germans” and ultimately isolated them almost completely from the outside world. Curfews for Poles (and Jews) were introduced in all rural districts of the Annexed Eastern Territories,
¹⁹
justified by the authorities on the grounds of security policy requirements and the need to make any participation in public occasions for Poles an impossibility.
²⁰
No exceptions were tolerated, even for functions of minor importance.
²¹

In contrast, no uniform policy about the use of public transport by “non-Germans” was pursued in the Annexed Eastern Territories because of the varied “racial situation,” despite the advocating of uniform regulations by the RSHA. The Security Police authorities in Danzig (Gda
sk) and Breslau (Wrocław) in particular were opposed to such regulations because of the strong German-Polish mixed population in Upper Silesia and the mixed-race situation in the Danzig–West Prussia
Gau,
together with the impossibility of supervising such regulations.
²²
Only with respect to the Jews is any uniform policy evident, to the extent that the special legislation in force in the Reich, which prohibited Jews in general from using all means of transport,
²³
as well as from entering station restaurants, catering establishments, etc.,
²⁴
also applied in the Annexed Eastern Territories. However, Poles in the Warthegau were also subject to similar restrictions, which although totally absurd in economic terms were “correct” in terms of “racial policy,” because they rounded off the isolation of the local population from the outside world. For instance, “non-German” laborers without a pass
(Durchlaβschein)
were not allowed to return to the Warthegau, although this was an integral part of the Reich territory.
²⁵
Poles arriving were subjected to strict controls.
²⁶
Poles wishing to travel to the Altreich required a special permit, but this was no longer issued at all after 1942, even for urgent reasons (e.g., marriage), allegedly because of the difficult transport situation
²⁷
but in fact to prevent Poles from establishing contacts outside the
Gau.
Although it is possible to identify certain variations among the other restrictions on travel applied in the individual administrative districts (Posen, Hohensalza [Inowrocław], Łód
), taken overall they represented a relatively uniform network of measures, with clear parallels to the travel restrictions for Jews in the Altreich, as demonstrated by the following examples.

From the outset, the district and local police authorities in the Warthegau had decreed a variety of transport restrictions for Poles (subject to approval), which were subsequently replaced by uniform regulations. As early as summer 1940, the
Reichsstatthalter
had issued a directive that prohibited the use of public transport by “non-Germans” and allowed exemptions (e.g., travel to one’s workplace) only with police approval.
²⁸
This was followed by corresponding police regulations in the individual administrative districts,
²⁹
issued by the district presidents as the higher administrative and state police authority.
³⁰

However, in view of the traffic density caused by the already limited transport facilities and the heavy commuter traffic, these restrictions do not appear to have been particularly effective; the authorities were repeatedly admonished to supervise the travel regulations more closely because the “supervision of travel by non-German inhabitants of the Warthegau is an urgent political and Security Police requirement.”
³¹
Toward the end of the war, the conditions were tightened even further, to prevent both resistance activities and the exodus of refugees.
³²
Just a few months before, all males in the Warthegau between the ages of 16 and 65 had been banned altogether from traveling “to avoid population displacements”;
³³
the authorities had been given tighter guidelines regarding the issue of travel permits.
³⁴

Further restrictions followed in the
Reichsgau
Wartheland on the basis of the fundamental ban on travel (with possible exemptions). The issue of police rail travel permits was forbidden in particular cases or in general, to prevent Poles from traveling at all.
³⁵
In addition, Poles were permitted only to use the lowest class of rail travel from 1942 at the latest, and Polish civilian laborers were forbidden access to express and fast trains without exception; otherwise, “justified complaints from the German population were to be expected.”
³⁶
The use of omnibuses by Poles, even if they possessed permits, was essentially illusory, because only a few routes were actually operating and Germans always enjoyed priority.
³⁷
Furthermore, the
Reichsstatthalter
had ordered that for the whole
Gau
“the use of recreational craft on the Reich waterways between the Oder and the Vistula” or the use of “all motorized water craft” in the Posen district
³⁸
was prohibited. Even use of the tram system, although generally not subject to approval,
³⁹
was severely restricted for Poles in the Warthegau. Since 1940 Poles in the
Gau
capital of Posen were subjected to humiliating conditions, evidently based on the special legislative practice applied to Jews in the Reich and the General Government, partially or totally banning them from using the tram system, especially during peak periods.
⁴⁰

The Poles were seriously hindered in this way—or even excluded—from using urban public transport, but the authorities in the Warthegau eventually decided to attack the last means of transport open to the Poles, the
bicycle,
upon which the local population was ultimately dependent because of the restrictions on other forms of transport. On the grounds of eliminating illegal communications among the Poles, the use of bicycles was initially severely controlled or prohibited outright at the local level (the parish, the rural district) and later throughout the
Gau,
a measure that had not even been enforced against the Jews in the Reich. The forerunners at the municipality level
⁴¹
were then followed by a fundamental prohibition with provision for exemptions in the administrative districts via corresponding police regulations,
⁴²
typical for National Socialist legal practice, banning all use of bicycles in principle and requiring a special police permit (“bicycle permit”) for exemptions (given only for journeys of over two kilometers to and from the workplace and for professional travel on special occasions).

Of course, the issue of these bicycle permits, for which the local police authorities were responsible, was often turned over to the Gestapo, which proceeded with extreme pettiness, rejecting applications by Poles for the most paltry of reasons.
⁴³
However, it is doubtful that these prohibitions were enforced in full, because complaints about the unauthorized use of bicycles by Poles did not cease.
⁴⁴
That the prohibitions were not observed, at least in part, is demonstrated by the threat of severe penalties for violations and the appeals for increased alertness.
⁴⁵
In any case, it is certain that bicycle traffic was severely curbed and that as many bicycles as possible were seized from the Poles, since bicycles for which no permit application had been submitted or for which an application had been rejected were confiscated and surrendered to the local police authorities for “safekeeping.”
⁴⁶
Of course, this did not mean “safekeeping” in the traditional sense but essentially expropriation, because the bicycles were then put to use for “public” purposes and put at the disposal of “public welfare” institutions, for example, various Party organizations, for an indefinite period.
⁴⁷

The purpose of the segregation of the “non-Germans” from the Germans, the isolation of the “non-Germans” from the outside world, and the restriction of their freedom of movement was, of course, not only to meet Security Police requirements, to supervise the population more easily, or to better control “labor management.” This complex should be viewed more in the wider political context, and its significance can be properly understood only in this respect. In particular, these processes should be considered in conjunction with the mass deportations (resettlement) from the Eastern Territories that commenced in fall 1939. The particulars of these cannot be discussed in detail at this point, but they form the backdrop against which all restrictions on the residence rights of “non-Germans” should be viewed.

This applies in particular with regard to the Jewish population of the Eastern Territories, which was to be subjected to the phased residence restrictions set out in the anti-Jewish laws. In concrete terms, this entailed the herding of the Jews from the countryside to the towns and thence into ghettos, euphemistically termed “Jewish residential districts,” where they were to be prepared for their “deportation” to the East (the Final Solution).
⁴⁸
It is not the case that the policy of stipulating compulsory residence for the Jews was adopted by the SS and police leadership only at the Wannsee Conference; this had been the line taken from the outset. As early as September 1939, the head of the SIPO and the SD instructed all leaders of the “mobile killing units” (
Einsatzgruppen
) in a decree of September 21, 1939, to maintain the strictest secrecy about “anti-Jewish measures” and to proceed only “gradually” in the achievement of the “Final Objective” (the expulsion of the Jews);
⁴⁹
they were to concentrate the Jews in the towns “for the time being,” to consult closely with the civilian and military authorities with respect to all measures, and to report the latter on a continuous basis. Involved in the elimination of the freedom of movement of the Jewish population and its harassment
⁵⁰
was not only the SIPO, which in any case no longer regarded the Jews as human beings but merely as a “commodity” to be deported,
⁵¹
but also the general administration, whose decrees it was that created the conditions under which the deportations and “resettlements” could proceed, with all their horrific consequences.
⁵²
These were, of course, compounded by all the “normal” processes of harassment, such as the practice of forcing Jews to quit their homes to make way for members of the Party and the administration and sending them to camps in the countryside. As viewed by the National Socialists, however, this was no “resettlement” in the usual sense, because those affected were forced to sign a declaration that they were moving to the country “voluntarily.”
⁵³

The policy of resettlement and “emigration,” pursued by the departments of the RFSS/RKF in close cooperation with the general administrative authorities, affected not only the Jews but also the Poles.
⁵⁴
To implement this resettlement, the enormous machinery of the “Resettlement Centers” was established, reporting directly to the RFSS/RKF. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to view this resettlement as the work only of the SS, implemented independently, as it were, of the authorities of the interior administration, because the senior administrators (
Reichsstatthalter
) were representatives of the RFSS/RKF.
⁵⁵
Employees of the administration were used to establish the resettlement centers. At the local level, resettlement matters were the responsibility of the
Landrat
(Oberbürgermeister).
⁵⁶