Ortona (24 page)

Men of the Loyal Edmonton Regiment rescue Lance Corporal Roy Boyd from the rubble of a destroyed building. Boyd was buried for three-and-a-half days.
— T. R
OWE
, NAC, PA-152748

Battle over, civilians and soldiers alike find walking through the streets of Ortona a difficult task.
— T. R
OWE
, NAC, PA-114032

One of the narrow streets through which the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada fought on the western side of Ortona.
— T. R
OWE
, NAC, PA-153938

A young woman hangs out washing in the ruins of Ortona on January 13, 1944.
— T. R
OWE
, NAC, PA-114040

Graves of Loyal Edmonton Regiment soldiers who died in the Ortona street battle.
— A
LEXANDER
S
TIRTON
, NAC, PA-115151

counter-barrage of artillery, Comfort imagined the infantry on both sides setting about their deadly purpose. “Men were emerging from deep hiding, like sullen beasts, shaken, baited, and desperate, crawling in cover in the vapour-filled valley, jockeying with death mid this fearful cacophony. What of those men? Were they battlewise and again secure in cover? Nothing, it seemed to us, could survive that fire as it tossed earth and trees high in the air. Yet down there were Canadian Engineers, ready to sweep the fords and get the bridge across; on their start line were the 48th, waiting for the quiet, ‘All right fellahs, let's go!'”
¹¹

The moment the artillery bombardment lifted, the leading companies of the 48th Highlanders of Canada and the Royal Canadian Regiment scrambled out of their slit trenches and disappeared into the shell smoke blanketing the battlefield. The 48th Highlanders descended from the ridgeline on a two-company front, advancing on line to the left of the destroyed bridge and the road running up from the valley bottom into San Leonardo. They followed roughly the same route taken two days earlier by Captain W.H. Buchanan's ‘B' Company of the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada. The Highlanders' orders were to occupy the same spur of land between San Leonardo and the hamlet of La Torre where, before being forced to retreat, Buchanan's men had destroyed many German positions. If successful, the Highlanders would control the western flank of San Leonardo. From this position, they would be able to blunt any attempt to use the road from La Torre as a path for reinforcing the San Leonardo garrison or for counterattacking the village once the RCR wrested it from German control.

It was customary for the Highlanders' company commanders to lead from the front, as officers had done in wars since time immemorial. On December 8, Captain Lloyd Smith of ‘D' Company and Major F.G. McLaren of ‘B' Company were consequently in the vanguard. Smith was so confident that he offered a five-pound bet to any taker that his company would cross the Moro without a single casualty.

Smith charged down a depression descending to the valley bottom, his men close on his heels. The company moved so quickly that it outran a sudden, heavy German mortar and 88-millimetre
antitank gun bombardment that slammed down on the valley's southern slope and marched methodically down the slope toward the river. The Panzer Grenadiers obviously knew an infantry attack was underway and hoped to break it up by shredding the advancing troops with shrapnel. Smith's company burst out of the depression, splashed through the river, scrambled up the other slope, and overwhelmed two lightly defended German positions in mere minutes. Had there been any takers for Smith's bet he would have lost. There was one casualty. Crossing the river, Corporal N.K. Thompson sprained an ankle, but was able to keep up with the rest of his section despite the injury.

While ‘D' Company went virtually unscathed, McLaren's ‘B' Company was less fortunate. Just before the river, an 88-millimetre salvo caught the trailing sections of his company. Six men were killed outright, another mortally wounded, and Company Sergeant Major Nelson Merry had his leg torn off. Stretcher-bearer Joe Kendel was killed when he rushed forward to tend the wounded. His hand mangled by shrapnel, Private Charles Palmer staggered back to battalion HQ to summon help. A Regimental Aid Post jeep with medical orderlies and the battalion padre on board raced to the scene to recover the wounded and dead.
¹²

Leaving the RAP men the task of sorting out dead from wounded, McLaren led the remainder of his company across the river and up a narrow gully running toward San Leonardo. Again there was virtually no infantry resistance offered by the Panzer Grenadiers. The defence seemed entirely dependent on concentrations of mortar and antitank gunfire. It was as if the Grenadiers, perhaps believing the Canadians would not attack the same point twice, had failed to reoccupy the defensive positions wiped out in Buchanan's earlier attack. The other possibility was a lack of communication between the two Panzer Grenadier regiments holding this section of the Moro River line. In the earlier attack Buchanan had discovered, and exploited, the fact that he had attacked the exact point where the 200th and 361st Panzer Grenadier regiments' defensive positions met. Such points always constitute weak links because of the difficulty of two regiments effectively communicating and coordinating defensive action. The Highlanders struck this same naturally weak point, already badly mauled by Buchanan's raid.

Trying to stay ahead of the enemy shelling, McLaren had no time to radio his situation to battalion HQ. This caused Highlanders commander Lieutenant Colonel Ian Johnston some anxiety as he waited anxiously for news that the initial objective was secure. Until his leading companies were both on their objectives, he could not risk taking the other two rifle companies forward.

At 1800 hours, just ninety minutes after going into the attack, McLaren's company reported that it was on the objective and had been contacted by a ‘D' Company patrol.
¹³
Both companies were digging in and would have their areas secure within fifteen minutes. At 1830 hours, Johnston led the other two companies over the Moro, following ‘D' Company's route and enjoying a similar lack of casualties. Once on the other side, Johnston located a deep cave that would serve adequately as a forward battalion HQ. He radioed 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade commander Brigadier Howard Graham at 2000 hours that his battalion controlled its objective.
¹⁴

Believing from confused radio traffic between Graham's HQ and the RCR that all was well with the right hook attack, Johnston sent a patrol to San Leonardo. He expected the patrol would find the RCR entrenching itself inside the small village. Approaching the small grouping of buildings, which were badly battered by days of intense artillery bombardments, the patrol leader called out, identifying himself as a 48th Highlander. This was met with a hail of machine-gun and rifle fire. Despite the fact that the machine guns gave off the distinctive high-pitched shriek of German automatic weaponry, the patrol leader still assumed San Leonardo must be in RCR hands. Undoubtedly the gunfire was coming from jumpy Canadians availing themselves of the firepower of captured German weapons. He called out again, eliciting the same result. Incensed at the perceived stupidity of the RCR troops, he withdrew and reported his findings to Johnston.
¹⁵

Unsure who occupied San Leonardo, Johnston could do little but wait for the morning. He conducted a tally of casualties and was relatively pleased to find that he had suffered only eleven dead and thirteen wounded in an always risky frontal assault against what had previously been a heavily defended position.
¹⁶
None of the casualties were officers, so command control in the morning should be excellent. One troubling factor about the casualties was the surprising number
of dead compared to wounded. Usually artillery and mortar fire injured far more men than it killed. In that sense, the Highlanders had been anything but lucky.

The 48th Highlanders' attack had been intended not only to secure a bridgehead on the western outskirts of San Leonardo but also to clear the river valley of enemy infantry. This would enable the Royal Canadian Engineers to build a bridge across the Moro River free of immediate enemy interference. It was imperative the RCE have a bridge ready by morning. If the engineers failed, the Highlanders' success would be for naught. Without tank support, the Highlanders and RCR would face the impossible task of holding ground against determined counterattacks by combined forces of armour and infantry.