Ostkrieg (99 page)

54
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 310–11; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 455–56; Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 267; Förster, “Securing ‘Living Space,' ” 1237; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 469. See also Cüppers,
Wegbereiter der Shoah;
Förster, “Das andere Gesicht des Krieges,” 155–57; Birn, “Zweierlei Wirklichkeit?”; Büchler, “Himmler's Personal Murder Brigades”; and Lozowick, “Rollbahn Mord.”

Himmler had returned to the Führer Headquarters the day before the meeting but was perhaps occupied by the news of the capture of Stalin's son.

55
.
TBJG
, 9 July 1941; Friedländer,
Nazi Germany and the Jews
, 2:204–5;
Völkischer Beobachter
, 24 July 1941; Herf,
The Jewish Enemy
, 110–11. See also Benz, “Judenvernichtung”; and Kaufman,
Germany Must Perish!

56
.
TBJG
, 24 July 1941, 3, 13, 19–20, 26, 29 August, 22 October 1941; Friedländer,
Nazi Germany and the Jews
, 2:205–7; Herf,
The Jewish Enemy
, 111–15; Benz, “Judenvernichtung,” 620–22; Boberach, ed.,
Meldungen aus dem Reich
, 31 July 1941.

Top Nazis seem to have come to believe their own propaganda about the Kaufman book or, more precisely, to have had their irrational, paranoid conspiracy fantasies confirmed. No longer merely a crank, Kaufman was elevated to a close personal adviser to Roosevelt and a decisive influence on American policy. Adolf Eichmann, e.g., suggested in his posthumously published memoirs: “Kaufman intended to bring about the complete extermination of our people. . . . It is probable that in our highest leadership circles, the Kaufman plan served as a stimulating factor for [our] own extermination plans.” This sense of a preventive measure fit well the Nazis' mind-set, which typically justified their own murderous actions as simply a response to the plans of others or as just retribution for past crimes. See Aschenauer, ed.,
Ich, Adolf Eichmann
, 177–78; Herf,
The Jewish Enemy
, 324 n. 87.

57
. Goering's authorization to Heydrich in Noakes and Pridham, eds.,
Nazism: A History
, 2:1104; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 315–16; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 460, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 470–71; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 149.

58
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 277–85; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 311–17;
TBJG
, 11 August 1941.

59
. Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 311–17; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 456–58, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 472–74;
TBJG
, 18–19 August 1941.

60
. Jersak, “Die Interaktion von Kriegsverlauf und Judenvernichtung,” “A Matter of Foreign Policy,” and “Decisions to Murder and to Lie,” 304–5; Meeting between Hitler and the Spanish ambassador, 12 August 1941, in Hillgruber,
Staatsmänner
, 1:624 (doc. 86); Tooze,
The Wages of Destruction
, 502.

61
.
TBJG
, 15–20 August 1941; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 318–23; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 407–8, 460–61, and
Hitler: Nemesis
, 960–61 n. 75; Gerlach, “The Wannsee Conference,” 777. For a more supportive view of Jersak's thesis, although with some reservations, see Arnold, “Hitlers Wandel im August 1941.”

62
. For a good English translation of the statistical report of Karl Jäger, see Klee, Dressen, and Riess, eds.,
“The Good Old Days
,” 46–58. It is also available on the Internet at “The Jäger Report,”
Einsatzgruppen Archives
,
http://www.einsatzgruppenarchives.com/jager.html
(accessed 2 October 2008).

63
. Matthäus, “Operation Barbarossa and the Onset of the Holocaust,” 277–85; Browning,
The Origins of the Final Solution
, 311–17, 353; Kershaw,
Fateful Choices
, 456–58.

64
. Halder,
War Diary
, 24–25, 27, 29–30 June, 2–3, 5 July 1941, 418–53; Bock,
War Diary
, 23–25, 27–28, 30 June, 1–2 July 1941, 225–35;
TBJG
, 15 July 1941.

65
. Quote in Lucas, ed.,
War on the Eastern Front
, 31–33.

66
. Klink, “Military Conception,” 257–85; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 99–118, 193–95, 254–69; Halder,
War Diary
, 29 June 1941, 432; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 50–51.

67
. Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 4–5, 8 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1020–21; Halder,
War Diary
, 8 July 1941, 458–59; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 197–98, 216; Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 569–70; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 51–52.

68
. Halder,
War Diary
, 8 July, 8 August 1941, 457, 503; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 200–201; Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 570, 586–87.

69
. Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 202; Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 581–88; Citino,
Death of the Wehrmacht
, 41.

70
. Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes,” 855–57; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 71–73; Glantz and House,
When Titans Clashed
, 71–72; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 48–49.

71
. Halder,
War Diary
, 6 July, 2 August 1941, 453–54, 493; Overmans,
Deutsche militärische Verluste
, 277–78; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 203; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 5 January 1942, 1, pt. 2:1120–21.

72
. Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 202; Halder,
War Diary
, 8 July 1941, 459–60; Reinhardt,
Moscow—the Turning Point
, 40.

73
. Halder,
War Diary
, 8 July 1941, 459–60; Reinhardt,
Moscow—the Turning Point
, 40, 61–62; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 203; Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,' ” 1085, 1127, and “From Economic Alliance to a War of Colonial Exploitation,” 219; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 202–3; Steiger,
Panzertaktik
, 160.

74
. Knappe,
Soldat
, 213; Haape,
Moscow Tram Stop
, 52–53, 55; Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 90–93.

75
. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,' ” 1118; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 204–5; Förster, “The Dynamics of Volksgemeinschaft,” 202; Kershaw,
War without Garlands
, 92–94.

76
. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,' ” 1107–13; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 205–6; Schüler, “The Eastern Campaign,” 205–10.

77
. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,' ” 1114–26; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 205–6, 210–12; Reinhardt,
Moscow—the Turning Point
, 146–47, 157 n. 61; Schüler, “The Eastern Campaign,” 210–13. Schüler notes that, in the autumn of 1939, the Reichsbahn had fewer locomotives and less rolling stock than in 1914 (Schüler, “The Eastern Campaign,” 206). See also Schüler,
Logistik im Rußlandfeldzug
.

78
. Müller, “The Failure of the Economic ‘Blitzkrieg Strategy,' ” 1117–26; Schüler, “The Eastern Campaign,” 212–13.

79
. Halder,
War Diary
, 26 July 1941, 487; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 207; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 94–96. The gnawing doubts, worries about the mood in Germany, frustration at the absence of a decisive victory, and a growing sense of crisis can be seen well in Goebbels's diary entries between 18 and 31 July 1941. Quotes from
TBJG
, 24, 31 July 1941.

80
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 532–34; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 98–101; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 77–78; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 198; Halder,
War Diary
, 9, 12 July 1941, 461, 467.

81
. Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 108–13. Van Creveld (
Supplying War
, 166–71, 175–76) argues that supply problems prevented a successful German advance. For an opposing view, see Stolfi, “Barbarossa Revisited,” and
Hitler's Panzers East
, 166–77.

82
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 534–36; Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes,” 865–69; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 114–17; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 77–78; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 66–69.

83
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 534–36; Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes,” 865–69; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 114–17; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 78–82; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 66–69; Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, 144; Halder,
War Diary
, 20 July 1941, 480–82; Bock,
War Diary
, 20–21, 23 July 1941, 255, 258, 260.

84
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 536–37; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 124–30; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 82–95; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 66–69; Bock,
War Diary
, 20–26, 31 July 1941, 255–69; Hoffmann, “The Conduct of the War through Soviet Eyes,” 869; Schüler, “The Eastern Campaign,” 212–13; Manteuffel,
Die 7. Panzer-Division
, 167–68.

85
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 536–37, 574; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 117–19, 130–35; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 83–84, 219 n. 24; Mawdsley,
Thunder in the East
, 66–69; Bock,
War Diary
, 1, 3, 10, 12, 14 August 1941, 270–81; Halder,
War Diary
, 26 July, 5 August 1941, 485, 497; Bock,
War Diary
, 25 July 1941, 262.

86
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 572; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 118; Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 84–85; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 55.

87
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 572; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 118; Megargee,
War of Annihilation
, 55; “Führerweisungen am 23. Juli 1941,” in Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 23 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1030–31; “Addendum to Directive No. 33,” in Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 236–37.

88
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 574; Kipp, “The Crisis of Successive Operations,” 118; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 207–8; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 23 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1033; Bock,
War Diary
, 25, 27–28 July 1941, 262–65; Halder,
War Diary
, 26 July 1941, 485–87.

89
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 574–78; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 207–8; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 25 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1035–40; Halder,
War Diary
, 26 July 1941, 485–87.

90
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 579–80; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 209; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 28 July 1941, 1, pt. 2:1040; “Directive No. 34,” in Glantz,
Barbarossa
, 237; Halder,
War Diary
, 30 July 1941, 490.

91
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 579–83; Leach,
German Strategy against Russia
, 209–12; Halder,
War Diary
, 1 August 1941, 491; Bock,
War Diary
, 5 August 1941, 273.

92
. Bock,
War Diary
, 2 August 1941, 271; Letters of 10 and 11 August 1941, in Buchbender and Sterz, eds.,
Das andere Gesicht des Krieges
, 77–78.

93
. Bock,
War Diary
, 7, 12 August 1941, 276, 281.

94
. Halder,
War Diary
, 4, 11 August 1941, 496, 505–6.

95
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 588–90; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 411; Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 12 August 1941, 1, pt. 2:1044.

96
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 590–91; Ueberschär, “Das Scheitern des Unternehmens ‘Barbarossa,' ” 153; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 411–12;
TBJG
, 19 August 1941.

97
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 591–93; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 412–14; “Sonderakte,” in Schramm, ed.,
Kriegstagebuch
, 20 August 1941, 1, pt. 2:1061; “Operative Gedanken des Führers und Weisungen am 21. August 1941,” in ibid., 21 August 1941, 1061–62; “Studie,” in ibid., 22 August 1941, 1063–68.

98
. Klink, “The Conduct of Operations,” 593–94; Wilt, “Hitler's Late Summer Pause,” 188; Kershaw,
Hitler: Nemesis
, 414–15; Halder,
War Diary
, 22, 24 August 1941, 514–16; Bock,
War Diary
, 22–24 August 1941, 288–93; Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, 198–202.