One Hundred Years of U.S. Navy Air Power (20 page)

After a score of such problems, Reeves startled his audience with a bold and unexpected declaration: “I do not know the answers to these questions and dozens like them any more than you do, but until we can answer them, we will be of very little use to the fleet. That means that we must become a school before we can become an air force.”
¹⁶

Reeves set out during his “concentration periods” to test in the air the theoretical answers to practical questions in his mimeographed pamphlet that he called his “One Thousand and One Questions.” It contained a list of the information that Reeves had decided must be gathered before his command could function effectively.
¹⁷

In the air his pilots would attack such problems as tactics and doctrine for dealing with air contacts. Specific task areas were assigned in Reeves' “Employment Schedule, for Study and Practical Development of Aircraft Tactics,” such as the one promulgated for the 12 June–11 September 1926 “concentration period”:

1.
  
When should “Control of the Air” be undertaken?

2.
  
How far and in what manner should efforts to gain control of the air extend?

3.
  
How proceed [
sic
] if “Control of the Air” is gained? If not gained?

4.
  
Considering the vital importance of “Control of the Air,” does our present Basic Air Organization provide sufficient fighting planes?

5.
  
Can we deny enemy planes Tactical Scouting?

6.
  
How can aircraft best aid surface craft during this phase?
¹⁸

Other major obstacles to operational success had to be overcome through innovation. Concerned that their extended time over target would make his bombers vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, Reeves and Lieutenant Commander Frank D. Wagner, the Commanding Officer of his fighter wing, devised what subsequently came to be known as “dive-bombing.”
¹⁹

Reeves knew from his own experience at Pensacola that high-altitude bombing could be effective only under ideal conditions and over a defenseless target. In his pamphlet of questions, he had pointed out the inadequacy of the bombsight, the difficulty of estimating air currents and density, and had asked, “How can we bomb more effectively?”

It was not an easy problem, but Lieutenant [Commander] Frank Wagner, Commander of the fighter squadron, finally solved it. If the bomber could get close enough to its target, he reasoned, there would be no room for errors—yet how could this be done before the plane itself was destroyed? For months Wagner struggled with the problem, while Reeves gave encouragement and advice. At first the pilots tried gliding down on their targets, with engines idling, and later on, with full power. Then in March [1926], Wagner quietly added a little more piano wire to the rigging of his plane, placed a 100-pound bomb under each wing, and started out on what was supposed to be a routine flight. Instead, he climbed to seven thousand feet in easy spirals, opened his throttle as far as it would go, and nosed over into a vertical dive at the field below. The airport crew watched, horrified as the plane rocketed toward them, and then scattered wildly. Somehow Wagner pulled out at the last moment, brushed over a hangar, and landed; he had risked his life, but found the answer.
²⁰

By also adopting a tactic of coming in toward the target from out of the sun, the bombers' steep vertical dive made them almost impossible to hit as they neared their targets. Moreover, the accuracy of 311 bombs dropped in the initial testing of these tactics in October 1926 was an astounding 44.5 percent on a target only one-third the length and ten feet shy the width of a typical cruiser.
²¹
When further refined, and with the entrance of the Dauntless dive-bomber into the fleet inventory, this combination of tactics resulted in one of the most lethal weapons systems of World War II.

One of the major challenges that confronted Reeves was gaining insights on and formulating a plan for the most appropriate types of aircraft composing the air wings. Controversies arose regarding such things as whether a single- or two-seat fighter was most appropriate; whether a future fighter should serve the dual purpose of being able to drop bombs as well as defend the carrier(s); the proper ordnance load for a bomber; and what type of engines and landing gear would best serve the purpose of a particular type of plane. Noting that
Langley
was at first equipped with biplanes and that the age of monoplanes had arrived, the design tradeoffs required a lot of speculation. Yet Reeves and his officers in Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet managed to keep abreast of design advances and provide timely and useful recommendations to the Bureau of Aeronautics. This ultimately led, by the start of World War II, to the inclusion of one squadron each of F4F-3 Wildcat fighters and TBD-1 Devastator torpedo planes and two squadrons of SBD-3 Dauntless dive-bombers on U.S. carriers each of eighteen aircraft. Though the two squadrons of Dauntlesses were in reality interchangeable, one was given the “VB” designation of bomber aircraft and the other the “VS” designation of scout aircraft. Thus the men of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet—even with primitive aircraft and a carrier of extremely limited space and capability in
Langley
—made a major contribution to the carrier air wing structure that proved so successful in the initial stages of the coming war.

Reeves was equally adept at manipulating the local population and the media to best advantage. During his time in command of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet he orchestrated a good number of “parades” of ultimately over 150 aircraft in a single formation and nurtured an aerial exhibition team of three pilots and their planes—against Navy regulations—that were unrivaled by the Army Air Corps. At almost every opportunity, particularly when a dignitary such as the Secretary of the Navy was present, Reeves unveiled his “air show” to demonstrate the capabilities of his pilots and their aircraft. Such shows usually concluded with a stellar performance by his de facto flight demonstration team and an exhibition of the dive-bombing techniques he had developed immediately overhead the observers. Similarly, Reeves employed the tactics developed by the
Langley
Air Wing at every opportunity to demonstrate the utility of both the carrier and its aircraft. Gradually those at the highest levels of leadership in the Navy began to take notice of the potential of the
carrier and it's Air Wing. Thus Reeves was at once a publicist for Navy aviation and its most powerful advocate.

An example of Reeves' acumen in driving home the utility of the carrier came in late 1928 when Vice Admiral Sir Cyril T. M. Fuller, Commander of the Royal Navy's American and West Indies Squadron, arrived in San Diego aboard his flagship, HMS
Despatch
, to discuss carrier developments. Fuller was truly impressed when Reeves told him, erroneously, that
Langley
—now fitted with a thirty-six-foot extension to the aft of her flight deck—could operate twenty-four aircraft, significantly more than the British under current practices.
²²
Reeves refused Admiral Fuller's request to walk
Langley
's flight deck and view the arresting gear that had been modified to do this and purposely withheld the true number of planes
Langley
could operate, stating to Admiral Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics later: “I did not tell Admiral Fuller that we operated not twenty-four, but thirty-six, and could operate forty-two and possibly forty-eight airplanes from the
Langley
.”
²³
This was made possible by an earlier push by Reeves to increase the number of aircraft onboard
Langley
in preparation for Fleet Problem VII by loading an almost impossible thirty-six aircraft on her deck in addition to those on her hangar deck. Again, this was a major innovation.
²⁴

The requirement to load a large number of aircraft on
Langley
's flight deck because of her small size ultimately led to the practice of “deck park,” which enabled newer and larger carriers such as USS
Lexington
and USS
Saratoga
to embark more aircraft than Japanese carriers of similar tonnage while still keeping space open on their hangar decks for aircraft maintenance functions.

Admiral Joseph Reeves' contributions to carrier aviation—as well as those to surface gunnery and design practices—are too numerous to chronicle here. They continued when USS
Lexington
and USS
Saratoga
were commissioned in 1927 and entered fleet service shortly thereafter.

By the time Reeves relinquished command of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet on 3 May 1929 the pilots and planes he had commanded on USS
Langley
, USS
Lexington
, and USS
Saratoga
had flown for 5,700 hours and covered 436,000 miles without incurring a single fatal injury to any of his flying personnel.
²⁵
Considering the primitive state of the aircraft flown, the small size and sizeable air wing of USS
Langley
, the pace of operations, and the danger inherent in experimenting with tactical innovations, this safety record was a phenomenal accomplishment. Moreover, perhaps more than any other aspect of Reeves' demonstration of the advantages of carrier aviation, this outstanding record of safety impressed those in decision-making positions of the viability of naval aviation as a primary aspect of the Navy's offensive lethality.

While Admiral Reeves was pioneering carrier aviation, others were at work too. Though advocacy for the carrier in an offensive mode saw ebbs and advances
through the prewar years, the Naval War College continued to establish operational methods, doctrine, and tactics for carriers and their Air Wings that emanated in large part from experience gained from the war games held there. Foremost among these were:

1.
  
Having two staffs for the Pacific Fleet—one of these would do the planning for the next major operation while the other was at sea executing the current operation. This shifting of staffs ensured that those executing the plan of action thoroughly understood every aspect of it.

2.
  
Advancing the notion that future generations of battleships and cruisers needed increased anti-aircraft capability. This was hugely important when USS
North Carolina
(BB-55) entered the Pacific Fleet in June 1942 because her vastly superior anti-aircraft gunnery preserved major fleet assets, including carriers, through the remainder of the war.
²⁶

3.
  
Settling on the characteristics of carriers to be constructed during the war. After
Lexington
and
Saratoga
were commissioned, a battle raged over the size of new carriers. Since available tonnage for new carriers was limited as a result of the Washington Naval Treaty, many advocated building smaller carriers. The result was the USS
Ranger
, which proved to be too small to be of any real use. Since
Lexington
and
Saratoga
weren't ready to participate in Fleet Problems until 1929, the debate continued until empirical evidence could be gathered. Thus the theoretical debate was conducted mainly at the Naval War College. The result was ultimately the greatly improved fighting characteristics of the
Essex
-class of carrier.

4.
  
Operating carriers independently rather than as an integral group in battle. This doctrine, which proved to be in error, was conceived so that carriers could take advantage of weather and cloud cover during battle for concealment. Admiral Jimmy Thach, who maintained until his dying day (as chronicled in the Naval Institute Press “oral history” manuscript he provided) that USS
Yorktown
would not have been sunk in the Battle of Midway if she had been operating in close company with
Enterprise
and
Hornet
.

So also were doctrine, operational procedures, and tactics advanced while conducting the twenty-one Fleet Problems and less frequent Grand Joint Exercises (GJE) during the interwar period in which the Navy tested, under real-world conditions, the theoretical doctrines and tactics generated at the War College.
²⁷
Much has already been said of how Admiral Joseph Reeves profited from ideas he tested in war games. Almost every aspect of carrier warfare was enhanced as a result of lessons learned in the Fleet Problems and Grand Joint Exercises pioneered by Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, Admiral Joseph Mason “Bull” Reeves.

Reeves' impact on carrier aviation didn't stop there. After leaving duty as Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet, Reeves was assigned to the General Board where his impact on Navy aviation continued. He was selected for this assignment specifically by Secretary of the Navy Charles F. Adams, a selection emanating from the secretary's favorable impression of a sixteen-page position paper Reeves had written in December 1928 rejecting Congress' fascination with the prospect of creating a single Department of Defense and a single American air arm, thus subjugating U.S. Navy aviation to another Service as had been done by the British. Though this idea died from lack of momentum in 1929, Reeves had significant impact on fleet issues in general—but particularly on Navy cruiser design requirements and aviation matters—throughout his assignment to the General Board.
²⁸

At the completion of his tour on the General Board, Reeves was offered his choice of duty as President of the Naval War College—a position he truly wanted after stepping down as Commander, Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet—or duty at sea returning to his old job as Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet. He chose the latter without hesitation and on 12 May 1930 was designated to relieve Rear Admiral Henry V. Butler as Commander Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet.
²⁹
There he further refined aviation tactics and doctrine, primarily during the continuing interwar Fleet Problems.