Not on Our Watch (26 page)

In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (the west African regional organisation) tried alone to address these two interlinked crises and failed. However, when the broader international community—led by the United States and the United Kingdom—joined more closely in partnership with ECOWAS, both ugly wars were brought to an end.

In southern Sudan, the United States and Europe worked closely for a decade with the east African regional organisation IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) to broker a peace deal ending the two-decade-long civil war there. President Bush overrode objections within his administration to name a special envoy and chose former senator Jack Danforth, who helped bring the leverage of the White House to the process. It cost the US and UK taxpayers almost nothing and brought tremendous results for the people of southern Sudan.

As of mid-2006, President Bush’s advisors continued to resist naming special envoys for the crises in Congo, Somalia, and northern Uganda, but were divided on Darfur. In response to enormous pressure from Congress and key American constituency groups, the president finally named Andrew Natsios as his special envoy for Sudan. The resistance to naming envoys for these conflicts seemed to come from the officials in the administration who would feel diminished by such appointments, and by an attitude among many that Africans should solve their own problems. Of course we are not going to unilaterally solve these crises, but we can help facilitate dialogue leading to solutions, for pennies of the cost of humanitarian or military clean-up operations.

Diplomats can also do more to prevent atrocities by making use of the incredible amount of information available at their fingertips and engaging in preventive diplomacy. In 1994, policy makers clung to the line that they ‘didn’t have enough information’ to prevent or respond quickly to the Rwandan genocide. If it was difficult to imagine that in 1994, then it is completely preposterous today. The United States and other nations knew exactly what was happening in Darfur in 2003, yet, for a number of reasons (the counterterrorism partnership between the United States and the Sudanese regime foremost among them), they failed to take the necessary steps to put diplomatic pressure on the government of Sudan to end the killing, and continued to do so for the following three years.

International influence, creativity, leverage, and direct involvement, when utilised for good, can have profoundly positive consequences in resolving deadly conflict.

Where You Fit In

In response to a major advocacy push in the spring of 2005, we had our first three victories in the campaign to confront genocide in Darfur, after two years of policy gridlock. The Security Council finally authorised targeted sanctions on those committing atrocities in the region and referred the case of Darfur to the International Criminal Court for investigation into crimes against humanity. And in April 2005, Harvard University became the first university to divest all of its stock holdings in companies doing business with Sudan. It set off a slow but steady chain reaction all over the country, from universities to state pension funds.

Those were the first baby steps. All three happened because a growing chorus of voices in the United States was demanding more substantial action. However, as time went on, implementing those measures proved difficult. The Security Council didn’t have the courage to impose the sanctions it had authorised on any significant official in Khartoum, and the United States didn’t share information and intelligence with the ICC to help accelerate the process of gathering evidence necessary for indictments. Without creating a cost for the killing, it proved hugely challenging to convince these same killers in Khartoum to allow a United Nations force into Darfur to protect the civilian targets.

The strategic counterterrorism relationship between the United States and Sudan is probably the largest, though unspoken, factor in why there has not been a more robust global response to Darfur. As during the Cold War, the United States puts short-term strategic advance at the expense of long-term solutions. However, there is grass roots political pressure on the Bush administration to do something about Darfur, so the administration in Washington seems to want to do the minimal necessary to appear to be doing something effective. This cannot be allowed to stand. Only greater pressure on our elected officials will produce the kind of policy change necessary to stop the killing in Sudan.

In May 2005, the International Crisis Group and the Zogby International polling firm teamed up to conduct a public opinion survey of 1,000 Americans, to ascertain public attitudes toward Darfur and what the United States response should be. The participants represented diverse political views, religious beliefs, incomes, and ethnic backgrounds. Yet American public opinion is more united on halting genocide in Darfur—and preventing mass atrocities wherever they occur—than on many other foreign policy issues. An overwhelming 84% of respondents said the United States shouldn’t tolerate an extremist government like that in Sudan committing such attacks, and should use its military assets, short of committing United States combat troops, to help bring them to a halt. 81% supported tough sanctions on Sudanese officials who control the Janjaweed militias, 80% supported establishing a no-fly zone over Darfur to prevent the deadly bombing raids by the Sudanese air force, and 91% said the United States should work with the International Criminal Court to help bring to justice those accused of crimes against humanity.

Clearly, there is a strong constituency throughout the United States for doing more, which could be tapped and expanded. We are not alone.

After the 30 April 2006, Rally to Stop Genocide in Washington, DC, President Bush dispatched his deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick to Nigeria to work on the Darfur peace talks. After two years, the peace process was often drifting, but in less than a week Zoellick was able to help strike a deal between the government of Sudan and one of the three Darfurian rebel factions. He presented letters from President Bush to the rebel leaders, urging them to sign the deal. Although the deal was incomplete and ultimately inadequate, this episode demonstrated that when the United States chooses to really engage, we can make a huge difference. Unfortunately, in this case, the engagement was not sustained. Thus, the inadequacies of the deal were not addressed and the two non-signatory rebel groups didn’t come on board. Sustaining peace efforts is as important as launching them, as this example so aptly demonstrates, since the truncated and incomplete effort actually made matters worse in Darfur.

We need to build a network focused on practical, country-specific responses. It must be framed by a collective embrace of the international ‘responsibility to protect’ and of the imperative to prevent and resolve conflicts. The concept of ‘responsibility to protect’ demands more assertive action—including, when necessary, military intervention—in situations marked by mass atrocities. Instead of putting the onus of responsibility on outsiders to intervene, this new concept focuses on the importance of authorities to protect those who are being victimised, and if local actors cannot or choose not to do so,
then
external action is legitimised. Actions can include economic, diplomatic, or military measures. Though many governments accept this concept in principle, when actually confronted with a situation in real time, like Darfur, most come up with excuses or reasons why the activation of this responsibility to protect must be delayed. And the longer action is delayed, the more people die.

As Samantha Power writes, we need to create a political cost for ignoring these issues. Without that cost, people being victimised by mass atrocities will be totally subject to the will of politicians, which, absent strong support from constituents, almost always leads to nice speeches but no action.

We can use the Six Strategies for Effective Change: Raise Awareness, Raise Funds, Write a Letter, Call for Divestment, Join an Organisation, and Lobby the Government. With these tools, we can build the network, increase pressure on all governments to act quickly and appropriately, and ensure that the political costs for inaction will always be too great.

DON:

Tomorrow is 29 November, my birthday, and it is shaping up to be unlike any other. Starting today, I’ve travelled to the Big Apple to attend an International Crisis Group awards lunch at the University Club on 54th Street in Manhattan. They are honouring Paul Rusesabagina with one of the countless awards he has received since the movie’s release. Crisis Group is John’s baby and he is chuffed beyond words to have the two of us attending. When I arrive, he thanks me profusely, but I tell him not to sweat it; I’m honoured to be the one handing the beautifully engraved chunk of crystal to Paul.

The lunch goes off without a hitch, and Paul is his usual eloquent, erudite self, speaking as only he can about his experiences in Rwanda in April 1994. At the end of the ceremony, Paul is swamped by the guests, all wanting to have just a small audience with the man who has given so much inspiration and hope. I don’t blame them. In fact, I encourage them to crowd him, it gives me the opportunity to duck out of there and get back to the apartment my friend has been so generous to offer me while he is out of town. I’m on a writing deadline for a television version of the movie Crash and have a lot of work to do before tomorrow.

In the cab on the way back, I start running over all the Darfur-related events that have cropped up for me as of late. It is amazing what happens when you open yourself up to things. It’s similar to thinking of a band you like and then suddenly hearing their music everywhere you go, on the radio, in elevators and stores. Saying ‘Yes’ to Darfur was very much the same for me. People from all over and from many different walks of life began to come into my sightline, all concerned about what was happening, all looking for solutions to a problem spiralling out of control by the hour, hundreds of them writing to me on my website, looking for insight. We were all passionate, ready to throw our energies into whatever proposed plan could prove beneficial or effective, but our methods were often disparate and unconnected from one another’s. We were like-minded individuals, yet each of us was doing his or her own thing. I wanted more cohesion. My dream was to put together as many folks as possible that I had come in contact with over the last year or so, to see if we could form a collective to create an ideological wedge and then drive it into the Darfur problem rather than attacking it scattershot. Though my wife and kids might disagree, I thought it very fitting that the only date that all parties I contacted could converge would be my birthday. The New York location also made it a tricky ‘family pass’ to acquire, but everyone agreed that the opportunity to be productive on Darfur should not be squandered. The cake and special cards my daughters made would hold until I returned.

I wake up on the couch still in my clothes, the screen saver on the computer in front of me now scrolling through my photo album. It’s almost 11am, and I haven’t slept in this late since before I had kids. No matter now. I’ve got to hustle if I’m going to make it to this meeting on time.

Everything about this apartment rivals a hotel for its amenities, but right now I could use a doorman and his whistle. Even though Matt’s place is in a very cool neighbourhood near the NYU campus, and Giuliani’s ‘sting’ on racist cabbies in the city has garnered some success, I’ve still been posted up on this street corner for 20 minutes, in a suit mind you, very unsuccessfully trying to hail a taxi. I’m really not trying to be late today. After about the sixth cab passes me, I step off the curb, taking my life into my hands, and wave my arms like a madman at the next rusty-looking yellow dart zooming by. The tires make a reluctant sound, and the nose of the vehicle dips low as it screeches to a halt.

‘Are you crazy?’ the cabbie blurts out as I throw open the back door.

‘No. Are you? Or is there some other reason you weren’t going to stop? 24th Street and Madison Avenue.’

Now, I’m sure there was something more appropriate, more productive to say in this moment, but I’m pissed that it had to come to this, my risking life and limb for a ride, especially when it’s mostly brown people I’m getting dissed by. I know that it is a ridiculous assumption to make, but I am always looking for a greater measure of solidarity between we of the darker hues, no matter the original region from whence we came. Maybe it’s this kind of misguided belief that gives me the desire to help people in a land far away and has me hoping against hope that the people I’m meeting with today can actually realise progress where little has been made. But at this moment, ruminating on the potential promise this day holds, I’m feeling a little petty, headed to our peace summit front-loaded with animosity. A couple of blocks into our trek I try to strike up some small talk to smooth things over.

‘You been doing this long?’

It doesn’t work. My man isn’t in the mood.

‘I didn’t see you, OK? I would have stopped. I stop for everybody, my friend. I am not a racist!’

The remainder of our ride is nice and quiet save for the sounds of the city and the cabbies’ dispatcher breaking in over the radio every now and then.

15 minutes later the taxi pulls up to 11 Madison Park. Guilt guides my hand, and as I hop out, I reach into my wallet for the fare and a tip much more than fair. I add stupidly, ‘Great ride,’ really overboarding it now. The man barely nods, just pulls away in a hurry. I hope this little diplomacy bobble is not indicative of how the day will go.

Up ahead, Gayle Smith is standing next to John on the steps.

‘You been waiting long?’

‘Nope. You’re good. This is Gayle.’

‘Hi, Gayle.’

‘Hello. And happy birthday.’

We do a quick pleased-to-meet-you and head inside.